Hall  on  Insurance 
Adjustments 

FIRST  REVISED  EDITION 


By 

THRASHER  HALL 

Adjuster     M 


Copyrighted  1916 
By  The  Rough  Notes  Company 


The  f^gh  Notes  Co. 

Publishers 
Indianapolis,  Indiana 


INTRODUCTION 

TO 

"HALL  ON  INSURANCE 
ADJUSTMENTS" 

FIRST  REVISED  EDITION 


This  work  was  issued  from  the  press  in  1907, 
and  at  once  became  popular  with  adjusters  of 
fire  insurance  losses.  Its  noted  author  had  long 
maintained  a  high  reputation  as  a  skilled  and 
accurate  adjuster  and,  being  widely  known,  his 
work  soon  became  popular  with  adjusters  of  fire 
insurance  losses  and  it  was  regarded  as  an  au- 
thoritative work  in  all  the  forty-eight  states  in 
the  Union;  hence  the  necessity  of  its  revision 
much  sooner  than  was  anticipated.  The  con- 
flicting nature  of  insurance  codes  of  laws  of  so 
many  states,  new  laws  enacted  by  their  legis- 
latures and  rules  made  by  state  officials  imposed 
a  herculean  task  upon  its  author  in  his  work  of 
revision  in  order  to  adapt  it  to  the  exact  require- 
ments of  the  present  day — wholly  up-to-date, 
and  wholly  accounting  for  the  great  delay  of 
more  than  a  year  in  publishing  the  revision  after 
it  was  commenced. 

The  merit  of  the  work  has  been  greatly  en- 
hanced by  the  time  taken  by  the  author  in  mak- 
ing his  revision  as  of  to-day,  at  the  expense  of 
much  new  matter,  necessarily  considerably  en- 
larging the  book.  It  is  with  much  confidence 
that  the  publishers  are  putting  forth  the  first 
revised  edition  of  Thrasher  Hall's  work,  as  we 
believe  that  Mr.  Hall  has  exhausted  his  powers 
of  research  upon  it  and  would  not  allow  it  to 
be  published  until  it  satisfied  him. 

On  behalf  of  the  Publishers. 

545687 


INDEX 

TITLE  TO  CHAPTERS 


Chapter  Page 

I     Direct  Loss   7 

II     Cash  Value — Measure  of  Damage 25 

III  Notice  of  Loss 37 

IV  Proofs  of  Loss  and  Requirements  of  Assured 41 

V     Notary  Public's  or  Magistrate's  Certificate 49 

VI     Examination    Under    Oath    and    the    Production    of 
Books,  Invoices,  etc 53 

VII     Fraud  and  False  Swearing 59 

VIII     Options    65 

IX     Duty  of  Insured  to  Protect   Property  at  and  After 
the  Fire— Loss  by  Theft,  etc 75 

X  Fall  of  Building 79 

XI  Explosions    81 

XII  Waiver — Non- Waiver  Agreement    85 

XIII  Appraisal — Arbitration — Award    93 

XIV  What  is  Not  Other  Contributing  Insurance 137 

XV     Apportionment     of     Non-Current     Insurance — Vari- 
ous Rules  and  Examples 139 

XVI     Court  Definitions  of  Insurance  Terms 163 

XVII     Expert   Accounting  in    its    Relation  to   the   Adjust- 
ment of  Fire  Losses 191 

XVIII     Form  of  Proof  and  Statement  of  Loss  Actually  Ad- 
justed— Iron-Safe  Clause — Appreciation 219 

XIX     Facts  Worth  Knowing '. 229 

Topical  Index 255 

Table  of  Cases..  ..265 


"HALL  ON  INSURANCE 
ADJUSTMENTS" 


CHAPTER  I. 

DIRECT  LOSS. 

"Direct"  Defined. 

The  word  "direct"  in  a  policy  of  insurance  has  been  con- 
strued to  mean  merely  "immediate"  or  "proximate,"  as  distin- 
guished from  "remote." 

Ermentraut  et  al.  v.  Girard  F.  &  M.  Ins.  Co.,  63  Minn.  305,  65  N.  W. 
635.  30  L.  R.  A.  346,  25  Ins.  L,.  J.  81  (Annotated  in  56  Am. 
St.  481). 

What  Is  Direct  Loss? 

Where  the  contract  of  insurance  was  against  loss  by  fire  on 
goods  which  were  being  transported  by  a  steamboat  which  came 
in  collision  with  another  boat,  causing  a  fire,  and  the  boat  was 
sunk -before  the  goods  insured  were  injured  by  fire.  Held*,  That, 
if  means  and  appliances  were  at  hand  by  which  the  sinking  of 
the  boat  could  have  been  avoided,  and  the  intervention  of  a  new 
agency,  namely,  that  of  fire,  prevented  their  use,  then  the  fire 
was  the  proximate  and  immediate  cause  of  the  loss,  and  that  it 
was  a  question  for  the  jury  to  decide,  from  all  the  circumstances 
of  the  case,  what  was  the  proximate  cause  of  the  loss  sustained 
by  the  plaintiff,  and  whether  it  was  the  result  of  the  fire. 

New  York  &  Boston  Dispatch  Express  Co.  v.  Traders  Ins.  Co.,  132 
Mass.  377  (Annotated  in  42  Am.  R.  Ext.  Anno.  440,  Notes). 

Where  it  clearly  appeared  that  the  boat  would  have  been 
destroyed  by  fire  had  it  not  been  sunk,  and  the  evidence  clearly 
showed  that  ignition  or  combustion  had  begun  before  the  boat 
was  sunk,  this  taken  in  connection  with  the  evidences  of  fire 
which  were  discovered,  before  the  boat  was  sunk,  the  smoke 
issuing  from  the  hold,  with  the  deck  so  hot  that  pitch  oozed 
from  its  seams,  made  it  reasonably  certain  that  a  fire  had  broken 
out  in  the  vessel  before  it  was  sunk,  and  which  was  the  proxi- 
mate cause  of  the  loss- 

Singleton  v.  Phoenix  Ins.  Co.,  132  N.  Y.  298,  30  N.  E.  839. 

In  an  action  to  recover  for  a  general  average  loss,  sustained 
by  the  sinking  of  the  Propeller  Potomac,  it  was  held,  that  in 
order  to  render  the  insurance  company  liable  upon  the  policy, 


8  HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 

the  loss  complained  of  must  have  been  occasioned  by  one  of  the 
risks  assumed  by  it. 

Wex  v.  Boatmen's  F.  Ins.  Co.  (N.  Y.),  11  St.  Rep.  713. 

Windstorm  or  Lightning. 

Where  the  defendant  had  insured  the  plaintiff's  property 
against  loss  by  fire.  The  contract  of  insurance  containing-  no 
exception  exempting  the  defendant  from  liability  for  fire  occa- 
sioned by  storm  or  lightning.  Held,  That  if  the  property  was 
destroyed  by  that  element,  no  difference  whether  occasioned  by 
windstorm  or  lightning,  the  loss  in  question  was  one  included  in 
the  risk  for  which  the  defendant  was  liable. 

Farrell  v.  Farmers  Mut.  F.  Ins.  Co.,  66  Mo.  App.  153. 

Testimony  by  Wool  Merchants. 

Where  in  an  action  upon  a  fire  insurance  policy  to  recover 
for  loss  and  damage  to  a  large  quantity  of  wool,  it  was  alleged, 
was  caused  by  fire.  It  was  held  that  wool  merchants  and  manu- 
facturers, who  having  had  years  of  experience  in  their  business, 
'were  competent  to  give  opinions  based  upon  facts  falling  within 
their  experience,  such  as  the  effect  of  water  on  a  large  mass  of 
wool  and  the  probability  of  spontaneous  combustion  in  it. 

Sun  Ins.   Office  of  London,   England  v.  Western  Woolen  Mill  Co., 
72  Kan.  41,  82  Pac.  613. 

Testimony  by  Chemist. 

In  an  action  upon  a  fire  insurance  policy  to  recover  for  loss 
and  damage  to  a  large  quantity  of  wool,  it  was  alleged,  was 
caused  by  fire,  where  the  question  was  as  to  whether  spon- 
taneous combustion  occurred.  It  was  held  not  error  to  refuse 
to  permit  an  expert  chemist  to  define  "fire,"  "ignition,"  ignition 
point,"  the  relation  between  "fire"  and  "flame,"  and  kindred 
terms,  of  which  the  meaning  is  commonly  understood  by  all 
well-informed  persons. 

Sun  Ins.   Office  of  London,  England  v.  Western  Woolen  Mill  Co., 
72  Kan.  41,  82  Pac.  513. 

Expert  Testimony  and  Scientific  Works. 

In  an  action  upon  a  fire  insurance  policy  to  recover  for  loss 
and  damage  to  a  large  quantity  of  wool,  it  was  alleged,  was 
caused  by  fire,  it  was  held  that  where  scientific  works  of  well- 
known  authority  and  the  opinions  of  experts  are  widely  at  vari- 
ance upon  the  question  whether  spontaneous  combustion  is  pos- 
sible in  a  certain  substance,  courts  will  not  assume  as  a  matter 


DIRECT  Loss.  9 

of  law  and  fact  which  theory  is  true,  but  will  leave  its  deter- 
mination to  the  jury. 

Sun  Ins.   Office  of  London,  England  v.  Western  Woolen  Mill  Co., 
72  Kan.  41,  82  Pac.  513. 

Instruction  as  to  "A  Total  Loss." 

Where  the  merits  of  the  appeal  was  as  to  whether  the  loss 
was  "a  total  loss"  by  fire  within  the  meaning  of  Section  5897, 
or  "a  partial  loss"  only  and  falling  within  Section  5899  (Rev. 
Stat.  of  Mo.  1889),  and  to  ascertain  the  fact  the  Court  instructed 
the  jury  as  follows:  "By  a  total  loss  is  meant  that  the  building 
had  lost  its  identity  and  specific  character  as  a  building  and 
become  so  far  disintegrated  that  it  can  not  be  properly  desig- 
nated as  a  building,  although  some  part  of  it  may  remain  stand- 
ing." Held,  The  instruction  was  proper. 

O'Keefe  v.   Liverpool,   London   &  Globe  Ins.   Co.,   140  Mo.   658,   41 
S.  W.  922,  26  Ins.  L.  J.  888. 

Necessity  for  Instruction  Defining  Fire. 

Where  in  an  action  upon  a  fire  insurance  policy  to  recover 
for  loss  and  damage  to  a  large  quantity  of  wool,  it  was  alleged, 
was  caused  by  fire.  It  was  held  not  error  to  refuse  to  give  an 
instruction  that  "wool  can  not  set  fire  to  itself,"  nor  to  define 
"fire,"  nor  to  instruct  that  "no  degree  of  heat,  short  of  ignition, 
producing  an  actual  burning,  is  covered  by  the  policy,"  where 
the  court  of  its  own  motion  charged  the  jury  that  the  definition 
of  the  word  "fire"  was  unnecessary,  and  that  "it  would  make  no 
difference,  if  there  was  fire,  whether  it  was  in  the  form  of  flame 
or  merely  smoldering,  but  there  must  be  in  fact  the  presence 
of  fire." 

Sun  Ins.   Office  of  London,  England  v.  Western  Woolen  Mill  Co., 
72  Kan.  41,  82  Pac.  513. 

Destruction  of  Building  Leaving  Walls  Standing. 

Where  building  "A"  was  destroyed  by  fire,  leaving  some  of 
the  walls  standing,  and  two  or  three  days  thereafter  one  of  the 
gables  fell,  damaging  building  "B."  Held,  That  the  insurance 
company  was  liable. 

Johnston  v.  Ins.  Co.,  7  Sess.  Gas.   (Scotland)  52,  1  Bennett,  259. 
The  company  is  liable  for  such  a  loss  where  the  walls  fell 
seven  days  after  the  fire. 

Russell  v.  German  F.  Ins.  Co.,  100  Minn.  528,  111  N.  W.  400. 

Building  Removed  from  Foundation  by  Windstorm. 

Where  in  an  action  upon  a  fire  insurance  policy  it  appeared 


10  HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 

from  the  evidence  that  the  building  was  not  blown  down  by  the 
storm,  but  merely  removed  a  few  feet  from  its  foundation  and 
left  sufficiently  intact  as  to  be  still  subject  to  identification  as 
the  building  covered  by  the  risk,  by  a  reference  to  the  descrip- 
tion in  the  policy,  and  one  or  more  of  the  agencies  of  the 
storm,  wind,  or  electricity  caused  fire  to  be  communicated  to 
the  building,  either  from  that  in  the  stove  contained  therein, 
or  in  any  other  way,  whereby  such  building  became  a  loss. 
The  contract  of  insurance  contained  no  exception  exempting 
the  defendant  from  liability  for  fire  occasioned  by  storm  or 
lightning.  Held,  That  the  loss  in  question  was  one  included  in 
the  risk  and  for  which  the  insurer  was  liable. 

Farrell  v.  Farmers  Mut.  F.  Ins.  Co.,  66  Mo.  App.  153. 

Loss  of  Goods  in  Building  Blown  up  by  Municipality. 

Insurers   against   loss  by   fire   were   held   liable   for   goods 
destroyed  in  the  blowing  up  of  a  building  with  gunpowder  by 
direction  of  municipal  authorities  to  prevent  the  spread  of  fire. 
City  Ins.  Co.  v.  Corliee  (N.  Y.),  21  Wend.  367,  1  Bennett,  753. 

Prohibition  of  Repair  of  Building  by  Ordinance. 

Where  a  policy  covered  a  building  located  within  the  fire 
limits  of  a  city,  and  the  building  was  of  a  class  the  repair  of 
which  was,  under  certain  conditions,  prohibited  by  the  city 
ordinance.  Held,  That  the  insurers  were  liable  for  a  total  loss 
(value  of  the  building)  where  the  city  ordinances  would  not  per- 
mit the  same  to  be  repaired. 

Larkins  v.  Glens  Fall  Ins.  Co.,  80  Minn.  527,  83  N.  W.  409,  29  Ins. 
L.  J.  527. 

To  the  same  effect. 

Brady  v.  Northwestern  Ins.  Co.,  11  Mich.  425,  4  Bennett  663; 
Hamburg-Bremen  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  Garlington,  66  Tex.  103,  18  S.  W. 
337,  15  Ins.  L.  J.  509. 

Building  Condemned  and  Repair  Prohibited. 

Where  the  building  insured  was  condemned  by  the  proper 
authorities  and  an  attempt  to  repair  the  same  was  prohibited 
by  them.  Held,  The  insured  could  claim  a  total  loss,  although 
the  building  when  insured  was  not  sound. 

Monteleone   v.   Royal   Ins.    Co.    of   Liverpool   and   London,    47    La. 
Ann.  1563,  18  So.  472,  24  Ins.  L.  J.  531. 

Contract  of  Insurance  and  Election  to  Repair  Made  After  Adop- 
tion of  Ordinance. 

Where  the   contract   of  insurance  and  the   election   of  the 


DIRECT  Loss.  11 

insurance  company  to  repair  a  wooden  building  under  the  same, 
were  both  made  after  the  adoption  of  a  city  ordinance,  the 
parties  contracted  with  reference  to  the  law  as  it  existed  at 
the  time,  and  the  question  whether  the  city  authorities  would 
permit  the  building  to  be  repaired  in  wood  was  therefore  a  risk 
the  insurers  assumed  at  the  issuing  of  the  policy,  and  which 
they  reassumed  at  the  making  of  the  election. 

Fire  Association  v.  Rosenthal,  108  Pa.   St.  474,  1  Atl.   303,   15  Ins. 
L.  J.  658. 

Exemption  Clause  Written  Out  of  Policy  by  Valued  Policy  Law. 

Where  a  policy  contained  the  following  exemption  clause: 
"This  company  shall  not  be  liable,  beyond  the  actual  value  de- 
stroyed by  fire,  for  loss  occasioned  by  ordinance  or  law  regu- 
lating construction  or  repair  of  buildings."  Held,  That  by 
virtue  of  the  valued  policy  law  of  Mississippi  (Section  2592  of 
the  Code  of  1906)  the  clause  of  exemption  from  liability  was 
written  out  of  the  policy. 

Palatine  Ins.  Co.  v.  Nunn,  99  Miss.  493,  55  So.  44,  40  Ins.  L,.  J.  1447. 
To  same  effect  is 

Dinneen  v.  American  Ins.Co.   (Neb.  S.  C.),  152  N.  W.  307. 

Increased  Cost  of  Repairs  Under  Building  Laws. 

In  an  action  upon  Massachusetts  Standard  form  policies 
for  a  balance  alleged  to  be  due  upon  a  partial  loss  by  fire,  it 
was  held  that  the  referees  had  the  right,  in  determining  the 
amount  of  damages  to  which  the  plaintiffs  were  entitled,  to 
take  into  consideration  the  increased  cost  of  repairing  by  reason 
of  the  building  laws. 

Hewins   v.   London  Assurance   Corporation   et   al.,    184   Mass.    177, 
68  N.  E.  62. 

Change  in  Physical  Condition  of  Building  Caused  Wholly  by 
Fire. 

Where  the  building  laws  were  the  same  at  the  time  of  the 
fire  as  at  the  time  the  policies  were  issued,  and  the  only  change 
in  the  situation  was  in  the  physical  condition  of  the  building, 
and  that  change  was  caused  wholly  by  the  fire,  and  the  sole 
operating  cause  of  the  change  in  the  building  was  the  fire.  Held, 
In  the  absence  of  any  provision  in  the  policy  expressly  exclud- 
ing from  the  damages  the  part  arising  out  of  that  condition,  that 
part  was  not  to  be  excluded,  but  was  to  be  regarded  as  primarily 
the  result  of  the  fire,  or  as  "loss  or  damage  by  fire." 

Hewins  v.   London  Assurance   Corporation  et  al.,    184   Mass.    177, 
68  N.  E.  62. 


12  HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 

Ordinance  Requiring  Walls  of  Increased  Thickness. 

Where  an  ordinance  was  passed  during  the  life  of  the 
policy  requiring  walls  of  an  increased  thickness.  Held,  That 
there  was  no  good  reason  why  the  insurance  company  would  not 
be  held  liable  for  the  actual  loss  incurred,  up  to  the  extent  of  the 
amount  designated  in  the  policy,  provided  the  proportional 
amount  of  the  loss  falling  upon  the  company  reached  that  sum. 

Pennsylvania,   etc.   v.    Philadelphia,   etc.,    201  Pa.   St.    497,   51   AtL 
rep.  361. 

Stock  Destroyed  by  Fire  Caused  by  Lightning. 

Where  in  an  action  upon  a  policy  of  insurance  upon  live 
stock  against  lightning.  The  barn  had  been  destroyed  by  fire, 
and  the  stock  burned  in  it,  and  the  main  issue  was  whether  the 
barn  was  struck  by  lightning,  and  thereby  set  on  fire.  Held, 
That  if  the  stock  was  destroyed  by  fire  which  was  immediately 
caused  by  the  lightning,  or  by  the  lightning  itself,  the  defendant 
was  liable. 

Hapeman  v.  Citizens  Mut.  F.  Ins.  Co.,  126  Mich.  191,  85  N.  W.  454, 
30  Ins.  L,.  J.  452. 

"Ice  Clause"  Applied  to  Boat  Detailed  by  Gale. 

Where  in  an  action  upon  a  marine  policy,  which  was  issued 
upon  a  cargo  of  hay  laden  on  a  canal  boat,  it  appeared  that 
while  the  boat  was  proceeding  down  a  river  a  heavy  gale  sep- 
arated her  from  the  steam  tugs  which  had  her  in  tow  and 
drove  her  to  shore,  and  her  detention  there  until  ice  formed 
around  her  was  due  to  a  consequence  of  the  gale,  stranding. 
The  policy  contained  the  following  ice  clause:  "It  is  understood 
and  agreed  that  if  any  boats  the  cargo  of  which  are  covered 
by  this  policy  are  prevented  or  detained  by  ice,  or  the  closing 
of  navigation,  trom  terminating  the  trip,  then  in  such  case  the 
policy  shall  cease  to  attach  upon  said  cargo,  and  this  company 
shall  return  the  premium  for  the  unexpired  portion  of  said  trip." 
Held,  That  as  the  efficient  cause  of  the  detention  was  the  loss 
of  the  motive-power  through  the  stress  of  the  storm,  and  the 
ice  acted  only  as  an  obstacle  to  its  restoration,  the  insurers 
were  liable. 

Brown  et  al.  v.  St.  Nicholas  Ins.  Co.,  61  N.  Y.  332. 

Loss  Due  to  Moisture  from  Water  in  Extinguishing  Fire. 

Where  a  policy  of  fire  insurance  in  the  standard  form  cov- 
ered property  (a  stock  of  fish)  in  a  warehouse,  and  the  property 
insured  was  at  the  time  of  the  fire  in  an  annex.  The  question 


DIRECT  Loss.  13 

was  as  to  whether  the  loss  of  the  fish  in  the  annex  was  due 
directly  to  the  fire.  It  appeared  from  the  evidence  that  there 
was  no  fire  in  the  annex,  and  that  no  part  of  plaintiff's  property 
in  the  annex  was  injured  by  heat  or  fire,  and  it  was  conceded 
by  plaintiff  that  the  fish  were  destroyed  by  moisture.  But  it 
claimed  that  this  moisture  came  directly  from  water  used  in 
extinguishing  the  fire  in  the  warehouse,  which  got  into  the 
annex.  In  an  action  upon  the  policy,  it  was  held  that  the  policy 
covered  the  property,  and  that  the  evidence  was  sufficient  to 
sustain  the  finding  of  the  jury  that  the  loss  was  directly  due  to 
the  fire. 

Boak  Fish  Co.  v.  Manchester  P.  Assur.  Co.,  84  Minn.  419.  87  N.  W. 
932,  31  Ins.  L.  J.  253. 

Removal  of  Stove  Pipe  as  Breach  of  Condition  that  Pipe  Be 
Secured. 

Where  in  an  action  upon  a  policy  of  insurance  against  loss 
or  damage  by  fire,  upon  the  dwelling  house  and  household  furni- 
ture of  the  plaintiff,  it  appeared  that  plaintiff's  wife  had 
taken  down  a  stove  in  a  second  story  room,  but  neglected  to 
remove  the  stove  in  the  room  underneath,  afterwards  placed 
a  bed  in  the  room  over  the  hole  through  which  the  stove  pipe 
passed.  Several  days  thereafter  a  fire  was  built  in  the  stove 
in  the  room  underneath  the  bed,  which  set  bed  on  fire  and 
destroyed  the  house-  Policy  provided  that  stoves  and  pipes 
should  be  well  secured,  ff&ld,  The  insurance  company  was 
liable. 

Mickey  v.  Burlington  Ins.  Co.,  35  Iowa  174,  5  Bennett  439,   2  Ins. 
L.  J.  15,  (Annotated  in  14  Am.  R.  Ext.  Anno.  494,   Notes). 

Burning  of  Building  After  Destruction  of  Minor  Portion. 

Where  in  an  action  upon  a  policy  of  insurance  it  appeared 
that  a  portion  of  the  building  had  fallen,  leaving  the  larger  por- 
tion— more  than  three-fourths  of  it  standing,  and  afterwards 
it  burned.  The  policy  contained  the  following  condition:  "XII. 
If  a  building  shall  fall,  except  as  the  result  of  a  fire,  all  insurance 
by  this  company  on  it,  or  its  contents,  shall  immediately  cease 
and  determine."  Held,  The  building  was  not  a  fallen  building 
within  the  meaning  of  the  thirteenth  condition  of  the  policy. 

Breuner  v.   L.   &  L.   &  G.   Ins.   Co.,   51  Cal.   101,   6  Ins.   L.  J.  475 
(Annotated  in  21  Am.  R.  Ext.  Anno.  703,  Notes). 

Where  the  policy  contained  a  clause  that,  if  the  building 
or  any  part  thereof  fall  except  as  the  result  of  fire,  all  insurance 
by  this  policy  on  such  building  or  its  contents  shall  immediately 


14  HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 

cease,"  and  before  the  fire  destroyed  the  insured  building,  it 
had  been  visited  by  a  cyclone,  and  the  roof  of  thd  two  front 
upper  rooms  had  been  blown  away,  the  rafters,  ceiling,  and 
parts  of  walls  remaining.  Held,  That  the  insurance  company 
was  not  exempt  under  the  policy,  as  its  term*  did  not  contem- 
plate the  fall  of  fragmentary  portions  of  the  building,  but  "some 
functional  portion  of  the  structure." 

London  &  L.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Crunk,  91  Tenn.  376,  23  S.  W.  140. 

(B)     What  Is  Not  Direct  Loss? 

Where  in  an  action  on  a  policy  of  insurance  effected  with 
the  defendant  "against  all  the  damage  which  the  plaintiffs  should 
suffer  by  fire,"  on  their  "stock  and  utensils  in  their  regular  built 
sugar  house."  It  appeared  that  the  loss  to  the  sugar  by  the  heat 
of  the  usual  fires  employed  for  refining  had  been  increased  by 
the  mismanagement  of  the  insured,  who  inadvertently  kept  the 
top  of  the  chimney  closed,  and  it  was  held  not  a  loss  within 
the  meaning  of  the  policy. 

Austin  et  al.  v.  Drewe,  6  Taunt.  436,  1  Bennett  102. 

It  is  suggested  that  insurance  adjusters  read  the  full  decision 
of  the  court  in  Austin  et  al.  v.  Drewe.  It  was  the  first  and 
leading  case  on  this  subject  and  is  frequently  quoted.  A  very 
full  report  of  it  may  be  had  in  1  Bennett  102. 

Loss  From  Smoke  and  Soot  From  Defective  Stove  Pipe. 

The  insurer  was  held  not  liable  for  loss  or  damage  occa- 
sioned by  smoke  and  soot  escaping  from  a  defective  stove  pipe 
and  emanating  from  a  fire  intentionally  built  in  a  stove  and 
kept  confined  therein;  or  for  damages  caused  by  the  water  used 
in  cooling  a  portion  of  the  ceiling  heated  by  the  pipe,  where  in 
the  proofs  of  loss  it  was  not  claimed  that  anything  was  actually 
ignited  by  this  heat,  and  it  did  not  appear  that  the  use  of  the 
water  was  necessary  to  prevent  ignition. 

Cannon  v.  Phoenix  Ins.  Co.,  110  Ga.  568,  35  S.  E.  775,  29  Ins.  L.  J. 
1023,  citing:  Austin  v.  Drewe,  6  Taunt.  436  and  Gibbons  v. 
Savings  Inst.,  30  111.  App.  263. 

But  where  the  assured's  servant  burned  some  rubbish  and 
cannel  coal  in  the  furnace  causing  a  loss  from  smoke  and  soot 
it  was  held  the  insurance  company  was  liable  for  the  loss  that 
it  was  not  a  friendly  fire,  the  furnace  was  for  heating  purposes 
and  not  meant  to  burn  rubbish. 

O'Connor  v.  Queen  Ins.  Co.,  140  Wis.  388,  122  N.  W.  1038,  Anno- 
tated in  25  L,.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  501,  and  17  Am.  &  Eng.  Anno.  Cas. 
1118. 


DIRECT  Loss.  15 

Smoke  From  Lamp. 

Where  in  an  action  upon  a  policy  insuring  the  plaintiff 
against  loss  or  damage  by  fire  or  lightning,  etc.  It  appeared 
upon  the  trial  that  all  the  damage  was  caused  by  smoke  from 
a  lamp  left  lighted  in  plaintiffs  office.  Held,  That  a  lighted  lamp 
was  not  a  "fire"  within  the  meaning  of  the  policy,  and  that  it 
was  not  contemplated  by  the  parties  to  the  contract  of  insur- 
ance that  the  policy  would  cover  damages  arising  from  a  smok- 
ing lamp. 

Fitzgerald  v.  German  Am.  Ins.  Co.,  30  Miscl.  (N.  Y.)  72,  62  N.  T. 
Supp.  824. 

Hop-House. 

Where  the  insurance  issued  by  the  defendant  to  plaintiff 
was  specified  to  be  "on  his  frame  shingle  roof  hop-house,  while 
drying  hops,"  and  the  defendant  agreed  to  make  good  to  plaintiff 
aH  loss  or  damage  which  should  happen  "by  fire  to  the  property 
so  specified,  from  the  15th  day  of  August,  to  the  15th  day  of 
October,  1875.  The  hop-house  was  destroyed  by  fire  after  the 
plaintiff  had  ceased  drying  hops.  Held,,  That  as  the  fire  hap- 
pened after  the  plaintiff  had  ceased  drying  hops,  the  defendant 
was  not  liable. 

Langrworthy  v.  O.  &  O.  Ins.  Co.,  85  N.  T.   632,  10  Ins.  L.  J.  546. 

Lightning. 

Where  a  policy  insured  against  loss  by  lightning,  an  electric 
discharge  causing  a  concussion  or  shock  of  such  violence  as  to 
jar  and  injure  the  walls  of  plaintiff's  building,  was  not  within 
the  contemplation  of  such  policy. 

Kattleman  v.  Fire  Ass'n,  79  Mo.  App.  447. 

Where  an  insurance  policy  contained  a  lightning  clause 
which  limited  the  liability  of  the  company  to  the  direct  loss 
caused  by  lightning,  and  expressly  excluded  damage  by  cyclone, 
tornado  or  windstorm.  Held,  There  could  be  no  recovery  for 
less  by  windstorm,  although  the  windstorm  completed  the  work 
of  destruction  of  the  building,  as  the  jury  must  be  required  to 
limit  the  recovery  of  plaintiff  to  the  direct  loss  or  damage  caused 
by  lightning. 

Beaks  v.  Phoenix  Ins.  Co.,  143  N.  Y.  402,  24  Ins.  L,.  J.  73,  38  N.  E. 
453  (Annotated  in  26  L.  R.  A.  267). 

Where  in  an  action  upon  a  policy  to  recover  for  loss  alleged 
to  have  been  caused  by  lightning.  The  property  insured  was  a 


16  HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 

gristmill  and  sawmill.  During  a  severe  storm  a  sharp  flash  of 
lightning  was  seen,  followed  immediately  by  a  loud  report  near 
by  and  in  the  vicinity  of  the  mill,  and  soon  thereafter  a  noise 
was  heard,  as  of  the  falling  and  crashing  of  a  building,  and  in 
the  following  morning  the  water  in  the  river  was  quite  high, 
and  the  building  lay  in  broken  disorganized  heaps  of  material 
at  various  points,  the  timbers  were  broken  and  splintered,  but 
there  were  no  marks  of  fire  on  any  of  the  remaining  portions 
of  the  building.  Held,  That  as  there  were  no  marks  of  fire  any- 
where, such  as  are  customarily  found  when  lightning  has  come 
in  contact  with  dry  wood,  there  was  no  justification  in  the  evi- 
dence for  the  finding  that  the  buildings  were  destroyed  by  the 
latter  cause,  and  since  the  evidence  established  clearly  that  the 
undermining  of  the  buildings  by  water  caused  the  loss  com- 
plained of. 

Clark  v.  Farmers  Mut.  Fire  Ins.  Co.,  Ill  Wis.   65,  86  N.  W.  649, 
14  Deitch  86. 

Where  in  an  action  upon  a  policy  of  insurance,  which  in- 
sured the  plaintiff  against  "all  direct  loss  or  damage  by  fire" 
on  his  store  and  office  furniture  and  fixtures  contained  in  a 
three-story,  brick,  tin-roof  building,  it  appeared  that  the  build- 
ing and  its  contents  were  damaged  by  fire,  the  plaintiff  was 
permitted  to  let  his  personal  property  remain  in  the  building, 
and  twenty-five  days  after  such  fire  and  after  a  new  roof  was 
put  on  the  building,  the  building  fell,  destroying  plaintiff's  prop- 
erty. Held,  That  there  was  no  error  in  granting  a  non-suit, 
since  it  did  not  appear  that  the  fire  was  the  proximate,  or,  in 
any  sense  of  the  term,  the  "direct"  cause  of  the  loss;  but  the 
evidence  tended  to  show  that  the  efficient  and  predominating 
cause  was  the  pouring  and  damming  up  of  the  water  against  the 
wall  from  the  heavy  rains  which  fell  subsequent  to  the  fire. 
Cuesta  v.  Royal  Ins.  Co.,  98  Ga.  720,  27  S.  E.  Rep.  172. 

Where  in  an  action  upon  two  policies  of  fire  insurance  upon 
wool,  against  all  direct  loss  or  damage  by  fire,  it  appeared  that 
the  wool  insured  had  become  entirely  submerged  by  water, 
caused  by  an  unusual  flood,  and  remained  so  for  eight  days, 
and  after  subsidence  of  the  water,  it  was  found  to  be  wet  and 
covered  with  mud,  very  much  heated,  and  there  was  smoke  in 
the  rooms  where  the  wool  was  and  an  odor  of  burned  wool, 
but  there  was  no  flame  to  be  seen,  and  no  visible  fire,  and 
whatever  damage  was  done  to  the  wool  had  been  caused  by 
the  action  of  water  thereon.  Held,  That,  since  it  appeared  from 


DIRECT  Loss.  17 

the  evidence  that  the  internal  development  of  heat  never  at 
any  time  became  so  rapid  as  to  produce  a  flame  or  a  glow, 
nor  any  visible  heat  or  light  in  or  about  the  wool,  the  plaintiff 
had  not  shown  any  direct  loss  by  fire  within  the  meaning  of  the 
word  "fire,"  as  used  in  the  policies,  and  as  that  word  is  known 
to  the  public  generally. 

Western  Woolen   Mills   Co.  v.    Northern   Assurance   Co.,   139,    Fed. 
637. 
(Annotated  in  72  C.  C.  A.  1). 

An  insurance  policy  covering  against  direct  loss  by  fire 
does  not  contemplate  a  loss  to  steam  boiler  caused  by  assured 
or  his  servants  negligently  leaving  the  boiler  with  insufficient 
water,  so  that  any  loss  that  was  done  to  it  must  of  necessity 
have  been  caused  by  the  fire  or  heat  used  for  heating  it,  which 
fire  was  in  its  usual  or  accustomed  place  and  therefore  not 
a  hostile  one. 

McGraw  v.   Home   Ins.   Co.    (Kan.    S.    C.)    28   Ins.    Digest  18,    144 
Pac.  821. 

"This  company  shall  not  be  liable  beyond  the  actual  value 
destroyed  by  fire,  for  loss  occasioned  by  ordinance  of  law  regu- 
lating construction  or  repair  of  buildings."  Insurance,  $2,500; 
value  of  building  was  $3,500;  loss,  $1,400.  The  insured  was  pro- 
hibited from  reconstructing  building  by  the  ordinances  of  the 
city  governing  the  repair  and  construction  of  buildings  within 
fhe  fire  limits  of  th«  city  of  Jackson,  in  which  it  was  located. 
It  is  thoroughly  well  settled  that  in  such  cases,  where  the  loss 
by  fire  is  partial,  but  the  injury  by  fire  has  rendered  the  build- 
ing unfit  for  use  for  the  purpose  for  which  it  was  constructed 
and  there  are  ordinances  or  there  is  a  law  prohibiting  its  re- 
construction, the  loss  in  such  cases  is  total.  This  is  very  clearly 
set  forth  in  Sandberg  v.  St.  Paul  and  S.  R.  R.  Co.,  80  Minn.  442, 
83  N.  W.  411.  The  sole  question  before  us  in  this,  the  only 
material  contention  in  the  case,  is  whether  or  not  this  clause  in 
the  contract  of  insurance  was  written  out  by  virtue  of  the  provi- 
sions of  our  valued  policy  law,  §2592  of  Code  of  1906.  The  ques- 
tion is  not  one  at  all  free  from  difficulty  and  we  have  given  it 
the  most  careful  consideration.  The  authority  chiefly  relied  on 
by  the  learned  counsel  for  appellant  is  the  case  of  Hewins  v. 
London  Assurance  Corp.,  184  Mass.  178,  68  N.  E.  62,  and  that 
case  clearly  holds  that  the  defense  here  would  be  good,  the  con- 
tract stipulation  referred  to  being  valid,  in  a  state  where  there 
is  no  valued  policy  law  substantially  like  ours. 

We  have  found  one  case,  New  Orleans  R.  E.  M.  &  S.  Co.  v. 


18  HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 

Teutonia  Ins.  Co.,  La.  54  S.  466,  which  does  squarely  hold,  on 
a  valued  policy  law  substantially  like  ours,  though  not  identical 
in  its  phraseology,  that  the  very  clause  here  relied  on  is  written 
out  of  the  policy  by  the  valued  policy  law. 

Palatine  Ins.  Co.  v.  Nunn,  99  Miss.  493,  55  So.  44.     To  same  effect 
is  Dinneen  v.  American  Ins.  Co.  (Neb.  S.  C.),  152  N.  W.  307. 

Recovery  on  account  of  the  increased  cost  of  repairing, 
by  reason  of  the  building  laws,  of  a  building  partially  destroyed, 
is  excluded  by  a  policy  providing  that  loss  or  damage  shall  in 
no  event  exceed  what  it  would  cost  the  insured  to  repair  or  re- 
place the  same  with  material  of  like  kind  and  quality,  and  the 
insurer  shall  not  be  liable  beyond  the  actual  value  destroyed  by 
fire  for  loss  occasioned  by  law  regulating  construction  or  repair 
of  buildings.  This,  too,  notwithstanding  the  fact  that  under  the 
Massachusetts  standard  policy  it  is  a  total  loss,  but  where  a 
company  issued  a  policy  on  property  in  Masachusetts,  which 
policy  provided  that  in  case  of  loss  or  damage,  "loss  shall  in  no 
event  exceed  what  it  would  cost  the  insured  to  repair  or  replace 
the  same  with  material  of  like  kind  and  quality"  and  that  the 
company  should  not  be  liable  beyond  the  actual  value  destroyed 
by  fire  for  loss  occasioned  by  ordinance  or  law  regulating  con- 
struction or  repair  of  buildings.  *  *  *  The  standard  policy 
law  does  not  provide  any  rule  of  interpretation  as  do  the  valued 
policy  laws  of  other  states,  nor  does  it  say  that  another  form  ot 
policy  shall  be  void.  On  the  contrary,  it  provides  for  a  fine  for  a 
company  issuing  a  different  policy,  but  also  declares  it  to  be 
binding  on  the  company.  Its  legal  effect  is  not  changed.  The 
illegal  policy  is  not  changed  by  law  so  as  to  conform  to  the 
legal.  The  assured  may  sue  upon  it,  but  it  must  be  construed 
as  it  reads.  No  statute  is  incorporated  in  it.  The  penalty  suf- 
fered by  the  company  is  a  fine  and  not  a  liability  to  be  held  on 
a  contract  different  from  that 'made  by  it. 

Hewins  v.  London  Assur.  Corp  etl  al.,  184  Mass.  178,  68  N.  E.  62. 

Some  time  since  I  asked  the  following  question  of  "Rough 
Notes":  If  a  New  York  Standard  form  of  policy  covered  meats 
in  cold  storage  warehouse  "A"  against  direct  loss  by  fire,  and 
building  "B"  located  across  the  street  was  a  refrigerating  plant 
supplying  through  pipes  the  cold  air  for  storage  warehouse  "A," 
the  same  owner  owning  and  operating  both  buildings,  would  the 
insurance  company  be  liable  for  a  loss  to  stock  of  meats  in 
building  "A"  by  reason  of  the  destruction  by  fire  of  building 
"B"?  Mr.  Deitch  answered,  the  company  would  not  be  liable 


DIRECT  Loss.  19 

and  I  think  his  answer  is  correct.  Yet,  a  large  list  of  companies 
paid  the  Bold  Packing  Company  at  Kansas  City  for  just  such  a 
loss  a  few  years  ago,  not  one  of  them  contested  it,  I  presume 
on  account  of  the  claim  against  each  company  being  so  small, 
though  the  aggregate  against  all  was  considerable. 

If  such  a  loss  be  one  of  the  perils  insured  against,  why 
would  not  the  insurer  be  liable  if  assured  chilled  his  meats  by 
natural  ice  from  his  ice  house  across  the  street,  carried  across 
on  chutes,  if  such  icehouse  be  destroyed  by  fire  and  it  be  im- 
possible to  procure  any  other  ice? 

If  the  insurer  be  liable  for  such  losses,  at  what  distance 
from  the  property  insured  must  the  cold  storage  plant  be,  be- 
fore liability  of  the  insurer  for  loss  will  cease  in  consequence 
of  its  destruction  by  fire?  Here  in  St.  Louis  (and  I  presume  in 
other  cities)  we  have  a  corporation  which  has  a  large  cold 
storage  plant,  furnishing  chilled  air  to  cold  storage  warehouses, 
restaurants,  hotels,  etc.,  throughout  the  city,  by  means  of  pipes 
under  the  streets  and  if  such  losses  as  I  have  mentioned  are 
covered  under  a  fire  policy,  then  the  losses  which  may  occur  in 
any  or  all  of  such  places  at  any  time  by  the  burning  of  the  cold 
storage  plant  is  one  for  which  the  insurer  is  liable. 

Loss  by  Negligence  of  Another. 

He  who  by  his  negligence  or  misconduct  creates  or  suffers  a 
fire  upon  his  own  premises,  which,  burning  his  own  property, 
spreads  thence  to  the  immediately  adjacent  premises  and  de- 
stroys the  property  of  another,  is  liable  to  the  latter  for  the 
damages  sustained  by  him.  (The  cases  of  Ryan  v.  N.  Y.  C. 
R.  R.  Co.,  35  N.  Y.  210,  and  Pa.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Kerr,  62  Pa.  353, 
distinguished.) 

Webb.  v.  R.,  W.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  49  N.  Y.  420. 

Loss  of  Blankets  Used  to  Protect  Building  From  Fire. 

A  fire  happening  in  the  neighborhood,  the  insured,  with  the 
approbation  of  the  insurer,  procured  blankets  and  spread  them 
(wet)  on  the  outside  of  the  building,  whereby  it  and  its  con- 
tents were  saved,  but  the  blankets  were  rendered  worthless. 
Held,  loss  of  blankets  not  covered  by  policy,  but  that  it  was  a 
subject  of  general  average,  to  which  the  insurer  and  insured 
should  contribute  in  the  proportion  to  the  amount  which  they 
respectively  had  at  risk  in  the  store  and  contents,  but  that  other 
neighboring  property  upon  which  the  insurer  had  risks  which 


20  HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 

would  have  been  in  danger  if  the  store  had  burned,  were  too  re- 
motely affected  to  be  liable  to  contribution. 
Wells  v.  Boston  Ins.  Co.,  6  Pick  (23  Mass.)  182. 

Loss  by  Negligence  of  Assured's  Agent. 

Underwriters  are  answerable  for  any  loss  occasioned  by  the 
negligence  of  those  in  charge  of  the  property  insured  by  them. 
But  the  negligence  must  be  unaffected  by  any  fruad  or  design 
on  the  part  of  the  insured. 

Henderson  v.  Western  M.  &  F.  Ins.  Co.,  10  Robinson  (La.)  164. 

Loss  by  Wilful  Burning  of  Assured's  Property  by  His  Wifo. 

A  policy  of  fire  insurance  covers  a  loss  occasioned  by  the 
wife  of  the  insured;  and  her  acts  and  declarations  at,  and  dur- 
ing the  fire  are  not  evidence  against  the  husband,  unless  done 
by  his  consent,  nor  are  they  part  of  the  res  gestae. 
Walker  v.  Phoenix  Ins.  Co.,  63  Mo.  App.  3«9. 

To  same  effect  is 

Plinsky  v.  Germania  P.  Ins.  Co.,  32  Fed.  47; 

Feibelman  v.  Manchester  F.  Assur.  Co.,  108  Ala.  180,  19  So.  540; 
Perry  v.  Mechanics  M.  Ins.  Co.,  11  Fed.  485. 

Loss  by  Carelessness  ®f  Assured's  Son. 

Where  the  loss  was  caused  by  the  assured's  son  filling  a 
stove  in  the  building  destroyed,  with  combustible  materials,  and 
thus  recklessly  causing  the  loss,  the  company  will  not  be 
relieved  from  liability,  where  the  act  was  unaffected  by  fraud  or 
design  on  the  part  of  the  assured. 

Malln  v.  Mercantile  T.  M.  Ins.  Co.,  105  Mo.  App.  625. 

Loss  by  Negligence  of  Another. 

The  negligent  burning  of  a  house,  and  the  spreading  of  the 
fire  to  a  neighboring  house,  and  the  burning  thereof,  does  not 
give  the  owner  of  the  last  house  a  cause  of  action  against  the 
owner  in  which  the  fire  originated.  The  damages  are  too  re- 
mote. 

Ryan  v.   N.  T.  Central  R.  R.   Co.,   35  N.  Y.  MO. 

Loss  by  Negligence  of  Another. 

A  railroad  company,  which  has  negligently  set  a  fire  to  in- 
flamable  material  which  it  has  allowed  to  accumulate  on  its  right 
of  way,  is  not  liable  to  the  owner  of  lands  not  abutting  on  its 
premises,  for  damages  caused  by  fire  communicated  through  the 
abutting  and  intervening  woodlands  of  a  third  person,  over 


DIRECT  Loss.  21 

which  the  railroad  had  no  control  and  without  which   the  fire 
could  not  have  extended. 

Hoffman  v.  King,  160  N.  T.  618,  55  N.  E.  401. 

Assured  Must  Protect  Property  at  Fire. 

The  assured  is  bound  diligently  to  labor  in  saving  the  prop- 
erty by  fire;  but  the  insertion  of  a  clause  in  the  policy  requiring 
such  labor  and  effort,  does  not  impose  any  additional  duty 
upon  him. 

Cincinnati  M.  Ins.  Co.  V.  May,  20  Ohio  211. 

Loss  by  Assured's  Recklessness. 

Where  an  act  of  Congress  passed  to  secure  steamboats 
against  fire,  in  order  to  secure  the  lives  of  passengers;  provides 
that  turpentine,  etc.,  on  such  vessels  shall  be  secured  in  metallic 
containers  at  a  secure  distance  from  any  fire.  The  act  of  plain- 
tiff in  placing  a  barrel  of  turpentine  near  the  furnace  and  used 
it  to  increase  the  head  of  steam  so  as  to  give  greater  speed  to 
his  boat;  whereby  it  was  set  on  fire;  he  cannot  recover  the  inr 
surance  on  his  boat.  The  only  question  for  the  jury  to  deter- 
mine is,  was  the  turpentine  used  in  the  manner  shown,  if  it  was 
he  cannot  recover  on  his  insurance. 

Citizens  Ins.  Co.  v.  Marsh,  41  Pa.  St.  386. 

What  is  not  General  Average  Loss. 

The  scuttling  of  a  ship  by  the  municipal  authorities  of  a 
port,  without  the  direction  of  her  master  or  other  commanding 
officer,  to  extinguish  a  fire  in  her  hold,  is  not  a  general  aver- 
age loss. 

R«,lli  v.  Troop,  157  U.  S.  386. 

Damage  by  Fire  Engine  on  Way  to  Fire. 

Where  a  fire  engine  on  its  way  to  a  fire  was  deflected  from 
its  course,  collided  with  and  damaged  plaintiff's  building.  Held, 
such  loss  is  not  a  direct  fire  loss  within  the  meaning  of  a  fire 
insurance  policy. 

Foster  v.  Fidelity  F.  Ins.  ®o..  24  Pac.  Supt.  Ct.  685. 

Damage  by  Smoking  Lamp. 

Smoke  and  soot  from  a  lamp  whose  flame  accidentally  flared 
up  two  or  three  feet  above  the  lamp  chimney,  is  not  a  direct 
fire  loss  as  used  in  an  insurance  policy. 

Samuels  v.  Continental  Ins.  Co.,  2  Pa.  Dist.  Ct.  $97. 


22  HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 

Damage  by  Soot  and  Smoke  from  Ignition  of  Accumulated  Soot 

in  Chimney. 

A  distinction  should  be  made  between  a  fire  intentionally 
started  and  maintained  for  a  useful  purpose  in  connection  with 
the  occupation  of  a  building,  and  a  fire  which  starts  from  such  a 
fire,  without  human  agency,  in  a  place  where  fires  are  never 
lighted  nor  maintained,  although  such  ignition  may  naturally  be 
expected  to  occur  occasionally  as  an  incident  to  the  maintenance 
of  necessary  fires. 

Way  v.  Abington  M.  P.  Ins.  Co.,  166  Mass.  67,  43  N.  E.  1032. 

Profits  not  Insured. 

The  liability  upon  a  policy  insuring  a  turn  pike  company 
against  loss  by  fire  of  a  bridge,  is  to  be  measured  by  the 
pecuniary  value  of  the  injury  to  the  bridge,  not  by  the  loss  of 
tolls  suffered  before  the  bridge  could  be  rebuilt. 

Such  turn  pike  company  has  no  insurable  interest  in  a  public 
county  bridge  on  the  line  of  its  road  but  free  to  all  travel,  even 
though  it  contributed  to  its  cost,  erection  and  maintenance. 
Farmers  M.  Ins.  Co.  v.  New  H.  T.  Co.,  122  Pa.  St.  37,  15  Atl.  663 

Company  is  Liable  for  Loss  by  Fire  Where  Assured's  Insane 
Wife  Burns  the  Property. 

Where  the  assured  was  for  the  time  being  entrusted  with 
the  care  of  his  insane  wife  and  she  burned  his  insured  property, 
the  insurer  will  be  held  liable  for  the  loss  unless  it  can  show 
actual  design  or  such  a  degree  of  negligence  and  carelessness 
on  the  part  of  the  husband,  as  will  evince 'a  corrupt  design  or 
a  fraudulent  purpose  on  his  part. 

Gove  v.   Farmers  M.   F.  Ins.  Co.,  48  N.   H.   41. 

Loss  by  Assured  or  His  Servant's  Negligence. 

In  relation  to  insurance  against  fire,  the  doctrine  seems  to 
have  prevailed  for  a  great  length  of  time  that  it  covers  losses 
occasioned  by  the  mere  faults  and  negligence  of  the  assured 
and  his  servants  unaffected  by  any  fraud  or  design.  Ins.  Co.  v. 
Lawrence,  10  Pet.  507;  see  also,  Mickey  v.  Burlington  Ins.  Co., 
35  la.  174,  and  cases  there  cited.  Hence  the  action  of  the 
assured's  president  in  burning  rubbish,  which  fire  spread  to  and 
burned  the  assured's  building,  is  not  such  an  increase  of  risk  as 
to  avoid  the  policy,  where  there  was  no  design  to  burn  the 
building. 

Des  Moines  Ice  Co.  v.  Niagara  Ins.  Co.,  99  la.  193,  68  N.  W.  600. 


DIRECT  Loss.  23 

Smoke  and  Soot  from  Coal  Oil  Stove. 

The  question  whether  the  smoke  proceeded  from  a  fire  out- 
side the  place  where,  under  the  contract  of  insurance,  it  was 
intended  to  burn  was  for  the  jury  under  the  evidence  in  this 
case.  It  was  submitted  to  them  in  a  charge  of  which  the  .de- 
fendant has  no  reason  to  complain.  If  the  smoke  that  did  the 
damage  proceeded  from  a  fire  "out  of  place,"  it  is  no  answer  to 
say  that  this  originated  in  a  fire  in  the  place  fitted  and  in- 
tended for  it. 

Collins  v.  Delaware  Ins.  Co.,  9  Pa.  Supr.  Ct.  576. 


HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 


CHAPTER  n. 
CASH  VALUE— MEASURE  OF  DAMAGE. 

"This  company  shall  not  be  liable  beyond  the  actual  cash 
value  of  the  property  at  the  time  the  loss  occurs,  *  *  *  with 
proper  deduction  for  depreciation  however  caused,  and  shall  in 
no  event  exceed  what  it  would  then  cost  the  assured  to  repair  or 
replace  the  same  with  material  of  like  kind  and  quality." 

Assured  being  a  manufacturer,  can  not  recover  more  than 
the  sum  it  would  cost  him  to  replace  the  property  destroyed. 

Standard  Sew.  Mch.  Co.  v.  Royal  Ins.  Co.   (Pa.  S.  C.),  51  Atl.  Rep. 
345,  15  Deitch  29. 

Cash  value  means  what  it  would  cost  the  insured  in  actual 
cash  to  replace  the  goods,  at  the  time  and  place  of  fire. 

Niagara  F.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Heflin  (Ky.  C.  A.),  60  S.  W.  Rep.  393,  30  Ins. 

L.  J.  326; 

Equitable  F.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Quinn,  11  Low.  Can.  170; 
Fisher  v.  Crescent  Ins.  Co.   (U.  S.  C.  C.),   (W.  Dist.  N.  C.),  17  Ins. 

L.  J.  712; 

Western  Assurance  Co.  v.  Studebaker,  124  Ind.  176,  20  Ins.  L.  J.  64; 
Grubbs  v.  North  Carolina  Home  Ins.  Co.   (S.  C.  of  N.  C.),  108  N.  C. 

4T2;  20  Ins.  L.  J.  784; 

Queen  v.  McCoin  (Ky.  C.  A.),  49  S.  W.  Rep.  800,  12  Deitch  67; 
Post  Printing-  &  Publishing  Co.  v.   Ins.   Co.   of  N.  A.    (Pa.   S.  C.), 

42  Atl.  Rep.  192; 

Hedger  v.  Ins.  Co.,  12  Ins.  L.  J.  926,  17  Fed.  498; 
Marchessen  v.  Merchants  Ins.  Co.,  1  Rob.   (La.)  438,  2  Bennett  166; 
Fowler  v.  Old  N.  C.  S.  Ins.  Co.,  74  N.  C.  81; 

Burgess  v.  Alliance  Ins.  Co.,  10  Allen  (Ma»e.)  221,  5  Bennett  46; 
Boyd  v.  Royal  Ins.  Co.,  Ill  N.  C.  372,  16  S.  E.  389; 
Hedger  v.  Ins.  Co.   (U.  S.  C.  C.),  12  Ins.  L.  J.  926; 
Mack  v.  Lancashire  Ins.  Co.   (U.  S.  C.  C.),  19  Ins.  L.  J.  68. 

And  this,   too,  regardless   of  cost   of  reproduction. 

Hartford  F.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Cannon  et  al.  (Tex.  C.  C.  A.),  46  S.  W.  Rep. 

851;  11  Finch  109; 
Mitchell  v.   St.  Paul  German  F.   Ins.   Co.    (Mich.   S.   C.),   52  N.   W. 

Rep.  1017;  21  Ins.  L.  J.  1003. 

The  policy  provided  that  the  company  should  not  be  liable 
"beyond  the  actual  cash  value  of  the  property  at  the  time  any 
loss  or  damage  occurs,  *  *  *  and  shall  in  no  event  ex- 
ceed what  it  would  then  cost  the  insured  to  repair  or  replace  the 
same  with  material  of  like  kind  and  quality."  Plaintiff  con- 
tended that,  as  the  goods  burned  could  not  be  immediately  re- 
placed at  the  scene  of  the  fire  with  goods  of  like  kind  and  qual- 

25 


26  HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 

ity,  it  is  entitled  to  recover  the  cash  market  value  of  the  goods, 
which  is  what  the  goods  could  have  been  sold  for  in  San 
Antonio  to  dealers  at  wholesale,  in  quantities  of  a  single  article 
or  in  car-load  lots,  or  in  less  than  car-load  lots,  in  plaintiff's 
ordinary  course  of  business.  The  contention  of  defendant  is 
that  the  value  is  to  be  determined  by  what  it  would  cost  to  re- 
place said  goods  from  other  markets  with  goods  of  like  kind 
and  quality  within  a  reasonable  time,  which  could  be  done,  and 
was  done  in  this  instance,  within  30  days.  Held,  That  the  expres- 
sion, "What  it  would  then  cost  the  assured"  evidently  was  not 
intended  to  mean  what  it  would  cost  to  replace  immediately  or 
instanter  upon  l^ie  destruction  of  the  goods  by  fire,  but  what  it 
would  cost  to  replace  the  burned  articles  from  the  markets 
where  such  goods  were  usually  manufactured  or  could  be  pur- 
chased within  a  reasonable  time.  The  goods  were  replaced 
within  30  days  after  the  fire  at  a  sum  less  than  that  claimed  by 
plaintiff.  This  was  within  a  reasonable  time,  and  fixed  the  sum 
of  plaintiff's  recovery. 

Texas  Moline  Plow  Co.  v.  Niagara  Fire  Ins.  Co.  (Tex.  C.  C.  A.): 
87  Southwestern  Reporter  (June  7,  1905),  192 

! 

If  the  insured  is  liable  to  the  government  for  tax  on  whisky, 
such  tax  forms  part  of  the  cash  value  for  which  the  insurer  is 
liable. 

Hedger  v.  Ins.  Co.   (U.  S.  C.  C.),  12  Ins.  L.  J.  926; 

Queen  v.  McCoin  (Ky.  C.  A.),  49  S.  W.  Rep.  800,  12  Deitch  67; 

Security  Ins.  Co.  v.  Farrell  (111.  S.   C.),  2  Ins.   L.  J.  302. 

(Though  in  this  case — 2  Ins.  L.  J.  302 — it  was  held  assured  was 
not  liable  and  in  that  case  it  necessarily  follows  that  insurer 
is  not.) 

) 

The  aim  should  be  to  arrive  as  nearly  as  possible  at  the 
value  of  the  building  as  it  stood  on  the  day  of  the  fire,  taking 
into  consideration  cost  to  rebuild  or  replace,  and  difference  in 
value  between  new  building  and  the  condition  it  was  in  at  the 
time  of  the  fire. 

Stenzel  v.  Pennsylvania  F.  Ins.  Co.  et  al.  (La.  S.  C.),  36  S.  W.  Rep. 

Hilton  v.   Phoenix  Ass'n  Co.    (Me.    S.   J.   C.),   42  Atl.   Rep.   412;   28 
Ins.  L.  J.  309. 

Linotype  machines  cost  manufacturer  $1.000  each.  They 
were  sold  to  publisher  for  $3,000.  The  contract  between  the 
two  provides  that  title  is  to  remain  in  manufacturer.  Held,  That 
such  an  agreement  is  constructively  fraudulent,  and  a  mere  at- 
tempt to  maintain  a  secret  lien,  and  the  title  is  really  in  the 


CASH  VALUE — MEASURE  OF  DAMAGE.  27 

publishing   company,   which    is   entitled   to   recover   $3,000,    the 
cost  to  them  of  replacing  the  machines. 

Post  Printing  and  Publishing  Co.  v.  Ins.  Co.  of  N.  A.   (Pa.  S.  C.), 
42  Atl.  Rep.  192. 

ASSESSORS  VALUE— ASSURED'S  TAX  RETURNS. 

The  assessed  value  is  not  the  measure  of  damage.  Where 
the  destroyed  building  was  in  a  small  village  it  had  an  intrinsic 
but  no  market  value,  therefore,  estimates  of  cost  to  rebuild  must 
be  relied  on. 

German  M.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Niewiede,  11  Ind.  App.  634,  39  N.  E.  534; 
Helm  v.  Anchor  F.  Ins.  Co.,  109  N.  W.   605; 
Knickerbocker  Ins.  Co.  v.  McGinness,  87  111.  70. 

CASH  VALUE  OF  WHISKY. 

The  policy  contains  the  fellowing  provision:  "This  com- 
pany shall  not  be  liable  beyond  the  actual  cash  value  of  the 
property  at  the  time  any  loss  or  damage  occurs,  and  the  loss  or 
damage  shall  be  ascertained,  or  estimated,  according  to  such 
actual  cash  value,  with  proper  deduction  for  depreciation,  how- 
ever caused,  and  shall  in  no  event  exceed  what  it  would  then 
cost  the  insured  to  repair  or  replace  the  same  with  material 
of  like  kind  and  quantity."  This  provision  of  the  contract  fur- 
nishes the  measure  of  damages  and  raises  the  important  ques- 
tion in  the  case.  The  policy  is  the  contract  between  the  parties, 
and  must  be  given  an  interpretation  which  will  carry  out  their 
intention.  If  the  language  of  the  policy  is  doubtful  or  obscure, 
it  will  be  construed  most  unfavorable  to  the  insurer.  Merrick 
v.  Germania  Fire  Insurance  Co.,  54  Pa.  277.  A  contract  of  in- 
surance must  have  a  reasonable  interpretation  such  as  was  prob- 
ably in  the  contemplation  of  the  parties  when  it  was  made; 
and  when  the  words  of  a  policy  are,  without  violence,  suscepti- 
ble of  two  interpretations,  that  which  will  sustain  a  claim  to  the 
indemnity  it  was  the  object  of  the  assured  to  obtain  should  be 
preferred.  Humphreys  v.  National  Benefit  Association,  139  Pa. 
214,  20  Atl.  1047,  11  L.  R.  A.  564. 

The  property  covered  by  this  policy  is  of  a  peculiar  char- 
acter, but  the  intention  of  both  parties  was  to  protect  the  in- 
sured against  its  loss  by  fire,  and  the  policy  must  be  construed 
so  as  to  effect  that  purpose.  It  not  like  a  machine,  a  house,  or 
property  of  that  character.  There  is  no  difficulty  whatever  in 
ascertaining  the  cost  of  repairing  or  replacing  such  property 
as  of  the  date  it  is  injured  or  destroyed.  Proof  is  readily  ac- 
cessible which  will  enable  the  insured  to  establish  "what  it 
would  then  cost  to  repair  or  replace  the  same  with  material  of 


28  HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 

like  kind  and  quantity."  A  moment's  reflection  will  show  that 
this  is  not  true  of  whisky  which  has  been  destroyed.  From  the 
uncontradicted  evidence  it  appears,  and  therefore  it  must  be 
taken  as  a  fact,  that  the  age  of  whisky  materially  affects  its 
character  and  quality,  and  hence  is  an  important  factor  in  ascer- 
taining or  determining  its  value.  It  also  appears  in  the  case  that 
this,  like  other  brands  of  whisky,  has  a  distinctive  character  and 
quality  of  its  own,  and  that  no  brand  of  whisky  can  be  substi- 
tuted in  the  market  for  another  brand. 


,  under  the  clause  of  the  policy  above  quoted,  how 
should  the  plaintiffs'  loss  be  measured?  The  whisky  insured  by 
the  several  policies  issued  to  the  plaintiffs  was  of  different  in- 
spections. There  were  6,910  barrels  destroyed.  The  most  of  it 
was  manufactured  about  six  months  prior  to  the  fire;  some  in 
1903  and  1904,  and  some  in  1898  and  1899.  The  defendant  com- 
pany is  not  liable  beyond  the  actual  "cash  value."  What  is  that 
value?  That  is  fixed  by  the  uncontradicted  testimony  of  a  num- 
ber of  witnesses.  It  ranges  from  50  cents  to  $1.05  per  gallon, 
according  to  its  age.  This  was  the  cash  value  of  the  A.  Over- 
hold  &  Co.  whisky  in  the  wholesale  liquor  market  on  November 
19,  1905,  when  it  was  destroyed.  As  appears  in  the  evidence, 
there  was  whisky  of  that  brand  of  the  different  inspections  on 
the  market  at  that  date.  It  must  be  conceded,  we  think,  that, 
if  the  cash  value  of  the  whisky  at  the  date  of  the  loss  is  the 
only  practical  standard  for  maasuring  the  plaintiffs'  damages, 
the  court  3fid  jury  must  accept  the  value  fixed  by  the  plaintiffs' 
witnesses.  It  will  be  observed,  however,  that  the  policy  provides 
that  the  cash  value  of  the  whisky  "shall  in  no  case  exceed  what 
it  would  then  cost  the  insured  to  repair  or  replace  the  same  with 
material  of  like  kind  and  quality."  The  defendant  company  con- 
tends that  the  loss  could  not  be  estimated  at  more  than  it  would 
have  cost  the  insured  to  replace  the  whisky.  In  other  words,  the 
position  of  the  defendants  is  that,  under  this  provision  of  the 
contract,  the  plaintiffs'  right  of  recovery  is  limited  to  the  cost 
of  material,  the  expense  of  manufacturing  the  whisky,  the 
charges  for  carrying  it  in  bond,  insurance,  and  interest  on  the 
amount  invested  in  the  whisky.  This  provision  of  the  policy 
is  simply  a  limitation  on  the  former  provision,  which  fixes  the 
loss  at  the  cash  value  of  the  property.  In  estimating  the  loss,  the 
insured  is  entitled  to  the  cash  value  of  the  property  destroyed, 
provided  it  does  not  exceed  what  it  would  cost  to  replace  it  with 
material  of  like  kind  and  quality  at  the  date  it  was  consumed. 
How  shall  this  cost  be  ascertained?  It  is  doubtless  true  that  the 


CASH  VALUE — MEASURE  OF  DAMAGE.  29 

cost  of  manufacturing  a  gallon  of  whisky  is  easily  ascertained. 
But  that  does  not  meet  the  requirements  of  this  case.  The 
plaintiffs  are  net  restricted  to  the  simple  cost  of  reproducing 
the  whisky.  They  are  entitled  to  have  the  whisky  which  was 
destroyed  replaced  as  of  the  date  of  the  loss  with  the  same 
material  of  like  kind  and  quality.  The  whisky  consumed  by  the 
fire  was,  as  we  have  seen,  of  different  inspections.  It  had  age 
which, _gave  it  character  and  quality.  It  was  of  the  A.  Overholt 
&  Co.  brand,  dissimilar  in  character  and  quality  from  other 
brands,  and  for  which  there  is  no  substitute.  The  cost  of 
whisky  of  like  character,  quality  and  age  is  the  measure  of  the 
plaintiffs'  right  of  recovery.  It  is  manifest  that  this  cost  can 
not  be  ascertained  by  simply  taking  into  consideration  the  cost 
of  the  elements  suggested  by  the  learned  counsel  for  the  de- 
fendant company.  It  omits  from  the  calculation  the  effect  which 
age  has  on  that  particular  brand  of  whisky,  which  is  a  most 
important  factor  in  determining  its  cost.  Nor  can  any  witness, 
as  is  apparent,  definitely  estimate  what  the  age  of  each  of  the 
several  inspections  in  this  case  will  add  to  the  actual  cost  of  the 
material  entering  into  the  particular  brand  of  whisky.  It  is  an 
important  element  entering  into  its  value,  but  the  precise  extent 
to  which  its  value  is  increased  cannot  be  fixed  by  testimony. 
There  is,  therefore,  but  one  way  to  ascertain  the  cost  of  replac- 
ing the  whisky  at  the  date  it  was  destroyed,  considering  the 
brand,  character,  quality  and  age  of  the  whisky;  and  that  is  to 
ascertain  by  competent  evidence  its  actual  cash  value  on  the 
day  of  the  fire.  By  that  method  oi  computing  the  cost  the 
whisky  destroyed  will  be  replaced  "with  material  of  like  kind 
and  quality"  as  of  the  date  it  was  consumed,  and  that  is  there- 
fore the  measure  of  the  plaintiffs'  damages. 

The  rule  adopted  in  ascertaining  the  cost  of  replacing  the 
insured  property  in  Standard  Sewing  Machine  Company  v. 
Royal  Insurance  Company,  201  Pa.  645,  51  Atl.  354,  is  not  ap- 
plicable here,  for  the  reasons  above  stated.  To  enforce  it  under 
the  circumstances  of  this  case  would  deprive  the  plaintiffs  of 
the  protection  against  loss  of  their  property  by  fire  which  the 
policy  stipulates.  In  the  sewing  machine  case  there  was  no 
difficulty  in  applying  the  rule.  Here,  owing  to  the  peculiar 
character  of  the  property  insured,  the  cost  of  replacing  it  must 
be  determined  by  its  value  *t  the  date  of  loss. 

The  judgment  of  the  court  below  is  affirmed. 
Frick  v.  United  Firemen's  Ins.  Co.,  87  Atl.  743,  218  Pa.  489. 


30  HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 

The  court  affirmed  the  cases  of  Frick  v.  Svea  F.  &  L,.  Ins. 
Cos.  and  twenty-three  other  companies  at  same  time  on  same 
grounds. 

To  same  effect  is  Mechanics  Ins  Co.  v.  Hoover,  182  Fed. 
590,  aff'g  173  Fed.  888. 

CASH    VALUE    AS    APPLIED    TO    MANUFACTURERS' 
STOCK. 

Houghton  ,  J.  The  plaintiff  is  a  manufacturer  of  straw  hats, 
and  the  defendant  issued  to  him  a  policy  of  insurance,  insuring 
him  against  loss  by  fire  to  his  manufactured  and  unmanufactured 
stock  in  the  sum  of  $2,000.  On  February  11,  1906,  while  such 
policy  was  in  force,  a  fire  occurred  by  which  the  plaintiff's  fac- 
tory and  contents  were  destroyed.  A  portion  of  the  property 
so  destroyed  consisted  of  a  quantity  of  hats  which  had  been  fin- 
ished, bargained  for,  cased  for  shipment,  and  marked  with  the 
buyers'  names  prior  to  the  fire.  The  delivery  and  shipment  of 
these  goods  would  have  commenced  the  morning  after  the  fire 
occurred,  and  would  have  continued  for  four  months  following. 
The  stipulated  facts  concede  that  it  would  have  required  four 
months  to  reproduce  the  hats  in  the  condition  they  were  at  the 
time  of  the  fire  and  that  plaintiff's  factory  could  not  be  rebuilt 
in  time  to  reproduce  the  goods  for  the  coming  season's  trade, 
and  that  after  diligent  effort  the  plaintiff  was  unable  to  procure 
any  other  mill  to  reproduce  the  goods  and  was  unable  to  replace 
them  by  purchase  in  the  market.  The  policy  was  the  standard 
form,  and  contained  the  following  provision  with  respect  to 
ascertaining  the  loss: 

"This  company  shall  not  be  liable  beyond  the  actual  cash 
value  of  the  property  at  the  time  any  loss  or  damage  occurs,  and 
the  loss  or  damage  shall  be  ascertained  or  estimated  according 
to  such  actual  cash  value,  with  proper  deductions  for  deprecia- 
tion, however  caused,  and  shall  in  no  event  exceed  what  it 
would  then  cost  the  insured  to  repair  or  replace  the  same  with 
material  of  like  kind  and  quality." 

It  is  stipulated  that  the  actual  cost  of  manufacture  to  the 
plaintiff  of  that  portion  of  the  hats  for  which  defendant  is  liable 
was  $1,841.95,  and  that  the  actual  selling  price  at  which  plaintiff 
had  made  sales  on  which  he  was  about  to  make  delivery  was 
$1,966.79.  There  would  be  no  difficulty  in  deciding  the  question, 
and  doubtless  no  controversy,  except  for  the  clause  of  the  con 
tract  providing  that  the  loss  or  damage  "shall  in  no  event 


CASH  VALUE — MEASURE  OF  DAMAGE.  31 

what  it  would  then  cost  the  insured  to  repair  or  replace  the  same 
with  material  of  like  kind  and  quality." 

Without  this  clause  the  actual  cash  value  must  be  con- 
ceded to  be  the  measure  of  damage.  Whatever  may  be  the  rule 
with  respect  to  ordinary  manufactured  articles,  and  whether 
under  ordinary  circumstances  the  cost  of  manufacture  under  this 
clause  would  be  the  measure  of  loss,  we  are  of  the  opinion, 
under  the  facts  as  stipulated,  that  the  plaintiff  is  entitled  to 
recover  the  actual  cash  value,  and  it  not  limited  to  the  cost  oi 
manufacture.  Straw  hats  are  not  an  ordinary  staple.  Their 
value  depends  upon  style  and  finish,  and  they  must  be  produced 
for  the  summer  market.  In  order  to  reach  the  retailer  in  time 
for  the  summer  trade,  they  must  be  manufactured  in  the  fall 
and  winter,  so  they  may  come  to  the  hands  of  the  retailer  in 
the  spring  and  early  summer.  It  is  conceded  the  plaintiff  could 
not  repair  his  factory  or  obtain  another  in  which  to  reproduce 
the  hats  lost  by  fire  in  time  for  the  season's  trade,  nor  could 
he  go  upon  the  market  and  replace  them  by  purchase.  Under 
the  stipulated  facts  it  is  impossible  to  apply  the  clause  of  the 
contract  respecting  repair  or  replacement.  The  plaintiff  could 
neither  buy  them  nor  could  he  again  manufacture  them  in  time 
to  be  of  any  value.  It  cannot  be  ascertained  what  it  would  cost 
.the  insured  to  "repair  or  replace"  the  hats  "with  material  of 
like  kind  and  quality,"  because  they  could  be  neither  repaired 
nor  replaced.  There  is  no  other  mode,  therefore,  under  the 
contract  of  ascertaining  the  plaintiff's  loss,  except  by  taking 
"the  actual  cash  value"  of  the  property  destroyed,  which  is  con- 
ceded to  be  the  price  at  which  they  were  contracted  to  be  sold. 

In  Frick  v.  United  F.  Ins.  Co.,  218  Pa.  409,  67  Atl.  743,  a 
quantity  of  whisky  of  various  ages  was  destroyed  by  fire,  and 
the  policy  of  insurance  contained  the  same  clause  as  that  of  the 
policy  under  consideration.  The  question  involved  was  whether 
the  measure  of  loss  was  the  cost  of  manufacture  or  cash  value. 
Because  of  the  fact  that  it  was  impossible  to  produce  whisky  of 
the  precise  quality  and  mellowness  of  that  destroyed,  which 
condition  added  largely  to  its  value,  it  was  concluded  that  the 
only  practical  method  of  ascertaining  the  loss  was  to  take  the 
actual  cash  value.  In  its  decision  the  court  was  careful  to  dis- 
tinguish it  from  its  former  decision  in  Standard  Sewing  Machine 
Co.  v.  Royal  Ins.  Co.,  201  Pa.  645,  51  Atl.  354,  where  it  had 
limited  the  loss  to  the  cost  of  manufacture,  deeming  the  peculiar 
situation  a  controlling  feature.  A  like  peculiar  situation  exists 
under  the  stipulated  facts  in  this  case,  and  the  goods  being  im- 


32  HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 

possible  of  replacement,  the  plaintiff  is  entitled  to  recover  the 
actual  cash  value,  and  is  not  limited  to  the  cost  of  manufacture. 

Judgment  is  ordered  for  the  plaintiff  in  the  sum  of  $1,966.79, 
with  interest  from  the  28th  day  of  March,  1906,  with  costs. 

Laughlin  and  Scott,  JJ.,  concur. 

McLaughlin,  J.  (dissenting).  The  contract  in  question  was 
one  of  indemnity  only.  13  Am.  &  Eng.  Enc.  of  Law  (2d  Ed.)  p. 
101.  Profits  may  be  recovered  only  \then  insured  as  such.  Id. 
105;  Niblo  v.  North  Am.  Fire  Co.,  1  Sandf.  551;  Buffalo  El.  Co. 
y.  Prussian  Nat.  Ins.  Co.,  64  App.  Div.  182,  187,  71  N.  Y.  Supp. 
918,  affirmed  171  N.  Y.  25,  63  N.  E.  810.  Upon  the  facts  the 
plaintiff  would  be  indemnified  by  the  payment  to  him  of 
$1,841.95,  and  any  greater  sum  necessarily  includes  profits.  He 
was  a  manufacturer,  and  his  actual  los»  was  obviously  what  he 
had  expended  upon  the  goods  destroyed,  and  not  what  he  would 
have  realized  had  he  sold  them,  since  hi»  profits  would  be  in- 
cluded in  the  selling  price.  Standard  Sewing  Machine  Co.  v. 
Insurance  Co.,  201  Pa.  645,  51  Atl.  354;  Scottish  Union  Ins.  Co. 
v.  Keene,  85  Md.  263,  37  Atl.  33;  Mumford  v.  Hallett,  1  Johns. 
433;  Harris  v.  The  Eagle  Fire  Co.,  5  Johns.  368. 

It  is  doubtless  true  that  "actual  cash  value"  is  frequently  to 
be  construed  as  equivalent  to  market  value;  but  that  term  is  used 
in  the  policy  to  limit  the  liability  of  the  insurer,  and  the  pro- 
vision that  the  loss  "shall,  in  no  event,  'exceed  what  it  would 
then  cost  the  insured  to  repair  or  replace  the  same  with  ma- 
terial of  like  kind  and  quality"  shows  it  was  never  intended  by 
the  use  of  such  words  to  insure  the  manufacturer's  profits.  The 
value  of  an  article  is  ordinarily  fixed  by  its  market  value,  but  in 
the  case  before  us  the  amount  which  would  indemnify  the  plain- 
tiff is  conceded,  and  to  allow  him  anything  more  is  simply  to  al- 
low him  the  profits  which  he  would  have  realized,  had  the  fire 
not  occurred. 

I  am,  therefore,  of  the  opinion  that  upon  the  agreed  facts 
the  plaintiff  is  entitled  to  judgment  for  the  sum  of  $1,841.95, 
with  interest  from  the  28th  day  of  March,  1906. 

Phillips  v.  Home  Ins.  Co.,  112  N.  Y.  Supp.  769. 

HOUSEHOLD  GOODS. 

The  measure  of  'recovery  for  loss  on  household  goods  can- 
not be  based  on  what  a  junk  shop  or  second-hand  dealer  would 
have  given  for  them,  nor  what  they  would  have  brought  at 
forced  sale.  Nor  is  it  limited  to  their  market  value,  since  their 


CASH  VALUE — MEASURE  OF  DAMAGE.  33 

value  to  the  owner  and  the  cost  of  replacing  them  would  exceed 
their  market  value. 

Sun  Fire  Office  v.  Ayers,  37  Neb.  184,  55  N.  W.  635; 
Birmingham  &  Co.  v.  Huitoh,  157  Ala.  630,  47  So.  676. 

But  the  company  may  prove  the  value  by  showing  the  as- 
sured offered  to  sell  it  for  a  certain  price. 

Joy  v.  Security  F.  Ins.  Co.,  83  la.  12,  48  N.  W.  1049. 

FREIGHT. 

Freight  is  a  part  of  the  cost  of  the  goods. 
Case  v.  Mfrs.  F.  &  M.  Ins.  Co.,  82  Cal.  263,  22  Pac.  1083. 

MANUFACTURER'S  MEASURE  OF  LOSS. 

The  measure  of  the  loss  on  stock  of  a  manufacturer  is  the 
fair  market  value  at  the  place  of  its  destruction. 

Parrish  v.  Virginia  F.  &  M.  Ins.  Co.,  20  Ins.  L.  J.  95; 
Grubbs  v.  North  Carolina  H.  Ins.  Co.,  108  N.  C.  472,  20  Ins.  L.  J. 
784. 

PARTY  WALLS. 

The  owner  of  a  one-half  interest  in  a  party  wall  has  an 
insurable  interest  in  the  easement  of  the  other  half. 
Nelson  v.  Continental  Ins.  Co.,  182  Fed.  783. 

The  owner  of  such  a  half  interest  may  recover  the  full  value 
of  the  entire  wall  if  it  is  a  loss. 

Citizens  Ins.  Co.  v.  Lochridge,   132  Ky.  1,  116  S.  W.   303,   38  Ins. 

L.  J.  491,  annotated  in  20  L.  R.  A.   (N.  S.)  226; 
Kinzer  v.  National  M.  Ins.  Co.,  88  Kan.  93,  127  Pac.  762,  annotated 

in  44  L.  R.  A.   (N.  S.)  121. 

But  see 

Northwestern  M.  L.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Rochester  Ger.  Ins.  Co.,  88  Minn. 
48,  88  N.  W.  272. 

i 

The  following  was  written  in  the  year  1905,  long  before  the 
decisions  in  the  whisky  cases  were  decided  (see  first  edition 
"Hall  on  Insurance  Adjustments")  and  is  applicable  to  those 
decisions  and  all  others  rendered  since  1905. 

I  apprehend,  after  carefully  reading  the  foregoing  decisions, 
that  most  of  the  courts  will  uphold  the  wording  of  the  policy, 
which  means  nothing  more  nor  less  than  the  cash  market  value 
of  the  cost  to  replace  or  reproduce  the  article  new,  on  the  day 
and  at  the  place  it  was  damaged  or  destroyed,  less  whatever 
difference  in  value  there  may  be  between  new  and  the  condi- 
tion in  which  the  destroyed  article  was  at  the  time  of  its  de- 
struction. At  least  that  is  the  interpretation  I  place  on  the  Ian- 


34  HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 

guage  of  the  courts,  after  carefully  reading  the  decisions,  espe- 
cially the  cases  of  Stenzel  v.  Pennsylvania,  Hilton  v.  Phoenix, 
Grubbs  et  al.  v.  Ins.  Co.  and  Mack  v.  Ins.  Co.,  and,  as  was  said 
in  these  decisions,  cash  value  does  not  necesarily  mean  prime 
cash  cost,  plus  freight,  nor  does  it  mean  cost  of  (original)  pro- 
duction; the  cash  value  on  the  day  of  the  fire  might  be  much 
less  and  it  might  be  much  more  than  the  goods  cost.  If  the 
goods  have  declined  in  price,  the  insurance  company  is  entitled 
to  that  decline.  If  prices  have  advanced,  the  assured  is.  entitled 
to  the  benefit  of  such  advance.  In  both  cases  the  insurance 
company  is  entitled  to  any  depreciation  it  can  show  has  taken 
place  in  the  goods  from  shop  wear,  change  in  styles  or  for  any 
other  valid  reason. 

There  may  be  great  difference  between  cost  of  production 
and  cost  of  reproduction,  not  only  for  the  reason  that  cost  of 
labor  and  material  fluctuates,  but  other  conditions  may  inter- 
vene, as,  for  instance,  a  manufacturer's  factory  may  burn  and 
he  be  thereby  placed  in  a  position  where  he  can  not  reproduce 
the  destroyed  goods.  In  such  case,  if  his  goods  have  a  known 
cash  market  value,  such  as  flour,  lumber  or  whisky,  then  the 
measure  of  damage  for  which  the  company  would  be  liable  is 
the  sum  a  similar  grade  of  goods  would  have  cost  him  deliv- 
ered at  the  time  and  place  of  fire. 

If  the  property  destroyed  be  whisky,  the  chances  are  it  can 
not  be  reproduced  by  the  assured,  even  though  his  distillery  may 
not  have  been  harmed,  for  the  reason  that  the  longer  he  has 
had  it  the  more  valuable  it  is.  New  whisky  has  to  be  aged. 
The  same  principle  holds  good  with  it  that  was  expressed  by  the 
court  in  Western  Assurance  Co.  v.  Studebaker,  124  Ind.  176,  20 
Ins.  L.  J.  64,  in  sustaining  the  objection  of  plaintiff  to  the  in- 
troduction of  evidence  showing  what  the  contract  was  between 
plaintiff  and  a  party  in  another  State  for  green  lumber  used 'in 
their  business.  The  court  said:  "These  contracts  are  for  green 
lumber  to  be  manufactured  and  delivered  in  future.  The  lum- 
ber destroyed  was  seasoned,  dry  lumber.  It  was,  therefore, 
proper  to  show  what  first-class  poplar  lumber,  dry  and  of  the 
sam  dimensions,  was  worth  in  the  market  at  the  time  and 
place  of  the  fire."  If  there  was  no  market  at  such  time  and 
place,  then  it  might  probably  be  proper  to  show  what  it  was 
worth  in  the  nearest  market,  with  cost  of  transportation  to  scene 
of  the  loss  added. 

Suppose,   too,  that  a  manufacturer  has   contracted   for  the 


CASH  VALUE — MEASURE  OF  DAMAGE.  35 

sale  of  his  entire  output,  and  has  only  a  certain  time  in  which 
to  deliver  a  certain  quantity  of  goods.  In  case  of  fire,  his  loss 
will  be  what  it  costs  him  to  go  on  the  market  and  buy  the  goods, 
and  that  will  be  the  measure  of  damage  for  which  the  insurer 
is  liable  for  those  goods  that  were  destroyed  by  the  fire.  The 
contract  does  not  insure  the  goods  themselves;  it  insures  their 
owner  against  loss  on  same. 

An  insurance  policy  is  a  personal  contract. 
Wilcox  v.  Hill,  44  Mass.  66. 


36  HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 


CHAPTER  III. 

NOTICE  OF  LOSS. 

"If  fire  occur  the  insured  shall  give  immediate  notice  of  any  loss 

thereby,  in  writing,  to  this  company." 

The  requirement  of  immediate  notice  of  loss  contained  in 
a  New  York  standard  policy  is  satisfied  by  a  notice  given  within 
a  reasonable  time.  (In  this  case,  53  days  after  the  fire,  where, 
however,  the  policy  was  in  the  safe  in  the  building  which  was 
burned  and  could  not  be  obtained  until  about  the  time  the  notice 
was  given),  taking  into  consideration  the  situation  of  the  insured 
and  all  the  circumstances  by  which  he  is  surrounded,  and  if 
he  uses  due  diligence  in  discovering  the  policy,  and  serving 
the  notice  of  loss,  this  is  sufficient. 

Solomon  v.  Continental  Ins.  Co.,  160  N.  T.  695. 

Citing: 

O'Brien  v.  Phoenix  Ins.  Co.,  76  N.  T.  459;  Carpenter  v.  German 
Amer.  Ins.  Co.,  135  N.  Y.  298;  Griffey  v.  N.  T.  Central  Ins.  Co., 
100  N.  Y.  417;  N.  Y.  Cent.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Nat.  Protection  Ins.  Co., 
20  Barb.  468;  Inman  v.  Western  Ins.  Co.,  12  Wend.  452;  Ben- 
nett v.  Lycoming  County  M.  Ins.  Co.,  67  N.  Y.  274;  Matthews 
v.  American  Central  Ins.  Co.,  154  N.  Y.  458;  McNally  v.  Phoe- 
nix Ins.  Co.,  137  N.  Y.  389;  Trustees  Amherst  College  v.  Ritch, 
151  N.  Y.  282;  Paltrovitch  v.  Phoenix  Ins.  Co.,  143  N.  Y.  73; 
Sergeant  v.  Liverpool  and  London  and  Globe  Ins.  Co.,  156  N.  Y. 
349. 

It  is  for  the  jury  to  determine  whether,  in  view  of  all  the 
circumstances,  the  insured  acted  with  due  diligence  and  without 
unnecessary  delay  in  giving  notice  forthwith. 

Griffey  v.  N.  Y.  Central  Ins.  Co.,  100  N.  Y.  417;  affirming  30  Hun. 

299; 
O'Brien  v.  Phoenix  Ins.  Co.,  76  N.  Y.  469. 

Eleven  days  after  fire  is  not  forthwith: 
Trask  v.  Ins.  Co.,  6  Casey  198. 

Eighteen  days  after  fire  is  not  forthwith: 

Edwards  v.  Ly coming  Co.  Mut.  Fire  Ins.  Co.  (Pa.  S.  C.),  3  Ins. 
L.  J.  534. 

Standard  form  policy  requiring  immediate  notice  is  not 
complied  with  by  giving  notice  thirty-three  days  after  fire. 

Quinlan  v.  Providence-Washington  Ins.  Co,  (N.  Y.),  39  St.  Rep. 
820;  affirmed  in  133  N.  Y.  356. 

37 


38  HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 

•\ 

Fourteen  days   after  the   fire,  unaccompanied  by   any   fact 
or  circumstances  excusing  delay  is  not  such  immediate  notice. 
La  Force  v.  Williamsburgh  City  Fire  Ins.  Co.,  43  Mo.  App.  618. 

Failure  to  notify  insurer  within  the  term  prescribed  unless 
waived,  will  avoid  the  policy. 

Blossom  v.  Lycoming  Fire  Ins.  Co.,  64  N.  T.  162; 
Burnham  v.  Royal  Ins.  Co.,  75  Mo.  App.  394. 

Requirement  of  notice  forthwith  is  not  complied  with  by 
serving  proofs  of  loss  seven  weeks  after  fire. 

Brown  v.  London  Assurance  Corp.  (N.  Y.),  40  Hun.  101. 

Where  assured  has  failed  to  notify  insurer  of  the  loss, 
thereby  forfeiting  his  claim  under  the  policy,  the  insurer  does 
not  waive  his  rights  to  claim  forfeiture  by  refusing  to  pay  loss 
on  other  grounds. 

Blossom  T.  Lycoming  Fire  Ins.  Co.,  64  N.  T.  162; 
Brown  T.  London  Assurance  Corp.  (N.  Y.),  40  Hun.  101. 

Notice  may  be  given  the  local  agent  who  wrote  the  policy. 

Kendall  T.  Holland  Purchase  Ins.  Co.  (N.  Y.),  2  S.  C.  376;  affirmed 

in  68  N.  Y.  682; 
Germania  F.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Curran   (Kan.  S.  C.),  1  Ins.  L.  J.  191. 

A  notice  of  loss  sent  by  the  local  agent  who  informs  the  in- 
sured that  it  is  sent,  though  not  purporting  to  be  sent  in  be- 
half of  insured,  if  received  by  the  company,  is  sufficient. 

Loeb  v.  American  Central  Ins.  Co.,  99  Mo.  60,  21  Ins.  L.  J.  889. 

Where  policy  makes  the  notice  of  loss  a  condition  precedent 
to  recovery,  no  suit  can  be  maintained  without  proof  of  such 
notice. 

Washington  M.  Ins.  Co.  T.  Heckenath  (N.  Y.),  7  Leg.  &  Ins.  Rep. 
357. 

Forthwith   means   in   reasonable   time,    or  with   reasonable 
diligence,  dependent  on  the  circumstances  of  the  case. 
Bennet  v.  Lycoming  Mo.  Mut.  Ins.  Co.,  67  N.  Y.  274. 

It  means  due  diligence,  four  days  after  the  fire  is  sufficient. 
St.  Louis  Ins.  Co.  v.  Kyle,  11  Mo.  278. 

In  case  of  an  infant,  the  guardian  appointed  after  the  loss 
may  give  the  requisite  notice. 

O'Brien  v.  Phoenix  Ins.  Co.,  76  N.  Y.  469. 


NOTICE  OF  Loss.  39 

Knowledge  by  a  fire  insurance  company's  agent  of  the  loss 
by  fire  does  not  relieve  the  insured  from  the  duty  of  giving 
notice. 

Smith  v.  Haverhill  Ins.  Co.,  83  Mass.  297. 

Verbal  notice  given  by  assured  to  insurance  company's 
agent  who  wrote  the  policy  is  not  such  notice  as  the  policy 
requires. 

Ermentraut  v.  Girard  F.  and  M.  Ins.  Co.  (Minn.  S.  C.),  25  Ins.  L.  J. 
87. 

Where  a  fire  insurance  policy  requires  notice  of  loss  forth- 
with, it  means  with  all  reasonable  diligence  under  the  circum- 
stances of  the  particular  case. 

Central  City  Ins.  Co.  v.  Gates,  86  Ala.  558.  18  Ins.  L.  J.  761. 


HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

PROOFS  OF  LOSS  AND  REQUIREMENTS 
OF  ASSURED. 

"If  fire  occur,  the  *  insured  shall  *  *  *  protect  the  property 
from  further  damage,  forthwith  separate  the  damaged  and 
undamaged  personal  property,  put  it  in  the  best  possible  or- 
der, make  a  complete  inventory  of  the  same,  stating  the 
quantity  and  cost  of  each  article  and  the  amount  claimed 
thereon;  and,  within  sixty  days  after  the  fire,  unless  such 
time  is  extended  in  writing  by  this  company,  shall  render  a 
statement  to  this  company,  signed  and  sworn  to  by  said 
insured,  stating  the  knowledge  and  belief  of  the  insured  as 
to  the  time  and  origin  of  the  fire;  the  interest  of  the  insured 
and  of  all  others  in  the  property;  the  cash  value  of  each 
item  thereof  and  the  amount  of  loss  thereon;  all  incum- 
brances  thereon;  all  other  insurance,  whether  valid  or  not, 
covering  any  of  said  property;  and  a  copy  of  all  the  de- 
scriptions and  schedules  in  all  policies;  any  changes  in  the 
title,  use,  occupation,  location,  possession,  or  exposures  oi 
said  property  since  the  issuing  of  this  policy;  by  whom  and 
for  what  purpose  any  building  herein  described  and  the 
several  parts  thereof  were  occupied  at  the  time  of  fire;  and 
shall  furnish,  if  required,  verified  plans  and  specifications  oi 
any  building,  fixtures,  or  machinery  destroyed  or  damaged; 
and  shall  also,  if  required,  furnish  a  certificate  of  the  magis- 
trate or  notary  public  (not  interested  in  the  claim  as  a 
creditor  or  otherwise,  nor  related  to  the  insured),  living 
nearest  the  place  of  fire,  stating  that  he  has  examined  the 
circumstances  and  believes  the  insured  has  honestly  sus- 
tained loss  to  the  amount  that  such  magistrate  or  notary 
public  shall  certify." — New  York  Standard  Policy. 
"The  insured  shall  forthwith  separate  the  damaged  and  un- 
damaged personal  property,  put  it  in  the  best  possible  order 
and  make  a  complete  inventory  of  same." 

Oshkosh  Match  Co.  v.  Manchester  Assur.  Co.,  92  Wis.  510; 
Thornton  v.  Security  Ins.  Co.,  117  Fed.  773;  32  Ins.  L.  J.  557; 
Astrich  v.  German  Amer.  Ins.  Co.,  33  Ins.  L.  J.  308;  affirmed  (U.  S. 
C.  C.  A.  3d  Dist.),  33  Ins.  L.  J.  925. 

The  assured  took  an  inventory  and  at  the  end  of  it  stated 
the  claim  for  loss  as  follows: 

41 


42  HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 

Inventory  Loss 

33  1/3  %   on    dry  goods,  underwear,  etc.$6,061  $2,020.53 

25         %  on  furniture  and  fixtures 650  162.50 

16        %  on  boots,  shoes  and  rubbers. .    1,050  157.50 

15         %  on  groceries,  spices,  etc 2,850  427.50 

Total    Loss    $2,768.03 

In  this  inventory  are  found  some  items  of  a  collective  char- 
acter, such  as  "a  lot  of  goods  in  show  windows,"  "contents  oi 
a  small  show  case,"  "lot  of  shirt  bosoms,  handkerchiefs,  fly  net- 
ting, etc."  The  point  taken  is  that  policy  requires  each  article 
to  be  given,  its  quantity  and  cost  and  the  amount  claimed  there- 
on separately.  Held,  This  stipulation  is  not  to  be  construed 
most  strictly  against  the  insured.  Its  object  is  to  secure  a  full 
statement  of  the  loss  he  claims,  so  that  company  may  have 
notice  and  the  neccessary  opportunity  to  test  its  correctness. 

Boyle  v.  Hamburg-Bremen  F.  Ins.  Co.    (Pa.   S.  C.),  24  Ins.  L,  J. 
699. 

If  unable  to  give  cost  of  each  article,  the  number  of  such 
articles  of  each  kind  may  be  given  with  the  average  price. 

Clement's    Digest,    Rule    5,    p.    15,    citing    Peoples    F.    Ins.    Co.    v. 
Pulver,  127  111.  246  ;  20  N.  E.  Rep.  18. 

The  expense  of  putting  in  order  and  of  inventorying  must 
be  borne  by  the  assured. 

Clement's  Digest,  Rule  4,  p.  15. 

Hebner  v.  Palatine  Ins.  Co.,  157  111.  144  ;  41  N.  E.  Rep.  627. 

i 

The  expense  of  the  insured  in  saving  and  protecting  the 
property  and  putting  it  in  the  best  possible  order  is  one  inci- 
dental to  the  loss,  and,  until  the  case  of  Hebner  v.  Palatine  Ins. 
Co.,  and  Fire  Ins.  Assn'  v.  Wickham  et  al.,  I  never  heard  of  an 
adjuster  taking  the  position  that  his  company  was  not  liable 
for  such  loss.  The  fact  that  the  policy  requires  the  assured  to 
do  certain  acts  in  the  preservation  of  his  property  is  all  the  more 
reason  for  reimbursing  him  for  the  expense.  If  goods  of  an 
unknown  value  were  among  the  debris  of  a  building,  and  the 
insured,  by  hard  work,  succeeds  in  saving  them  at  an  expense 
of  $5,000  and  they  sell  for  $7,500,  the  salvage  has,  according  to 
this  Illinois  decision,  two  values,  one  of  $7,500  to  the  insurance 
companies,  but  only  $2,500  to  the  insured,  but  fortunately  for 
the  insured,  the  insurance  companies  do  not  take  such  an  unrea- 
sonable and  unfair  view  of  the  matter  in  adjusting  losses  with 
their  claimants  and  policyholders,  and  if  they  were  inclined  to 
settle  losses  according  to  the  Illinois  decision,  I  am  of  the 
belief  that  other  States  would  follow  the  doctrine  laid  down 


PROOFS  OF  Loss — REQUIREMENTS  OF  ASSURED.  43 

by  the  U.  S.  S.  C.  in  the  case  of  Fire1  Ins.  Ass'n,  (Ltd.),  v. 
Wickham  et  al.,  21  Ins.  L.  J.  193,  in  which  they  say: 

In  this  case  there  are  two  distinct  and  separate  claims  of 
similar  amounts,  namely,  $15,364.78,  one  of  which  was  for  the 
direct  loss  by  fire  to  the  property  insured,  and  the  other  was 
for  incidental  cost  of  saving  and  protecting  it  from  further  dam- 
age. The  plaintiff  assumed  on  the  face  of  the  receipts  (which 
were  in  usual  form  one  for  payment  of  loss,  the  other  for  pay- 
ment of  return  premium,  both  providing  for  cancellation  and 
surrender  of  the  policy)  to  settle  with  the  plaintiff  for  both  of 
these  claims  for  the  exact  amount  of  one  of  them.  In  other 
words,  they  assumed  to  settle  for  a  moiety  of  the  entire  claim, 
a  claim,  the  legality  and  justness  of  which  was  so  far  beyond 
dispute  that  it  could  hardly  fail  to  be  recognized  by  the  ad- 
justers for  the  companies  *  *  *.  The  appraisement  (which  pro- 
vided that  it  was  "of  binding  effect  only  as  far  as  regards  the 
actual  cash  value  of  or  damage  to  such  property  insured."  It 
was  further  added  that  "the  property  on  which  loss  or  damage 
is  to  be  estimated  and  appraised  is  the  hull  of  the  propeller 
St.  Paul,  including  tackle,  awnings,  furniture,  engine  and  boiler 
connections  and  appurtenances  thereto  belonging,"  with  a  further 
memorandum  following  the  signature  of  Wickham,  but  preceding 
those  of  the  companies  that  this  agreement  does  not  apply  to 
or  cover  any  question  that  may  arise  for  saving  boat  and 
cargo")  the  actions  of  the  parties  and  the  statement  of  the 
adjusters  that  they  had  no  authority  whatever  for  considering 
the  claim  for  raising  and  saving  the  steamer,  as  the  companies 
were  not  liable  for  such  expenses,  all  show  that  this  claim  was 
not  intended  to  be  included  in  the  receipts. 

Judgment  for  plaintiff  in  court  below  was  here  affirmed. 

In  both  these  cases,  Hebner  v.  Palatine  and  Fire  Ins.  Ass'n 
v.  Wickham,  the  property  insured  was  a  boat  and  the  risk  as- 
sumed was  against  fire  only. 

But  the  insured  is  not  required  to  put  the  goods  in  order  (or 
to  make  inventory)  when  the  value  is  trifling  and  no  proof  is 
offered  that  by  so  doing  the  value  would  be  enhanced. 

Clement's  Digest,  Rule  4,  p.  15. 

Citing: 

Wright  v.  Hartford  Fire  Ins.  Co.,  36  Wis.  522. 

Where  goods  (merchandise)  are  totally  destroyed,  an  item- 
ized inventory  is  not  required. 
Clement's  Digest.  Rule  6.  p.  15. 


44  HAU,  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 

Citing: 

Davis  v.  Grand  Rapids  Ins.  Co.,  15  Misc.  263  ;  36  N.  Y.  Supp.  792; 

affirmed  157  N.  Y.  685,  no  opinion. 
Johnston  v.  Farmers  Ins.  Co.,  106  Mich.  96;  64  N.  W.  Rep.  6. 

Nor  where  they  are  so  damaged  as  to  render  the  making 
of  such  an  inventory  impracticable. 
Clement's  Digest,  Rule  6,  p.  15. 

Citing: 

Powers  D.  G.  Co.  v.  Imperial  Ins.  Co.,  48  Minn.  380. 

A  clause  in  a  fire  policy  requiring  an  itemized  statement 
of  the  cash  value  of  each  article  and  the  amount  of  loss  thereon, 
applies  only  to  the  goods  saved  from  the  fire  and  not  to  those 
which  were  burned. 

Davis  v.   Grand  Rapids  Ins.  Co.,   36  N.  Y.  Supp.  792,  affirmed  In 
157  N.  Y.  685,  no  opinion. 

Where  the  books  and  papers  of  the  insured  and  all  means 
of  making  an  accurate  inventory  were  consumed  with  the  in- 
sured merchandise,  a  statement  on  oath,  showing  this  fact,  and 
that  the  property  insured  and  destroyed  was,  at  least,  of  the 
value  of  the  sum  named  is  sufficient. 

Bumstead  v.  Dividend  Mut.  Ins.  Co.,  12  N.  Y.  81  ; 

Hoffman  v.  ^Etna  Ins.  Co.,  1  Rob.  501 ;  S.  C.  19  Abb.  Pr.  325  ; 

Mortimer  v.  N.  Y.  Fire  Ins.  Co.,  2  U.  S.  Law  Magf.  452. 

The  furnishing  of  preliminary  proofs  of  loss,  unless  waived, 
is  condition  precedent  to  recovery. 

Underwood  v.  Farmers  Joint  Stock  Ins.   Co.,  57  N.  Y.   500  ; 

Irving  v.  Excelsior  F.  Ins.  Co.,   (N.  Y.),  1  Bos.  507; 

Burnham  v.  Royal  Ins.  Co.,  75  Mo.  App.  394  ; 

Kingsley  v.  N.  B.  Ins.  Co.,  62  Mass.  393  ; 

Wellcome  v.  Peoples  Ins.  Co.,  68  Mass.  480  ; 

Shawmut  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Peoples  Ins.  Co.,  78  Mass.  535  ; 

Home  Ins.  Co.  v.  Duke  (Ind.  S.  C.),  3  Ins.  L.  J.  365  ; 

Ins.  Co.  v.  Hathaway,  43  Kans.  399  ; 

Ins.  Co.  v.  Seyferth,  29  111.  App.  513  ; 

Leigh  v.  Ins.  Co.,  37  Mo.  App.  542  ; 

Lee  v.  Ins.  Co.,  73  Tex.  641. 

And  they  must  be  furnished  within  the  time  required  by 
the  policy. 

McDermott  v.  Lycomlng  F.  Ins.  Co.  (N.  Y.),  12  J.  and  S.  221; 
Smith  v.  Haverhill  Ins.  Co..  83  Mass.  297  ; 
Eastern  R.  R.  v.  Relief  Ins.  Co.,  98  Mass.  420. 

Where  proofs  are  served  60  days  after  the  fire  has  termi- 
nated or  abated  to  such  an  extent  that  an  inspection  of  the  dam- 
aged property  may  be  had,  it  is  a  sufficient  requirement  of  the 
policy  that  proofs  must  be  furnished  within  60  days  after 
the  fire. 

National  Wall  Paper  Co.   v.   Associated   Mfrs.   Mut   F.   Ins.   Co., 
175  N.  Y.  226. 


PROOFS  OF  Loss — REQUIREMENTS  OF  ASSURED.       .         45 

The  requirement  in  the  policy  that  proofs  be  furnished 
within  60  days  after  the  fire,  is  not  complied  with  by  deposit- 
ing such  proofs  in  the  mail  on  the  60th  day  after  the  loss,  where 
it  does  not  reach  its  destination  within  the  limited  time. 

Peabody  v.   Satterlee,  166   N.   Y.   174.  reversing    (S.  C.)    36  App. 
Dlv.  426  ;  30  Ins.  L.  J.  885. 

A  statement  in  the  proofs  of  loss,  that  the  property  be- 
longed to  the  assured,  and  that  no  other  person  or  persons  had 
any  interest  therein,  is  equivalent  to  a  statement  that  there 
were  no  incumbrances  on  the  property. 

Davis  v.    Grand   Rapids   Ins.    Co.,   N.   Y.    S.    C.    5,  App.    Div.    36 ; 
affirmed  in  157  N.  Y.  685   (no  opinion.) 


Where  several  policies  are  issued  to  one  person,  upon  the 
same  property,  a  single  proof  of  loss  referring  to  all  the  poli- 
cies is  sufficient. 

Dakin  v.   L.  and  L.  and   G.   Ins.   Co.,    13   Hun.   122 ;    S.   C.   77   N. 
Y.  600. 


Preliminary  proofs  may  be  signed  by  a  member  of  a  co- 
partnership in  the  absence  of  any  provision  in  the  policy  re- 
quiring the  names  of  the  individual  members  of  the  firm  to  be 
given. 

Kerelsen   v.    Sun  Fire   Office,   122   N.   Y.    545 ;    affirming  S.   C.    16 
St.  Rep.  239. 

The  retention  of  proofs  of  loss  for  more  than  twenty-three 
days  without  objection  operates  as  a  waiver  of  defects  therein. 

Davis  v.    Grand   Rapids   Ins.   Co.,   N.    Y.   S.    C.,    5   App.    Div.    36 ; 
affirmed  in  157  N.  Y.  685    (no  opinion.) 

Where  proofs  of  loss  are  kept  without  objection  that  they 
were  not  served  by  the  proper  party,  the  insurer  can  not  make 
defense  that  they  were  not  served  by  the  "insured." 


De  Witt  v.  Agricultural  Ins.  Co.,  89  Hun.  229  ;  S.  C.  71  St.  Rep. 
556  ;  Affirmed  in  157  N.  Y.  353. 


Where  the  insured  in  his  proofs  of  loss  makes  a  statement 
of  what  he  had  been  "informed"  was  the  origin  of  the  fire,  and 
no  question  of  surprise  was  raised  on  the  trial,  he  is  not  es- 
topped or  precluded  from  showing  that,  in  fact,  the  fire  origi- 
nated from  some  other  cause. 

White  v.  Royal  Ins.  Co.,  149  N.  Y.  485 ;  affirming  S.  C.  8  Misc.  611. 


46  HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 

The  preliminary  proofs  are  not  evidence  of  the  loss  on  the 
trial. 

Yonkers  and  N.  Y.  F.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Hoffman  F.  Ins.   Co.,    (N.  Y.), 

6  Rob.  316  ; 
Sexton  v.  Montgomery  Co.  Mut.  Ins.  Co.,  9  Barb.  191. 

Unless  made  so  by  the  terms  of  the  policy. 
Sexton  v.  Montgomery  Co.  Mut.  Ins.  Co.,  9  Barb.  191. 

The  furnishing  of  preliminary  proofs  according  to  the  con- 
ditions of  the  policy  must  be  averred  in  the  declaration;  or  it 
will  be  bad  on  demurrer, 

Inman  v.  Western  Fire  Ins.  Co.,  12  Wend.   452,    (N.  Y.)  ; 
Furlong  v.  Agricultural  Ins.  Co.,  28  Abb.  N.  C.  444;  S.  C.    (N.  Y.), 

45  St.  Rep.  856. 

A  denial  of  liability  waives  proofs  and  suit  may  be  brought 
at  once. 

Hicks  v.   British  America  Assur.   Co.,    8    (N.   Y.   S.   C.)    App.   Div. 

444  ;  S.  C.   43  N.  Y.  Supp.   623. 
Flaherty  v.  Continental  Ins.   Co.,  20  App.  Div.   275;   (N.  Y.)   S.  C. 

46  N.  Y.  Supp.  934  ; 

Ins.  Co.  v.  Richardson  (Neb.  S.  C.),  24  Ins.  L.  J.  690  ; 

Ins.  Co.  v.  Journal  .Pub.  Co.   (Wash.  S.  C.),  20  Ins.  L*.  J.  395; 

Ins.  Co.  v.  Carey  (111.  S.  C.),  6  Ins.  L.  J.  493. 

Ins.  Co.  v.  Maguire,  57  111.  342  ; 

Cobb  v.  Ins.  Co.,  11  Kans.  93  ; 

Ins.  Co.  v.  Gracey  (Cal.  S.  C.),  20  Ins.  L.  J.  28  ; 

Donohoe  v.  Ins.  Co.  (Vt.  S.  C.),  13  Ins.  L.  J.  116. 

The  trustee  in  bankruptcy  of  an  absconding  bankrupt  may, 
by  direction  of  the  court,  make  proofs  of  loss  under  policies  of 
insurance  held  by  the  bankrupt. 

Sims  v.  Union  Assur.  Soc.   (U.  S.  C.  C.  Ga.),  129  Fed.  Rep.  804. 

Mortgagee  may  make  proofs. 

Nickerson  v.  Nickerson  et  al.  (Me.  S.  J.  C.),  12  Atl.  Rep.  880. 
Bull  v.  North  British  and  Merc.  Ins.  Co.  (Ont.  S.  C.  of  J.),  9  Can. 

Law  Times,  26; 
Armstrong  v.  Agricultural  Ins.  Co.  (N.  Y.  S.  C.),  31  N.  Y.  St.  Rep. 

201. 

The  case  of  Peabody  v.  Satterlee,  30  Ins.  L.  J.  885,  does  not 
pass  upon  the  question  as  to  who  may  make  proofs.  The  at- 
torney for  the  assured  in  that  case  made  proofs  which  were 
returned  by  the  company,  with  the  request  that  the  insured 
make  the  proofs.  The  fact  that  the  assured  accepted  the  re- 
jected proofs  made  by  his  lawyer,  and  made  new  proofs  in  his 
own  name,  waived  any  right  that  he  might  have  had  to  claim 
that  the  proofs  were  in  order,  hence,  the  court  did  not  pass  upon 
this  question. 

A  proof  of  loss  is  an  entirely  ex  parte  statement  of  facts 


PROOFS  OF  Loss — REQUIREMENTS  OF  ASSURED.  47 

concerning  the  property,  the  loss  and  the  insurance,  intended 
only  to  afford  information  as  a  basis  of  settlement,  if  satisfac- 
tory, and  if  not,  a  basis  for  investigation.  This  statement  made 
in  behalf  of  the  insured,  by  an  agent  fully  conversant  with  all 
the  facts,  and  having  charge  of  the  property,  serves  these  pur- 
poses as  well  as  if  made  by  the  insured  himself.  Accordingly, 
it  has  been  generally  held,  when  the  principal  is  absent,  and 
the  facts  are  within  the  knowledge  of  the  agent,  a  proof  so 
made  is  sufficient. 

Fireman's  Fund  Ins.  Co.  v.  Sims  (Ga.  S.  C.),  42  S.  E.  Rep.  269; 
Lumbermen's  Ins.  Co.  v.  Bell  (111.),- 45  N.  E.  Rep.  130; 
German   F.   Ins.    Co.   v.    Grunert   (111.); 
Sims  v.  State  Ins.  Co.,  4  Am.  Rep.  311; 

Pearlstine  v.  Westchester  F.  Ins.  Co.  (S.  C.  S.  C.),  34  I.  L.  J.  39; 
Sims  v.  Union  Assur.  Soc.   (U.  S.  C.  C.  Ga.),  129  Fed.  Rep.  804. 

/ 

But  see  cases  under  examination  under  oath,  which  places 
it  within  the  power  of  the  adjuster  to  practically  nullify  the 
ruling  of  the  courts  allowing  a  third  party  to  make  proofs  for 
the  insured. 

Objections  to  proofs  of  loss  must  be  specific  and  not 
general. 

Hartford  F.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Meyer  (Neb.  S.  C.),  46  N.  W.  Rep.  292; 
Bean  v.  Travelers  Ins.  Co.  (Cal.  S.  C.),  29  Pac.  Rep.  1113; 
Dwelling  House  Ins.  Co.  v.  Gould  (Pa.  S.  C.),   19  Atl.  Rep.  793; 
Paltrovitch  v.  Phoenix  Ins.  Co.,  143  N.  Y.  73;  S.  C.  60  St.  Rep.  462; 
affirming  S.   C.   68  Hun.  304. 

J 

It  is  the  duty  of  the  company  immediately  to  notify  the  as- 
sured wherein  his  proofs  are  defective. 

Dwelling  House  Ins.   Co.  v.   Gould   (Pa.   S.   C.),   19  Atl.  Rep.   793. 

Company  must  object  to  defects  in  reasonable  time. 

Union  Ins.  Co.  v.  Barwick  (Neb.  S.  C.),   (Mar.  18.  1893),  6  Finch 

Digest  67; 

Nease  v.  Aetna  Ins.  Co.   (W.  Va.  C.  A.),  9  S.  E.  Rep.  233; 
Peet  v.  Dakota  F.  and  M.  Ins.  Co.  (Dakota  S.  C.),  20  Ins.  L.  J.  253. 

Company  must  object  to  defects  promptly. 

Kernochan  v.  N.  Y.  Bowery  F.  Ins.  Co.,  17  N.  Y.  428; 
Biddleford  Savings  Bank  v.  Dwelling  House  Ins.  Co.    (Me.  S.  C.), 
18  Atl.  Rep.  298. 

Retention  of  proofs  of  loss  without  objection  for: 
Twenty-three  days  is  waiver  of  defects. 

Paltrovitch  v.  Phoenix  Ins.  Co.,  143  N.  Y.  73;  S.  C.  60  St.  Rep.  462; 
affirming  S.  C.  68  Hun.   304. 

Thirty  days  is  waiver  of  defects. 

Peoples  F.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Pulver  (111.  S.  C.),  20  N.  E.  Rep.  18; 
Carpenter  v.  Allemannia  F.  Ins.  Co.  (Pa.  S.  C.),  26  Atl.  Rep.  781. 


48  HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 

Thirty-eight  days  is  waiver  of  defects. 
Keeney  v.  Home  Ins.  Co.,  71  N.  Y.  396. 

Forty-five  days  is  waiver  of  defects. 
Jones   v.    Howard   Ins.    Co.,    117    N.   Y.    103. 

Forty-eight  days  is  waiver  of  defects. 
Capitol  Ins.  Co.  v.  Wallace  (Kan.  S.  C.).  22  Ins.  L.  J.  397. 

The  failure  of  the  insurance  company  to  object  to  proofs  of 
loss  after  notice,  in  other  words  by  undue  length  of  silence  after 
presentation;  or  its  refusal  to  pay  on  grounds  other  than  de- 
fective proofs,  will  waive  proofs.  But  none  of  the  courts  hold 
that  its  mere  silence  after  receipt  of  notice  of  loss  will  waive 
proofs. 

Central  City  Ins.  Co.  v.  Gates,  86  Ala.  668,  18  Ins.  L.  J.  761. 


CHAPTER  V. 

NOTARY  PUBLIC'S  OR  MAGISTRATE'S 
CERTIFICATE. 

The  production  of  such  certificate  when  required,  unless 
the  insurer  has  waived  it  or  prevented  the  obtaining  it,  is  a^con- 
dition  precedent  to  recovery. 

DeLand  v.  Aetna  Ins.  Co.,  68  Mo.  App.  277; 
Johnson  v.  Phoenix  Ins.  Co.,   112  Mass.   49; 
Dplliver  v.  St.  Joseph  Ins.  Co.,    131  Mass.   39; 
Fink  v.  Lancashire  Ins.  Co.,   60  Mo.  App.   673; 
Hubbard  v.  North  British  and  M.  Ins.  Co.,  67  Mo.  App.  1; 
Cornell  v.  Hope  Ins.  Co.,  3  Martin   (La.)  223; 
Columbian  Ins.  Co.  v.  Lawrence,  10  Pet.  507; 
Leadbetter  v.  Aetna  Ins.  Co.,  13  Me.  265. 

The  clause  requiring  notary  public  or  magistrate  most  con- 
tiguous to  the  fire,  will  be  liberally  construed,  the  magistrate's 
proximity  to  the  place  is  all  that  can  be  required. 

Turley  v.  North  American  F.  Ins.  Co.  (N.  T.  S.  C.),  25  Wend.  374. 

His  certificate  that  he  is  not  concerned  in  the  loss  is  suffi- 
cient until  disproved. 

Cornell  v.  LeRoy  (N.  Y.  S.  C.),  9  Wend.  163. 

Where  the  policy  requires  the  certificate  within  60  days 
after  fire,  no  recovery  can  be  had  unless  it  is  furnished. 

Gottlieb  v.   Dutchess   Mut.   Ins.   Co.    (N.   Y.    S.   C.),    89   Hun.    36; 
S.  C.  69  St.  Rep.  250. 

The  requirement  as  to  nearest  magistrate  must  be  strictly 
complied  with,  when  the  nearest  not  only  does  not  refuse  to  act, 
but  actually  gives  a  certificate  which  does  not  meet  the  require- 
ment. 

Noonan  v.  Hartford  F.  Ins.  Co.,  21  Mo.  81. 

The  capricious  refusal  of  the  nearest  magistrate  to  give  the 
certificate  will  not  prevent  a  recovery  if  the  certificate  of  an- 
other magistrate  is  obtained. 

Leigh  v.  Springfield  F.  and  M.  Ins.  Co.,  37  Mo.  App.  642. 

Where  the  nearest  notary  refuses  certificate,  that  of  next 
nearest  notary  is  a  compliance  with  the  policy. 

Lang  v.  Eagle  F.  Ins.  Co.,  12  App.  Div.  39;  S.  C.  42  N.  Y.  Supp.  638. 
Walker  v.  Phoenix  Ins.  Co.,  62  Mo.  App.  209. 

49 


50  HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 

Not  concerned  in  the  loss  as  a  creditor  means  that  he  shall 
not  have  a  specific  interest  by  way  of  lien,  and  does  not  dis- 
qualify a  magistrate  who  is  a  general  creditor. 
Dolliver  v.  St.  Joseph  Ins.   Co.,  131  Mass.  39. 

Where  the  insurer  furnishes  blank  proof  of  loss  containing 
form  for  a  certificate,  and  rejects  two  sets  of  proofs  because 
they  each  fail  to  contain  such  certificate,  it  will  defeat  recovery 
on  the  policy,  unless  it  is  otherwise  waived. 

Sullivan  v.  Germania  F.  Ins.  Co.,  89  Mo.  App.  106. 

If  the   certificate  be   so  drawn   as   to  mean   the   same  thing 
without  using  the  exact  words  of  the  policy,  it  is  sufficient. 
Aetna  F.  Ins.   Co.  v.  Tyler   (N.  Y.  S.  C.)(  16  Wend.  385. 

Assured  complies  with  the  requirement  if  he  goes  to  the 
nearest  de  jure  magistrate. 

Walker  v.  Phoenix  Ins.  Co.,  62  Mo.  App.  209. 

Without  requirement  assured  did  furnish  certificate,  which 
insurer  objected  to  on  the  ground  that  it  did  not  mention  the 
damage.  Held,  This  did  not  amount  to  a  requirement  for  such 
certificate,  (^tna  Ins.  Co.  v.  Bank,  62  Fed.  Rep.  222,  dis- 
tinguished). 

Swearinger  v.   Pacific  F.  Ins.  Co.,   66  Mo.  App.   90. 

An  objection  to  proof  because  certificate  was  not  furnished 
is  not  good  unless  such  certificate  has  been  requested  before- 
hand.    (Cases  reviewed  and  distinguished).  , 
Burnett  v.  American  Central  Ins.  Co.,  68  Mo.  App.  343. 

Retention  for  23  days  of  certificate  of  notary  not  nearest 
fire  waives  company's  right  to  reject  proofs  on  that  ground. 

Paltrovitch  v.  Phoenix  Ins.  Co.,  143  N.  Y.  73;  S.  C.  60  St.  Rep.  462; 
affirming  S.  C.  68  Hun.  304. 

Where  company  rejects  certificate  on  the  ground  that  there 
is  a  nearer  notary,  it  should  give  the  name  and  address  of  such 
notary  to  enable  the  insured  to  comply  with  its  demands. 

Paltrovitch  v.  Phoenix  Ins.  Co.,  143  N.  Y.  73;  S.  C.  60  St.  Rep.  462; 
affirming  S.   C.   68  Hun.   304. 

I 

Where  proofs  of  loss  not  containing  certificates  were  re- 
jected and  nearly  a  year  afterwards  proofs  of  loss  and  certifi- 


NOTAEY  PUBLIC'S  OR  MAGISTRATE'S  CERTIFICATE.  51 

cate  were  served  and  suit  commenced  the  same  day,  it  was  held 
suit  was  not  prematurely  brought. 

McNally  v.  Phoenix  Ins.  Co.,  137  N.  T.  389;  S.  C.  50  St.  Rep.  680; 
reversing  S.  C.  42  St.  Rep.  21. 

Where  nearest  notary's  certificate  was  not  secured,  but  no 
defect  in  this  respect  was  pointed  out  until  after  commencement 
of  action,  the  objection  was  too  late. 

Barnum  v.  Merchant's  F.  Ins.  Co.,  98  N.  T.  188; 
Smith  v.  Home  Ins.  Co.   (N.  Y.  S.  C.),  47  Hun.  30. 


52  HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 


CHAPTER  VI. 

EXAMINATION  UNDER  OATH,  AND  THE 

PRODUCTION  OF  BOOKS,  INVOICES, 

ETC. 

"The  insured,  as  often  as  required,  shall  exhibit  to  any  person 
designated  by  this  company  all  that  remains  of  any  prop- 
erty herein  described,  and  submit  to  examinations  under 
oath  by  any  person  named  by  this  company,  and  subscribe 
the  same ;  and,  as  often  as  required,  shall  produce  for  exami- 
nation all  books  of  account,  bills,  invoices,  and  other  vouch- 
ers or  certified  copies  thereof,  if  originals  be  lost,  at  such 
reasonable  place  as  may  be  designated  by  this  company  or 
its  representative,  and  shall  permit  extracts  and  copies 
thereof  to  be  made." 

The  trustee  in  bankruptcy  of  an  absconding  bankrupt  may, 
by  direction  of  the  court,  make  proofs  of  loss  under  policies  of 
insurance  held  by  the  bankrupt. 

Sims  v.  Union  Assur.  Soc.   (U.  S.  C.  C.  Ga.),  129  Fed.  Rep.  804. 

A  proof  of  loss  is  an  entirely  ex  parte  statement  of  facts 
concerning  the  property,  the  loss  and  the  insurance,  intended 
only  to  afford  information  as  a  basis  of  settlement  if  satisfac- 
tory, and  if  not,  a  basis  for  investigation.  This  statement,  made 
in  behalf  of  the  insured  by  an  agent  fully  conversant  with  all 
the  facts,  and  having  charge  of  the  property,  serves  these  pur- 
poses as  well  as  if  made  by  the  insured  himself.  Accordingly, 
it  has  been  generally  held,  when  the  principal  is  absent  and 
the  facts  are  within  the  knowledge  of  the  agent,  a  proof  so 
made  is  sufficient. 

Fireman's  Fund  Ins.  Co.  v.  Sims  (Ga.  S.  C.),  42  S.  E.  Rep.  269: 
Lumbermen's  Ins.   Co.  v.  Bell    (111.),  45  N.  E.   Rep.   130. 
German  F.   Ins.  Co.  v.   Grunert   (111.), 
Sims  v.  State  Ins.  Co.,  4  Am.  Rep.  311. 

Pearlstine  v.  Westchester  F.  Ins.  Co.  (S.  C.  S.  C.).  34  Ins.  L.  J.  39; 
Sims  v.  Union  Assur.  Soc.  (U.  S.  C.  C.  Ga.),  129  Fed.  Rep.  804; 
Burns  v.   Michigan  Mfrs.  Mut.  F.  Co.   (Mich.  S.  C.,  May,  1902),  31 
Ins.  L.  J.  663. 

But  the  provision  for  examination  under  oath  stands  upon 
an  entirely  different  footing  from  that  requiring  proofs  of  loss; 
the  manifest  purpose  of  this  stipulation  is  to  afford  a  method 

53 


54  HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 

of  detecting  imposition  and  fraud.  In  demanding  examination, 
the  insurer  indicates  dissatisfaction  with  the  formal  ex  parte 
statement  of  proof.  In  such  case,  the  insured  has  agreed  his 
conscience  may  be  searched  by  questions  put  to  him  face  to 
face,  where  there  is  no  opportunity  for  studied  concealment. 
He,  and  not  his  agent,  has  an  interest  in  the  claim  for  the 
insurance  and,  therefore,  a  motive  for  fraud.  To  hold  that 
a  person  to  whom  an  insurance  policy  was  issued  could  sub- 
stitute an  agent  for  himself  to  undergo  such  an  examination 
would  be  to  disregard  not  only  the  letter,  but  the  spirit  of  the 
actual  contract,  and  make  another  for  the  parties.  We  know 
of  no  authority  which  holds  that  an  agent  may  be  substituted 
for  such  an  examination. 

Pearlstine  v.  Westchester  F.  Ins.  Co.  (S.  C.  S.  C.),  34  Ins.  L.  J.  39; 

Citing 

Fireman's  Fund  Ins.   Co.  v.   Sims   (Ga.   S.  C.),  42   S.   E.   Rep.    269; 
Gross  v.  Ins.  Co.  (U.  S.  C.  C.  Ga.),  22  Fed  Rep.  74. 

The  company  has  the  right  to  demand  and  have  the  insured 
himself  appear  for  examination  under  oath,  and  his  failure  to 
appear  for  examination  on  demand  of  the  company  is  a  bar 
to  a  right  of  action. 

Sims  v.  Union  Assur.  Soc.    (U.  S.  C.  C.  Ga.),  129  Fed.  Rep.  804; 
Fireman's  Fund  Ins.  Co.  v.  Sims    (Ga.  S.   C.),  42   S.  E.   Rep.   269; 

31  Ins.  L.  J.  1049; 
Gross  v.  Ins.  Co.  (U.  S.  C.  C.),  22  Fed.  Rep.  74. 

To  constitute  insured's  refusal  to  be  examined  under  oath 
a  ground  of  defense,  the  insurance  company  must  show  that  it 
named  a  reasonable  time  after  notice  of  the  fire,  the  place  must 
have  been  a  reasonably  convenient  one  within  the  county  where 
the  insured  resided,  and  it  must  have  designated  some  person 
authorized  by  law  to  administer  oaths  and  before  whom  such 
examination  could  be  had. 

Aetna  Ins.  Co.  v.  Simmons,  49  Neb.  811;  69  N.  W.  Rep.  125. 


And  the  insured  must  subscribe  to  such  examination. 

>p.  276; 

:eene,  85  Md.   263;  26  Ins.  L.  J.  963. 


Grigsby  v.  Ins.  Co.,  40  Mo.  App.  276; 
Scottish  U.  &  N.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Ke< 


Once  he  refuses  to  subscribe,  he  may  still  do  so  if  he  so 
wishes. 

O'Brien  v.  Ohio  Ins.  Co.,  52  Mich.  131. 

The  insured,  if  required,  is  bound  to  furnish  duplicate  bills 


EXAMINATION;   PRODUCTION  OF  BOOKS,  ETC.  55 

(the  originals  of  which  have  been  lost),  certified  by  the  ven- 
dors, unless  unable  to  do  so. 

O'Brien  v.  Commercial  F.  Ins.  Co.,  63  N.  T.  108. 

Plaintiff  is  bound  to  show  that  he  made  a  reasonable  effort 
to  comply  with  defendant's  request  to  furnish  duplicate  bills, 
the  originals  of  which  were  lost. 

Langan  v.  Royal  Ins.  Co.  (Pa.  S.  C.),  29  Atl.  Rep.  710. 

A  duplicate  bill  is  not  a  certified  copy;  the  demand  should 
be  in  the  language  of  the  policy  to  make  it  operative. 
Ins.  Cos.  v.  Weides,  14  Wallace  U.  S.  375. 

Insured  can  not  be  compelled  to  say  on  what  basis  he  set- 
tled with  other  companies. 

Ins.  Cos.  v.  Weides,  14  Wallace  U.  S.  375. 

The  insured  is  only  required  to  answer  such  questions  as 
have  a  material  bearing  on  the  risk. 

Titus  v.   Glens  Falls  Ins.  Co.,  81  N.  T.  410; 
Porter  v.  Traders  Ins.  Co.,  164  N.  Y.  504. 

In  the  absence  of  any  stipulation  to  the  contrary,  the  proper 
place  for  examination  of  assured's  books  is  the  trading  place 
of  assured  in  the  town  or  place  where  loss  occurred. 

Fleisch  v.  Ins.  Co.  of  N.  A.,  58  Mo.  App.  598;  23  Ins.  L.  J.  634; 
Murphy  v.  North  B.  &  M.  Ins.  Co.,  61  Mo.  App.  323. 

Reasonable  place  means  reasonable  place  in  the  locality 
or  town  where  the  loss  occurred. 

Murphy  v.  North  B.  &  M.  Ins.  Co..  61  Mo.  App.  323. 

Tucker  v.  Colonial  F.  Ins.   Co.    (W.  Va.   S.  C.),  34  Ins.   L.   J.  969. 

The  insurer  can  not  require  the  insured  to  leave  the  State 
where  he  resides  and  where  fire  occurs  to  submit  to  examina- 
tion under  oath. 

Amer.  Central  Ins.  Co.  v.   Simpson,  43  111.  App.  98. 

i 

And  the  insured  may  not  demand  that  such  examination 
shall  be  made  at  a  distant  place  to  which  he  has  removed  after 
the  fire. 

Fleisch  v.  Ins.   Co.  of  N.  A.,  58  Mo.  App.  596;  23  Ins.  L.  J.  634. 

Where  the  insured  endeavors  to  comply  with  the  require- 
ment to  furnish  duplicate  bills,  the  jury  must  decide  whether 
such  efforts  were  reasonable  under  all  the  circumstances. 

Coleman  v.  Ins.  Co.,  177  Pa.  St.  239. 


ii  HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 

He  is  bound  to  comply  with   the  request,  if  possible. 

Langan  v.  Ins.  Co.,  162  Pa.  St.  367;  23  Ins.  L.  J.  878; 
Seibel  v.  Ins.  Co.   (Pa.  S.  C.),  29  Ins.  L.  J.  838. 

The  insurer's  office  in  the  adjoining  county  in  which  the 
loss  occurs  is  a  reasonable  place  for  the  production  of  books  and 
bills. 

Seibel  v.  Ins.  Co.  (Pa.  S.  C.),  29  Ins.  L.  J.  838; 

Aetna  Ins.  Co.  v.  Simmons,  49  Neb.  811;  69  N.  W.  Rep.  125. 

The  time  must  be  reasonable,  and  the  place  be  reasonably 
conventient  to  where  insured  resides. 

Aetna  Ins.  Co.  v.  Simmons,  49  Neb.  811;  69  N.  W.  Rep.  125; 
Aurora  Ins.  Co.  v.  Johnson,  46  Ind.  315; 
State  Ins.  Co.  v.  Maackens,  38  N.  J.  L.  564. 

The  failure  of  the  insured  to  produce  books,  papers  and 
vouchers,  in  the  absence  of  a  proper  demand  for  their  produc- 
tion, does  not  constitute  a  defense  to  payment  under  a  policy 
of  fire  insurance. 

[Judgment  for  plaintiff  below.     Here  affirmed  against  company.] 
Narinsky  v.  Fidelity  Surety  Co.   (N.  T.  S.  C.  App.  Tr.): 
92  New  York  Supplement  (April  10,1905),  771. 

The  postive  refusal  of  an  insurance  company  to  pay  the 
loss  is  an  absolute  waiver  of  its  right  under  the  policy  to  exam- 
ine the  books  of  the  insured. 

[Judgment  for  plaintiff  below.     Here  affirmed  against  company.] 
Colonial  Mut.  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  Ellinger   (111.  A.  C.): 
112  111.  App.  302. 

Although  it  might  be  found  that  it  was  impossible  to  pro- 
duce duplicate  bills  of  purchase  of  a  certain  class,  that  fact  did 
not  excuse  the  non-production  of  those  that  could  have  been  ob- 
tained by  a  bona  fide  effort  on  the  part  of  the  insured. 
Mispelhorn  v.  Ins.   Co.,  53  Md.  473. 

Insured  is  not  compelled  to  do  an  impossible  thing,  and  if 
he  can  show  that  it  was  impossible  to  get  duplicate  bills,  he 
may  recover.  A  finding  by  the  jury  that  he  has  done  all  that 
was  possible  is  conclusive. 

Eggleston  v.  Council  Bluffs  Ins.  Co.,  65  Iowa  308;  14  Ins.  L.  J.  365; 
Miller  v.  Hartford  F.  Ins.  Co.,  70  Iowa  704. 

The  insured  is  not  obliged,  when  unable  to  do  so,  to  fur- 
nish invoices  of  property  destroyed. 

Stepehens  v.  Union  Assur.  Soc.    (Utah  S.  C.),  50  Pac.  Rep.  626. 


EXAMINATION;   PRODUCTION  OF  BOOKS,  ETC.  57 

The  insured  may  have  his  attorney  present  at  such  examina- 
tion. 

Thomas  v.  Burlington  Ins.  Co.,  47  Mo.  App.  169; 
Amer.  Central  Ins.  Co.  v.  Simpson,  43  111.  App.  98. 

The  defense  to  an  action  on  a  fire  policy  that  insured  had 
failed  to  submit  to  an  examination  under  oath,  as  required,  is 
waived,  if  no  notice  was  given  to  the  insured,  but  notice  was 
given  to  her  husband,  and  as  her  agent  he  appeared  and  was  ex- 
amined. 

Western  Assur.  Co.  v.  McGlathery   (Ala.  S.  C.),  22  Southern  Rep. 
104. 

The  insurer  waives  the  formal  certification  of  the  copy 
of  bills  and  invoices  furnished  it,  where  it  receives  and  exam- 
ines the  same,  without  objection  to  the  absence  of  certificates, 
and  makes  no  objection  until  a  trial. 

Johnson  v.  Phoenix  Ins.  Co.,  69  Mo.  App.  226. 

Where  the  insured  makes  no  attempt  to  comply  with  in- 
surer's request  to  furnish  certified  copies  of  bills,  the  originals 
of  which  were  destroyed,  he  cannot  recover. 

Milwaukee  Mechs.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Winfield  (Kan.  C.  A.),  51  Pac.  Rep. 
667. 

Certified  copies  of  bills  and  invoices  does  not  mean  an  in- 
ventory of  the  stock  insured  owned  when  policy  was  issued. 

Phoenix  Ins.  Co.  v.  Center   (Texas  C.  C.  A.),  31  S.  W.  Rep.   446. 

The  examination  under  oath  cures  defects  in  proofs. 
Carpenter  v.  German- American  Ins.  Co.,  136  N.  T.  298. 

Misstatement  of  facts  made  in  examination  under  oath  will 
not  avoid  the  policy  unless  insured  knew  them  to  be  false,  and 
made  them  with  fraudulent  intent. 

Huston  v.  State  Ins.  Co.   (Iowa  S.  C.),  69  N.  W.  Rep.   674. 

Wilful  false  swearing  will  avoid  the  whole  policy. 

Hamberg  v.  St.  Paul  F.  &  M.  Ins.  Co.   (Minn.  S.  C.),  26  Ins.  L.  J. 
782. 

The  loss  is  due  sixty  days  after  proofs  of  loss  are  furnished 
and  the  duplicate  bills  furnished  on  demand  of  insurer  are  no 
part  of  the  proofs  of  loss. 

Aetna  Ins.  Co.  v.  McLeod  et  al.   (Kan.  S.  C.),  25  Ins.  L.  J.  669. 


58  HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 


CHAPTER  VII.. 

FRAUD  AND  FALSE  SWEARING. 

The  policy  will  not  be  avoided  without  proof  of  fraudulent 
intent. 

Dresser  v.  United  Firemen's  Ins.  Co.   (N.  Y.),  45  Hun.  298. 

An  over-valuation  of  the  goods  destroyed  in  the  proofs  of 
loss,  unless  shown  to  be  wilful,  is 'not  even  presumptive  evi- 
dence of  false  swearing  or  fraud. 

Unger  v.  People's  F.  Ins.  Co.   (N.  Y.),  4  Daly  96; 
Gibbs  v.  Continental  Ins.  Co.    (N.  Y.),  13  Hun.   611. 

The  misstatement  as  to  value  in  proofs  of  loss  must  be 
false  and  fraudulent,  but  a  misstatement  which  is  but  the  ex- 
pression of  an  opinion  does  not  operate  to  avoid  the  policy. 

Cheever  v.  Scottish  U.  and  N.  Ins.  Co.   (N.  Y.  S.  C.),  86  App.  Div. 
328;  83  N.  Y.  Supp.  730. 

An  honest  mistake,  or  other  misstatement  in  proofs  of  loss 
will  not  forfeit  claim. 

Little  v.  Phoenix  Ins.  Co.,   123  Mass.   380; 

Parker  et  al.  v.  Amazon  Ins.  Co.  (Wis.  S.  C.),  3  Ins.  L.  J.   567. 

But  if  no  amended  statement  has  been  furnished  the  in- 
surer before  suit  on  policy,  the  action  can  not  be  maintained. 

Campbell  v.  Charter  Oak  Ins.  Co.,  92  Mass.  213; 

City  F.  C.  Sav.  Bank  v.  Pa.  F.  Ins.  Co.,  122  Mass.  165. 

To  work  a  forfeiture  the  false  statement  must  be  wilfully 
made  with  respect  to  a  material  matter. 

Winn  v.  Ins.   Co.,  27  Neb.  649; 

Marion  v.   Great  Rep.  Ins.  Co.,  35  Mo.   148; 

Walker  v.   Phoenix  Ins.   Co.,   62  Mo.  App.   209; 

Hamberg  v.  St.  Paul  F.  and  M.  Ins.  Co.   (Minn.  S.  C.),  26  Ins.  L. 

J.  782; 
Phoneix  Ins.  Co.  v.  Summerfleld  (Miss.  S.  C.),  22  Ins.  L.  J.  746. 

And  the  false  swearing  must  be  either  in  the  proofs  of 
loss  or  in  the  examination  under  oath. 

Schulter  v.  Merchants  Mut.  Ins.  Co.,  62  Mo.  236; 
Ins.  Cos.  v.  Weide   (U.   S.   S.   C.),  1  Ins.   L.  J.   767; 
Ferris  &  Eaton  v.  North  American  Ins.  Co.    (N.   Y.   S.   C.),   1  Hill 
71;   2  Bennett  56. 


60  HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 

Defense  on  ground  of  false  swearing  in  proofs  of  loss  will 
not  avail  the  defendant  when  not  pleaded. 

Bear  v.  Atlantic  Home  Ins.  Co.    (N.   T.),  34  Misc.   613;   70  N.   Y 
Supp.  681. 

The  fact  that  the  evidence  showed  that  other  dealers  carried 
a  much  smaller  line  of  certain  articles  plaintiff  claimed  to  have 
had  is  not  competent  to  show  that  plaintiff's  sworn  statement 
of  loss  was  fraudulent. 

Townsend  v.  Merchants  Ins.  Co.   (N.  Y.),  4  J.  &  S.  172;  S.  C.  46 
How.  Pr.  601. 

A  finding  by  the  jury  that  plaintiff's  loss  was  less  than  one- 
fourth  amount  claimed  in  his  proofs  of  loss  necessarily  results 
in  an  inference  of  fraud  and  requires  a  verdict  in  favor  of  the 
defendant. 

Steinfeld  v.  Park  Ins.  Co.,  N.  Y.,   50  Hun.  262;   S.  C.  19   St.  Rep. 
1*3;   2  N.  Y.  Supp.   766. 

Contra: 

Com'l  Ins.   Co.  v.  Friedlander,  156   111.   595. 

Obersteller   v.    Com'l  Assur.    Co.    (Cal.    S.    C.),    22    Ins.   L.   J.    392. 
Moore  v.  Protection  Ins.  Co.,  29  Me.  97;  2  Bennett  758. 
Marchesseau  v.  Merchants  Ins.   Co.,  2  Ben.    166    (La.   S.  C.). 

The  question  of  false  swearing  is  one  for  the  jury. 

Dolan  v.  Aetna  Ins.  Co.   (N.  Y.),  22  Hun.  396. 

Levy  v.  Brooklyn  Ins.  Co.,  25  Wend.   687  ;   2  Bennett  93. 

A  false  statement  wilfully  made  as  to  the  loss  and  value  of 
the  insured  property  will  defeat  recovery  on  the  policy. 

Lion  F.  Ins.   Co.  v.  Star   (Tex.   S.   C.),  18  Ins.  L.  J.   873. 

Hall  v.  Western  U.  Asset.,   106  Mo.  App.   476. 

Home  Ins.  Co.  v.  Winn   (Neb.  S.  C.),  24  Ins.  L.  J.  126. 

Citing: 

Claflin  v.  Ins.  Co.,  110  U.  S.   81. 

Geib  v  Ins.  Co.,   1  Dil   443   Fed.  Cas.   No.   5298. 

Huchberger  v.  Ins.  Co.,  4  Biss.  265  Fed.  Cas.   No.   6822. 

JDollof  v.  Ins.  Co.,  82  Me.  266  ;  19  Ins.  L.  J.  450. 

Sleeper  v.   Ins.  Co.,   56  N.  H.   401. 

Moore  v.  Ins.  Co.,  28  Grat.   508. 

Ins.  Co.  v.  Mannasson,  29  Mich.  316  ;  3  Ins.  L.  J.  668. 

If  the  plaintiff  knowingly  and  willingly  inserts  in  his  sworn 
statement  of  loss,  as  burned,  any  single  article,  which  in  fact 
was  not  in  the  house,  or  was  not  burned,  or  if  he  knowingly 
puts  a  false  and  excessive  valuation  on  any  single  article,  or 
puts  such  false  and  excessive  valuation  on  the  whole  as  dis- 
plays a  reckless  and  dishonest  disregard  of  the  truth  in  regard 
to  the  extent  of  the  loss.  Such  acts  are  in  themselves  fraudulent 


FRAUD  AND  FALSE  SWEARING.  61 

and  plaintiff  cannot  recover  at  all.  Mere  words  are  not  neces- 
sarily proof,  and  courts  are  not  compelled  to  allow  justice  to 
be  perverted,  because  incredible  evidence  is  not  contradicted 
by  direct  and  postive  testimony.  Such  cases  call  for  the  su- 
pervisory power  of  the  court. 

Rovinsky   v.    Northern    Assur.    Co.    and    another    (S.    J.    C.    Me.), 
34  Ins.  L.  J.  800. 

Practically  the  same  doctrine  is  upheld  in 
Schmidt  v.  Phil.  Underwriters    (La.  S.   C.),  32  Ins.  L.  J.   531. 

Citing: 

Claflin  v.   Ins.   Co.,  110  U.   S.   81  and  Regnier  v.   Ins.  Co.,    12  La. 
336 ;    1   Bennett  670. 

And  this  is  so  where  the  actual  loss  was  in  excess  of  the 
amount  of  the  policy  as  stated  in  false  sworn  statement. 

Dollof  v.   Phenix  Ins.  Co.   and   one   other    (S.   J.   C.   Me.),   19   Ins. 
'  L.   J.   450. 

Plaintiff's  affidavit  that  property  which  had  been  saved 
was-destroyed  worked  a  forfeiture  of  the  policy. 

Knop  v.  National  F.  Ins.  Co.    (Mich.  S.  C.),  25  Ins.  L.   J.  181. 
Mullen  v.  Ins.  Co.,  58  Vt.   113. 

West   v   British   America  Assur.    Co.    (U.    S.    C.    C.   Dist.    Col.),    25 
Ins.  L.   J.   689. 

Plaintiff  paid  $3,000  for  the  building,  but  claimed  it  worth 
$6,500  in  his  proofs  of  loss.  On  trial  of  the  case  $3,000  was 
proven  to  be  its  real  value.  Held,  such  false  statement  worked  a 
forfeiture. 

West  v.  British  America  Assur.  Co.    (U.   S.   C.   C.  Dist.   Col.),    25 
Ins.   L.  J.   689. 

Of  all  the  decisions  one  ever  heard  of,  and  one  which,  if 
upheld  and  generally  known,  will  cause  more  attempts  to  de- 
fraud insurance  companies  than  any  other,  the  following  takes 
the  lead  and  is  the  most  unreasonable  and  unfair: 

1.  A  deception,  in  order  to  amount  to  legal  fraud,  must 
both  deceive  and  damage.     Where  the  company  is  not  injured 
in  an  adjustment  by  the  fraudulent  alteration  of  books,  the  ad- 
justment (based  on  and  arrived  at  by  such  books  )will  not  be 
defeated  (disturbed). 

2.  The   concealment   of  an   inventory   from    the   adjusters 
is  not  a   concealment   of   a  "material   fact"   within   the   policy, 
unless  the  company  is  injured  thereby. 

3.  Evidence    of   the    adjusters    that    they   would    not    have 


62  HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 

made  the  adjustment  had  they  known  of  the  alterations  is  a 
mere  opinion  of  their  course  under  different  circumstances  and 
is  not  admissible. 

4.  Evidence  of  the  manager  as  to  his  reasons  for  the  altera- 
tions is  admissible. 

Commercial    Bank   v.    Firemen's    Ins.    Co.    (Wis.    S.    C.),    23    Ins. 
L.  J.  543. 

No  wonder  the  court  cites  no  decisions  in  support  of  its 
ruling  other  than  those  of  its  own  rendition.  It  was  conceded 
on  the  trial  of  the  case  that  the  insured's  manager  did,  after 
the  fire  by  erasure  and  overwriting,  reduce  the  manufacturing 
account  $13,000  and  increase  the  lumber  account  $13,000.  The 
loss  was  on  lumber  in  kilns.  (Such  erasurer  and  changes  would 
not  throw  the  books  out  of  balance.) 

The  inventory  taken  in  January  previous  to  the  fire  was 
also  concealed  from  the  adjusters. 

Would  not  assured's  manager  who  had  done  these  things, 
swear  to  anything?  Would  he  ever  admit  that  the  insurance 
company  had  been  defrauded  by  his  fraudulent  acts?  For  what 
purpose  would  he  perpetrate  a  fraud?  For  the  protection  of  the 
insurance  companies  (?)  of  course. 

How  different  the  reasoning  in  this  case  from  that  of  courts 
of  New  York,  Massachusetts,  Maine  and  Louisiana,  and  the 
U.  S.  S.  C.  and  especially  that  of  the  eminent  and  learned  Judge 
Cooley  in  Mannasson  v.  Ins.  Co.,  29  Mich.  316;  3  Ins.  L,.  J.  668. 

Here  is  Wisconsin  again.  It  was  admitted  that  in  stating 
the  amount  of  the  loss  in  their  proofs,  insured  included  mer- 
chandise as  destroyed  which  had  been  ordered  before  the  fire, 
but  had  not  been  received  at  the  time  of  the  fire;  and  that 
upon  their  examination  under  oath  after  making  of  the  proofs, 
they  testified  that  these  goods  had  actually  been  received  before 
the  fire.  Insured  claimed  that  these  false  statements  were  made 
through  innocent  mistake,  while  the  companies  claimed  that 
they  were  wilfully  made  with  intent  to  defraud.  The  proofs  of 
loss  were  made  out  for  insured  by  an  expert  employed  by  them, 
from  information  furnished  by  insured.  The  evidence  showed 
that  the  bills  and  invoices  of  insured  were  freely  submitted  to 
the  adjusters  who  in  this  manner  ascertained  the  inclusion  of 
the  goods  in  dispute.  Held,  That  while  the  evidence  tended  to 
show  the  inclusion  of  the  amount  of  these  goods  in  the  proofs 


FKAUD  AND  FALSE  SWEARING.  63 

of  loss  was  wilful,  it  was  a  question  for  the  jury  whether  they 
were  included  with  fraudulent  intent.  [Judgment  for  plaintiff 
below.  Here  affirmed  against  company.] 

Newton  et  al.  v.  Theresa  Village  Mut.  Fire  Ins.  Co.; 

Same  v.  Waterloo  Mut.  Fire  Ins.  Co.; 

Same  v.  DeForest  Mut.  Fire  Ins.  Co.   (Wis.  S.  C.)  : 

104  Northwestern  Reporter  (July  18,  1905),  107. 


64  HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

OPTIONS. 

Option  To  Repair  or  Rebuild. 

Where  the  insurer  elects  to  rebuild,  the  contract  of  insur- 
ance is  converted  into  a  building  contract,  and  the  amount  of 
damage  recoverable  from  the  breach  of  contract  is  not  limited 
to  the  amount  of  insurance. 

Heilman  v.  Westchester  F.  Ins.  Co.,  75  N.  Y.   7,  8  Ins.  L.  J.   53. 
Morrell  v.   Irving  Ins.   Co.,   33   N.  Y.   429. 

Brown  et  al.  v.   Royal  Ins.   Co.    (Queen's  Bench,  Eng.),   4   Bennett 
371 ;  1  Ellis  &  Ellis  853. 

Where  two  separate  insurers  eject  to  rebuild,  in  case  of 
breach,  the  owner  may  recover  his  full  damages  against  one  of 
them,  leaving  it  to  seek  contribution  from  the  other  on  its  own 
motion. 

Morrell  v.  Irving  Fire  Ins.  Co.,  33  .N.   Y.   429. 

The  impossibility  of  performance  by  reason  of  action  of 
city  authorities  does  not  relieve  the  insurer,  it  having  elected  to 
rebuild,  it  is  liable  for  damages  for  not  doing  so. 

Brown    and    others   v.    Royal    Ins.    Co.    (Queen's    Bench,    Eng.),    4 

Bennett  371  ;  1  Ellis  &  Ellis  853. 
Fire  Ass'n  v.   Rosenthal    (Pa.  S.   C.),   15   Ins.   L.  J.   658. 

The  insurer  is  liable  for  damages  including  rent,  resulting 
through  delay. 

Fire  Ass'n  v.  Rosenthal  supra. 

But  there  can  be  no  claim   for  rent  until   at  least   after  a 

reasonable  length  of  time  has  elapsed  for  making  the  repairs. 

St.  Paul  F.  &  M.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Johnson   (111.  S.  C.),  6  Ins.  L.  J.  434. 

The  assured  is  not  bound  to  take  any  steps  to  restore  the 
property  to  its  previous  condition. 

Hoffman  v.   Aetna  F.  Ins.  Co.    (N.  Y.);   1  Rob.   501. 

The  insurer  will  not  be  granted  an  injunction  restraining 
insured  from  removing  the  goods  saved,  to  enable  the  insurers 
to  exercise  their  option. 

N.  Y.  F.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Delaven,   (N.  Y.),  8  Paige  419. 

65 


66  HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 

The  notice  of  insurer's  intention  to  exercise  the  option  must 
be  given  within  the  time  named  in  the  policy. 

McAllaster  v.  Niagara  F.  Ins.  Co.,  ,156  N.  Y.  80  ;  28  Ins.  L.  J.  769. 

The  insurance  company  having  elected  to  rebuild  is  no 
longer  under  obligation  to  pay  a  money  damage  and  it  will  be 
discharged  from  garnishment  proceedings. 

Hurst  et  al.  v.  Home  Protection  F.   Ins.   Co.    (Ala.  S.   C.),  16  Ins. 

L.  J.  688. 
Godfrey  v.  Macomber  and  Ins.  Co.   (Mass.  S.  C.),  9  Ins.  L.  J.  287. 

The  insurer  having  rebuilt  for  sum  less  than  the  insurance, 
the  unexhausted  amount  of  policy  remains  in  force  on  the  new 
building  in  case  of  its  destruction  by  fire  for  the  unexpired  term 
of  policy. 

Trull  v.  Roxbury  Mut.  Ins.  Co.   (Mass.  S.  C.),  3  Ben.  15. 

The  company  having  elected  to  repair,  but  for  more  than 
a  month  taking  no  steps  to  do  so,  is  liable  for  damages  from  ex- 
posure of  building  to  weather. 

Amer.  Cent'l  Ins.  Co.  v.  McLanathan  (Kan.  S.  C.),  2  Ins.  L.  J.  907. 

The  right  of  option  to  rebuild  begins  to  run  from  time 
proofs  are  served  and  60  days  thereafter  when  the  loss  becomes 
payable  the  option  terminates  and  right  of  action  accrues. 

McAllaster  v.  Niagara  F.  Ins.  Co.    (N.  Y.  C.  A.),  28  Ins.  L.  J.  769. 
Clover  v.  Greenwich  Ins.  Co.  101  N.  Y.  277  ;  15  Ins.  L.  J.  214. 

And  when  the  insurance  company  waives  proofs  of  loss,  it 
may  still  exercise  the  option  within  the  time  limited  by  the 
policy  and  such  time  begins  to  run  from  the  date  of  such  waiver. 

Farmers  and  Merchants  Ins.  Co.  v.  Warner   (Neb.   S.  C.),  34   Ins. 
L.  J.  83. 

There  are  two  modes  of  settlement  under  the  contract,  one 
is  payment  of  damages  for  the  loss,  the  other  the  restoration  of 
the  subject  of  insurance  to  its  former  condition.  It  could  not 
have  been  contemplated  by  the  parties  that  both  methods  of 
performance  were  to  be  pursued.  The  selection  by  the  insur- 
ance company  of  one  of  these  alternatives  necessarily  consti- 
tuted an  abandonment  of  the  other. 

Wynkoop  v.  Niagara  F.  Ins.  Co.    (N.  Y.  C.  A.),  12  Ins.  L.  J.  253. 

The  resort  to  arbitration  by  the  insurer  is  an  election  to 
make  payment  in  money. 

McAllaster  v.  Niagara  F.  Ins.  Co.   (N.  Y.  C.  A.),  28  Ins.  L.  J.f  769. 
Iowa    Central   Bldg.    &   L.    Ass'n   v.   Merchants   and  Bankers'    Fire 


OPTIONS.  67 

Ins.  Co.  (la.  S.  C.),  32  Ins.  L.  J.  852. 
Alliance    Cooperative  Ins.    Co.   v.    Arnold    (Kan.    S.    C.),    31    Ins. 

L.    J.    943. 
Platt   v.   Aetna   Ins.    Co.   is   to   same   effect,    but   that   non-waiver 

clause  in   appraisal  agreement  preserved   company's   option   to 

rebuild,    153    111.    133    (Aff'g   40    111.    App.    191),    24    Ins.    L.    J. 

132,  38  N.  E.  580. 

The  Insurer,  one  of  ten,  and  all  having  elected  to  rebuild, 
but  afterwards  all  except  the  defendant  compromised  the  loss. 
The  defendant  declined  to  settle  and  then  demanded  an  ap- 
praisal, which  was  agreed  to.  The  award  under  the  appraisal 
exceeded  the  total  insurance.  Held,  defendant's  election  to  re- 
build converted  its  policy  into  a  building  contract,  and  that  the 
appraisal  was  without  reference  to  any  questions  or  matters 
of  difference  other  than  the  loss  and  damage,  and  that  plaintiff 
by  agreeing  to  appraise  did  not,  as  a  matter  of  law,  waive  his 
existing  right.  He  was  merely  leaving  all  questions  other  than 
the  loss  and  damage  to  be  determined  by  the  parties  themselves, 
or  by  litigation.  It  was  further  held  the  liability  was  several  and 
not  joint,  and  that  plaintiff  had  the  right  after  the  insurer  had 
elected  to  rebuild  to  compromise  and  settle  with  any  of  the 
companies  thus  bound  to  rebuild  without  releasing  the  others 
from  such  proportionate  share  of  the  cost  to  rebuild. 

Good  v.  Buckeye  Mut.  F.  Ins.  Co.   (Ohio  S.  C.),  15  Ins.  L.  J.,  3. 

! 

In  those  States  having  the  valued-policy  law,  the  statute 
forms  not  only  part  of  the  contract  between  the  parties,  but  as 
was  said  in  Reilly  v.  Ins.  Co.  (43  Wis.  456)  of  a  statute  similar 
in  its  terms,  controls  other  provisions  in  the  policy,  so  that 
such  other  provisions  as  far  as  they  are  inconsistent  with  the 
statute  are  necessarily  avoided. 

Ampleman  v.   Cit.  Ins.   Co.,   18  Ins.  L.   J.,  396    (Mo.  App.). 

Nor  under  such  circumstances  has  the  insurer  the  right  to 
rebuild. 

Marshall  et  al.  v.  Amer.   Guar.  F.  M.  I.  Co.,  80  Mo.  App.   18. 
Milwaukee  Mech.   I.   Co.   v.   Russell    (Ohio   S.  C.),    62   N.   E.  Rep., 
338,  31  Ins.  L.  J.,  360. 

Wisconsin's  standard  form  of  policy  permits  the  insurer,  in 
case  of  total  or  partial  loss,  to  rebuild  or  replace  the  property 
destroyed  with  other  of  like  kind  and  quality  or  pay  the  full 
insurance,  holding  that  such  provision  does  not  conflict  with 
the  valued-policy  law  of  the  State.  (R.  S.  Wis.  1898,  Sec.  1941- 
44.) 

Temple  v.  Niagara  Ins.  Co.    (Wis.   S.  C.),  85  N.  W.  Rep.,  361. 


68  HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 

Where  the  city  ordinances  will  not  permit  the  building  to 
be  repaired  or  rebuilt,  the  insurer  is  liable  for  total  loss,  i.  e., 
the  entire  value  of  the  building  not  exceeding  the  insurance. 

O'Keefe  v.  L.  &  L.  &  G.  Ins.  Co.,  140  Mo.    558  ;  41  S.  W.  Rep.,  922. 

Brady  v.  Ins.  Co.,  11  Mich.,   445. 

Brown  v.   Ins.   Co.,  1  Ellis  &  Ellis,   853. 

Hamburg- Bremen  F.  L  Co.  v.  Garlington  (Tex.),  15  Ins.  L.  J.,  509. 

Larkin  v.  Glens  Falls  Ins.   Co.    (Minn.  S.  C.),   83  N.  W.  Rep.,  409. 

Monteleone  v.  Royal  I.  Co.   (La.  S.  C.),  24  Ins.  L.  J.,  531. 

And  this  is  true  where  such  law  was  enacted  during  the  life 
of  the  policy. 

Pennsylvania,  etc.  v.  Phil,  etc.   (Pa.  S.  C.),  51  Atl.  Rep.,  351. 

But  in  New  York,  where  the  standard  form  of  policy  is  part 
of  the  statute  law  of  the  State,  the  insurer  is  only  liable  for  the 
amount  it  would  cost  the  insured  to  rebuild,  repair  or  replace 
the  building  with  material  of  like  kind  and  quality,  this  regard- 
less of  laws  or  ordinances  regulating  the  repair  and  construc- 
tion of  buildings. 

McCready  et  al.  v.  Hartford  F.  Ins.  Co.    (N.  Y.  S.  C.,  App.   Div.), 
70  N.   Y.   Supp.,  778;   30  Ins.  L.  J.,   668. 

And  the  same  is  true  where  the  policy  exempts  the  company 
from  loss  caused  by  a  law  or  ordinance  regulating  the  repair 
of  damaged  buildings,  except  in  those  States  which  have  a 
valued  policy  law. 

Option  Of  Insurer  To  Take  Over  Salvage. 

Option  of  "insurer  to  take  all  or  any  part  of  damaged  prop- 
erty at  its  ascertained  or  appraised  value  *  *  *  on  giving 
notice  within  thirty  days  after  receipt  of  proofs  herein  required, 
of  its  intention  so  to  do." 

Where  assured  sells  the  goods  without  giving  the  company 
the  right  to  exercise  this  option,  he  thereby  renders  void  his 
policy,  and  all  rights  thereunder. 

Astrich   v.    German-American    Ins.    Co.     (U.   S.    C.    C.    A.,    July    5, 

1904),  33  Ins.  L.  J.   925. 
Morley  v.  L.  &  L.  &  G.   Ins.  Co.   (Mich.   S.  C.),   20   Ins.  L.  J.   577. 

After  an  appraisal  the  company  must  have  taken  some  steps 
to  show  that  it  wishes  to  avail  itself  of  the  option  before  it  can 
claim  breach  of  the  condition. 

Davis  v.   Grand  Rapids  F.   Ins.  Co.,  15   Misc'l  263,   S.   C.  36  N.   Y. 
Supp.   792.     Affirmed,  157   N.   Y.   685. 

Defendants  claim  that  assured  should  have  kept  the  goods 


OPTIONS.  69 

thirty  days;  awaiting  its  option  to  take  them  was  unreasonable. 

Davis    v.    American    Central    Ins.    Co.,    7    App.    Div.    488,    S.    C.    40 
N.  Y.  Supp.  248.     Affirmed   (no  opinion),  158  N.  Y.  688. 

Neither  can  the  insurer  with  a  $1,500  policy  on  goods  valued 
at  $16,000,  insured,  also,  in  twelve  other  companies,  exercise 
this  right. 

Davis   v.    American   Central    Ins.    Co.,    7    App.    Div.    488,    S.    C.    40 
N.   Y.   Supp.  248.     Affirmed,   158   N.  Y.   688. 

When  two-thirds  of  the  goods  were  wholly  destroyed,  the 
balance  greatly  damaged,  and  the  assured  had  kept  them 
eighteen  days,  during  which  time  none  of  the  thirteen  companies 
in  which  assured  held  policies  claimed  the  goods,  the  insured, 
after  advertising  the  sale  in  two  daily  papers,  sold  the  goods  at 
public  auction  for  $250.  Held,  That  he  did  not  thereby  forfeit 
his  claim  for  loss. 

Davis   v.    American   Central    Ins.    Co.,    7    App.    Div.    488,    S.    C.    40 
N.  Y.   Supp.  248.     Affirmed,   158  N.  Y.  688. 

If  an  Insurance  company  fails  within  three  days  to  demand 
an  appraisal,  or  to  exercise  its  option  to  take  the  goods,  it 
waives  its  right  to  take  them  or  to  have  them  appraised. 

Phoenix  Assur.  Co.  v.  Stenson  (Tex.  C.  C.  A.),  79  S.  W.  Rep.   866. 

If  there  was  no  appraisement,  the  option  to  take  the  goods 
did  not  attach,  and  this  regardless  of  whose  fault  caused  the 
failure  to  appraise. 

Swearinger  v.   Pacific  F.   Ins.   Co.,   66   Mo.   App.    90. 

The  insurance  company  can  not  in  one  breath  deny  the 
arbitration  and  in  the  next  assert  and  claim  rights  growing  out 
of  and  depending  on  it.  If  it  elects  not  to  be  bound  by  the  arbi- 
tration, this  is  necessarily  a  waiver  of  its  option  to  take  the 
goods  at  their  appraised  value. 

Model  D.  G.  Co.  v.  N.  B.  and  M.   Ins.   Co.,  79   Mo.   App.   550. 

While  nothing  is  said  regarding  the  insurer's  option  to  take 
the  damaged  property  at  its  ascertained  or  appraised  value  in 
Chainless  Cycle  Co.  v.  Security  Ins.  Co.  (N.  Y.  C.  A.),  31  Ins. 
L.  J.  324,  yet,  if  not  entitled  to  an  appraisal,  insurer  can  not  ex- 
ercise the  option  to  take  the  stock.  The  opinion  of  the  court 
very  clearly  enunciates  the  rights  of  the  parties  in  the  matter 
of  adjustment,  waiver,  etc.,  and  is  well  worth  reading  by  every 
adjuster  and  lawyer.  It  may  also  be  found  in  169  N.  Y.  304. 

As  regards  the  option  in  the  policy  to  take  any  part  of  the 


70  HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 

goods  at  their  ascertained  or  appraised  value,  I  can  find  no  de- 
cisions affecting  this  option.  My  own  opinion  is  that  if  a  case 
is  ever  defended  on  the  ground  that  assured  has  forfeited  his 
rights  by  refusing  to  permit  the  insurer  to  exercise  this  option, 
the  insured  will  not  be  held  to  have  forfeited  his  claim,  the 
reason  being  that  if  Insurance  companies  are  allowed  to  exer- 
cise this  unfair  option  they  thereby  create  a  further  damage 
to  the  insured's  property. 

If  an  appraisal  be  fairly  conducted,  the  award  thereunder 
is  arrived  at,  having  in  view  all  the  facts,  circumstances,  condi- 
tions and  environments  of  the  goods  or  wares  appraised,  so  that, 
should  the  insurer  feel  that  it  has  been  unjustly  dealt  with,  it 
may  take  all  of  the  stock  by  paying  the  insured  the  loss  and 
the  value  of  the  salvage  as  fixed  by  the  appraisers,  in  which 
event  neither  party  is  harmed. 

But  suppose  the  property  damaged  be  a  clothing  and  men's 
furnishing  stock,  and  the  appraisers  have  determined  the  loss 
to  be  as  follows:  Coats,  75  per  cent.;  vests,  30  per  cent;  pants, 
60  per  cent.;  shirts,  20  per  cent;  undershirts,  662-3  per  cent.; 
underdrawers,  20  per  cent;  neckties,  25  per  cent.;  collars  and 
cuffs,  20  per  cent.,  and  hosiery,  70  per  cent.  When  the  award  is 
returned  the  adjuster  says  to  the  assured:  "We  have  decided 
to  take  the  coats,  pants,  undershirts  and  hosiery  at  their  ap- 
praised value,  leaving  you  the  vests,  shirts,  drawers,  neckties, 
collars  and  cuffs." 

If  the  courts  uphold  the  option  to  take  any  part  of  the  goods 
and  thus  allow  insurer  to  take  the  goods  mentioned,  it  thereby 
permits  it  legally  to  damage  the  goods  they  force  the.  insured 
to  keep  to  the  extent  of  at  least  50  per  cent  more. 

In  more  than  half  of  the  appraisals  there  is  a  good  deal  of 
ill-feeling  and  bad  blood  engendered  between  the  insured  and 
the  adjuster  in  an  effort  to  adjust  the  loss;  and,  while  some 
appraisals  are  held  where  there  is  no  ill-feeling  and  no  desire 
to  do  otherwise  than  to  arrive  at  a  fair  estimate  of  the  loss, 
yet  in  a  great  many  it  is  a  question  of  "do  or  be  done,"  and  you 
will  see  the  same  appraiser  appraising  a  clothing  stock,  that 
last  week  appraised  a  household  furniture  loss,  that  the  week 
before  appraised  a  grocery  loss,  and  maybe  last  month  he  ap- 
praised a  shoe  loss,  and  the  month  before  he  may  have  ap- 
praised a  machinery  loss.  It  is  wonderful  what  a  variegated 
knowledge  (?)  these  men  have  as  to  values  in  different  lines. 
Is  it  not  true  that  they  are  selected  not  so  much  for  their  abil- 
ity to  judge  values  as  for  their  skill  in  judging  human  nature? 


OPTIONS.  71 

The  great  objection  to  these  men  is  not  that  they  are  rob- 
bers, because  most  of  them  are  honest,  but  they  would  not  be 
human  if  they  were  not  biased.  This  bias  leads,  them  to  such 
long  delays  in  selecting  a  competent  umpire,  and  then  they 
further  delay  by  assessing  the  damage  article  by  article,  which 
is  unfair  to  the  insured  in  more  ways  than  one,  as,  for  instance, 
what  sensible  merchant,  if  he  is  negotiating  for  the  purchase 
of  a  stock  of  goods,  will  go  through  the  stock  and  place  a  value 
on  it  article  by  article?  He  carefully  examines  each  line  of 
goods,  and,  when  he  gets  through,  makes  up  his  mind  what 
the  entire  stock  is  worth.  That  is  the  way  the  damage  should 
be  fixed  in  case  of  fire,  either  as  a  whole  or  by  departments. 
The  appraisers  need  not  assess  the  damage  article  by  article 
(Enright  v.  Montauk  F.  Ins.  Co.,  40  N.  Y.  St.  Rep.  642,  5  Finch 
25),  nor  does  the  policy  exact  such  appraisal. 

The  assured  can  not  select  a  man,  except  in  very  rare  cases, 
who  is  competent  to  cope  with  these  professional  appraisers, 
for  they  are  attending  to  this  work  nearly  every  day.  If  they 
make  a  mistake  in  the  umpire  they  can  easily  protect  their 
clients  by  running  up  the  damage  on  a  few  lines  of  goods  so  as 
to  enable  their  principals  to  take  those  articles,  or  force  assured 
into  a  settlement  different  from  the  award  by  threatening  to 
take  them. 

When  adjusters  take  such  advantage  of  a  man — not  all  of 
them  will  do  so,  no  matter  what  the  provocation — it  is  usually 
because  of  some  fancied  or  real  wrong  or  meanness  done  them 
by  the  assured,  or  at  the  instigation  of  some  wrecker,  who 
promises  big  returns  for  conditioning  and  selling  the  stock  at 
fire  sale. 

The  adjuster  is  frequently  justified  in  taking  any  advantage 
of  the  assured  that  he  possibly  can,  were  it  not  for.  that  old 
aphorism,  "two  wrongs  do  not  make  a  right,"  for  sometimes  the 
assured  can  act  meaner  than  a  devil  and  more  stubborn  than 
an  ass,  and  in  many  such  cases  I  have  been  compelled  to  admire 
the  adjuster  who  could  handle  the  adjustment  without  appar- 
ently losing  his  head  or  his  temper.  What  is  more,  everybody 
else  will  respect  and  honor  him,  including  those  claimants  who 
make  fools  of  themselves  by  their  mean,  nasty  ways. 

In  the  case  of  Palatine  v.  Morton-Scott-Robertson  Co.,  106 
Tenn.  558,  it  was  held  when  there  are  several  insurers,  the  right 
of  each  is  to  take  only  its  pro-rata  of  the  appraised  salvage 
articles;  that  even  if  the  insured  sells  a  portion  of  the  salvage, 
it  is  immaterial  so  long  as  enough  remains  unsold  to  enable  the 


72  HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 

complaining  company  to  exercise  its  option  under  the  policy  to 
take  its  pro-rata  of  the  salvage.  It  would  seem  this  is  a  rea- 
sonable rule.  , 

The  salvage  was  the  property  of  the  insured,  and  for  its  rea- 
sonable value,  he  must  account,  so  that  it  would  be  unfair  to 
require  him  to  hold  it  in  a  deteriorating  condition  while  the 
companies  delayed  settlement,  and  thus  give  opportunity  for  its 
further  depreciation. 

Where  salvage  is  carried  along  with  a  new  stock  and  sold 
as  opportunity  offers,  it  should  be  charged  with  its  fair  share 
of  the  expenses  of  the  business. 

North  German   Ins.    Co.   v.   Morton-Scott-Robertson   Co.,    108   Tenn. 
384  ;   67   S.   W.   Rep.    816  ;   31   Ins.   L.  J.   580. 

SOME  DANGERS  ENCOUNTERED  FROM  TAKING 
OVER  SALVAGE. 

Since  the  advent  of  Salvage  Companies  operated  by  the  in- 
surance companies,  many  appraisals  have  been  avoided,  espe- 
cially on  stocks  of  merchandise  when  circumstances  warrant  its 
being  taken  over  by  the  companies,  in  such  cases  where  the  as- 
sured is  not  in  position  to  handle  the  damaged  stock,  or  where 
the  companies  are  in  position  to  realize  as  good  or  better  results 
than  could  the  assured. 

It  seems  to  the  author  that  in  taking  over  these  salvages 
not  enough  caution  is  used  by  the  companies.  For  instance,  it  is 
held  that  where  two  or  more  companies  repair  a  damaged  build- 
ing this  creates  a  joint  building  contract,  so  that  if  the  building 
is  not  rebuilt  for  any  cause,  the  insured  may  sue  one  or  all  of  the 
companies,  and  the  company  against  whom  he  obtains  judgment 
must  look  to  the  other  company  for  its  share  of  the  damage 
recovered.  This  being  true  the  same  rule  of  law  will  apply  when 
companies  take  over  salvage — their  action  will  be  joint  and  not 
several.  Therefore,  should  one  of  the  companies  afterwards  be- 
come bankrupt,  the  assured  could  unquestionably  look  to  the 
other  companies  for  at  least  that  portion  of  the  proceeds  of  the 
salvage  apportioned  to  the  bankrupt  company,  and  possibly  for 
even  more.  Certainly,  the  insured  having  parted  with  his  title 
or  interest,  in  the  salvage,  has  no  lien  in  that  portion  of  the 
proceeds  apportioned  to  such  bankrupt  insurance  company.  The 
fact  that  he  once  owned  the  stock  gives  him  no  greater  right 
to  the  proceeds  of  the  sale  than  has  any  other  creditor  of  such 
bankrupt  company.  His  only  recourse  is  either  to  attach  or 


OPTIONS.  73 

garnish  the  money  apportioned  to  the  bankrupt,  or  let  it  be  paid 
to  its  assignee  or  receiver,  and  sue  some  one  or  all  of  the  other 
companies.  Under  such  circumstances,  the  company  not  having 
paid  his  loss,  what  would  be  the  measure  of  his  recovery?  If 
the  value  of  the  salvage  had  been  agreed  upon  before  the  stock 
was  taken  over,  then  unquestionably  he  could  not  recover  more 
than  such  bankrupt  company's  portion  of  such  value.  But  if 
the  value  of  the  salvage  had  not  been  agreed  to,  all  sorts  of 
questions  might  be  injected  into  the  suit,  such,  for  instance,  as 
whether  the  salvage  had  been  handled  to  the  best  advantage.  It 
might  be,  that  assured  would  have  the  right  to  say  to  the  com- 
panies, "You  have  jointly  agreed  with  me  on  the  value  of  my 
stock  and  have  taken  it  over  for  your  benefit.  Now  I  want  its 
entire  value.  It  was  your  business,  not  mine  that  you  entered 
into  this  joint  contract,  this  partnership  deal,  with  an  insolvent 
company.  Pay  me  my  loss." 

A  carefully  worded  agreement  as  to  the  value  of  the  salvage, 
and  that  the  companies  would  be  looked  to  in  a  several  and  not 
joint  capacity,  might  prevent  the  possibility  of  a  come-back  on 
the  solvent  companies  for  the  default  of  an  insolvent  one. 


74  HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 


CHAPTER  IX. 

DUTY  OF  INSURED  TO  PROTECT  PROP- 
ERTY AT  AND  AFTER  THE  FIRE- 
LOSS  BY  THEFT,  ETC. 

The  New  York  standard  policy  has  the  following  pro- 
visions: "This  company  shall  not  be  liable  for  loss  caused 
directly  or  indirectly  *  *  *  by  theft;  or  by  neglect  of  the  insured 
to  use  all  reasonable  means  to  save  and  protect  the  property  at 
and  after  a  fire,  or  when  the  property  is  endangered  by  fire  in 
neighboring  premises." 

Lines  60  to  66  of  the  New  York  standard  policy,  provide 
that  when  property  is  removed  to  a  place  of  safety  to  protect 
it  from  further  loss  the  excess  of  its  proportion  for  the  loss  and 
damage  already  done,  shall  cover  the  property  so  removed  for 
five  days  only. 

How  inconsistent  these  clauses  are.  Every  insurance  man 
knows  that  no  insurance  company  will  insure  salvage  goods 
until  after  the  value  of  same  has  been  determined  by  the 
adjusters.  Hence  it  is  absolutely  impossible  to  insure  them  in 
other  companies  and  the  insurers  try  to  exempt  themselves  from 
liability  after  five  days,  when  their  policies  compel  assured  to 
protect  his  property  and  to  protect  it  he  h'as  been  compelled  to 
remove  it  and  can  not  insure  it  until  his  loss  on  same  is  ad- 
justed.' 

Here  are  a  few  decisions  that  may  be  of  interest.  They  re- 
late to  the  exemptions  in  the  clause  quoted. 

Losses  in  removing  goods  from  approaching  fire,  though 
not  yet  caught  in  the  building  where  the  goods  are,  whether  by 
theft,  loss  or  destruction,  is  to  be  borne  by  the  insurance  com- 
pany when  the  policy  does  not  exempt  the  company  from  them. 

Agnew  v.  Ins.   Co.,  3   Phil.  193    (Pa.). 

Thompson  v.  Montreal  Ins.  Co.,  6  Up.  Can.,  2  Q.  B.  319. 

Case  v.  Hartford  F.  Ins.  Co.,  1.3  Ills.   676. 

Lebanon  Mut.  F.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Hankinson,  2  Cent.  Rep.   828    (Pa.). 

Newmark  v.  L.  &  L.  &  G.   Ins.  Co.,  30  Mo.   160. 

The  exemption  from  loss  by  theft  is  independent  of  the 
clause  following  it  which  exempts  insuring  company  from  lia- 

75 


76  HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 

bility  from  losses  by  means  of  invasions,  insurrections  and 
similar  commotions.  The  object  of  the  policy  is  to  indemnify 
assured  against  any  losses  by  fire  and  any  loss  by  theft  not 
attributable  directly  to  the  fire,  would  not  be  within  the  con- 
tract, (there  was  great  noise,  crowd  and  disturbance  in  the 
streets  on  the  night  of  the  fire),  and  when  the  insurer  exempts 
itself  from  liability  for  fires  which  happen  by  reason  of  inva- 
sions, etc.,  it  is  superfluous  to  add  that  losses  by  theft  occasioned 
by  such  fires  would  also  be  without  the  protection  of  the  policy. 
Webb.  v.  Protection,  and  Aetna  Ins.  Cos.  14  Mo.  3. 

Unless  the  policy  exempts  the  company  from  such  losses 
the  insurer  is  liable  for  loss  by  theft  during  and  after  the  fire, 
if  the  theft  be  occasioned  directly  by  the  fire. 

Newmark  v.  L.  and  L,.  and  G.  Ins. -Co.,  30  Mo.  160,  and  fol- 
lowing authorities  there  cited:  1  Phillips  on  Ins.,  Sec.  624,  p. 
1107;  3  Penn.  471;  13  111.  676;  1  Story  157. 

The  insurer  is  responsible  for  loss  of  goods  stolen  after  a 
fire,  in  a  populous  city;  it  is  a  natural  consequence  of  the  peril 
insured  against. 

Tilton  v.  Hamilton  F.  Ins.  Co.,  1  Bos.  367  ;  S.  C.  How.  Pr.  363. 

The  insurer  is  liable  for  goods  destroyed  in  blowing  up  a 
building  with  gun  powder  by  civil  authorities,  to  prevent  spread 
of  fire. 

City  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  Corlies,  21  Wend.  367. 

The  insurer  is  not  liable  for  theft  during  fire. 
Sklencher  v.  Fire  Ass'n   (N.  J.  S.  C.),  60  Atlantic  Rep.  232. 

The  assured  must  comply  with  the  policy  requirement,  save 
and  protect  his  property  at  and  after  the  fire,  though  the  policy 
provision  does  not  impose  any  greater  effort  on  his  part  than 
does  the  law,  and  his  duty  to  the  company,  both  of  which  re- 
quires that  he  do  whatever  is  reasonable  to  minimize  his  and 
therefore  the  company's  loss.  The  penalty  for  not  making  all 
reasonable  efforts  to  save  the  property  is  not  a  forfeiture  of  the 
policy,  but  is  the  amount  of  loss  caused  by  his  failure  to  use 
such  reasonable  efforts. 

It  seems,  however,  he  must,  under  penalty  of  forfeiture  of 
his  policy  save  all  that  remains  of  the  property  insured,  and 
exhibit  it  to  the  company  as  often  as  required,  not  so  much  for 
the  value  of  the  salvage  as  to  enable  the  company  to  form  some 
accurate  idea  of  what  it  consisted  of,  etc.  See  Thornton  v. 


DUTY  OF  INSURED;  Loss  BY  THEFT,  ETC.  77 

Security  Ins.  Co.,  117  Fed.  773,  32  Ins.  L.  J.  557.  The  company 
must  have  the  right  to  examine  the  property  and  to  have  it  and 
the  loss  appraised  if  a  difference  arises,  Ostrich  v.  German-Am. 
Ins.  Co.,  65  C.  C.  A.  251,  131  Fed.  13,  33  Ins.  L.  J.  925.  The 
company,  of  course,  must  act  promptly,  Chainless  Co  v.  Security 
Ins.  Co,  169  N.  Y.  304,  31  Ins.  L.  J.  324,  62  N.  E.  392.  Flynn 
v.  Hanover  F.  Ins.  Co.,  121  N.  Y.  Supp.  621.  A  Texas  case, 
holds  that  three  days'  time  is  enough.  But  a  reasonable  time 
should  be  given,  taking  all  circumstances  into  consideration. 


78  HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 


CHAPTER  X. 

FALL  OF  BUILDING. 

"If  a  building  or  any  part  thereof  fall,  except  as  the  result 
of  fire,  all  insurance  by  this  policy  on  such  building  or  its^ 
contents  shall  immediately  cease." — New  York  Standard  Policy. 

The  meaning  of  the  clause  in  question,  when  reasonably 
interpreted,  is  that  the  insurer  is  excused  from  its  obligation  by 
either  the  fall  of  the  building  as  a  structure,  or  of  such  a 
substantial  and  important  part  thereof  as  impairs  its  useful- 
ness as  such  and  leaves  the  remaining  part  of  the  building 
subject  to  an  increased  risk  of  fire. 

Nelson  et  al.  v.  Traders'  Ins.  Co.  (N.  Y.  C.  A.),  34  Ins.  L.  J.  933. 

The  question  of  fact  for  the  jury  to  determine  is,  "was 
the  fall  caused  by  the  fire  or  by  some  other  force?"  If  not  by 
fire,  the  insurer  is  not  liable.  A  request  to  charge  that  if 
building  was  on  fire  before  the  fall,  the  insurer  was  liable, 
even  if  the  fall  was  caused  by  the  wind,  was  properly  refused. 
Keisel  v.  Sun  Ins.  Office  (U.  S.  C-  C.  A.  8th  Disk),  28  Ins.  L.  J.  434. 

When  an  explosion  causes  a  building  to  fall  and  catch  fire, 
it  might  be  conceded  that  if  the  clause  exempting  the  company 
from  liability  stood  alone,  the  policy  would  be  terminated  im- 
mediately upon  fall  of  the  building.  But  that  clause  is  gov- 
erned by  a  specific  clause,  which  exempts  the  insurer  from 
loss  by  explosion  of  any  kind  unless  fire  ensues,  and  in  that 
event  for  damage  by  fire  only. 

Davis  v.  Ins.  Co.  of  N.  A.   (Mich.  S.  C.),  27  Ins.  L.  J.  184. 

The  clause  in  the  policy  contemplates  the  fall  of  a  build- 
ing caused  by  inherent  defects,  or  by  withdrawal  of  the  neces- 
sary support  as  by  digging  away  the  underlying  or  adjacent 
soil.  It  might  perhaps  include  the  case  of  a  building  thrown 
down  by  storm,  flood  or  earthquake. 

Dows  v.  Ins.  Co.,  127  Mass.  346. 

Leonard   v.    Orient   Ins.    Co.    (U.    S.    C.    C.    A.    7th   Dist).    30    Ins. 

L.  J.   980. 
Davis  v.  Ins.  Co.  N.  A.    (Mich.  S.  C.),  2'7  Ins.  L.  J.  184. 

79 


80  HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 

Where  there  was  no  evidence  of  fire  about  the  ruins  of  a 
building  which  had  fallen  for  over  an  hour,  and  it  had  been,, 
according  to  evidence,  weakened  by  cutting  timbers  and  remod- 
eling, but  six  witnesses  testified  that  a  flame  shot  from  the 
roof  before  it  fell,  a  finding  that  the  fall  was  caused  by  fire 
will  not  be  disturbed. 

Friedman  v.  Atlas  Assur.  Co.,  32  Ins.  L.  J.  673   (Mich.  S.  C.). 

Contents  of  building  No.  93  were  insured,  one  wall  and  half 
of  building  No.  93,  and  all  of  building  95  fell,  evidence  varied 
from  15  to  40  minutes  after  fall  when  fire  occurred.  Loss  i& 
within  the  policy. 

Lewis  et  al.  v.  Springfield  F.  &  M.  Ins.  Co.,  76  Mass.  159. 

As  a  direct  result  of  fire  the  adjoining  building  fell,  carry- 
ing with  it  the  party  wall  and  part  of  the  insured  building. 
Held,  loss  within  the  policy. 

Ermentraut   v.    Girard   F.   &  M.    Ins.    Co.    (Minn.    S.    C.),   25    Ins. 
L,.   J.    81. 

It  must  cease  to  be  a  building  to  be  fallen  within  the 
meaning  of  the  policy.  So  long  as  standing,  however  depreci- 
ated, it  is  not  fallen. 

Firemen's  Ins.  Co.  v.  Sholom,  80  111.  558. 

If  a  building  falls  and  afterwards  burns,  the  insurer  is 
not  liable. 

Nave  v.  Home  Mut.  Ins.  Co.,  37  Mo.  431. 

Nichols   et  al.    v.    Sun    Mut.   F.    Ins.  Co.    (Miss.    S.    C.),    14    S.    W. 

Rep.   263  ;  23  Ins.  L.  J.  633. 
Trans-Atlantic   F.    Ins.    Co.    v.    Bamberger    (Ky.    C.    A.),    18    Ins. 

L.  J.  625. 
Keisel   v.    Sun    Fire    Office    (U.    S.    C.    C.    A.    8th    Dist),    28    Ins. 

L.  J.  434. 

Under  Code  Pleading,  the  burden  of  proof  is  on  the  defend- 
ant, where  it  admits  the  amount  of  the  loss,  but  claims  fall  of 
building  caused  the  fire. 

Royal  Ins.  Co.  v.  Schwing  (Ky.  C.  A.),  18  Ins.  L.  J.  451. 
Trans-Atlantic    F.    Ins.    Co.    v.    Bamberger     (Ky    C.    A.),    18    Ins. 
L.   J.  625. 

The  burden  of  proof  is  on  plaintiff. 

Pelican    Ins.    Co.    v.    Co-Operative    Assoc.    (Tex.    S.    C.),    19    Ins. 
L.  J.   921. 

Contra: 

Friedman  v.  Atlas  Assur.  Co.    (Mich.  S.  C.),  32  Ins.  L.  J.  673. 
Western    Assur.    Co.    v.    Mohlman    (U.    S.    C.    C.    A.    2d    Dist),    27 
Ins.  L.  J.  392. 


CHAPTER  XI. 

EXPLOSIONS. 

"This  company  shall  not  be  liable  for  loss  *  *  *  unless 
the  fire  ensues,  and  in  that  event,  for  the  damage  by  fire  only—- 
by explosion  of  any  kind,  or  lightning;  but  liability  for  direct 
damage  by  lightning  may  be  assumed  by  a  specific  agreement 
hereto." — New  York  Standard  Policy. 

So  many  people  cannot  understand  why  a  loss  to  the  in- 
sured's  building  caused  by  explosion,  which  in  turn  was  caused 
by  fire  in  an  adjacent  building,  renders  the  policy  void,  as  in 
such  case  the  fire  was  the  first  or  moving  cause  of  the  loss.- 
The  insurer  would  be  liable  but  for  the  policy  contract  which 
exempts  it  from  liability  from  loss  by  explosions,  regardless 
of  what  produced  the  explosion;  and  such  exemption  is  wholly 
contractual.  An  insurance  company  insuring  against  loss  has 
the  right  to  exempt  itself  from  any  loss  that  may  originate  on 
the  insured's  property. 

Sohier  v.  Norwich  Ins.  Co.,  93  Mass.,  336. 

So  where  the  policy  against  loss  by  fire  exempted  the  in- 
sured from  any  loss  occasioned  by  an  explosion  of  steam  boiler, 
it  was  held  that  a  loss  by  fire  caused  by  the  explosion  of  a 
steam  boiler  in  the  factory  insured  was  not  within  the  policy. 
SL  John  v.  Mut.  M.  &  F.  Ins.  Co.,  11  N.  T.,  516. 

Nor  is  a  loss  by  fire  caused  by  an  explosion  where  the  in- 
surer exempts  itself  from  loss  by  explosion  of  any  kind. 

Hayward  v.  Liverpool  &  London  F.   &  L.   Ins,  Co.,  7   Bosw.,   385  ; 
affd.  2  Abb.  Ct.  App.  Dec.  349,  3  Keyes,  456   (N.  Y.). 

Nor  where  such  a  fire  was  extinguished  but  broke  out  a 
second  and  third  time  within  two  days,  as  it  was  held  the 
existence  of  the  fire  as  an  effect  of  the  explosion  must  be  pre- 
sumed to  have  continued  as  such  an  effect  in  the  absence  of 
contrary  proof. 

Tanneret  v.  Merchants'  Ins.  Co.,  34  La.  Ann.,  249. 

But  it  is,  if  the  fire  is  caused  by  explosion  of  a  lamp. 
Heffron  v.  Kitanning  Ins.   Co.,  132  Pa.,  580. 

81 


82  HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 

Insurer  is  not  liable  for  loss  resulting  from  explosion  of 
dynamite,  gas  or  other  substances  coming  in  contact  with 
lighted  match  or  lamp. 

Huer  v.  Westchester   F.   Ins.    Co.    (111.    S.    C.),    33    N.    E.    411;    24 

Ins.  L.  J.  471. 

Phoenix  Ins.  Co.  v.  Greer  (Ark.  S.  C.),  25  Ins.  L.  J.  311. 
Mitchell  v.  Potomac  Ins.  Co.   (U.  S.  S.  C.),  31  Ins.  L.  J.  570. 
Briggs  v.   N.   B.    &  M.   Ins.   Co.    (N.   Y.),   53  N.   Y.,   446;   affirming 

66  Barb.,  325;  2  Ins.  L.  J.,   929. 

Huer  v.  N.  W.  National  Ins.  Co.   (111.  S.  C.),  22  Ins.  L.  J.  518. 
German- Amer.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Hyman,  42  Col.  156,  94  Pac.  27,  37  Ins. 

L.  J.  362. 

Home  Lodge  v.  Queen  Ins.  Co.,  21  S.  D.  165,  110  N.  W.  778. 
Vorse  v.  Jersey  Plate  Glass  Ins.   Co.,  119   la.   556,  93  N.  W.   569. 

(But  see  Contra,  Furbush  v.  Ins.   Co.,  140  la.  240,  118  N.  W. 

371.) 

Trans-Atlantic  F.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Dorsey,  56  Md.  70,  12  Ins.  L.  J.  437. 
United  &c.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Foote,  22  Ohio  St.  340,  2  Ins.  L.  J.  190. 

Contra: 

Scripture  v.  Lowell  Ins.  Co.,  64  Mass.   356. 

Renshaw   v.    Mo.    State   Mut.  F.   &   M.    Ins.    Co.,    103    Mo.    595,    20 

Ins.  L.  J.  385. 
Furbush  v.  Ins.  Co.,  140  la.  240,  118  N.  W.   371. 

Where  fire  in  another  building  causes  an  explosion  which 
damages  plaintiff's  property  the  loss  is  not  within  the  policy. 

Miller  v.  London  &  Lancashire  F.  Ins.  Co.,  41  111.  App.  395. 

Dows.  v.  Faneuil  Hall  Ins.  Co.,  127  Mass.  346. 

Leonard   v.   Orient   Ins.    Co.    (U.    S.   C.    C.   A.,   7th   Dist.),   30    Ins. 

L.  J.   981. 

Caballero  v.  Home  Ins.  Co.,  15  La.  Ann.  217,  4  Ben.  478. 
Hall   v.    National   F.    Ins.   Co.,    35    Ins.   L.   J.    507,    115    Tenn.    513, 

92  S.  W.  402. 

But  if  fire  ensue,  the  insurer  is  liable  for  the  loss  by  fire. 

Miller  v.  London  &  Lancashire  F.  Ins.  Co.,  41  111.  App.   395. 

Dows  v.  Faneuil  Hall  Ins.   Co.,  127  Mass.  -346. 

Leonard   v.    Orient   Ins.   Co.    (U.    S.    C.    C.   A.    7th   Dist.),   30    Ins. 

L.  J.   981. 
Davis  v.  Ins.  Co.  N.  A.    (Mich.  S.  C.),  27  Ins.  L.  J.  184. 

The  same  principle  is  involved  where  explosion  is  caused 
by  lightning  in  another  building  71  feet  from  the  premises  in- 
sured. And  where  a  lightning  clause  is  attached  to  policy,  cov- 
ering loss  by  lightning,  subject  in  all  other  respects  to  the 
terms  and  conditions  of  the  policjr. 

German  F.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Roost   (Ohio  S.  C.),   26  Ins.  L.  J.   699. 

The  provisions  of  the  written  form,  that  the  policy  should 
cover  such  merchandise  as  is  usually  kept  for  sale  in  retail 
hardware  stores,  was  sufficient  permission,  the  custom  to  keep 
dynamite  being  established  by  the  evidence  for  the  keeping  of 
dynamite  on  the  premises.  [Judgment  for  plaintiff  below.  Here 
affirmed  against  company.] 

Traders  Ins.  Co.  v.  Dobbins  et  al.   (Tenn.  S.  C.) 

86   Southwestern  Reporter    (May   3,   1905),   383. 


EXPLOSIONS.  83 

Where  policy  provides  that  it  should  be  void  if  dynamite 
were  kept  on  the  premises,  the  keeping  of  a  stick  and  a  half 
of  dynamite  whether  it  caused  the  fire  or  not,  worked  a  for- 
feiture. 

Bastian  v.  British  Amer.  Assur.  Co.   (Gal.  S.  C.),  33  Ins.  L.  J.  1033 

Where  the  explosives  did  not  cause  the  fire,  and  were  re- 
moved in  time  to  prevent  an  explosion,  it  was  held  that  policy 
was  forfeited. 

Kenneflck-Hammond  Co.   v.   Norwich  Union  F.    Ins.   Society    (Mo. 
App.),    33    Ins.   L.   J.    664. 

It  is  not  necessary  to  show  that  the  loss  was  due  to  the 
violation. 

Norwaysz  v.  Thuringia  Ins.  Co.   (111.  S.  C.),  33  Ins.  L.  J.  83. 

Nor  is  the  insured  owner  relieved  by  the  fact  that  the 
violation  was  by  a  tenant,  without  his  knowledge. 

Norwaysz  v.  Thuringia  Ins.  Co.   (111.  S.  C.),  33  Ins.  L.  J.   83. 
La  Force  v.  Williamsburg  City  F.  Ins.  Co.,  43  Mo.  App.  518. 

A  fire  loss  caused  by  explosion  of  gasoline  stove  on 
premises  without  consent  of  insured  is  not  within  the  policy. 

McFarland  v.  St.  Paul  F.  and  M.  Ins.   Co.    (Minn.  S.  C.),  21  Ins. 
L.  J.  879. 


84  HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 


CHAPTER  XII. 

WAIVER— NON-WAIVER  AGREEMENT. 

Definition  of  Waiver. 

A  waiver  is  the  voluntary  relinquishment  of  some-  known 
right. 

Rosen  v.  German  Alliance  Ins.   Co.    (Me.),   76   All.   688. 
Scottish  U.   &  M.  Ins.   Co.    (Georgia),   68   S.  E.  1097. 
Dahrooge  v.  Rochester  Ger.  Ins.  Co.,  143  N.  W.  608. 
Gardner  v.  North  St.  M.  L.  Ins.  Co.    (N.  C.  S.  C.),  79  S.  B.  806. 

One's  Acts,  Rather  Than  Denial  of  Waiver,  Looked  To. 

It  matters  not  if  the  Insurance  Company  says:  "We  waive 
nothing."  Its  acts  must  be  looked  to  to  ascertain  if  there  is  a 
waiver.  Its  actual  waiver  cannot  be  affected  by  its  statements 
that  it  is  not  doing  that  which  it  clearly  is  doing. 

Summers  v.  Western  Home  Ins.  Co.,  45  Mo.  App.,  46. 
Erwin  v.   Ins.   Co.,  24  Mo.   App.  153. 
Phillips  v.  Protection  Ins.  Co.,  14  Mo.   220. 

Must  Know  Facts  Before  Waiver  Can  Be  Charged. 

One  cannot  waive  a  right  when  ignorant  of  its  existence,  as 
an  essential  element  of  waiver  is  knowledge  of  the  fact  waived. 

Security  Ins.  Co.  v.  Mette,  27  111.  App.  324. 

Rudd  v.  American  G.   F.  M.  F.  Ins.   Co.,  120   Mo.  App.  1. 

Security  Ins.  Co.  v.  Laird,  62  So.  182    (Ala.). 

i 

An  insurance  adjuster  knowing  the  policy  had  been  for- 
feited by  a  breach  of  a  condition,  asked  for  and  was  refused 
a  non-waiver  agreement.  He  then  stated  he  would  not  waive 
any  of  the  policy  conditions  but  required,  assured  to  make  a 
list  of  destroyed  property  and  then  went  away.  Court  held  his 
actions  a  waiver  of  the  forfeiture,  comparing  them  to  those  of 
Julia  in  Byron's  Don  Juan — 

"A  little  still  she  "strove,  and  much  repented, 
And  whispering,  'I  will  ne'er  consent,'  consented." 
German-American  Ins.   Co.   v.   Evans    (Texas  C.   C.   A.);   61   S.   W. 
Rep.    536  ;    14   Deitch   Ins.  Digest,   41. 

A  forfeiture  is  waived  by  requiring  proofs  of  loss  or  the 
correction  of  defective  proofs,  after  knowledge  of  such  for- 
feiture. 

Roby.  v.   Ins.  Co.,   120   N.  Y.   510. 
Cobbs  v.  Ins.  Co.,  68  Mich.  463. 
Cleaver  v.  Ins.  Co.,  71  Mich.  414. 

35 


86  HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 

Jerdee  v.  Ins.  Co.,  75  Wis.  345. 
Carpenter  v.   Ins.   Co.,    61   Mich.    635. 

To  constitute  waiver  the  assured  must  be  put  to  some 
trouble  or  expense,  or  have  been  misled. 

Roby  v.  Ins.  Co.,  120  N.  Y.  510. 

Weidert  v.   Ins.   Co.,    19   Ins.   L.   J.  740    (Oregon). 

Devens  v.  Ins.  Co.,  83  N.  Y.  168. 

Findeisen  v.  Ins.  Co.,  15  Ins.  L.  J.  90    (Vermont). 

There  can  be  no  waiver  unless  the  assured  relied  on  acts 
of  the  adjuster,  or,  as  a  prudent,  careful  man,  had  a  right  to 
do  so. 

Devens   v.    Ins.   Co.,    83    N.   Y.    168. 

NON- WAIVER  AGREEMENT. 

Most  non-waiver  agreements  are  entered  into  between  the 
assured  and  adjuster  sent  to  adjust  the  loss  on  behalf  of  the 
company.  The  reason  for  entering  into  such  an  agreement  is 
very  clearly  set  out  by  the  Supreme  Court  of  Alabama  in  the 
Draper  case,  first  the  court  quotes  the  agreement,  then  shows 
the  reason  for  taking  a  non-waiver  agreement  and  how  it  may 
itself  be  waived. 

"R.  W.  Draper  insured  under  policy  No.  5656  of  the  Penn- 
sylvania Ins.  Co.,  hereby  requests  W.  L.  Reynolds,  adj.,  to 
make  examination  of  books,  papers,  and  other  evidence  of 
loss  including  assured's  sworn  statement  if  deemed  necessary, 
which  I  submit  to  him  for  the  purpose  of  ascertaining  amount 
of  loss,  sustained  by  me  by  fire  May  21,  1910,  with  the  express 
understanding  and  agreement  that  such  examination  shall  not 
be  considered  an  acknowledgment  of  any  liability  of  the  said 
Pennsylvania  Ins.  Co.  under  said  policy,  nor  a  waiver  or  im- 
pairment of  any  rights  or  defenses  of  that  company  under  said 
policy,  nor  a  waiver  or  impairment  of  assured's  obligation 
thereunder.  It  is  further  understood  and  agreed  that  the  exist- 
ing legal  rights,  if  any,  the  said  R.  W.  Draper  may  have  under 
said  policy  are  not  impaired  by  his  act  in  signing  this  request." 

It  thus  appears  that  the  agreement  merely  requests  an 
examination  of  books,  papers  and  other  evidence  of  loss,  sub- 
mitted for  purpose  of  ascertaining  the  amount  of  loss,  with 
the  understanding  that  such  examination  shall  not  be  con- 
sidered as  fixing  liability.  *  *  *  Giving  to  it  a  natural  and 
reasonable  construction,  we  think  its  purpose  was  merely  to 
prevent  a  liability  being  fastened  upon  the  company  by  virtue 
of  the  fact  that  the  investigation  would  be  continued  after 


WAIVER — NON-WAIVER  AGREEMENT.  87 

knowledge  by  the  adjuster  of  the  breach,  recognizing  that  by 
so  continuing  after  such  knowledge  it  may  be  considered  as 
treating  the  policy  as  valid  and  binding,  and,  therefore,  that  the 
mere  continued  examination  might  be  held  a  waiver.  (Georgia 
Home  Ins.  Co.  v.  Allen,  119  Ala.  436,  24  So.  399). 

There  is  nothing  in  the  language  of  the  agreement  to  indi- 
cate the  company  could  not  be  bound  by  positive  declara- 
tions or  acts  evincing  a  clear  purpose  to  waive  any  breach  and 
treat  the  policy  as  valid. 

Pennsylvania   F.    Ins.    Co.   v.    Draper,    65    So.   923,   will  appear   in 
186,  187,  or  188  Alabama  Reports. 

ONE  CAN  WAIVE  ANY  CONTRACT  ONE  HAS  THE 
RIGHT  TO  MAKE. 

If  the  adjuster  sent  by  a  company  to  adjust  a  loss,  has  the 
right  to  enter  into  a  non-waiver  agreement,  he  certainly  has 
the  right  to  waive  the  non-waiver  agreement  or  any  rights 
growing  out  of  it,  and  this  too  when  the  non-waiver  agree- 
ment specifically  provides  that  he  has  no  such  rights.  There  is 
only  one  way  an  insurance  company  may  or  can  prevent  an 
adjuster  from  waiving  its  rights,  that  is  by  appointing  him  to 
do  certain  specified  things  towards  adjusting  or  investigating 
the  loss  and  then  notifying  the  assured  just  what  the  adjuster's 
power  and  authority  is.  Where  the  assured  is  put  on  notice, 
he  cannot  be  heard  to  complain  if  he  has  done  something  the 
adjuster  had  no  right  to  require  him  to  do.  Nor  can  he  be 
misled  by  the'  adjuster's  unauthorized  promise  to  pay. 

Most  waivers  are  thought  of  after  the  claim  drifts  into  the 
hands  of  some  tricky  lawyer,  who  tells  the  assured  his  policy 
is  void  unless  the  adjuster  said  certain  things.  Though  there 
are  many  adjusters  who  do  not  know  when  they  commit  a 
plain  waiver.  But  as  already  stated  most  of  these  waivers 
originate  in  the  fertile  brain  of  tricky  lawyers  and  a  rascally 
assured.  For  these  reasons  an  independent  adjuster  employed 
at  so  much  per  day  should  have  the  company's  certificate  of 
authority  setting  forth  just  what  he  is  authorized  to  do,  i.  e.,. 
investigate  the  circumstances  concerning  the  origin  and  cir- 
cumstances of  the  fire  and  the  claim  growing  out  of  it,  to  agree 
with  the  assured  on  the  amount  of  loss  if  possible,  failing  in 
which  he  would  have  authority  to  have  it  appraised  in  accord- 
ance with  the  terms  of  the  policy.  But  that  he  had  no  authority 
1o  admit  or  deny  liability,  nor  to  require  the  assured  to  do  or 
perform  any  thing  or  act  that  could  be  construed  into  a  waiver 


88  HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 

of  the  company's  rights  to  claim  a  forfeiture  by  reason  of  a 
breach  of  the  policy  conditions,  whether  such  breach  was 
known  to  the  adjuster  or  not.  That  all  questions  concerning 
the  company's  liability  must  be  determined  by  the  company 
itself  or  the  courts  in  case  it  failed  or  refused  to  pay. 

Of  course,  salaried  adjusters,  and  salaried  special  agents 
called  upon  to  adjust  a  loss,  being  regular  employes  of  the 
company  with  power  to  give  drafts  in  payment  of  the  loss, 
could  not,  in  the  opinion  of  the  author  have  their  authority 
curtailed  unless  possibly  the  certificate  of  authority  and  the 
draft  also,  set  out  the  fact  that  the  draft  should  not  be  taken 
by  the  assured  as  an  admission  by  the  company  of  liability, 
but  would  be  taken  as  the  measure  of  the  company's  liability, 
if  liable  at  all,  and  the  giving  by  the  adjuster  and  acceptance 
by  the  assured  of  the  said  draft  was  without  reference  to  any 
other  questions  or  matters  of  difference  than  the  fixing  of  the 
amount  of  the  company's  liability  if  it  should  be  found  liable. 
The  company  could  then  pay  the  draft  or  not  as  it  saw  fit, 
if  it  refused  payment,  the  draft  would  obviate  the  necessity  of 
assured  proving  his  claim  in  court,  and  leave  the  court  to  deter- 
mine only  the  question  of  liability. 

The  following  is  a  case  now  before  the  courts  in  Alabama, 
it  shows  the  facts  as  given  by  the  assured,  and  an  opinion  and 
brief  by  the  author,  based  on  assured's  statement  of  facts. 

AN   ALABAMA   LOSS,    SHOWING   EFFECTS  OF   IRON- 
SAFE  CLAUSE  AND  NON-WAIVER  AGREEMENT. 

Where  an  inventory  was  taken  December  31,  1913,  the  in- 
sured has  the  whole  of  the  calendar  year  1914  in  which  to  take 
another  inventory  under  the  form  of  iron-safe  clause  usually 
made  a  part  of  the  policies  issued  in  Alabama,  a  copy  of  which 
is  shown  in  the  McGlathery  case,  115  Ala.  213,  22  So.  104. 
Therefore,  if  the  next  or  second  inventory  is  being  taken  and 
while  in  process  it  is  destroyed  by  a  fire  which  occurs  before 
December  31,  1914,  which  also  destroys  the  stock  insured,  such 
destruction  of  the  unfinished  inventory  is  not  a  violation  of  the 
iron-safe  clause.  The  clause  only  provides  for  the  production 
of  the  inventory,  that  is,  the  completed  inventory,  for  it  is  no 
inventory  at  all  if  incomplete. 

Wherever  the  language  of  the  policy  is  susceptible  of  more 
than  one  construction,  that  construction  will  be  placed  upon 
it  which  will  be  most  favorable  to  the  insured.  Western  Assur- 


WAIVER — NON-WAIVER  AGREEMENT.  89 

ance  Co.  v.  McGlathery  and  cases  there  cited,  115  Ala.  213, 
22  So.  104. 

The  Alabama  courts  only  require  a  substantial  compliance 
with  the  iron-safe  clause.  Queen  Ins.  Co.  v.  Vines,  174  Ala. 
570,  57  So.  444. 

For  the  sake  of  argument  we  will  assume  the  iron-safe 
clause  was  violated  in  every  particular  in  which  event  the 
company  could,  according  to  the  Alabama  decisions,  success- 
fully resist  payment  for  claim  under  such  policy.  Day  v.  Home 
Ins.  Co.,  177  Ala.  600,  58  So.  549.  But  the  Alabama  courts 
hold  the  violation  of  an  iron-safe  clause  in  a  fire  insurance 
policy  renders  the  policy  voidable  not  void.  They  further  hold 
that  an  adjuster  may  waive  the  iron-safe  clause,  Liverpool  &  L,. 
&  G.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Tillis,  110  Ala.  20,  17  So.  672.  Georgia  Home 
Ins.  Co.  v.  Allen,  28  Ins.  L.  J.  199,  119  Ala.  436,  24  So.  399. 
See  same  (Allen)  case  128  Ala.  451,  30  So.  537,  31  Ins.  L.  J.  60. 

The  insurance  company  may,  however,  take  a  non-waiver 
agreement,  but  such  agreement  is  only  a  privilege  granted  the 
insurance  company  to  investigate  and  ascertain  the  cause  of 
the  fire  and  the  amount  of  damage  done,  without  waiving  or 
invalidating  any  of  the  conditions  of  the  policy. 

Pennsylvania   F.    Ins.    Co.    v.   Draper,    65    So.   923*  will   appear  in 

about  187  Ala. 
Gish  v.  Ins.  Co.  of  N.  A.,  16  Okla.  59,  87  Pac.   869,  Annotated  13 

L.  R.  A.    (N.   S.)    826. 
Rudd  v.  American  G.  F.  M.  F.  Ins.  Co.,  120   Mo.  App.   1,  96  S.  W. 

237,  35  Ins.  L.  J.   948. 
Hatcher  v.  Sovereign  F.  Assur.   Co.,  127  Pac.  588. 

There  is  nothing  in  the  language  of  the  non-waiver  agree- 
ment to  indicate  that  the  company  could  not  be  bound  by 
positive  declarations  or  acts  evincing  a  clear  purpose  to  waive 
any  breach  and  treat  the  policy  as  valid. 

Robert  v.    Sun   M.    Ins.   Co.    (Tex.    C.    C.   A.),   35   S.   W.    955. 
Pennsylvania  F.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Draper,  65  So.  923,  Ala.  Rep.  about  187. 
Rudd  v.    Amer.   G.    D.   M.   F.    Ins.    Co.,    120    Mo.   App.    1,   96    S.   W. 

237,   35   Ins.   L.   J.   948. 

McMillan  v.  Ins.  Co.  of  N.  A.,   58   S.   E.  1020,  78   S.   C.   433. 
Gish  v.  Ins.  Co.  of  N.  A.,   16   Okla.  59,  87   Pac.   869  annotated  13 

L.  R.  A.   (N.  S.)   826. 
Hatcher    v.    Sovereign    Ins.    Co.,    127    Pac.    588,    42    Ins.    L.  J.    137 

(Wash.   S.  C.). 

A  perusal  of  the  foregoing  cases  will  show  that  the  com- 
pany or  its  adjuster  may  treat  the  policy  as  a  valid  contract 
in  several  ways,  that  is  by  insisting  upon  the  assured  comply- 
ing with  some  of  the  policy  requirements  such  as  the  furnish- 
ing proofs  of  loss,  the  waiving  of  proofs  of  loss,  the  furnishing 
of  certified  copies  of  bills  the  originals  of  which  have  been 
lost,  or  requiring  him  to  submit  to  examination  under  oath,  or 


90  HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 

by  taking  over  and  conditioning  the  salvage  or  exercising  its 
option  under  the  contract  of  taking  the  salvage  at  its  ascer- 
tained or  appraised  value,  or  by  a  promise  to  pay. 

In  other  words,  if  the  policy  has  been  avoided  by  a  viola- 
tion of  the  iron-safe  clause,  the  non-waiver  agreement  merely 
permits  the  company  to  investigate  the  circumstances  concern- 
ing the  fire  and  examine  all  the  books  and  papers  in  the  in- 
sured's  possession  pertaining  to  the  claim  for  loss.  But  it 
cannot  in  one  breath  deny  the  contract  and  in  the  next  assert1' 
and  claim  rights  growing  out  of  and  depending  on  it.  If  it 
elects  not  to  be  bound  by  the  policy,  that  is  necessarily  a 
waiver  of  its  right  to  insist  upon  the  compliance  with  its 
requirements  or  vice  versa.  That  is  the  doctrine  laid  down 
by  the  Missouri  Appellate  Court  in  passing  on  another  point. 
See  Model  D.  G.  Co.  v.  North  B.  &  M.  Ins.  Co.,  79  Mo. 
App.  550. 

THE  ASSURED'S  STATEMENT  OF  FACTS. 

The  insurance  covered  stock  subject  to  the  average  clause 
in  buildings  A  and  B  an  alley  separating  them.  The  stock  in 
A  was  almost  a  total  loss,  stock  in  B  was  not  damaged.  The 
assured  had  completed  his  inventory  December  31,  1913,  which 
had  required  more  than  a  month  to  complete.  While  in  process 
of  taking  the  next  inventory,  say  December  14,  1914,  a  fire 
burned  the  greater  part  of  the  stock  and  with  it  all  the  sheets 
of  the  incomplete  inventory.  The  adjusters  claimed  .this  a 
violation  of  the  iron-safe  clause  and  would  not  proceed  with 
the  adjustment  or  investigation  until  a  non-waiver  agreement 
was  signed. 

AFTER  THE   NON-WAIVER   AGREEMENT  WAS 
ENTERED  INTO. 

The  adjuster  required  assured  to  submit  to  examination 
under  oath.  He  required  assured  at  great  expense  to  furnish 
certified  copies  of  bills  the  originals  of  which  were  lost.  Agreed 
with  assured  that  Underwriter's  Salvage  Co.  should  condition 
the  stock,  both  agreeing  that  this  conditioning  of  stock  did  not 
divest  assured  of  title  and  was  not  to  be  a  waiver  of  the 
rights  of  either.  Told  assured  that  the  proportion  of  his  in- 
surance covering  in  B  was  still  in  force.  All  of  the  local 
agents  told  him  the  same  thing  concerning  the  insurance  in 
B.  (It  is  well  to  remember  that  a  policy  covering  stock  only, 
if  void  in  part  is  void  altogether)  though  the  avoidance  of  the 


WAIVER — NON-WAIVER  AGREEMENT.  91 

insurance  on  stock  by  reason  of  violation  of  iron-safe  clause 
does  not  avoid  the  insurance  on  building,  both  being  insured 
under  separate  amounts  under  same  policy. 

Hanover  Ins.  Co.  v.  Crawford,  121  Ala.  259,  25  So.  912. 

The  author  gave  it  as  his  opinion,  the  companies  would  be 
held  liable  if  the  assured's  statement  of  facts  was  correct. 

This  loss  has  been  settled  and  paid.  The  companies  offered 
$160,000,  assured  offered  to  take  $180,000.  It  was  compromised 
for  $170,000. 


92          HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 


CHAPTER  XIII. 

APPRAISAL— ARBITRATIONS-AWARD. 

First  Duty  Is  to  Try  to  Effect  Settlement. 

Where  the  policy  provides  that  loss  shall  be  ascertained 
or  estimated  by  the  insured  and  the  company,  or  if  they  differ, 
then  by  appraisers  as  thereinafter  provided,  such  language  con- 
templates an  actual  effort  to  agree.  When  this  effort  fails  and 
not  until  then  neither  party  possess  the  right  to  say  we  differ, 
and  our  points  of  difference  must  be  referred  to  arbitrament 
under  the  terms  of  the  policy.  Until  there  is  some  disagree- 
ment as  to  the  amount  of  the  loss,  there  is  nothing  to  arbitrate. 

Boyle   v.   Hamburg-Bremen   F.   Ins.    Co.,   169    Pa.    349;    32   Atl.  R. 

553  ;  24  Ins.  L.  J.  699. 

Harrison  v.  Hartford  F.  Ins.  Co.,  23  Ins.  L.  J.  161 ;  59  Fed.  732. 
British    Am.    Assur.    Co.    v.    Darragh,    128    Fed.    Rep.    890;    33    Ins. 

L.  J.  557  ;   63   C.   C.  A.  426. 

Summerfield  v.  N.  B.   &  M.  Ins.  Co.,   62  Fed.  249. 
Stevens  v.  Norwich  U.  Ins.  Soc.,  120  Mo.  App.  88  ;  96  S.  W.  R.  684. 
Continental  Ins.  Co.  v.  Vallandmgham,  116  Ky.  287  ;  76  S.  W.  22. 
Moyer  v.  Sun  Ins.  Off.,  176  Pa.   579  ;  35  Atl.  R.  221. 
Fletcher  v.  German  Am.  Ins.  Co.,  79  Minn.  337;  82  N.  W.  R.   647; 

29  Ins.  L.  J.  752,  Harrison  v.  German  Am.  Ins.  Co.,  67  Fed.  577. 
Kelly  v.   Liverpool  &  L.   &  G.   Ins.   Co.,   94  Minn.   141 ;   102   N.   W. 

380  ;   34  Ins.  L.  J.   421. 
Liverpool  &  L.  &  G.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Hall,  1  Kans.  App.  18;  41  Pac.  R. 

65,   Phoenix  Fire  Assur.  Co.   v.   Murray,    (U.    S.    C.   C.   A.)    187 

Fed.  809. 
Mutual  F.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Alvord,  23   Ins.  L.   J.  801 ;   61  Fed.   752  ;   21 

U.   S.  App.   228,  Vangindertallen  v.   Phoenix  Ins.  Co.,   82  Wis. 

112,  51  N.  W.  1122. 
Manchester  F.  Assur  Co.  v.  Simmons,  12  Tex.  C.  A.  607  ;  35  S.  W. 

R   722. 
Farnum  v.   Phoenix   Ins   Co.,  83    Cal.    246  ;   26    Ins.   L.   J.   473  ;    23 

Pac.  R.   869. 
Randall  v.  Phoenix  Ins.  Co.,  10  Mont.   362;  25  Pac.   R.  960;   20  Ins. 

L.  J.  613,  Ohio  Farmers  Ins.  Co.  v.  Titus  (Ohio),  92  N.  E.  82. 
Wright  v.  Susquehana  M.  F.  Co.,  110  Pa.  29;  20  Atl.  R.  716. 
Hanover  F.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Harper,  77  111.  App.   453. 
American  F.  Ins.   Co.  v.  Stuart   (Tex.   C.  C.  A.),  38   S.  W.  R.   395. 
Torpedo   Top   Co.   v.   Royal   Ins.    Co.,   162    111.   App.    338 ;    42   Nat'l 

C.  Rep.  593. 
Zimeriski  v.   Ohio  Farmers   Ins.    Co.,   91   Mich.   600  ;    21   Ins.   L.   J. 

818  ;  52  N.  W.  55. 
Capital  Ins.  Co.  v.  Wallace,   50  Kans.    453  ;  21   Ins.  L.   J.   516  ;   37 

Pac.  R.  1070. 

Valued  Policy  Law,  Effect  of. 

In  those  States  having  a  valued  policy  law  in  force,  it  is 
held  that  there  is  no  consideration  for  an  appraisal  and,  if  had, 
the  award  will  not  be  enforced. 

Seyks  v.  Millers  National  Ins.  Co.   (Wis.  S.  C.),  41  N.  W.  Rep.  443. 
Queen   Ins.    Co.  v.-  Leslie    (Ohio    S.    C.),    24   N.    E.    Rep.    1072;    19 

93 


94  HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 

Ins.  L.  J.  673. 

Queen  Ins.  Co.  v.  Jefferson  Ice.  Co.   (Tex.  S.  C.),  15  Ins.  L.  J.  109. 
Home  F.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Bean   (Neb.  S.  C.),  24  Ins.  L,.  J.  516. 
German   Ins.    Co.  v.   Eddy    (Neb.   S.   C.).   54   N.   W.   Rep.   856;    22 

Ins.  L.   J.    468. 

Baker  v.  Phoenix  Assur.  Co.,  57  Mo.  App.  559.  * 
Doxey  v.  Royal  Ins.  Co.    (Tenn.   Ch.  App.),  36   S.  W.   Rep.  950. 
Pennsylvania    F.    Ins.    Co.    v.    Drackett    et    al.     (Ohio    S.    C.),    57 

N.  E.  Rep.  962. 

Aetna  Ins.  Co.  v.  Stephens  (Ky.  C.  A.),  57  S.  W.  Rep.  583. 
Merchants  Ins.  Co.  v.   Stephens    (Ky.  C.  A.),  59   S.  W.  Rep.   511. 
Ohage  v.   Union  Ins.   Co.    (Minn.   S.   C.),   85  N.  W.  Rep.   212. 

The  delay  of  the  insured  in  offering  to  arbitrate,  which 
offer  is  a  condition  precedent  to  an  action  on  a  policy,  does 
not  bar  his  right  of  action  after  an  offer  has  been  made  and 
refused,  unless  such  delay  has  prejudiced  the  insurer. 

Johnson  v.  Phoenix  Ins.  Co.,  69  Mo.  App.   226. 

Schrepfer  v.  Rochford  Ins.  Co.,  77  Minn.   291,  79  N.  W.   1005. 

Maine  and  Massachusetts  Standard  Policies. 

The  determination  by  arbitration  of  the  amount  of  the 
loss  having  been  specially  made  by  the  parties  a  condition 
precedent  to  suit  (on  the  policy)  it  was  incumbent  upon  the 
plaintiff  to  prove  performance  or  a  valid  excuse  for  non- 
performance. 

Fisher  v.  Merchants  Ins.  Co.,  95  Me.  486  ;  50  Atl.  282. 
Dunton  v.  Westchester  F.  Ins.  Co.  (Me.),  71  Atl.  1037. 
Lamson  v.  Prudential  Ins.  Co.,  171  Mass.  433,  50  N.  E.  943,  28 

Ins.  L.   J.  70. 

Weissmann  v.   Firemen's  Ins.  Co.,   208  Mass.   577,   95   N.  E.    411. 
Paris  v.  Hamburg  B.  F.  Ins.  Co.,  204  Mass.  90,  90  N.  E.   420. 

Arbitration — Appraisal — Award,  Annotated  Case. 

1.  Validity  of  appraisal  provision  of  the  policy, 
a     In  general. 

b     Agreement    to    submit    amount    of   loss    or    damage, 

valid, 
c     Agreement  to  submit  all  matters  in  dispute  invalid. 

2.  Occasion   of   appraisal   or  arbitration. 

a     Preliminary     requisites,     presupposes     a     failure     to 

agree. 

b     Condition  precedent  to  right  of  action, 
c     Collateral  and  independent  condition.     The  provision 

for    appraisal    must    fix    a    definite     method.      As 

affected  where,   loss   is   total,   or   by  valued   policy 

law   or   statutory   provision, 
d     Demand  of  party, 
e     Miscellaneous  cases. 

3.  Requiring  compliance  with  condition. 


APPRAISAL — ARBITRATION — AWARD.  95 

a     Duty  mutual, 
b     Duty  of  insurer. 
c     Duty  of  insured. 

'  d     When    arbitration    fails    through    no   fault    of   either 
party. 

4.  Effect  of  failure  of  arbitration  through  fault  of  insured 

is  a  bar  to  suit,  as  does  his. 
a     Refusal  to  arbitrate. 
b     Or  bad  faith. 

5.  Waiver  of  appraisal  provision. 

a     General  cases. 

b  Accepting  and  returning  proofs  of  loss  without  ob- 
jection. Adjusting  loss. 

c     Denying   liability. 

d  Demanding  or  having  an  appraisal  different  from 
that  provided  by  the  policy. 

e     Acts  of  the  parties. 

1.  Refusal  to  arbitrate. 

2.  Time    in    which    appraisal    may    be   had    or    de- 
manded. 

3.  Other  "acts. 

f     Acts  of  insurance  company's  appraiser. 

Graham  v.   German  Am.  Ins.   Co.,   75   Ohio  St.   374,   79   N.   E.    930, 
36  Ins.  L.  J.  193,    (Annotated  in  15  L.  R.  A.    (U.  S.)    1055  on 
all  points  named  above.) 

It  Is  No  More  the  Duty  of  the  Assured  Than  of  the  Company 

to  Demand  Appraisal. 

It  is  no  more  the  duty  of  the  insured  than  of  the  company 
to  demand  an  appraisal  in  case  of  differences  under  a  policy  like 
the  N.  Y.  Standard  form.  Each  party  is  entitled  to  demand  it, 
but  neither  can  compel  it,  and  neither  has  the  right  to  insist 
that  the  other  shall  first  demand  it.  If  the  insured  refuses  the 
company's  demand  for  an  appraisal,  his  right  of  action  is  sus- 
pended until  he  consents.  If  the  company  refuses  the  insured's 
demand  for  an  appraisal,  he  may  institute  suit. 

Western  Assur.  Co.  v.  Decker,  98  Fed.  381,  39  C.  C.  A.  383-9 
(citing  and  approving  Kahnweiler  v.  Phoenix  Ins.  Co.,  14  C.  C. 
A.  485,  67  Fed.  483.)  Dissenting-  op.  by  Sanborn  Circuit  J. 
with  valuable  citations. 

Common   Law    Agreement    or    Appraisal    Different    from   that 
Provided  by  the  Policy. 

The   agreement   for   submission   need  not   be   in  the   terms 


96  HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 

of  the  policy;   the  parties  can  waive  those  provisions,   even  if 
they  were  intended  to  prescribe  a  form. 

Hall  v.  Norwalk  F.  Ins.  Co.    (Conn.  S.  C.).  17  Atl.  Rep.   356. 
London  and  Lancashire  F.   Ins.  Co.  v.  Storrs    (U.  S.   C.  C.  A.  8tb 

Dist.),    25    Ins.   L.   J.    283. 
British  Amer.  Assur.   Co.  v.   Darragh   (U.   S.  C.   C.  A.   5th  Dist.), 

33   Ins.  L.  J.   577. 
Mutual    F.    Ins.    Co.    v.    Alvord    (U.    S.    C.    C,    A.,    1st    Dist),    2 a 

Ins.  L,  J.  801. 
Adams    v.    N.    Y.    Bowery    F.    Ins.    Co.    (Iowa    S.    C.),    51    N.    W. 

Rep.  1149. 

Where  the  company's  adjuster  appeared  at  the  loss,  ex- 
amined the  premises,  and  agreed  with  the  insured  to  leave 
the  question  of  amount  of  loss  to  a  third  person,  a  carpenter, 
the  company  taking  no  further  action,  this  was  a  waiver  of 
proofs  of  loss,  and  rendered  inapplicable  the  arbitration  clause 
of  the  policy. 

Wholley   v.    Western   Assur.    Co.,    174    Mass.    263;    54    N.    E.    548; 
28  Ins.  L.  J.  1029. 

If  the  appraisal  agreement  does  not  follow  and  is  not  in 
accordance  with  the  provisions  of  the  policy  for  arbitration,  it 
cannot  be  offered  in  evidence  under  the  plea  of  failure  to 
comply  with  the  policy  condition  as  to  appraisal  of  the  loss. 
(In  this  case  the  policy  provided  if  differences  should  arise 
between  the  company  and  the  insured  as  to  the  amount  of 
the  loss,  the  same  should  be  submitted  to  appraisal.  The 
appraisal  agreement  recited  that  the  appraisers  should  ascer- 
tain the  amount  of  the  loss,  and  were  required  "to  make  an 
estimate  of  the  actual  cash  cost  of  replacing  or  repairing 
same.") 

Western  Assur.  Co.  v.  Hall,  143  Ala.  168  ;  38  Southern  853. 

Where  the  policy  requires  appraisers  to  first  select  an 
umpire  before  proceeding  with  appraisal,  this  is  generally  not 
material  and  merely  directory.  The  parties  proceeding  before 
an  umpire  improperly  appointed  by  the  appraisers  waive  all 
objection  to  his  appointment.  The  umpire '  can  act  only  after 
disagreement  of  the  appraisers.  Until  then  an  umpire  is  not 
necessary.  He  can  act  as  well,  and  with  the  same  effect,  if 
appointed  when  such  a  contingency  occurs.  The  time,  there- 
fore, fixed  in  the  contract,  is  not  essential  or  material.  The 
case  of  Adams  v.  N.  Y.  Bowery  Ins.  Co.,  85  Iowa  6,  51  N.  W. 
1149,  21  Ins.  L/.  J.  833,  is  the  only  case  to  be  found  in  which 
it  is  held  that  the  omission  to  appoint  an  umpire  before  ap- 
praisers entered  upon  their  duties  invalidated  the  award.  The 
opinion  is  very  brief  (and  covers  other  questions  also  invaHdat- 


APPBAISAL — ARBITRATION — AWARD.  97 

ing  the  award)  and  as  to  this  point  cites  no  authority  and 
gives  no  reason.  We  cannot  follow  such  an  authority  in  setting 
aside  an  award  for  such  a  merely  technical  omission. 

The  fact  that  the  appraisers  agreed  in  every  particular  is 
sufficient  evidence  that  they  alone  were  not  partial  or  corrupt, 
and  that  their  award  is  just  and  fair. 

Chandos  v.  American  F.  Ins.  Co.,  84  Wis.  184;   22  Ins.  L.  J.  425; 
54  N.  W.  390. 

To  same  effect  except  last  paragraph  is  Doying  v.  Broad- 
way Ins.  Co,  25  N.  J.  L.  569;  23  Ins.  L.  J.  394,  27  Atl.  927, 
and  Caledonian  Ins.  Co.  v.  Traub,  83  Md.  524:  25  Ins.  L.  J, 
791;  37  Atl.  782. 

An  agreement  between  the  assured  and  the  adjuster  on  the 
amount  of  the  loss,  whether  arrived  at  between  the  parties,  or 
by  leaving  it  to  any  other  person  or  persons,  in  fact  no  matter 
how  the  amount  of  the  loss  was  agreed  to  it  is  binding  on 
both  the  company  and  the  assured.  It  cannot  be  set  aside 
except  for  fraud,  mistake  or  inadequacy.  (The  Author.) 

Assured  Must  Demand  an  Appraisal. 

In  case  of  disagreement,  the  insured  must  demand  an  ap- 
praisal, under  a  policy  such  as  the  New  York  standard  form. 

Connecticut   F.   Ins.    Co.   v.   Hamilton    (U.    S.   C.   C.   A.    6th   Dist), 

23  Ins.  L.  J.  241. 
Johnson   v.    Phoenix   Ins.    Co.,    69   Mo.   App.    226;    see   also    69   Mo. 

App.   232  ; 

Murphy  v.  North  B.  &  M.  Ins.   Co.,  61  Mo.  App.   323  ; 
Dautel  v.   Pennsylvania  F.   Ins.   Co.,   65   Mo.  App.  44  ; 
McNees  v.   Southern  Ins.   Co.,   69   Mo.  App.   232  ; 
Swearinger  v.  Pacific  F.  Ins.  Co.,  66  Mo.  App.  90  ; 
Hooker  v.  Phoenix  Ins.  Co.,  69  Mo.  App.  141 ; 
Chippewa  Lumber  Co.  v.  Phoenix  Ins.  Co.,  80  Mich.  116  ;  44  N.  W. 

Rep.  1055  ;  19  Ins.  L.  J.  535  ; 

Kahnweiler   v.   Phenix   Ins.    Co.,  23    Ins.   L.    J.    391 ;    57   Fed.    562. 
(But  in  this  case,  Kahnweiler  v.   Phenix)    the  policy  provided 

for  appraisal   on  disagreement  so   that  on  appeal  Kanhweiler 

v.    Phenix    Ins.    Co.,    it   was    held    the    assured   was    no    more 

obligated    to    demand    appraisal    than    was    the    company ;    67 

Fed.   483;   14  C.   C.   A.   485.); 
Western  Assur.   Co.   v.  Hall,   112   Ala.    318  ;   25   Ins.   L.  J.    874  ;    20 

Southern   447,   Earley  v.    Providence   Wash.   Ins.   Co.    (R.    I.). 

76   Atl.   Rep.  753  ; 
American  Cent'l  Ins.  Co.  v.  Bass,  90'  Tex.   380  ;  26   Ins.  L    J    718  : 

38  S.  W.  1119; 

Dee  v.  Key  City  F.  Ins.  Co.,  104  Iowa  167;   73  N.  W.  594; 
Allen  v.  Patroup  M.  F.  Ins.  Co.    (Mich.),  130   N.  W.   196' 
Pioneer  &c.  v.  Phoenix  Assur.   Co.,   106   N.  C.   28  ;  10   S.   E.   1057  ; 

19  Ins.  L.  J.  408. 
Veney  v.    Reginald,    Eng.,   Q.    B.   Law   R.,   Feby.    1888,   part   2,   p. 

177  ;  1  Ins.  Dig.  33  ; 
Wolff   v.   L.  &   L.    &   G.    Ins.   Co.,    50   N.    J.    Law    453  ;    14    Atl.   R. 

561  ;  17  Ins.  L.  J.   714; 
Gasser   v.    Sun   Fire    Off.,    42    Minn.    315  ;    44    N.   W.    R.    252  ;    19 

Ins.  L.  J.   243  ; 
Blackwell  v.  American  C.  Ins.  Co.,  2  Mo.  App.  516  ; 


98  HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 

Phenix  Ins.  Co.  et  al.  v.  Carnahan,  63  Ohio  St.  258  ;  58  N.  B.  805  ; 
Westenhaver  v.   German   Am.   Ins.    Co.,   113  Iowa   726 :    84  N.  W. 

717;  30   Ins.  L.  J.   314; 
Palatine   Ins.    Co.    v.   Morton,   106    Tenn.    558;    61    S.   W.   787;    30 

Ins.  L.  J.   481; 
Mosness    v.    German    Ins.    Co.,    50    Minn.    341;    52    N.    W.    932;    21 

Ins.  L.  J.  915  ; 

Dunton  v.  Westchester  F.  Ins.  Co.   (Me.),  71  AtL  Rep.  1037; 
Connecticut  F.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Hamilton,  59  Fed.  258  ;  23  Ins.  L.  J.  241 ; 
Nolan  v.  Ocean  Ace.  &  G.  Corp.,  23  Canadian  Law  Times  187  ; 
Kersey  v.  Phoenix  Ins.  Co.,  135  Mich.  10  ;  97  N.  W.  57  ; 
Exchange   Bk.   v.    Thuringia   F.    Ins.    Co.,   109    Mo.   App.    654;    83 

S.  W.  534  ; 

Law  v.  Commercial  M.  F.   Co.    (N.  D.),  107  N.  W.  69; 
Graham    v.    German    Am.    Ins.    Co.,    Royal   Ins.    Co.   v.    Silberman 

(Ohio),  79   N.   E.   930;   36   Ins.   L.  J.   193; 

Paris  v.  Hamburg  Bremen  F.  Ins.  Co.    (Mass.),  90  N.  E.   420; 
Novak   v.    Rochester    G.    Ins.    Co.    (111.    App.),    40    Nat.    Corp.    R. 

698,   June,    1910  ; 

Weismann  v.  Firemen's  Ins.  Co.  (Mass.  S.  J.  C.),  95  N.  E.  411 ; 
North  B.  &  M.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Robinett   (Va,  S.  C.  A.),  72  S.  E.  668; 

Condition  Precedent  to  Suit. 

Appraisal  when  demanded  is  a  condition  precedent  to  re- 
covery, where  the  policy  so  provides  as  does  the  New  York 
standard  form. 

Scottish  U.  &  N.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Clancy  (Tex.  S.  C.),  8  S.  W.  Rep.  630  ; 
Wolff  v.  L.  &  L.  &  G.  Ins.  Co.   (N.  J.  S.  C.),  14  AtL  Rep.  561 ;  17 

Ins.  L.  J.  714  ; 
Gasser  v.  Sun  Fire  Office  (Minn.  S.  C.),  19  Ins.  L.  J.  247  ;  44  N.  W. 

Rep.  252  ; 
Chippewa  Lumber  Co.  v.  Phenix  Ins.  Co.   (Mich.  S.  C.),  44  N.  W. 

Rep.  1055;   80  Mich.  116; 

Hamilton  v.  L.  &  L.  &  G.  Ins.  Co.    (U.  S.   S.  C.),   136  U.  S.   242; 
Mosnes  v.  German  Am.  Ins.  Co.    (Minn.  S.  C.  July  1892),  21  Ins. 

L.  J.   915; 

Western  Assur.  Co.  v.  Hall  (Ala.  S.  C.),  25  Ins.  L.  J.  874; 
Chainless  Cycle  Co.   v.   Security  Ins.  Co.,   169   N.   Y.   304;   31  Ins. 

L.  J.  324 ; 
Phenix  and    other    Ins.    Cos.    v.    Carnahan    et    al.    (Ohio    S.    C.), 

58  N.  E.  Rep.  805 ; 

Davis  v.  Atlas  Assur.  Co.    (Wash.  S.  C.),  47  Pac.  Rep.  436; 
Sun  Mut.   Ins.  Co.  v.   Crist    (Ky.  C.  A.),   39    S.   W.   Rep.   837;  26 

Ins.  L.  J.   695. 

Not  a  Condition  Precedent. 

The  New  York  standard  form  of  policy  makes  an  appraisal 
a  condition  precedent  to  recovery  only  when  one  has  been  re- 
quired by  the  insurer,  it  is  not  the  duty  of  the  insured  to 
initiate  one. 

Chainless  Cycle  Co.  v.   Security  Ins.  Co.,   169   N.  T.   304;   31  Ins. 

L.  J.  324  ;  62  N.  E.  392  ; 

Kahnweiler  v.  Phenix  Ins.  Co.,  14  C.  C.  A.  485,  67  Fed.  Rep.  483  ; 
Milwaukee    Mechs.    Ins.    Co.    v.    Stewart    (Ind.    A.    C.),    42    N.    E. 

Rep.   290  ; 
Grand   Rapid   F.   Ins.  Co.    v.   Finn,    60    Ohio    513,    54  N.   W.   Rep. 

545.      (Ohio  now  holds  to  the  contrary.)  ; 

Davis  v.    Atlas   Assur.    Co.   v.    (Wash.   S.   C.),   47    Pac.   Rep.    436; 
Sun  Mutual   Ins.   Co.  v.    Crist    (Ky.  C.  A.),   39   S.   W.    Rep.   837; 

26  Ins.    L.    J.    695; 
Lesure  Lumber  Co.  v.   Mut.  F.  Ins.  Co.,  101  Iowa  514;  70  N.  W. 

Rep.   761; 

Norris  v.  Equitable  F.  Assn.   (S.  C.  S.  D.),  102  N.  W.  Rep.  306; 
Nerger  v.  Equitable  F.  Assn.,  20  S.  D.  419;  35  Ins.  L.  J.  556; 


APPRAISAL — ARBITRATION — AWARD.  99 

American  Ins.  Co.  v.  Rodenhause   (Okla.),  128  Pac.  502; 
Winchester  v.  North  B.  &  M.  Ins.  Co.,  160  Cal.  1;  116  Pac.  63; 
Amusement  &c.  v.  Prussian  N.  Ins.  Co.,  85  Kan.  367,  116  Pac.  620. 

Where  there  is  no  disagreement  as  to  amount  of  loss  and 
the  company  offered  to  pay  on  same  basis  that  other  companies 
had  settled,  the  policy  requirement  for  an  appraisal  was  thereby 
waived;  the  offer  to  pay  being  virtually  an  admission  of  the 
amount  of  insured  loss. 

Shook  v.  Retail  Hardware  M.  F.  Ins.  Co.   (Mo.  App.),  134  S.  W. 
589. 

To  take  advantage  of  the  appraisal  clause  provision  in  a 
fire  insurance  policy  such  as  the  New  York  standard  form,  the 
defendant  must  allege  in  its  plea  that  there  was  a  disagreement 
between  it  and  the  plaintiff  as  to  the  amount  of  such  loss, 
prior  to  institution  of  suit. 

Torpedo  Top   Co.  v.  Royal   Ins.    Co.,   162   111.   App.  338;    42   Nat'nl 
Corp.  Rep.  593. 

Provision  for  Appraisal  not  Upheld  by  Pennsylvania  and  Ne- 
braska Courts. 

An  appraisal  is  not  a  condition  precedent  to  suit,  it  being 
revocable  by  either  party,  and  the  bringing  of  the  action  a 
revocation. 

Needy  v.  German-Am.  Ins.  Co.  (Pa.  S.  C.),  47  Atl.  Rep.  739; 
Yost  v.  McKee  et  al.    (Pa.  S.  C.),   36  Atl.  Rep.   317. 

The  Nebraska  Supreme  Court  holds  the  effect  of  the  ap- 
praisal clause  is  to  oust  the  courts  of  their  legitimate  jurisdic- 
tion. . 

German  Am.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Etherton,  41  N.  W.  Rep.   406. 

After  failure  of  appraisal  materially  different  in  terms 
from  that  provided  in  the  policy,  an  insurance  company  waives 
right  to  demand  new  appraisal  pursuant  to  the  terms  of  the 
policy. 

Davis  v.  Atlas  Assur.  Co.   (Wash.  S.  C.),  47  Pac.  Rep.  436. 

A  joint  demand  by  several  companies  for  an  appraisal  is 
not  authorized  by  the  policy;  the  demand  must  be  separate. 

Connecticut  F.   Ins.   Co.  v.  Hamilton    (U.  S.   C.   C.   A.    6th   Dist.), 

23  Ins.  L.  J.  241; 
Hamilton   v.    Phoenix    Ins.    Co.    (U.    S.    C.    C.  A.,    6th   Dist),    23 

Ins.  U  J.  561. 

A  joint  demand  is  not  good  where  the  policies  differ. 

Palatine    Ins.    Co.   v.    Morton-Scott-Robertson    Co.    (Tenn.    S.    C.), 
61  S.  W.  Rep.  787. 


100  HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 

Where  defendant  insisted  on  assured  signing  a  written 
agreement  containing  provisions  not  in  the  policy,  it  waived  its 
rights  to  appraisal. 

Walker  v.    German   Ins.   Co.    (July,   1893),    (Kan.  S.    C.)f   22   Ins. 

L.  J.  750; 
Summerfleld  v.  North  British  &  M.  Ins.  Co.   (U.  S.  C.  C.  Western 

Dist.  Va.),  24  Ins.  L.  J.  442. 

Where  the  insured,  after  filing  proofs,  but  before  their  re- 
ceipt by  the  company,  upon  failure  of  parties  to  agree,  adver- 
tised and  sold  the  property  against  the  company's  protest,  the 
latter  was  deprived  of  its  rights  to  appraisement  and  was  re- 
leased from  liability  under  the  policy. 

Astrich    v.    German- Am.    Ins.    Co.    (U.    S.    C.    C.    A.    3d   Dist.),    33 
Ins.  L.  J.  925. 

I 

The  assured,  after  agreeing  to  appraisal,  revoked  the  sub- 
mission and  refused  to  be  bound.  He  then  had  the  goods  ap- 
praised and  sold  them.  Held,  A  forfeiture  of  the  policy. 

Morley  v.  L.  &  L.  &  G.  Ins.  Co.   (Mich  S.  C.),  48  N.  W.  Rep.  502; 

20  Ins.  L.  J.  577: 
Providence-Washington   Ins.   Co.   v.   Wolf    (Ind.   A.    C.),    72   N.   E. 

Rep.    606. 

The  demand  for  appraisal  iterated  and  reiterated  is  met  by 
a  denial  that  there  was  any  "disagreement"  or  difference  as  to 
the  amount  of  the  loss,  which  was  a  distinct  evasion  of  the 
demand;  and  it  is  the  merest  trifling  with  words  to  say  that 
this  quibbling  and  evasion,  which  was  continued  until  an  ap- 
praisal was  rendered  fruitless  by  the  sale  of  the  remnants  by 
insured,  does  not  amount  to  a  refusal  on  the  part  of  the  in- 
sured to  perform  the  condition  as  to  arbitration  or  appraise- 
ment of  the  loss. 

Phoenix  v.  Carnahan   (Ohio  S.  C.),  58  N.  E.  Rep.   805. 

Citing: 

Hamilton   v.    Ins.    Co.,    136   U.    S.    242  ;    10    Supp.    Ct.    945  ;    34    L. 

Ed.  419; 
Zalesky   v.   Ins.   Co.,   102   Iowa   613  ;    71   N.   W.   Rep.    566. 

All  verbal  demands  for  an  appraisal  and  for  an  examina- 
tion under  oath  touching  the  cause  and  origin  of  the  fire  are 
merged  in  a  subsequent  written  demand  therefor. 

Citizens'  Ins.   Co.  et  al.  v.   Herposheimer    (Neb.),  109   N.   W.  160. 

The  insured's  statement  that  he  was  "ready  to  proceed 
under  the  provisions  of  the  policy"  is  not  a  request  for  the 
appointment  of  referees  (arbitration). 


APPRAISAL — ARBITRATION — AWARD.  101 

Vera  et  al.   v.   Mercantile  F.    &   M.   Ins.    Co.   2nd   cth^r   Cos".,'  10:- 
N.    E.   292  ;    216   Mass.   154. 

A  local  agent  who  issues  policies  is  a  proper  person  on 
whom  to  serve  notice  of  a  demand  upon  the  company  for 
arbitration  provided  for  in  the  policy. 

Phenix  v.  Stocks  et  al.   (111.  S.  C.)f  36  N.  E.  Rep.   408. 

After  some  unsatisfactory  negotiations,  the  insured  sug- 
gested an  appraisal,  and  afterwards  wrote  the  insurer  that  un- 
less an  appraisal  was  agreed  to  within  five  days,  he  would  pro- 
ceed to  dispose  of  the  goods,  to  which  no  answer  was  made. 
This  was  held  to  be  a  waiver  of  the  insurer's  right  to  appraisal". 

Chainless   Cycle   Co.    v.    Security  Ins.    Co.,    169   N.    Y.    304;    31   Ins. 
L.  J.   324. 

After  once  refusing  to  appraise,  the  insurer  can  not  after- 
wards compel  an  appraisal. 

•Continental   Ins.   Co.    v.   Wilson    (Kan.    S.    C.),   25    Pac.   Rep.    629; 

20    Ins.   Lr.   J.   269  ; 
Wainer   v.    Milford    Mut.    F.   Ins.    Co.    (Mass.    S.   J.   C.),    23    N.    E. 

Rep.   887  ; 
McDowell  v.  Aetna  Ins.   Co.  and  other  Ins.  Cos.    (Mass.    S.   J.   C.), 

41   N.   E.   Rep.    665  ; 
Chainless    Cycle    Mfg.   Co.    v.    Security    Ins.    Co.,    169    N.    Y.    304 ; 

31   Ins.   L.   J.   324. 

When  the  adjuster  makes  an  offer  in  payment  of  the  loss 
which  'assured  refuses,  and  then  withdraws  his  proposition, 
with  notice  that  the  company  will  insist  upon  every  require- 
ment of  the  policy,  intending  to  terminate  all  negotiations  for 
a  settlement,  the  arbitration  clause  of  the  policy  is  rendered 
inoperative  and  cannot  be  invoked  as  a  defense. 

Dautel  v.   Pennsylvania  F."  Ins.    Co.,    65   Mo.   App.    44 

.1 

Failure  of  the  insurer  after  demanding  appraisal  at  a  given 
time  and  place,  to  appear  at  the  time  and  place,  is  a  waiver 
of  its  right  to  appraisal. 

Northern  Assur.  Co.  v.  Samuels  (Tex.  C.  C.  A.),  33  S.  W.  Rep.  239. 

The  insurer  knowing  that  the  insured  desires  a  prompt  ap- 
praisal or  adjustment,  so  that  the  property  may  not  suffer 
further  injury  before  it  is  sold,  can  not  postpone  its  demand 
for  an  appraisal,  until  after  the  insured,  misled  by  its  act,  has 
been  placed  in  a  position  where  one  is  impossible. 

Chainless  Cycle   Co.   v.   Security   Ins.   Co.,   169   N.   Y.    304  ;   31   Ins. 
L.  J.  324. 

The   insurer   can  not   compel   an   appraisal    of   loss   by  fire 


102  HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 

after  the  property  has  been  damaged  by  fire  a  second  time, 
since  the  damage  by  both  fires  constitutes  but  one  claim,  to  be 
settled  in  one  proceeding. 

Mechanics  Ins.   C».  v.   Hodge    (111.   S.   C.),  26   Ins.   L.   J.   406;   37 
N.  E.  Rep.  61. 

The  insured's  death  before  award  is  made  does  not  revoke 
the  submission. 

Citizens'  Ins.  Co.  v.  Coit  (Jnd.  A.  C.),  39  N.  E.  Rep.  766. 

The  company  can  not  take  advantage  of  the  want  of  arbi- 
tration as  provided  by  the  policy,  when  its  refusal  defeated 
such  arbitration,  and  it  is  immaterial  that  a  former  action  was 
pending  on  the  policy  at  the  time  the  offer  to  arbitrate  was 
made. 

Johnson  v.  Phoenix  Ins.  Co.,  69   Mo.  App.   226. 

A  submission  to  appraisal,  though  made  jointly  by  several 
companies,  is  under  policies  and  not  a  common  law  agreement, 
where  the  policies  are  all  alike  and  the  submission  is  such  as 
is  provided  for  therein. 

Wicking   et   al.    v.    Citizens'    Mut.    F.    Ins.    Co.    (Mich.    S.    C.),   77 
N.  W.  Rep.   275  ;  28  Ins.  L.  J.   230. 


Appraisal  is  waiver  of  insurance  company's  right  to  rebuild. 

Wynkoop  v.  Niagara  F.  Ins.  Co.  (N.  Y.  C.  A.),  12  Ins.  L.  J.  253; 
McAllaster  v.  Niagara  F.  Ins.  Co.  (N.  Y.  C.  A.),  28  Ins.  L.  J.  769  ; 
Iowa  Cent'l  B.  &  L.  Assn.  v.  Merchants  and  Bankers  F.  Ins.  Co. 

(Iowa  S.  C.).  32  Ins.  L.  J.  852  ; 
Alliance   Co-operative   Ins.   Co.   v.   Arnold    (Kans.    S.    C.),   31   Ins. 

L.  J.  943  ; 
Elliott  v.  Merchants  and  Bankers  F.  Ins.  Co.    (la.   S.  C.),  28  Ins. 

L.    J.   677. 

But  where  appraisal  agreement  expressly  stipulates  that  it 
is  "Without  reference  to  any  other  question  or  matter  of 
difference  within  the  terms  and  conditions  of  insurance  than 
the  amount  of  the  loss,"  it  neither  waives  the  company's  right  to 
rebuild  instead  of  paying,  as  provided  for  in  the  policy,  nor 
excludes  proof  of  a  previous  oral  waiver  of  such  right. 

Platt  v.  Aetna  Ins.  Co.    (111.   S.  C.),   24  Ins.  L.  J.   132;   38   N.   E. 
Rep.  750. 


An  appraisal  had  by  the  insured  and  other  companies  is  not 
competent  evidence  of  the  amount  of  the  loss. 


APPRAISAL — ARBITRATION — AWARD.  103 

Penn.  Plate  Glass  Co.  v.   Spring  Garden  Ins.   Co.    (Pa.   S.   C.),  28 
Ins.  L.  J.   223  ; 

Chenowith    v.    i-henix    Ins.    Co.,    4    Finch    Digest,    22     (Ky.    S.    C.), 
12  Ky.  L.  Rep.   232. 

If  the  insurers  deny  liability  as  to  a  portion  of  the  loss 
and,  in  the  agreement  for  submission  to  appraisal,  exclude  such 
items  from  the  purview  of  the  agreement,  and  when  the  award 
is  returned  the  loss  be  paid  in  accordance  therewith,  and 
receipts  be  taken  discharging  the  insurer  from  all  liability  by 
reason  of  the  fire  for  which  claim  for  loss  was  made,  and 
another  receipt  for  payment  of  the  return  premium  in  con- 
sideration of  which  the  policy  is  canceled,  still  the  insured  may 
recover  for  the  loss  on  items  omitted  from  the  appraisal,  and 
which  the  insurer  refused  to  pay,  provided  the  court  finds,  as 
a  matter  of  fact,  they  were  covered  by  the  policy. 

Fire  Ins.  Assn.  v.  Wickham   (U.  S.  S.  C.),  21  Ins.  L.  J.  193. 

Plaintiff  dismissed  his  action  on  a  fire  policy  and  brought 
new  suit.  On  receiving  notice  of  intention  to  dismiss,  defend- 
ant served  demand  for  appraisal  under  terms  of  policy.  Held, 
That  demand  was  too  late. 

Davis  v.  Imperial  Ins.  Co.    (Wash.  S.  C.),  47  Pac.  Rep.  439. 

Where  the  insured's  action  was  dismissed  for  refusing  to 
submit  loss  to  appraisal  and  thereafter  she  offered  to  submit 
to  appraisal,  but  the  company  refused  to  do  so,  claiming  that 
by  her  previous  conduct  the  insured  had  lost  all  rights  under 
the  policy,  the  insured  brought  this  action  to  recover  her  loss. 
Held,  That  the  doctrine  between  inconsistent  rights  or  remedies 
is  inapplicable.  The  plaintiff  never  had  any  election.  Her  re- 
fusal at  first  to  submit  to  appraisal  merely  amounted  to  a 
waiver  of  her  right  to  an  appraisal,  but  did  not  extinguish  her 
rights  to  recover  on  the  policy;  that  the  refusal  of  the  company 
to  submit  to  appraisal  upon  a  subsequent  offer  of  the  insured 
to  do  so,  was  waiver  of  its  right  to  an  appraisal,  and  thereupon 
the  insured  could  maintain  an  action  on  the  policy  without 
appraisal. 

Schrepfer  v.  Rockford  Ins.  Co.,  77  Minn.  291;  79  N.  W.  Rep.  1005. 

Where  the  representative  of  a  company  that  demands  a 
separate  appraisal  did  not  join  the  other  companies  in  an  ap- 
praisal, but  afterwards  co-operated  with  them,  and  took  advan- 
tage of  whatever  was  done  and  was  notified  of  all  that  occurred 
and  made  no  objections,  the  company  can  not  allege  that  it 
was  not  a  party  to  the  appraisal. 


104  HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 

North    German    Ins.    Co.    v.    Morton-Scott-Robertson    Co.     (Tenn. 

S.  C.),  31  Ins.  L.  J.  580; 

(See  also  the  case  of  Levy  v.  Scottish  U.  &  N.  Ins.  Co.    (W.  Va. 
S.  C.  A.),   52  S.   E.   Rep.   449). 

Statute,  Michigan. 

The  Michigan  statutes  prescribing  the  form  of  a  standard 
policy  to  be  used  in  that  state  which  provides  that  an  award  of 
appraisers  should  be  prima  facie  the  amount  of  the  loss,  does 
not  prevent  the  insured  and  insurer,  after  loss,  from  entering 
an  arbitration  of  the  loss  and  making  the  award  of  appraisers 
binding  and  conclusive  as  to  the  value  of  the  property  and  the 
loss  thereto. 

Montgomery   v.    Amer.    Cent'l  Ins.    Co.,   108    Wis.    146  ;    84    N.    W. 
175;  30  Ins.  L.  J.  122. 

Iowa. 

A  statute  that  the  amount  of  the  policy  shall  be  prima 
facie  evidence  of  the  insurable  value,  at  the  date  of  the  policy, 
doesn't  prevent  the  company  from  showing  depreciation,  and 
actual  value  at  time  of  fire,  nor  does  it  relieve  the  insured  from 
proving  the  loss,  nor  relieve  him  from  the  operation  of  a 
clause  making  an  appraisement  a  condition  precedent  to  right 
of  action  on  the  policy. 

Zalesky  v.  Home  Ins.  Co.,  108  Iowa  341;  79  N.  W.  69. 

Must  Produce  Books  for  Inspection  of  Appraisers. 

On  demand  of  insurer,  the  insured  directed  its  bookkeeper 
to  allow  appraisers  to  examine  all  its  books.  He,  however, 
withheld  a  book  containing  an  estimate  of  the  cost  of  the 
destroyed  articles.  Held,  Insured  was^  bound  by  his  acts  and 
that  his  action  amounted  to  a  representation  that  there  was  no 
such  book  and  that  insurer  was  released  from  its  agreement. 

Stockton  Comb.  Harvester  and  Agricultural  Works  v.  Glens  Falls 
Ins.  Co.  (Gal.  S.  C.),  33  Pac.  Rep.  663. 

On  a  retrial  of  this  case  it  was  proven  that  no  books  were 
concealed  from  appraisers,  hence  judgment  for  plaintiff  in  lower 
court  here  affirmed  (Cal.  S.  C.),  53  Pac.  Rep:  565. 

When  appraisal  fails  through  plaintiff's  bad  faith,  he  can 
not  maintain  an  action. 

Silver  v.  Western  Assur.  Co.    (N.  Y.  C.  A.),   58  N.  E.  Rep.  284. 

Appraisal — Value  of  Saloon  Furniture  in  Dry  Town. 

The  policy  limited  liability  to  the  "actual   cash  value,  with 


APPRAISAL — ARBITRATION — AWARD.  105 

proper  deductions  for  the  depreciation  however  caused."  Held} 
That  the  value  meant  the  price  which  the  property  would  bring 
at  a  fair  market;  as  to  fixed  property  the  value  would  have  to 
be  arrived  at  at  its  place  of  location;  that  as  to  movable 
property  it  should  be  ascertained  at  the  nearest  fair  market 
for  same,  subject  to  a  deduction  for  cost  of  transportation; 
hence  on  loss  of  saloon  fixtures  in  a  town  where  the  sale  of 
liquor  had  been  prohibited,  the  insurer  was  not  entitled  to  a 
valuation  of  the  property  at  that  place,  but  was  obliged  to  pay 
on  the  basis  of  the  value  of  the  property  at  the  nearest  fair 
market  for  such  property  less  cost  of  transportation. 

Prussian  National  Ins.  Co.  v.  Lawrence,   (U.  S.  C.  C.  A.,  4th  Cir.)  : 
221  Federal  Reporter   (June  10,   1915)    931. 

Insured's  Right  to  Introduce  Evidence  Before  Appraisers. 

The  authorities  generally  are  in  accord  in  holding  that 
where  there  has  been  a  total  extinction  of  the  property  or  any 
part  of  it  it  is  not  only  the  right  of  the  insured  to  introduce 
evidence  as  to  such  property,  but  that  it  is  the  duty  of  the 
appraisers  to  hear  evidence  as  to  the  quantity  and  value  of 
such  property.  Where  appraisers  are  appointed  because  of 
their  knowledge  and  familiarity  with  values  such  as  was  dam- 
aged, or  of  the  property  itself,  and  enough  of  it  remains  from 
which  a  fair  and  accurate  estimate  may  be  made  of  its  extent 
and  value,  then  appraisers  may  refuse  to  hear  evidence.  The 
question  is  annotated  in  Aetna  Ins.  Co.  v.  Jester,  47  L.  R.  A. 
(N.  S.)  1191. 

Assured  was  not  given  an  opportunity  to  be  present  with 
their  books,  or  other  evidence,  to  show  the  extent  of  their  loss 
at  any  time  from  the  beginning  of  the-  arbitration  proceedings 
until  the  completion  of  the  award  in  writing.  This  was  im- 
proper. Assured  should  have  been  given  this  opportunity.  It 
is  true  that  the  arbitrators  were  shown  to  be  experienced  men 
in  this  line  of  business;  and,  if  appellants  should  have  been 
permitted  to  be  present  with  their  evidence,  it  might  not  have 
changed  the  result.  From  the  evidence  we  are  not  prepared 
to  say  that  insurance  companies  or  any  one  of  the  arbitrators, 
were  guilty  of  fraud  or  an  intentional  wrong  in  arriving  at 
the  result  of  this  arbitration;  but  we  are  convinced  that  mis- 
takes, or  errors,  were  committed  to  the  prejudice  of  assured. 

'Harth  v.  Continental  Ins.  Co.    (Ky.   C.  A.),   36   Ins.   L.  J.   603.   102 
S.  W.  242. 

The  insured  has  a  right  to  be  heard  when  he  has  requested 


106  HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 

such  right  if  the  appraisers  disagree,  and  an  award  of  the  com- 
pany appraiser  and  the  umpire  who  have  denied  him  that  right 
will  be  set  aside. 

Chenoweth  v.  Phenix  Ins.  Co.,  12  Ky.  L.  R.  232  ; 

American  F.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Bell  (Tex.  C.  C.  A.),  75  S.  W.  319; 

Harth  v.  Continental  Ins.  Co.  et  al.  (Ky.  C.  A.),  102  S.  W.  242, 
36  Ins.  L.  J.  603. 

The  insured  has  the  right  to  introduce  evidence,  before  the 
appraisers  as  to  the  extent  of  his  loss,  and  where  he  is  refused 
such  right,  the  award  is  not  binding  on  him.  Aetna  Ins.  Co. 
v.  Jester  (Okla.),  132  Pac.  130. 

The  rejection  and  exclusion  of  pertinent  and  material  testi- 
mony on  a  hearing  before  appraisers  is  usually  fatal  to  the 
award. 

Schoe-nick  v.  American  Ins.  Co.   (Minn.),  124  N.  W.  5; 
Mosness   v.   German   Ins.    Co.,    50    Minn.    341 ;    21    Ins.   L.    J.    915 ; 

52  N.  W.  932; 
Redner    v.    New    York    Fire  Ins.    Co.,    92    Minn.    306;    99    N.    W. 

886  ;  33  Ins.  L.  J.  780  ; 

Continental  Ins.  Co.  v.  Garrett,  125  Fed.  589  ;  60  C.  C.  A.  395  ; 
Stout  v.  Phoenix  Assur.  Co.,  69  N.  J.  Eq.   566  ;  56  Atl.  691 ; 
Springfield  F.    &    M.    Ins.    Co.    v.    Payne    (Kan.    S.    C.),    26    Ins. 

L.  J.   46  ; 
Christiansen  v.   Norwich   U.    F.    Ins.    Soc.,   84    Minn.    526,    31   Ins. 

L.  J.   218; 

Redner  v.   N.   Y.   Fire   Ins.   Co.    (Minn.    S.   C.),   33   Ins.   L.   J.   780; 
Phoenix    Ins.    Co.    v.    Romeis    (Lucas   Co.    Ohio    C.   C.),    15    C.    C. 
Rep.  697. 

In  case  of  destroyed  property,  which  an  appraiser  had  never 
seen,  fairness  would  require  that  he  be  informed  by  evidence 
of  some  sort  (not  necessarily  under  oath)  as  to  the  character 
and  value  of  the  property  and,  unless  an  opportunity  is  afforded 
to  impart  such  information,  the  award  will  not  be  binding. 

Springfield  F.  &  M.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Payne,  57  Kans.  291 ;  26  Ins. 
L.  J.  46  ;  46  Pac.  315. 

Where  appraisers  are  appointed  to  adjust  a  loss  to  a  prop- 
erty only  partially  destroyed  and  sufficient  of  it  remains  to 
disclose  the  size,  general  character  and  architecture,  and  quality 
of  material  used,  a  hearing  and  an  opportunity  to  introduce 
evidence  of  value  need  not  be  granted;  but  where  they  are  un- 
acquainted with  the  insured  property,  and  are  selected  to 
estimate  a  loss  arising  from  total  destruction  of  the  property, 
notice  of  the  time  and  place  of  the  appraisers'  meeting  and  an 
opportunity  to  the  parties  to  be  heard  is  essential  to  a  valid 
award. 

Carlston  v.  St.  Paul  F.  &  M.  Ins.  Co.,  37  Mont  118;  94  Pac.  756; 
37  Ins.  L.  J.  366. 

It  seems  that  the  appraisers  are  not  obliged  to  give  the 
claimant  any  formal  notice  or  to  hear  evidence,  at  least  in  all 


APPRAISAL — ARBITRATION — AWARD.  107 

cases,  and  yet,  unless  the  insured  waive  it,  he  must  either  have 
notice  or  knowledge  of  the  meeting  of  the  appraisers  and  an 
opportunity  to  draw  their  attention  to  the  items  of  his  loss 
and  make  representations  and  explanations  to  them  concerning 
the  nature  thereof. 

Kaiser  v.  Hamburg-Bremen  F.  Ins.  Co.,  59  (N.  Y.  S.  C.),  App. 
Div.  525;  69  N.  Y.  Supp.  344.  Affirmed  172  N.  Y.  663,  65  N.  E. 
1118. 

Citing: 

Linde  v.  Republic  F.  Ins.  Co.,  50  N.  Y.  Super.  Ct.  362; 
Remington   Paper  Co.  v.   London  Assur.   Corp.   12    (N.  Y.    S.  C.), 
App.   Div.    218. 

An  award  of  arbitrators  will  not  be  set  aside  on  the  ground 
that  the  arbitrators  refused  to  hear  pertinent  testimony,  when 
the  party  objecting  to  the  award  only  announced  his  willingness 
to  introduce  testimony  without  actually  offering  any. 

Stemmer  v.  Scottish  U.  &  N  Ins.  Co.,  33  Ore.  65 ;  58  Pacif.  R. 
498  ;  27  Ins.  L.  J.  972. 

The  award  will  be  set  aside  if  appraisers  refuse  to  consider 
the  books  in  arriving  at  the  goods  assured  had  on  hand  at  time 
of  fire. 

LevJne  v.  Lancashire  Ins.  Co.    (Minn.  S.  C.),  26  Ins.  L.  J.  36. 

Books  of  account  are  not  the  only  evidence  of  the  amount 
of  the  loss,  and  if  the  appraisers  are  satisfied  that  they  do  not 
show  the  correct  amount  of  merchandise  on  hand,  they  may 
resort  to  other  evidence,  and  their  mere  refusal  to  examine 
them  in  such  case  will  not  justify  the  setting  aside  of  an  award. 

Tyblewski  v.  Svea  F..  &  L.  Ins.  Co.,  220  111.  436;  35  Ins.  L.  J. 
616;  77  N.  E.  196. 

Where  persons  are  selected  arbitrators  by  reason  of  special 
knowledge  or  skill  possessed  by  them  with  reference  to  the 
matter  in  controversy,  so  that  it  is  apparent  that  the  parties 
intended  to  rely  upon  their  personal  information,  investigation 
and  judgment,  they  may  even  be  justified  in  refusing  altogether 
to  hear  evidence. 

Hall  v.  Norwalk  F.  Ins.  Co.,  57  Conn.  105;   18  Ins.  L.  J.  518;  17 

Atl.   356,  and  cases  there  cited; 
Townsend  v.   Greenwich  Ins.   Co.,   83   N.   Y.   Supp.   909. 

There  being  no  requirement  for  notice  nor  necessity  for 
witnesses,  an  appraisement  is  not  vitiated  by  the  mere  fact 
that  the  appraisers  met  without  notice  to  the  company,  while 
officers  of  the  insured  corporation  were  present  and  pointed 


108  HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 

out  the  damaged  property,  where  there  is  no  suggestion  of 
undue  influence  or  bad  faith,  and  the  appraisers,  made  their 
award  on  their  own  knowledge  of  the  subject. 

American   Steel   Co.  v.   German-Am.  F.   Ins.   Co.    (U.   S.  C.  C.   A.)  ; 

187  Fed.  730  ; 
Orient  Ins.   Co.  v.  Harmon   (Tex.  C.   C.  A.),  117  S.  W.   192.          ,  . 

It  is  not  necessary  for  either  party  to  the  submission  {o 
have  notice  of  the  meeting  of  the  appraisers  or  an  opportunity 
\o  present  evidence.  The  submission  did  not  provide  for  such 
notice  or  for  the  parties  to  have  the  opportunity  to  produce 
evidence  upon  the  question  at  issue.  On  the  contrary,  the 
terms  of  submission  were  such  as  to  indicate  the  appraisers 
were  to  proceed  informally  to  fix  the  amount  of  plaintiff's  loss, 
and  if  unable  to  agree,  to  call  in  the  umpire  to  settle  their 
differences.  See  Blakely  v.  Proctor,  134  Ga.  139,  67  S.  E.  389.) 
Of  course,  the  award  could  have  been  set  aside  for  fraud, 
or  by  showing  that  unfair  advantage  had  been  given  to  one  of 
the  parties,  or  for  palpable  mistake  of  law,  Eberhardt  v.  Fed- 
eral Ins.  Co.  (ct.  of  App.  Ga.  Feby.  4,  1914),  80  S.  E.  856. 

An  award  will  not  be  set  aside  for  irregularity  or  bad  faith, 
where  one  of  the  arbitrators  privately  made  certain  experiments 
as  to  the  effect  of  intense  heat  on  certain  goods,  the  result  of 
which  he  communicated  to  the  other  arbitrators  at  a  meeting 
at  which  the  respective  parties  and  their  counsel  were  present, 
without  objection  from  them.  The  arbitrators  also,  with  knowl- 
edge and  consent  of  both  parties  visited  the  scene  of  the  fire 
and  made  certain  examinations.  Two  of  the  arbitrators  talked 
with  third  persons  about  the  fire,  but  both  testified  this  had  no 
effect  on  them  in  making  up  the  award.  •  Two  of  the  arbitrators, 
in  the  absence  of  the  third,  discussed  the  amount  of  the  award, 
but  came  to  no  conclusion  until  the  final  meeting  when  all  three 
were  together.  Two  of  them  privately  examined  the  books  of 
one  of  them  who  dealt  in  similar  goods  to  those  of  insured,  to 
learn  the  prices  thereof  and  communicated  the  facts  and  infor- 
mation therefrom  to  the  third  arbitrator. 

Farrell  v.  German-Am.  Ins.  Co.,   175  Mass.   340  ;   56   N.  E.   572. 

The   provision   in   the   policy  that   "the   appraisers   together 
shall   then    (after   choosing  the   umpire)    estimate   and   appraise 
the  loss,"  does  not  require  them  to  view  the  damaged  property 
together  nor  forbid  them  viewing  it  separately. 
Kent  v.  Aetna  Ins.  Co.    (Mo.  App.),  146  S.  W.  78. 

Inquiries,  made  by  one  of  the  appraisers  for  his  own  infor- 


APPRAISAL — ARBITRATION — AWARD.  109 

mation,  in  the  absence  of  the  parties  or  other  appraisers,  will 
not  invalidate  the  award,  unless  the  party  is  prejudiced  or  the 
award  affected  thereby. 

Hall  v.  Norwalk  F.  Ins.  Co.    (Conn.  S.  C.),  17  All.  Rep.  356; 
Farrell  v.  German- Am.  Ins.  Co.   (Mass.  S.  C.),  29  Ins.  L.  J.  341. 

Referees  under  Minnesota  Standard  Fire  Policy  have  no 
authority  to  make  independent  investigation  and  base  their 
award  on  the  result  thereof,  but  are  required  to  give  interested 
parties  reasonable  opportunity  to  present  evidence  bearing  on 
case. 

Schoenich  v.   American  Ins.   Co.    (Minn.),  124  N.  W.   5. 

Where  the  award  was  rendered  upon  the  report,  infor- 
mation and  conclusion  of  the  loss  of  one  of  the  appraisers  who 
was  the  only  one  of  the  appraisers  who  had  seen  the  loss,  it 
will  be  declared  void. 

Citizens  Ins  Co.  v.  Hamilton,   48  111.   App.  593. 

Where  the  insured  furnishes  an  inventory  which  he  certifies 
is  correct,  he  cannot  have  set  aside  for  mistake  in  inventory  an 
award  based  thereon. 

Kentucky  C.   Co.  v.   Rochester  Germ.  Ins.   Co.,   20  Ky.  L.   R.   1571 : 
49  S.  W.  780. 

The  company's  appraiser  and  the  umpire  agreed  on  the 
amount  of  loss  on  goods  totally  destroyed,  and  accepted  an 
expert's  opinion  of  damage  to  goods  saved.  Held,  no  evidence 
could  be  received  which  showed  plaintiff's  loss  was  greater  than 
the  award. 

Rogers  v.  Commercial  U.  A.  Co.,   15  Can.  L.  Times  228. 

Referees  under  Massachusetts  standard  policy  are  not  com- 
pelled to  receive  evidence  upon  the  amount  of  the  loss,  but  may 
proceed  to  determine  that  fact  in  any  way  in  which  they  may 
think  best. 

Hanley  v.  Aetna  Ins.  Co.    (Mass.),  102   N.  E.   641. 

\  • 

Where  the  appraisers   and  umpire  have  before   them  a  list 
of  the  property  destroyed  and  the  insured's  statement  in  detail 
in  respect  to  his  loss,  they  may  refuse  to  hear  evidence. 
Royal  Ins.  Co.  v.  Ries,  80  Ohio  St.  272;  88  N.  E.  R.  638. 

ARBITRATION  OF  ALL  DIFFERENCES. 

Before  the  New  York  standard  form  policy  came  inio 
vogue,  a  great  number  of  the  fire  policies  required  all  differences 


110  HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 

to  be  submitted  to  arbitration  and  the  courts  in  nearly  every 
such  case  decided  such  clause  would  not  be  enforced,  as  the 
effect  would  be  to  oust  the  courts  of  jurisdiction. 

National  Masonic  A.  Ass'n  v.  Burr   (Neb.  S.  C.).  62  N.  W.  Rep. 

466;  24  Ins.  L.  J.   423; 

Prader  v.  Nat'l  Masonic  A.  Ass'n  (Iowa  S.  C.),  63  N.  W.  Rep.  601 ; 
Keefe   v.    Nat'l   Ace.   Ass'n    (N.    Y.    S.    C.,    App.    Div.),    38    N.    Y. 

Supp.  854  ;  4  App.  Div.  392  ; 
Fox  v.  Mason's  Frat.  Ace.  Ass'n  (Wis.  S.  C.),  71  N.  W.  Rep.  363. 

Appraisal,  as  Used  in  the  Policies,  Means  Arbitration  of  Only 
the  Amount  of  the  Loss. 

But  the  New  York  standard  form  policy  is  now  in  general 
use,  except  in  a  few  of  those  states  having  a  standard  form  of 
their  own,  and  all  of  the  policies  now  provide  that  only  the 
sound  vajue,  loss  and  damage  are  to  be  submitted,  to  appraisers. 
The  policy  now  in  use  contemplates  an  arbitration  limited  to 
the  amount  of  the  loss,  rather  than  an  appraisal,  and  the  arbi- 
trators are  termed  appraisers,  I  presume,  on  account  of  the 
courts  deciding  that  an  arbitration  ousted  them  of  jurisdiction. 
But  the  policy  is  perfectly  plain  in  defining  the  duties  of  the 
appraisers  and  in  saying  that  they  shall  be  the  sole  arbiters 
only  in  so  far  as  the  loss  and  damage  is  concerned,  leaving  all 
other  questions,  including  the  liability,  to  be  determined  by  the 
parties,  or,  if  they  fail,  then  by  the  courts,  and  this  is  in  accord 
with  nearly  all,  if  not  all,  of  the  decisions. 

Subject    of    Appraisal — Totally     Destroyed     Goods — Damaged 
Goods. 

Where  the  amount  of  the  loss  is  made  payable  60  days  from 
date  of  adjusted  claim  and  the  method  of  adjustment  provided 
for  in  the  policy  in  respect  to  the  "damage  to  the  property"  is 
in  case  the  parties  are  unable  to  agree,  by  appraisement  as 
therein  provided  made  a  condition  precedent  to  recovery,  this 
contemplates  an  appraisement  of  the  total  as  well  as  the  partial 
loss. 

Gasser  v.   Sun   Fire   Office,    42   Minn.   315 ;    19   Ins.   L.  J.    243  ;    44 

N.  W.  252  ; 

Barley  v.  Providence  Wash.  Ins.  Co.    (R.  I.),  76  Atl.  Rep.  753; 
Williamson  v.  L.  &  L.  &  G.  Ins.  Co..  122  Fed.  69  ;  58  C.  C.  A.  241 ; 
Rutter  v.  Hanover  F.  Ins.   Co.,   138  Ala.  202  ;   35   Southern  33  ; 
Stout  v.  Phoenix  Assur.  Co..  65  N.  J.  Eq.  566  ;  56  Atl.  691. 

Where  the  policy  provided  that  in  case  of  disagreement  the 
loss  or  damages  should  be  submitted  to  appraisers  to  be  chosen 
as  provided  by  the  policy,  a  submission  entered  into  by  the 
parties  which  only  provided  for  an  appraisal  of  the  damage  to 
goods  saved,  was  void  as  not  in  accord  with  the  conditions  r< 
the  policy. 


APPRAISAL — ARBITRATION — AWARD.  Ill 

Adams  v.  N.  Y.  Bowery  F.  Ins.  Co.,  85  Iowa  6  ;  21  Ins.  L.  J.  833  ; 
51  N.  W.  1149. 

When  the  appraisal  agreement  provides  that  "it  is  expressly 
understood  that  this  agreement  and  appraisement  is  for  the 
purpose  of  ascertaining  and  fixing  the  amount  of  said  loss  and 
damage  only  ,  *  *  *  and  shall  not  determine,  waive  or  invalidate 
any  other  right  or  rights  of  either  of  the  parties,"  the  only 
question  which  can  be  considered  as  submitted  to  the  appraisers 
is  that  of  determining  the  value  of  the  property  totally  de- 
stroyed and  the  injury  to  that  not  destroyed. 

Germania  F.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Warner,  13  Ind.  App.  466;  41  N.  E.  969. 

A  policy  that  provides  that  the  amount  of  the  loss  shall  be 
ascertained  by  appraisers,  in  case  of  disagreement,  contemplates 
the  articles  totally  obliterated  as  well  as  those  which  have  suf- 
fered a  damage  only. 

Palatine   Ins.   Co.   v.    Morton,    106    Tenn.    558;    61    S.   W.    787;    30 
Ins.  L.  J.   481. 

A  demand  for  appraisal  of  the  salvage  goods  alone  is  not 
authorized  under  a  policy  providing  that  the  amount  of  the  loss 
shall  be  ascertained  by  appraisers  in  case  of  disagreement,  and 
the  insured  is  justified  in  declining  it. 

Palatine   Ins.    Co.   v.    Morton,   106   Tenn.    558;    61    S.   W.    787;    30 
Ins.  L.  J.  481. 

i 

The  insured   is  not  concluded  by  an  award  of  appraisers, 
which,  through  the  fault  of  the  adjusters,  is  limited  to  the  dam- 
age to  such  goods  only  as  are  visible  at  the  time  of  the  appraisal. 
Hong  Sling  v.  Scottish  U.  &  N.  Ins.  Co.,  7  Utah  441 ;  27  Pac.  170. 

Where  a  policy  insures   contents   of  a  two-story  building 
known  as  the  Hotel,  the  failure  of  appraisers  to  appraise  the 
contents  in  a  one-story  addition  will  render  their  award  invalid. 
Phoenix  Ins.  Co.  v.  Moore  (Texas  C.  C.  A.),  46  S.  W.  Rep.  1131. 

If  the  appraisers  disregard  the  instructions  in  the  agree- 
ment for  submission  to  appraisal,  the  award  is  not  binding. 

Rutter  v.  Hanover  F.  Ins.  Co.    (Ala.  S.  C.),  35  Southern  Rep.  33. 

A  provision  in  the  policy  requiring  "the  amount  of  sound 
value  and  of  damage  to  the  property"  to  be  determined  by  ap- 
praisal applies  only  to  a  case  of  partial  damage  and  not  where 
the  property  has  been  totally  destroyed  by  fire. 

Rosenwald  v.  Phoenix  Ins.  Co.,  50  Hun.  172;    19  St.  Rep.   732;    3 
N.  Y.  Supp.  215; 


112  HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 

Lang  v.   Eagle  F.   Ins.    Co.,   12    (N.  Y.    S.   C.),   App.    Div.    39;    42: 
N.  Y.  Supp.   539. 

The  standard  form  (N.  Y.)  provides  that  loss  on  totally 
destroyed  goods,  as  well  as  the  damage  to  the  goods  not  de- 
stroyed, are  to  be  appraised. 

Stout  v.  Phoenix  Ins.  Co.,  65  N.  J.  Eq.   566  ;  56  Atl.  Rep.  691  ; 
Phenix  Ins.  Co.  v.  Carnahan   (Ohio  S.  C.),  58  N.  E.  Rep.  805; 
Chippewa  Lumber  Co.  v.   Phenix  Ins.  Co.    (Mich.  S.  C.).  44  N.  W. 
Rep.  1055;  80  Mich.  116;  19  Ins.  L.  J.  535. 

An  appraisement  omitting  property  claimed  by  the  insured 
to  have  been  destroyed  is  void. 

American  F.  Ins.   Co.  v.  Bell    (Tex.  C.   C.  A.),  75  S.  W.  Rep.  319; 
Rutter  v.  Hanover  F.  Ins.  Co.   (Ala.  S.  C.),  35  Southern  Rep.  33. 

After  signing  the  award  the  authority  of  the  arbitrators 
ceases,  and  it  is  not  in  their  power  to  reopen  it  or  to  deal 
further  with  the  matter;  the  fact  that  one  of  them  was  misled 
by  the  others  in  connection  with  the  signing  of  the  award,  if 
true,  would  form  good  ground  for  an  application  to  the  court 
to  set  it  aside,  but  did  not  justify  him  in  calling  in  the  third 
arbitrator  and  making  another  award  different  from  that  to 
which  he  was  already  a  party. 

Hall  v.  Queen  Ins.   Co.,   39  Nova  Scotia  295  ;   1  E.  L.  R.  295  ;   21 
Ins.  Dig.  88. 

For  goods  which  are  totally  destroyed  by  fire  no  appraise- 
ment can  be  required,  for  the  reason  that  to  appraise  the  loss  on 
such  goods  would  require  appraisers  to  call  witnesses  and  be- 
come arbitrators. 

Pennsylvania  F.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Carnahan,  19  Ohio  Cir.  Ct.  97, 
114;  10  Ohio  C.  D.  186,  225;  but  see  when  these  cases  came  be- 
fore Ohio  Supreme  Court.  Phenix  Ins.  Co.  et  *al.  v.  Carnahan, 
63  Ohio  St.  258;  58  N.  E.  805,  it  was  held  assured  must  not  only 
submit  to  appraisalj  but  that  he  must  show  that  he  has  per- 
formed the  condition  or  has  a  legal  excuse  for  non-performance 
thereof. 

The  award  cannot  be  impeached  in  an  action  at  law  on  the 
ground  that  appraisers  refused  to  consider,  or  to  include  in  the 
a\vard,  the  loss  on  so  much  of  the  property  as  was  totally  de- 
stroyed, when  such  loss  was  clearly  within  the  submission  and 
was  covered  by  the  terms  of  the  award. 

Georgia  Home  Ins.  Co.  v.  Kline  et  al.      (Ala.   S.   C.),  21   Southern 
Rep.    958. 


APPRAISAL — ARBITRATION — AWARD.  113 

Total  Loss— Statute. 

Two  rules  have  been  adopted  defining  total  loss.  The  earlier 
one,  that  the  loss  is  total  whenever  the  building  has  been  so 
injured  as  to  lose  its  identity  and  specific  character  as  such; 
and  the  other,  that  it  is  not  totally  destroyed  so  long  as  a 
substantial  remnant  remains  which  a  prudent,  uninsured  person 
would  use  in  rebuilding.  The  whole  question,  however,  is  one 
of  fact  for  a  jury  to  determine.  Most  of  the  recent  cases  follow 
the  latter  rule.  Where  the  statutes  provide -for  the  amount  of 
the  insurer's  liability  in  case  of  total  loss,  there  can  be  no  con- 
sideration for  appraisal. 

See  case  Springfield  F.  &  M.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Homewood  (anno- 
tated) for  important  and  valuable  cases  bearing  on  the  question 
of  Constructive  Total  Loss,  39  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  1182  (Okla- 
homa). 

Fair — Unfair  Appraisers — Conduct  of  Appraisers — Selection  of 

Umpire. 

The  action  of  insurer's  apraiser  in  nominating  for  umpire, 
names  of  persons  unknown  to  assured's  appraiser,  and  who  had 
frequently  acted  as  appraisers  and  umpires  for  insurance  com- 
panies in  other  loses,  was  tantamount  to  a  refusal  to  agree  upon 
a  disinterested  umpire.  This  being  true,  the  fact  that  an  ap- 
praisal was  not  had  is  no  defense  to  the  action. 

Bishop  v.  Agricultural  Ins.  Co.,  130  N.  Y.  488  ;  21  Ins.  L.  J.  345. 

Citing: 

Unrig  v.  Ins.  Co.,  101  N.  T.  362  ; 

Bradshaw  v.  Agricultural  Ins.   Co.    (137   N.   T.   137),    22  Ins.   L.  J. 

161. 
McCullough  v.   Phoenix  Ins.   Co.    (Mo.   S.   C.),   22   Ins.   L.    J.   781; 

113  Mo.  606; 
Brock  v.   Dwelling  House  Ins.   Co.,   102  Mich.   583;   24  Ins.  L.   J. ; 

464;  61  N.  W.  Rep.  67; 
Niagara    F.    Ins.    Co.   v.    Bishop    (111.    S.   C.),    154    111.    9;    25    Ins. 

L.  J.  24  ; 

Hickerson  v.   Ins.  Cos.,   25  Ins.   L.  J.   422   (Tenn.   S.   C.); 
Harrison  v.  Hartford  F.  Ins.  Co.    (Iowa  <S.  C.),  30   Ins.  L.  J.  255; 
Read  v.   Ins.   Co.,   103  la.   314; 
Chapman  v.  Rockford  Ins.  Co.    (Wis.  S.  C.),  62  N.  W.  Rep.  422. 

Where  the  appraiser  for  the  insured  insisted  on  taking  as 
umpire  any  one  of  a  number  of  business  men  residing  in  the 
city  where  the  loss  occurred,  but  the  appraiser  for  the  insurance 
company  named  a  number  of  persons  not  residents  of  said  city. 
They  were  for  that  reason  rejected  by  insured's  appraiser,  who, 
after  trying  for  eleven  days  to  agree  on  an  umpire,  resigned. 
Held,  The  insured  was  not  warranted  in  withdrawing  from  the 


114  HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 

appraisal,  and  that  neither  the  company  nor  its  appraiser  was 
at  fault;  that  no  evidence  was  introduced  showing  that  either 
the  company's  appraiser  or  the  persons  nominated  by  him  as 
umpire  were  not  fair  and  competent. 

Kersey  v.  Phenix  Ins.  Co.    (Mich.   S.   C.),  97   N.  W.  Rep.  57; 
(And  see  Vernon  Ins.   Co.  v.   Maitlen,  158   Ind.  393). 

Where  the  evidence  shows  that  the  acceptance  of  a  person 
as  one  of  the  appraisers  of  a  loss  by  the  insured  is  induced  by 
the  company  by  false  statements  as  to  his  business  and  impar- 
tiality, such  fact  affords  ground  for  setting  aside  an  award  which 
is  grossly  below  the  actual  loss. 

Kiernan  v.    Dutchess   Co.   Mut.   Ins.    Co.    (N.   Y.    C.   A.)(    44   N.   E. 

Rep.   698  ; 
Produce  Refrigerator  Co.  v.  Norwich  Union  F.  Ins.  Society    (Minn. 

S.   C.),   97   N.  W.   Rep.   875. 
Bradshaw   v.  Agricultural   Ins.   Co.    (N.    Y.    C.   A.,  Jan.,   1893),   22 

Ins.  L.  J.  161  ; 

Ins.  Co.  of  N.  A.  v.  Hegewald   (Ind.  S.  C.),  32  Ins.  L.  J.  621; 
Glover    v.    Rochester    German    Ins.    Co.     (Wash.    S.    C.),    39    Pac. 

Rep.   380. 

,  The  fact  that  one  of  the  appraisers  was  an  endorser  of  a 
note  made  by  assured  secured  by  a  mortgage  did  not  render 
him  an  interested  party  in  the  subject  of  arbitration. 

Bullman  v.  Ins.  Cos.   (Mass.  S.  C.,  May,  1893),  22  Ins.  L.  J.  668. 

In  selecting  an  umpire,  the  appraisers  should  seek  an  hon- 
est and  competent  person  and  one  living  within  a  reasonable 
distance. 

Fowble  v.  Phoenix  Ins.  Co.,  106  Mo.  App.   527. 

Where  the  insurer's  appraiser,  being  a  non-resident  of  the 
place  where  the  loss  occurs,  refuses  to  accept  as  umpire  any 
of  the  persons  resident  of  such  place  proposed  by  insured's 
appraiser,  his  conduct  amounts  to  a  refusal  to  appraise  and 
entitles  the  insured  to  sue. 

Brock  v.   Dwelling  House  Ins.   Co.    (Mich.    S.    C.),    61   N.   W.   Rep. 

67  ;    24   Ins.   L.  J.   464  ; 

Chapman  v.  Rockford  Ins.  Co.    (Wis.  S.  C.),   62  N.  W.  Rep.  422; 
Hickerson  v.   German  Am.   Ins.   Co.    (Tenn.   S.   C. ),  33   S.   W.   Rep. 

1041;   25   Ins.   L.  J.   422. 

Each  appraiser  presented  three  names;  those  of  the  in- 
sured's appraiser  were  objected  to  without  cause,  and  those 
proposed  by  the  insurer's  appraiser,  for  the  reason  that  they 
were  non-residents.  Held,  Failure  of  appraisal  was  due  to  un- 
reasonable conduct  of  the  insurer's  appraiser. 

Braddy    v.    N.    Y.    Bowery    F.    Ins.    Co.    (N.    S.    S.    C.).    20    S.    E. 
Rep.    477. 


APPRAISAL — ARBITRATION — AWARD.  115 

The  insured's  appraiser  may  insist  that  the  umpire  be 
selected  from  some  place  in  the  county  in  which  the  property 
is  situated. 

Niagara   Ins.    Co.   v.   Bishop,   49    111.  App.    388. 

It  is  no  defense  in  an  action  on  a  policy  that  no  appraise- 
ment was  had  pursuant  to  requirements,  where  the  insured 
refused  to  allow  the  appraisers  to  proceed  by  reason  of  an 
improper  proposal  that  was  made  by  the  company's  appraiser 
to  insured's  appraiser. 

Davis    v.    Guardian    Assur.    Co.,    87    Hun.    414    Aff'd.    on    opinion 
below  in  155  N.  Y.  682. 

The  fact  that  an  appraiser  had  before  been  employed  as 
such  by  the  company  does  not  necessarily  render  him  ineligible. 

Stemmer  v.  Scottish  Union  and  National  Ins.  Co.    (Oregon  S.  C.). 
27   Ins.  L.  J.   972. 

The  insured  selected  one  G  to  act  as  appraiser  on  his 
behalf.  G  was  an  experienced  builder  and  contractor  and  had 
made,  as  such,  an  estimate  of  the  damage  to  the  property  by 
the  fire,  for  which  he  had  been  paid  prior  to  his  selection  as 
appraiser.  Held,  That  the  fact  that  he  had  made  such  estimate 
under  the  employment  of  the  insured  was  a  fact  to  be  con- 
sidered by  the  jury  on  the  issue  whether  he  was  sufficiently 
free  of  bias  and  prejudice  to  be  disinterested  party  in  the 
appraisement.  The  fact  that  he  had  an  intimate  knowledge  of 
the  subject-matter,  and  on  that  account  a  preconceived  opinion, 
did  not  of  itself  disqualify  him,  because  it  was  such  knowledge 
and  such  experience  which  made  him  the  better  qualified  to 
ascertain  the  true  value  if  he  was  free  from  bias  and  prejudice. 
In  other  words,  this  preconceived  opinion  as  an  expert,  derived 
from  personal  inspection,  was  not  a  disqualification  as  an 
appraiser. 

National  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  O'Brien  et  al.  (Ark.  S.  C.),  87  South- 
western Reporter  (June  7,  1905)  129. 

An  award  will  not  be  set  aside  because  one  of  the  appraisers 
had  been  in  the  employ  of  the  insurance  company,  and  where 
the  other  was  in  the  employ  of  the  insured,  and  the  two  agreed 
on  the  loss  without  calling  an  umpire. 

Remington  Paper   Co.  v.   London  Assur.   Corp.    (N.   T.    S.   C.,  App. 
Div.),   43  N.  Y.   Supp.  431. 

The  question  of  distinterestedness  of  appraiser  is  one  of 
fact  for  the  jury. 

Hall    et    al.    v.    Western   Assur.    Co.    (Ala.    S.    C.),    32    Southern 
Rep.  257. 


116  HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 

The  burden  of  proof  is  on  the  party  seeking  to  impeach  the 
award,  which  is,  in  the  absence  of  fraud,  prima  facie  binding 
on  both  parties. 

Connecticut  F.  Ins.  Co.  v.  O'Fallon  (Neb.  S.  C.),  69  N.  W. 
Rep.  118. 

A  party  does  not  assume  responsibility  for  the  con- 
sequences of  irregularities  and  misconduct  on  the  part  of  an 
appraiser,  merely  because  he  knew  him  to  be  a  professional 
appraiser  on  behalf  of  interests  of  the  other  party. 

Christiansen  v.  Norwich  Union  F.  Ins.  Soc.  (Minn.  S.  C.,  De- 
cember, 1901),  31  Ins.  L.  J.  218. 

But  -see 

Western  Assur.   Co.  v.  Hall    (Ala.   S.   C.),   38   S.  E.  Rep.   853; 

Bradshaw  v.  Agricultural  Ins.  Co.,  137  N.  Y.  137;  22  Ins.  L.  J. 
161; 

Indiana  Ins.  Co.  v.  Boehm,  88  Ind.  578. 

The  whole  question  of  responsibility  for  fairness  or  unfair- 
ness of  appraiser  is  covered  in  the  two  cases  of  Fowble  v. 
Phoenix  Ins.  Co.  and  Uhrig  v.  Ins.  Co. 

While  the  appraiser  is  not  an  agent  for  the  party  who 
selected  him,  yet  when  it  is  the  improper  act  or  conduct  of 
such  appraiser  which  prevents  the  selection  of  an  umpire,  the 
consequence  of  a  failure  should  be  visited  upon  him  who  selects 
such  appraiser. 

Fowble  v.  Phoenix  Ins.  Co.   (Mo.  App.  C.),  81  S.  W.  Rep.  485. 

The  spirit  of  the  statute  relating  to  arbitration  of  fire  losses 
requires  that  the  three  referees  shall  be  as  free  from  pecuniary 
interest  and  relationship  as  judges  and  jurors  are  required  to 
be,  and  also  be  as  free  from  bias,  prejudice,  sympathy  and  par- 
tisanship as  judges  and  jurors  are  presumed  to  be.  If  there 
is  no  other  restriction  as  to  the  men  to  be  nominated  for  the 
other  party  to  choose  from,  or  as  to  the  third  man  however 
appointed,  than  that  they  shall  not  be  relatives,  and  have  no 
pecuniary  interest,  then  either  party  may  have  forced  upon  him 
as  referee  at  least  one  violent  partisan  of  the  other  party,  or 
at  least  men  incompetent,  opinionated,  or  biased.  The  purpose 
of  the  statute  might  thus  be  wholly  defeated  and  made  to  work 
an  injustice. 

From  the  foregoing  considerations  and  others  we  are  satis- 
fied that  the  insurance  statute  and  the  insurance  contract  re- 
quire that  the  referees  shall  be  "disinterested,"  not  only  in  the 
narrow  sense  of  being  without  relationship  and  pecuniary  in- 
terest, but  also  in  the  broad,  full  sense  of  being  competent,  im- 


APPRAISAL — ARBITRATION — AWARD.  117 

partial,  fair  and  opened-minded,  substantially  indifferent  in 
thought  and  feeling  between  the  parties,  and  without  bias  or 
partisanship  either  way.  Brock  v.  Ins.  Co.,  102  Mich.,  583;  61 
N.  W.  67;  26  L.  R.  A.  623;  47  Am.  St.  Rep.  562;  Bradshaw  v.  Ins. 
Co.,  137  N.  Y.  137;  32  N.  E.  1055;  Hall  v.  Assurance  Co.,  133  Ala. 
637;  32  Southern  257;  Hickerson  v.  Ins.  Co.,  96  Tenn.  193;  33 
S.  W.  1041;  32  L.  R.  A.  172.  Turning  now  to  the  evidence  in  this 
case,  we  find  the  following  facts  among  others:  The  property  in- 
sured was  situated  in  Calais,  a  city  on  the  extreme  eastern  fron- 
tier of  the  state.  The  referee  chosen  by  the  defendant  from  the 
three  men  nominated  by  the  plaintiff  was  Mr.  Sawyer,  of  Calais. 
The  referee  chosen  by  the  plaintiff  from  the  three  men  nomin- 
ated by  the  defendant  was  Mr.  Allen,  of  Portland,  nearly  300 
miles  distant  from  Calais.  Practically,  Mr.  Sawyer  was  the 
choice  of  the  plaintiff,  and  Mr.  Allen  the  choice  of  the  defendant. 
When  these  two  undertook  to  agree  upon  a  man  as  third  referee, 
Mr.  Allen  declined  to  agree  upon  any  man  in  Calais,  though 
freely  admitting  there  were  as  good  men  in  Calais  as  anywhere 
else  in  the  state.  He  gave  as  a  reason  for  his  refusal  that  the 
defendant  company  objected  to  any  local  man. 

This  refusal,  apart  from  the  excuse  given  for  it,  was  unrea- 
sonable. Assuming,  as  Mr.  Allen  admitted,  that  there  were  as 
good  men  in  Calais  as  anywhere  else  in  the  state,  it  is  not  a 
reasonable  inference  from  the  fact  of  their  residence  in  Calais 
and  consequent  probable  better  knowledge  of  local  conditions 
affecting  values  there,  that  none  of  them  were  proper  persons 
to  act  as  appraising  referees.  His  refusal  to  consider  any  of 
them  shows  that  Mr.  Allen  was  not  an  impartial,  indifferent 
arbitrator,  and  coupled  with  the  excuse  given,  it  shows  that  he 
regarded  himself  as  the  representative  of  the  defendant  com- 
pany. From  this  circumstance  alone,  without  considering  other 
appearing  in  the  evidence,  we  think  it  clear  that  Mr.  Allen  was 
not  the  disinterested  referee  required  by  the  statute  and  the 
policy,  and  hence  that  the  award  must  be  adjudged  not  binding 

on  the  plaintiff,  and  must  be  set  aside.  Brock  v.  Ins.  Co.,  102 
Mich.  583;  61  N.  W.  67;  26  L.  R.  A.  623;  47  Am.  St.  Rep.  562; 
McCullough  v.  Ins-  Co.,  113  Mo.  606;  21  S.  W.  207;  Ins.  Co.  v. 
Bishop,  154  111.  9;  39  N.  E.  1102;  45  Am.  St.  Rep.  105;  Hick- 
erson v.  Ins.  Co.,  96  Tenn.  193;  33  S.  W.  1041;  32  L.  R.  A.  172; 
The  defendant  company  refused  to  comply  with  the  plain- 
tiff's request  for  another  arbitration  of  the  amount  of  the  loss, 


118  HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 

and  it  was  stipulated  in  the  report  of  the  case  that  if  the  court 
adjudged  the  award  invalid,  judgment  should  be  awarded  for 
the  plaintiff  for  the  full  amount  of  the  insurance,  $1,700,  less 
$1,353.06  already  paid. 

Judgment  for  the  plaintiff  and  interest  from  the  date  of 
the  writ. 

Young  v.  Aetna  Ins.  Co.  et  al.,  64  All.  584   (Me.  S.  J.  Ct.). 

An  appraiser  ought  not  to  consider  himself  as  an  agent  of 
the  party  by  whom  he  was  selected,  but  the  authorities  seem  to 
hold  a  party  responsible  when  the  appraiser  whom  he  selected 
assumes  to  be  his  representative  and  improperly  prevents  the 
appraisal  from  being  made.  Under  such  circumstances,  the  act 
of  the  appraiser  is  regarded  as  the  act  of  the  party  at  whose 
instance  he  was  named  and  in  whose  interest  he  assumes  to 
act,  and  no  direct  evidence  of  authorization  or  ratification  is 
required. 

Niagara  Fire   Ins.    Co.    v.   Bishop,    x54    111.    9  ;    39   N.   E.    1102  ;    45 

Am.    St.    Rep.    105; 

Uhrig  v.  Ins.   Co..  101  N.  Y.  362;   4  N.  E.   745; 
Bishop  v.   Ins.   Co.,   139  N.   Y.   488;   29  N.   E.   844; 
Harrison  v.  Hartford  Fire  Ins.  Co.,   112  Iowa  77;  83  N.  W.  820; 
McCullough  v.  Ins.   Co.,   113   Mo.   606  ;  21   S.   W.   207  ; 
Franklin  v.  Ins.  Co.,  70  N.  H.  256  ;  47  Atl.  91 : 
Braddy  v.  Ins.  Co.,  115  N.  C.  355;  20  S.  E.  477; 
Hickerson  v.   Ins.   Co.,   96  Tenn.  193  ;   33   S.   W.  1041  ;   32   L.  R.  A. 

172; 
Chapman  v.   Rockford   Ins.   Co.,    89   Wis.   572;    62   N.   W.    422;    28 

L.  R.  A.   405. 

After  the  first  attempt  at  arbitration  had  failed  and  was  out 
of  the  way,  the  plaintiff  requested  the  insurance  company  to 
appoint  new  referees  and  proceed  under  the  provisions  of  the 
policy,  and  that  the  company  refused  to  have  anything  further 
to  do  with  it.  This  being  true,  the  right  to  an  appraisal  was 
waived,  and  the  insured  was  entitled  to  commence  his  action 
to  recover  upon  the  policy.  The  fact  that  the  building  had  been 
in  the  meantime  repaired  did  not  justify  the  company  in  refus- 
ing to  proceed  with  the  appraisal. 

O'Rourke  v.  German  Ins.   Co.    (Minn.  S.  C.),  109  N.  W.   401. 

It  was  an  unreasonable  and  improper  requirement  of  the 
insurance  companies,  through  their  agent  Young,  that  the 
umpire  should  not  live  in  Bell  county  or  vicinity,  and  when 
the  appraisers  broke  up-  in  February  without  doing  anything, 
and  it  was  apparent  that  they  were  not  going  to  agree  upon 
anything,  it  was  incumbent  upon  the  insurance  companies, 
promptly  within  a  reasonable  time,  to  name  another  appraiser 
not  a  partisan,  and  to  request  of  Asher  to  do  the  same,  that  the 


APPRAISAL — ARBITRATION — AWARD.  119 

two  new  appraisers  might  adjust  the  matter  or  agree  upon  an 
umpire,  if  they  were  unable  to  agree  upon  the  appraisement. 
This  was  not  done,  and,  when  a  reasonable  time  had  elapsed, 
the  proposition  for  an  appraisement  must  be  regarded  aban- 
doned, and  a  subsequent  demand  for  an  appraisement  could  not 
be  made.  It  has  been  well  said  that  an  habitual  appraiser  is 
not  a  disinterested  person,  within  the  meaning  of  the  arbitra- 
tion clause  in  insurance  policies.  The  conclusions  we  have 
indicated  are  supported  by  the  following  authorities: 

McCullough  v.   Phoenix  Ins.   Co.,   113  Mo.   606;   21   S.   W.    207; 
Niagara  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  Bishop,   154  111.   9;  39  N.   E.   1102;  45  Am. 

St.  Rep.  105; 

Braddy  v.  Bowery  Ins.  Co.,  115  N.  C.  354;  20  S.  E.  477; 
Bradshaw  v.   Agricultural  Ins.   Co.,   137   N.   T.   137;   32  N.    E.   1055; 
GJover  v.  Rochester  German  Ins.  Co.,  11  Wash.  143  ;  39  Pac.  380  ; 
Powers  v.  Imperial  Ins.  Co.,  48  Minn.   380;   51  N.   W.  123;   13  Am. 

&  Eng.   Ency.  of  Law  362-365;  19  Cyc.   880. 

A  demand  by  two  or  more  insurance  companies  for  sub- 
mission of  their  several  liabilities  in  one  appraisement  of  arbi- 
tration is  not  warranted. 

Wicking  v.   Citizens'   Fire   Ins.    Co.,   118   Mich.   640;   77   N.   W.   275; 
Palatine   Ins.    Co.   v.   Morton-Scott-Robertson   Co.,    106    Tenn.    558; 

61  S.  W.  787; 
Hartford  F.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Asher,    (Ky.)  100  S.  W.  233. 

The  requirement  of  the  policies  of  insurance  was  that  the 
appraiser  and  the  umpire  should  be  disinterested.  Such  ap- 
praisers were  not  in  the  strict  sense  arbitrators,  and  it  is  not 
probable  that  either  party  to  the  policies  contemplated,  in  case 
of  loss,  that  the  appraisers  should  stand  absolutely  unbiased.  It 
is  more  than  probable  that  each  one  selected  an  appraiser  in 
whom  confidence  was  reposed  as  an  honest  man,  but  that,  in 
case  of  any  difference,  his  sympathies  would  incline  toward  the 
party  by  whom  he  was  chosen.  It  would  be  expecting  too 
much,  in  the  present  stage  of  progress  toward  the  millennium, 
to  assume  that  either  party  contemplated,  when  entering  into 
the  contract  of  insurance,  that  the  appraisers  selected  should 
be  absolutely  indifferent.  These  tribunals  are  home-made,  and 
neither  their  composition  nor  their  conduct  should  be  more 
closely  scrutinized  than  is  that  of  the  tribunals  selected  in 
accordance  with  the  statutes  and  long-standing  judicial  prac- 
tice. If  such  appraisers  are  honest  men,  who  make  an  honest 
effort  to  arrive  at  an  honest  award,  I  believe  that  nothing 
further  can  be  demanded  or  expected.  At  the  same  time,  all 
appearances  of  fraudulent  or  unfair  practice  should  be  met  with 
the  disapproval  of  the  courts.  How  far  the  parties  intended  to 
differentiate  between  bias  and  interest  is  not  apparent,  but  I 


120  HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 

think  there  is  a  distinction;  and,  if  each  party  was  satisfied  that 
the  opposing  appraiser  was  free  from  interest,  he  should  not 
have  been  surprised  to  find  that  he  was  not  entirely  free  from 
bias.  It  would  not  be  an  extremely  easy  undertaking  to  find 
either  an  appraiser  or  an  umpire,  in  a  business  as  limited  as  is 
that  of  preserving  fruit,  who  would  be  an  entire  stranger  to 
both  parties  in  the  case. 

Whalen  v.  Goldman,  116  N.  Y.  Supp.  1006. 

To  set  aside  an  award  of  appraisers  on  the  ground  that  tht 
appraiser  appointed  by  the  company  and  the  umpire  were  not 
"competent  and  disinterested,"  or  that  articles  damaged  were 
by  them  excluded  as  not  insured  by  the  policy,  it  must  be  shown 
that  the  company  knew  of  such  incompetency  and  interested- 
ness,  and  that  it  was  responsible  for  the  decision  excluding  such 
articles,  that  a  demand  was  made  on  the  company  that  they  be 
appraised,  or  it  must  be  shown  the  company  waived  the  condi- 
tion of  appraisement. 

Early  v.  Providence  Wash.  Ins.  Co.  (R.  I.).  76  Atl.  Rep.  753. 

If  either  of  the  parties  to  an  appraisal  under  a  clause  in 
the  policy  acts  in  bad  faith  so  as  to  defeat  the  object  of  the 
clause,  the  other  is  absolved  from  compliance  therewith;  when 
one  appraisal  fails  by  reason  of  default  of  one  of  the  parties, 
the  other  is  not  bound  to  enter  into  a  new  appraisal  agreement. 

Unrig  v.  Williamsburgh  City  F.  Ins.  Co.,  101  N.  T.  362,  affirming 
31  Hun.  98. 

Every  presumption  must  be  made  in  favor  of  fairness  and 
the  award  should  not  be  set  aside,  except  upon  clear  and  strong 
proof  of  partiality,  conspiracy  or  fraud. 

Mosness  v.   German-American  Ins.   Co.    (Minn.   S.   C.,   July,   1892), 

21  Ins.  L.  J.  915. 
Citing: 
Brush   v.    Fisher,   70   Mich.    469;   Overby  v.    Thrasher,    47    Ga.    10; 

Ins.  Co.   v.  Goehring,   99   Pa.   St.  13; 

Barnard  v.  Ins.  Co.   (U.  S.  C.  C.  A.  8th  Dist.),  29  Ins.  L.  J.  631; 
Hartford  F.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Bonner  Mercantile  Co.,  15  U.  S.  App.  134. 

Section  3643,  Rev.  St.  Ohio,  providing  arbitrators  and 
umpire  must  have  been  residents  of  the  county  in  which  loss 
occurred  at  least  one  year  prior  to  said  loss,  is  constitutional. 

Germania  Ins.  Co.  v.  Cincinnati  P.  B.  S.  &  P.  P.  Co.    (Cinn.  Su- 
preme Ct.  Gen.  Term),  7  Ohio  Decisions  571. 

Where  two  appraisers  made  independent  estimates,  one  of 
$5,000,  the  other  of  $115,000,  and  without  discussing  their  differ- 


APPRAISAL — ARBITRATION — AWARD.  121 

ences,  submitted  them  to  the  umpire,  who  took  both  estimates 
and  the  books  to  his  room  at  a  hotel,  and  requested  both  ap- 
praisers to  remain  within  call;  he  had  six  clerks  to  assist  him 
and  after  three  days  made  an  award  of  $60,624.73,  in  which  in- 
sured's  appraiser  joined.  Held,  Award  valid. 

Hartford  F.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Bonner  Mercantile  Co.   (U.  S.  C.  C.  A.  9th 
Cir.,  May,  1893),  22  Ins.  L.  J.  801. 

Where  one  appraiser  in  bad  faith  refuses  to  meet  the  other 
appraiser  and  fails  or  refuses  to  proceed  with  the  appraisal,  the 
other  appraiser  and  the  umpire  may  make  a  valid  appraisement. 

Doying  v.  Broadway  Ins.  Co.    (C.  of  E.  &  A.  N.  J.),  23  Ins.  L.  J. 

396;  27  Atl.  Rep.  927; 
American  Central  Ins.  Co.  v.  Landau  (N.  J.  Ch.),  49  Atl.  Rep.  738. 


Where  one  appraiser  and  the  umpire  refuse  to  deal  with 
the  other  appraiser  and  bring  in  an  award,  it  is  not  binding 
and  will  be  set  aside. 

Providence-Washington  Ins.    Co.  v.   Board  of  Education    (W.   Va. 

S.  C.  A.),  30  Ins.  L.  J.  577; 

Schmitt  v.  Boston  Ins.  Co.,  81  N.  Y.  Supp.  767; 
Christiansen    v.    Norwich    Union    P.    Ins.    Society    (Dec.    6,    1901), 

(Minn.  S.  C.),  31  Ins.  L.  J.  218; 
Mfrs.  and  Builders  F.  Ins.   Co.  v.  Mullen   (Neb.   S.   C.),   67   N.  W. 

Rep.  445; 
Caledonian  Ins.   Co.   v.   Traub    (Md.  C.  A.),  25   Ins.  L.   J.   791;   35 

Atl.  Rep.  13; 
Strome  v.  London  Assur.  Corp.  (N.  Y.  S,  C.  App.  Div.),  47  N.  Y. 

Supp.  481;  affirmed  in  162  N.  Y.  627; 
N.   Y.  Mut.   S.   &  L.  Co.  v.   Manchester  F.   Ins.   Co.    (N.   Y.   S.  C. 

App.  Div.),  87  N.  Y.  Supp.  1075; 
Western  Und.  Ass'n.  v.  Hankins  (111.   S.  C.),  35  Ins.  L.  J.  378. 

Where  one  appraiser  resigns,  the  other  appraiser  and  the 
umpire  can  not  render  a  valid  award  on  items  concerning  which 
there  had  been  no  preceding  conference  and  disagreement  with 
the  withdrawing  appraiser. 

Seibert  v.   Germania  and  other  Go's.,    (Iowa   S.  C.),  35  Ins.   L.  J. 
384. 

Where  one  appraiser  is  called  away  on  business  engage- 
ment, and  in  his  absence  the  other  appraiser  and  umpire  agreed 
on  an  award,  it  is  a  question  for  jury  whether  such  award  is 
valid  or  not. 

Caledonian  Ins.  Co.  v.  Traub   (Md.   C.  A.),  25  Ins.  L.  J.  791; 
Schmitt  Bros.  v.  Boston  Ins.  Co.   (N.  Y.  S.  C.  App.  Div.),  81  N.  Y. 
Supp.  767. 

Arbitrators  are  not  obliged  to  follow  strict  rules  of  law  un- 
less it  is  a  condition  of  the  submission  that  they  do  so. 

Hall  v.  Norwalk  F.  Ins.  Co.   (Conn.  S.  C.),  17  Atl.  Rep.  356; 
Levine  v.  Lancashire  Ins.  Co.   (Minn.  S.  C.),  21  Ins.  L.  J.  36; 


122  HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 

Stemmer    v.    Scottish    U.    &    N.    Ins.    Co.    (Oregon    S.    C.),    27    Ins. 

L.   J.    972; 
Farrell    v.    German    American    Ins.    Co.     (Mass.     S.    C.),    29    Ins. 

L.  J.  341. 

Where  the  arbitrators  and  umpire  agreed  that  each  should 
mark  on  a  card  his  idea  of  damage  and  that  the  aggregate  of 
these  amounts  should  be  divided  by  three  and  the  result  should 
be  the  amount  of  the  award,  it  was  held  to  be  valid. 
Aetna  F.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Davis  (Ky.  C.  A.),  29  Ins.  L.  J.  560. 

Where  appraisers  disregard  their  instructions  "to  state  sep- 
arately sound  value  and  damage"  and  bring  in  an  award  showing 
the  damage,  but  ignoring  the  sound  value,  the  award  will  be 
set  aside. 

Continental  Ins.  Co.  v.   Garrett  (U.   S.  C.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.),   125  Fed. 
Rep.  589. 

In  appraisal  agreement  was  an  unsigned  direction  to  ap- 
praisers to  affix  to  each  article  a  specific  damage,  per  yard, 
pound,  etc.  This  appraisers  did  not  do.  Held,  The  award  was 
not  avoided. 

Enright  v.  Montatlk  F.  Ins.  Co.    (N.  Y.  S.  C.),  40  N.  Y.  State  Rep. 
642. 

Appraisal  Must  Be  in  Detail  in  Rhode  Island. 

An  appraisal  agreement  is  made  to  secure  two  things;  First: 
an  appraisement;  and  second,  an  award,  which  is  the  finding 
or  judgment  based  upon  the  appraisement.  Where  there  are 
numerous  articles  of  different  kinds  and  quality  to  be  appraised, 
it  is  obvious  that  an  appraisement  to  be  of  value  must  be  founded 
upon  an  individual  appraisal  of  the  various  articles.  There  is  no 
provision  in  the  agreement  expressly  requiring  an  itemized  ap- 
praisal; but  its  implications  as  indicated  by  citations  above  (the 
only  cases  cited  are  South  of  v.  American  Centra*!  Ins.  Co.,  34 
R.  I.  324;  83  Atl.  441;  Am.  &  Eng.  Ency.  Law,  vol.  12,  442,  3; 
Cyc.  374;  Continental  Ins.  Co.  v.  Garrett,  125  Fed.  589;  60  C.  C. 
A.  395,  396)  therefrom,  in  our  judgment  show  that  an  itemized 
or  individual  appraisement  was  contemplated  thereby.  The  num- 
ber or  articles  to  be  appraised  after  different  fires  may  be  ex- 
pected to  vary  greatly,  particularly  when  the  articles  are  per- 
sonal property.  The  itemized  list  in  such  cases  must  also  vary 
greatly  in  length.  Perhaps  for  this  reason  no  space  for  the 
appraisement  is  provided  for  on  the  form  of  agreement.  The 
api  raisers  are  apparently  left  to  make  that  up  themselves.  In 
the  form  of  the  award,  after  the  last  printed  word,  "dollars,"  is 


APPRAISAL — ARBITRATION — AWARD.  123 

a  space  with  a  dotted  line  upon  which  to  write  whatever  may 
be  necessary  in  addition.  There  is  ample  room  allowed  to  make 
the  itemized  appraisement  a  part  of  the  award  by  reference. 
*  *  *  The  evidence  in  this  case  does  not  warrant  the  pre- 
sumption or  inference  that  the  form  of  the  award,  if  presented 
by  the  defendant,  was  by  it  intended  or  calculated  to  deceive 
or  mislead  the  appraisers  or  the  insured  as  to  the  character  of 
the  appraisement  and  award  desired.  The  court  therefore  held, 
it  was  the  insured's  duty  to  demand  a  new  appraisal  of  his  loss, 
the  first  being  invalid  for  the  reason  that  it  failed  to  show  that 
appraisers  had  appraised  the  value  of  each  article  and  the  loss 
and  damage  to  each  in  detail.  Riddell  v.  Rochester  Ger.  Ins. 
Co.  (R.  I.  S.  C.),  89  Atl.  833. 

In  one  of  the  cases  cited  by  the  Rhode  Island  Supreme  Court 
(i.  e.  Continental  Ins.  Co.  v.  Garrett,  125  Fed.  589;  60  C.  C.  A. 
395)  as  a  case  in  point,  it  is  true  in  that  case  the  Federal  Court 
did  hold  the  award  invalid  for  the  reason  the  appraisers  did  not 
carry  out  the  provisions  of  the  appraisal  agreement  as  well 
as  those  of  the  policy,  both  of  which  required  appraisers  to  de- 
termine the  sound  value,  as  well  as  the  loss  thereto,  whereas 
they  omitted  to  find  the  amount  of  the  sound  value,  but  did  find 
the  amount  of  the  loss.  The  court  held  the  award  invalid  and 
permitted  the  insured  to  bring  suit,  holding  that  he  was  not  re- 
quired to  enter  into  a  second  appraisal,  the  first  one  not  being 
valid  through  no  fault  of  his.  In  Enright  v.  Montauk  Ins.  Co.,  40 
N.  Y.  State  Rep.  642,  it  was  held  the  award  was  not  avoided 
because  the  appraisers  had  not  appraised  the  loss  article  by 
article  when  there  was  in  the  appraisal  agreement  an  unsigned 
direction  to  affix  to  each  article  a  specific  damage.  There  are 
no  other  cases  in  line  with  the  Rhode  Island  Court's  decision 
with  the  single  exception  of  one  the  same  court  decided  and  re- 
ferred to.  The  Author. 

By  failing  to  furnish  an  arbitrator  who  would  proceed  with 
reasonable  promptness  in  the  discharge  of  his  duties,  any  right 
it  may  have  had  to  insist  on  the  damages  being  appraised  was 
lost.  The  record  leaves  no  doubt  but  that  the  appraiser  chosen 
by  this  company  resorted  to  the  familiar  expedient  of  prevent- 
ing or  delaying  action  by  demanding  an  umpire  from  afar  off, 
and  then,  when  something  might  be  accomplished  finding  it  im- 
possible to  proceed  because  of  pressing  business  engagements  at 
hils  home  in  Kansas  City,  Mo.,  there  detaining  him  several 
months.  That  the  defendant  was  precluded  by  such  conduct 
from  insisting  on  arbitration  as  a  condition  precedent  to  the 


124  HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 

maintenance  of  the  action  is  well  settled  authority.  Harrison  v. 
Hartford  F.  Ins.  Co.,  30  Ins.  L.  J.  253,  112  Iowa  77  (citing  Read 
v.  Ins.  Co.,  103  la.  314;  Brook  v.  Ins.  Co.,  102  Mich.  583;  Brad- 
shaw  v.  Ins.  Co.,  137  N.  Y.  137;  McCullough  v.  Ins.  Co.,  113  Mo. 
606;  Bishop  v.  Ins.  Co.,  130  N.  Y.  488;  Uhrig  v.  Ins.  Co.,  101 
N.  Y.  362). 

The  provision  in  a  fire  policy  that  the  loss  is  payable  sixty 
days  after  *  *  *  an  award  of  appraisers,  doesn't  give  the  in- 
surer after  it  has  agreed  to  appraisal  and  named  its  appraiser,  an 
absolute  right  to  sixty  days  in  which  to  commence  the  appraisal, 
but  it  must  proceed  without  unnecessary  delay,  and  in  a  reason- 
able time  depending  on  the  facts  in  the  case,  so  where,  after 
the  fire  the  parties  appointed  appraisers  and  agreed  that  they 
should  commence  at  once  to  appraise  the  goods  and  insured  got 
his  appraiser  and  left  him  waiting  for  six  days  at  great  expense, 
and  the  insurer  stated  the  appraiser  appointed  by  it  could  not 
attend,  and  promised  to  procure  a  substitute  but  failed  to  do 
so,  and  when  communicated  with  by  telegram  failed  to  reply, 
though  knowing  that  insured  was  at  great  expense,  and  that  the 
goods  which  were  not  fully  insured,  were  being  injured  by  delay, 
and  that  an  early  appraisement  was  necessary  for  insured  to 
save  anything  from  the  stock.  Such  action  is  a  refusal  to  ap- 
praise. 

Providence- Wash.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Wolf,  168  Ind.  690;  80  N.  E.  27  over- 
ruling Ind.  App.,   72  N.   E.  606. 

Where  the  company  fraudulently  represents  its  appraiser 
as  an  unprejudiced  one  and  a  business  man,  whereas  he  was 
a  professional  appraiser,  and  it  appearing  the  award  was  inade- 
quate, it  will  be  set  aside  because  of  a  prejudiced  appraiser  hav- 
ing been  fraudulently  imposed  on  insured. 

"The  scheme  of  appraisal  contemplates  that  the  two  apprais- 
ers shall  estimate  the  amount  of  the  loss,  and  in  case  of  dis- 
agreement their  differences  shall  be  submitted  to  the  umpire. 
It  is  not  the  purpose  of  the  provision  that  one  appraiser  shall 
present  no  estimate  to  his  co-appraiser,  but  confer  with  the  um- 
pire in  the  absence  of  and  without  any  notice  whatever  to  the 
other  appraiser." 

Kaiser  v.  Hamburg- Bremen  F.  Ins.  Co.,  69  N.  Y.  Supp.   344; 
Hall  v.  Western  Assur.  Co.,  133  Ala.  637;  32  Southern  267; 
Glover  v.  Rochester  Ger.  Ins.  Co.,  11  Wash.  143;  39  Pacif.  380. 

Where  the  arbitration  fails  by  reason  of  fraud  or  intermed- 
dling of  the  insured,  the  right  to  sue  on  the  policy  is  lost.  Where 
the  fraud  or  intermeddling  with  the  appraisers  is  at  the  instance 


APPRAISAL — ARBITRATION — AWARD.  125 

of  the  company,  the  insured  may  abandon  the  arbitration  and 
sue  on  the  policy.  St.  Paul  F.  &  M.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Kirkpatrick 
(Tenn.  S.  C),  164  S.  W.  1186. 

But  this,  substantially,  is  what  was  done  here,  and  such 
action  barely  rose  to  the  dignity  of  a  real  conference  between 
Thomas  Fleming  (one  of  the  appraisers)  and  David  Nicholson, 
the  umpire.  Each  obtained  information  upon  "his  own  hook,"  so 
to  express  it,  and  then  each  made  figures  based  on  his  private 
information,  to  a  large  extent,  and  ignoring  the  other  appraiser 
proceeded  to  make  an  award.  Really  Fleming  was  ignorant  of 
the  evidence  or  information  on  which  Nicholson  acted,  and 
Stultz  (the  other  appraiser)  knew  little,  if  anything,  of  the  real 
information  on  which  either  or  both  of  the  others  acted.  This 
award  was  not  the  result  of  information  furnished  to  all  or  con- 
sidered by  all  or  by  any  two,  or  of  the  joint  deliberation  of  the 
three  or  of  any  two.  True,  two  signed  the  award,  and  so  two 
agreed  in  the  final  result,  but  it  by  no  means  follows  that  the 
two  would  have  agreed  on  that  result  had  they  consulted  all  the 
evidence  and  information  possessed  by  each  and  deliberated 
thereon. 

I  think  that  an  examination  and  consideration  of  the  evi- 
dence of  Mr.  Fleming  is  conclusive  against  the  fairness  and 
justice  of  the  award  made.  He  testified  that  he  gave  full  credit 
to  Palmer's  (a  gentleman  engaged  by  the  insurance  companies) 
report,  and  no  credit  whatever  to  the  sworn  proofs  of  loss  and 
the  affidavits  presented  by  the  insured. 

Without  going  into  detail,  the  evidence  also  shows  that  on 
the  prior  file  of  one  of  the  cases  against  one  of  the  companies 
involved  in  this  loss  Mr.  Fleming  made  statements  almost  ex- 
actly opposite  to  the  statements  made  on  the  trial  of  this  case 
in  important  matters,  *  *  *  If  it  be  true  that  he  was  unable 
\to  understand  and  comprehend  the  questions  put  to  him  on  the 
trial  (as  he  claims),  a  fair  inference  may  be  drawn  that  he  was 
incompetent  to  act  as  an  appraiser  in  this  important  matter. 
*  *  *  My  conclusions  are  that  the  appraisal  made  should  be 
set  aside,  and  the  matter  should  be  determined  before  a  court 
and  jury. 

Davis  v.  Fireman's  Fund  Ins.  Co.,  210  Fed.   653. 

It  is  the  duty  of  the  appraiser,  undoubtedly,  to  bring  out  all 
the  facts,  favorable  to  the  party  nominating  him;  but  he  is  not 
the  agent  of  the  party  so  naming  him.  A  refusal  or  willful 
neglect  of  the  appraiser  or  umpire  to  listen  to  and  consider 


126  HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 

material  sworn  statements  presented,  is  evidence  of  prejudice, 
bias  and  interest.  Davis  v.  Firemen's  Fund  Ins.  Co.,  210  Fed. 
653  (citing  Kaiser  v.  Hamburg-Bremen  Fire  Ins.  Co.,  59  App. 
Div.  525,  69  N.  Y.  Supp.  344,  Aff'd  172  N.  Y.  663,  65  N,  E.  1118). 

While  an  award  of  appraisers  will  be  presumed  to  be  just 
and  proper,  yet  where  the  evidence  shows  that  the  company's 
appraiser  was  an  expert  in  adjusting  losses,  and  that,  in  enter- 
ing upon  the  appraisement  of  the  destroyed  property  he  practi- 
cally ignored  the  insured's  appraiser,  and  refused  to  take  any 
account  of  the  estimated  depreciation  made  by  an  appraisal  com- 
pany who  had  personally  examined  the  property  about  a  year 
before  the  fire,  but  arbitrarily  depreciated  the  property  50  per 
cent.,  it  was  no  such  effort  at  a  fair  and  impartial  appraisement 
as  the  standard  policy  contemplates.  Davis  v.  Stuyvesant  Ins, 
Co.,  145  N.-Y.  Supp.  "192. 

Mere  inadequacy  alone  is  not  sufficient  to  set  aside  an 
award;  but,  if  the  inadequacy  be  so  gross  and  palpable  as  to 
shock  the  moral  sense,  it  is  sufficient  evidence  to  be  submitted 
to  the  jury  on  the  issues  relating  to  fraud  and  corruption  or 
partially  and  bias.  The  arbitrators  awarded  insured  damages 
in  the  amount  of  $73.50.  The  jury  found  that  insured's  loss 
amounted  to'  $750.  Held,  That  the  award  in  such  case  ought 
not  to  be  permitted  to  stand. 

Perry  v.  Greenwich  Ins.  Co.   (N.  C.  S.  C.)  49  Southeastern  Reporter 
(March  11,  1905),  889. 

Where  an  award  was  signed  by  one  appraiser  with  the  un- 
derstanding that  certain  items  not  considered  were  improperly 
omitted,  it  should  not  be  final,  and  afterwards  sach  omission 
was  found  improper,  such  award  can  not  be  claimed  as  final. 

Herndon   v.    Imperial   F.   Ins.    Co.    (N.    C.    S.  C.    March,    1892),    21 
Ins.  L.  J.   193. 

Where  the  award  was  based  on  an  inventory  furnished  by 
the  insured  and  certified  by  him  to  be  correct,  he  can  not  have 
the  award  set  aside  for  a  mistake  in  the  inventory. 

Kentucky  Chair  Co.    v.    Rochester  German   Ins.    Co.    (Ky.    C.    A.), 
28  Ins.  L.  J.  361. 

Neither  party  can  avoid  the  award  on  the  ground  that  ap- 
praisers erred  in  judgment  as  to  the  law  or  facts. 

Hall  v.  Norwalk  F.  Ins.  Co.    (Conn.   S.  C.),  17  Atl.  Rep.  356; 
Stemmer   v.    Scottish    U.    &    N.    Ins.    Co.    (Oregon    S.    C.),    27    Ins. 
L.  J.  973. 

An   appraiser   or  umpire  may  inform   himself  by  calling  in 


APPRAISAL — ARBITRATION — AWAIID.  127 

the  aid  of  a  third  person  skilled  in  a  special  branch  embraced 
in  the  appraisal  and  give  to  such  estimate  of  such  third  person 
such  weight  and  evidence  as  he  sees  fit,  even  to  adopting  it  as 
his  own  judgment. 

Bangor    Savings    Bank    v.    Niagara    P.    Ins.    Co.    (Me.    S.    C.),    23 

Ins.   L.   J.   292; 
Rogers  v.  Com'l  Union  Assur.   Co.    (Manitoba  O.   B.),   15  Canadian 

L.   Times  228. 

The  award  of  appraisers  was  not  binding  where  they  did 
not  appraise  the  damage  to  all  the  articles  embraced  in  the 
schedule,  but  held  that  some  of  them  were  not  covered  by  the 
policy.  A  policy  of  insurance  covering  "tools  used  in  the  manu- 
facture of  boots  and  shoes"  covers  patterns  for  making  boots 
and  shoes. 

Adams    v.    N.    Y.    Bowery    F.    Ins.    Co.     (Iowa    S.    C.),    51    N.    W. 
Rep.   1149. 

In  this  state  courts  of  equity  will  set  aside  awards  not  only 
for  fraud  and  for  corrupt  practices  on  the  part  of  arbitrators 
or  parties,  but  for  mistake,  or  willful  misconduct  of  the  arbitra- 
tors. Commercial  Assur.  Co.  v.  Parker,  119  111.  App.  126,  citing 
Citizens  Ins.  Co.  v.  Hamilton,  48  111.  App.  593;  Catlett  v.  Dough- 
erty, 114  111.  568. 

The  policy  requires  the  parties  to  choose  appraisers  only 
Dnce  and  if  that  fail  through  no  fault  of  assured,  he  may  bring 
suit. 

Braddy  v.  N.  Y.  Bowery  F.  Ins.  Co.,  115  N.  C.  354,  20  S.  E.  477; 

Harrison  v.   German  Am.  Ins.   Co.,  67   Fed.  577; 

Hickerson  v.  Royal  Ins.  Co.,  96  Tenn.   193,  33  S.  W.   1041; 

Niagara   F.    Ins.    Co.    v.    Bishop,    154    111.    9,   39    N.    E.    1102.    25    Ins. 
L.  J.  24; 

Connecticut  F.  Ins.   Co.  v.   Cohen,  97  Md.  294,   55  Atl.   675; 

Western   Assur.    Co.   v.    Decker,    39   C.   C.   A.    383,    98   Fed.    381; 

Brock  v.   Dwelling  Ho.    Ins.    Co.,    102  Mich.    583,    61    N.    W.    67; 

Davis  v.  Atlas  Assur.  Co.,  16  Wash.  232,  47  Pacif.  436,  885; 

Capitol   Ins.   Co.   v.   Wallace,   50  Kans.   454,   31   Pacif.   1070; 

McCullough  v.  Phoenix  Ins.  Co.,  113  Mo.  606,  21  S.  W.   207; 

Chapman  v.   Rockford  Ins.    Co.,   89   Wis.  572,    62   N.   W.    422; 

Uhrig  v.  Williamsburgh  City  F.  Ins.  Co.,  101  N.  Y.  362,  4  N.  E.  745; 

Davenport  v.  Long  Island  Ins.  Co.,  10  Daly  538; 

Bishop  v.  Agricultural  Ins.   Co.,   130  N.  Y.  488,   29   N.   E.   844; 

Randall  v.   Phoenix  Ins.   Co.,   10   Mont.   362,   25   Pacif.    960; 

Fire  Assn.  v.  Appel,  76  Ohio  St.  1,  80  N.  E.  952,  36  Ins.  L.  J.  769; 

O'Rourke   v.    German  Ins.    Co.,    99   Minn.    293,    104   N.    W.    900; 

Bernhard  v.  Rochester  G.   Ins.  Co.,   79  Conn.  388,  65  Atl.  134; 

Pretzfelder  v.   Merchants  Ins.   Co.,   116  N.  C.  491,   21  S.   E.  302,   28 
Ins.  L.  J.   169; 

Shawnee  F.   Ins.  Co.   v.   Pontfleld,   110  Md.   356,  72  Atl.   835; 

•Sharp  v.    Niagara    F.   Ins.    Co.    (Mo.   App.),    147    S.    \V.    154; 

Continental    Ins.    Co.    v.    Wilson,    45    Kans.    250,    25    Pacif.    629,    20 
Ins.  L.  J.  269; 

St.  Paul  F.  &  M.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Kirkpatrick  (Tenn.  S.   C.),   164  S.   W. 
1186; 

German   Am.    Ins.    Co.    v.    Jerrills.    82   Kans.   320.   108    Pac.    114,    an- 
notated in  28  L.   R.  A.    (N.    S.)    104; 

Aetna  Ins.  Co.  v.  Jester,  37  Okla.  413,  132  Pac.  130,  annotated  in  39 
L.  R.  A.    (N.  S.)   1191. 


128  HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 

Where  the  policy  makes  appraisal  a  condition  precedent,  and 
the  appraisers  after  making  an  honest  effort  to  agree  on  an  um- 
pire and  fail  to  do  so,  the  assured  is  not  justified  in  refusing  to 
proceed  with  the  appraisal  by  selection  of  a  new  appraiser,  and 
in  suing  for  the  amount  of  his  loss. 

Westenhaver  v.  German  Am.  Ins.  Co.,  113  Iowa  726;  84  N.  W.  717; 
Vernon  Ins.  Co.  &  T.  Co.  v.  Maitlen,  168  Ind.  App.  393;  62  N.  E. 

755; 
Baumgarth  v.  Fireman's  Fund  Ins.  Co.   (Mich.),  116  N.  W.  449,  37 

Ins.   L.   J.   577   (citing  Davenport  v.   Ins.  Co.,  10  Daly  (N.   Y.) 

535); 

Grady  v.  Home  F.  &  M.  Ins.  Co.,  27  R.  I.  435; 
Kersey  v.   Phoenix  Ins.   Co.,   135  Mich.   10,   97   N.   W.   67. 

It  is  not  unreasonable  for  the  insured  to  refuse  to  submit 
to  a  second  appraisal  (the  first  having  failed)  unless  the  insurer 
waives  the  provision  in  the  policy  that  loss  should  not  become 
due  until  sixty  days  after  award  of  appraisers. 

Michel  v.   American  Cent'l  Ins.   Co.    (N.  Y.   S.    C.   App.   Div.),    44 
N.  Y.  Supp.  832. 

If  an  appraisal  fails,  through  no  fault  of  insurer,  assured  has 
no  standing  in  court  until  a  new  appraisement  is  had. 

Levine  v.  Lancashire  Ins.  Co.  (Minn.  S.  C.),  26  Ins.  L.  J.  36; 
Carp  v.  Queen  Ins.  Co.   (Mo.  C.  of  A.),  79  S.  W.  Rep.  757. 

But,  if  it  fail  through  no  fault  of  either  party,  this  does  not 
justify  insured  from  refusing  further  arbitration  and  bringing 
suit;  other  appraisers  should  be  selected. 

Westenhaver  et  al.  v.   German -Am.   Ins.  Co.    (la.   S.   C.),   30  Ins. 

L.  J.  314; 

Fisher  v.  Merchants  Ins.  Co.    (Me.  S.  J.   C.),   31  Ins.   L,.  J.  45; 
Vernon  Ins.  and  Trust  Co.  v.  Maitlen  (Ind.  S.  C.),  31  Ins.  L.  J.  672; 
Carp  r.  Queen  Ins.  Co.,  104  Mo.  App.  602. 

The  Mass.  Rev.  Law  as  c  118  S.  60  provides  that  where  the 
referees  are  unable  to  agree  on  a  third  referee  within  ten  days, 
the  insurance  commissioner  will  on  request  of  either  party  ap- 
point the  third  referee.  The  Mass,  standard  policy  makes  arbi- 
tration as  to  the  amount  of  the  loss  a  condition  precedent  to 
suit.  Upon  a  disagreement  the  insured  and  the  company  each  se- 
lected referees  who  failed  to  agree  on  a  third  within  ten  days, 
whereupon  the  insured  notified  one  of  the  referees  that  he 
wished  the  third  appointed  by  the  insurance  commissioner  but 
no  written  application  was  made  by  plaintiff  to  the  commissioner 
as  is  required  by  statue,  but  he  asked  for  the  appointment  of  new 
referees.  About  twenty  days  after  their  appointment  the  two 
referees  agreed  on  a  third.  The  plaintiff  refused  to  abide  by  the 
selection  because  it  was  not  made  in  ten  days  of  the  appoint- 


APPRAISAL — ARBITRATION — AWARD.  129* 

ment  of  the  referees.    The  company  declined  to  waive  its  right 
to  have  the  loss  determined  by  the  referees.     It  was  held  that 
the  selection  of  the  third  referee  after  ten  days  was  legal,  and 
that  the  arbitration  as  condition  precedent  was  not  waived. 
Paris  v.  Hamburg-Bremen  F.   Ins.   Co.    (Mass.),   90  N.  B.  420. 

Waiver. 

Where  the  insurer  knew  the  policy  was  avoided  by  breach 
of  a  condition  and  then  entered  into  an  appraisal,  it  is  estopped 
from  setting  up  such  a  defense. 

McFarland  v.  Kittanning  Ins.  Co.   (Pa.  S.  C.)f  21  Ins.  L.  J.  655; 

Hickerson  v.  Ins.  Cos.   (Tenn.  S.  C.),  25  Ins.  L.  J.  422. 

Insurer's  demand  for  appraisal  waives  proofs. 
Walker  v.    German  Ins.   Co.    (July,    1893),    (Kan.    S.   C.),   22   Ins. 

L.  J.  750; 

Home  P.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Bean  (Neb.  S.  C.),  24  Ins.  L.  J.  516; 
Smith  v.  Herd  et  al.    (K.  C.  A.),  30  Ins.  L.  J.  393; 
Branigan  v.  Jefferson  Mut.  Ins.  Co'.,  102  Mo.  App.  70;  76   S.  W. 

Rep.  643. 

An  appraisal  which  provides  that  no  questions  are  to  be  de- 
termined other  than  the  loss  is  no  waiver  of  forfeiture. 

Queen  Ins.  Co.  v.  Young  (Ala.  S.  C.),  5  Southern  Rep.  102; 
Holbrook  v.  Baloise  F.  Ins.  Co.   (Cal.  S.  C.),  49  Pac.  Rep.  555. 

Even  though  such  forfeiture  be  known  to  the  insurer  before 
agreeing  to  appraisal  where  agreement  specified,  it  should  not 
decide  liability  under  the  policy. 

Johnson  v.  American  F.  Ins.   Co.    (Minn.   S.   C.),   41  Minn.   396,   43 
N.  W.  Rep.  59. 

Nor  where  the  insurer  learned  of  such  forfeiture  after  en- 
tering into  appraisal  and  did  not  withdraw  from  the  appraisal 
and  the  award  was  not  rendered  for  a  month  afterwards. 

Gibson  Electric  Co.  v.  Liverpool  &  London  &  Globe  Ins.  Co.  (N.  T. 
C.  A.),  28  Ins.  L.  J.  629. 

The  insurer  may  deny  liability  and  still  insist  on  the  ap- 
praisement as  conclusive  of  the  amount  of  the  loss  under  Texas 
standard  policy. 

American  Cenfl  Ins.   Co.   v.   Bass   et  al.    (Tex.    S.    C.),    38    S.   W. 
Rep.  1119. 

Nor  does  it  waive  proofs  of  loss. 

Wicking  et  al.  v.  Citizens'  Mut.  F.  Ins.  Co.   (Mich.  S.  C.),  28  Ins. 

L.  J.  230; 

Fournier  v.  German  Am.  Ins.  Co.  (R.  I.  S.  C.),  30  Ins.  L.  J.  715; 
Cook  v.  North  B.  &  M.  Ins.  Co.   (Mass.  S.  C.),  31  Ins.  L.  J.  385. 

Where  a  policy  of  insurance  contains  one  provision  requir- 


130  HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 

ing  proofs  of  loss  and  another  requiring  an  appraisal,  both  can- 
not be  in  operation  at  the  same  time,  so  that  where  the  com- 
pany offers  to  pay  what  it  believes  to  be  the  loss,  it  implies  that 
it  is  satisfied  with  the  integrity  of  the  loss,  but  if  the  insured 
declines  the  offer  it  brings  into  operation  the  appraisal  clause, 
and  insured  must  allege  an  award  of  appraisers,  or  that  he  has 
endeavored  to  secure  one. 

Murphy  v.  North  B.  &  M.  Ins.  Co.,  70  Mo.  App.   78. 

So  where  an  answer  pleads  failure  to  arbitrate,  it  impliedly 
admits  the  necessary  proofs  of  loss. 

Exchange    Bank   v.    Thuringia  F.    Ins.    Co.,    109    Mo.    App.   654;    83 
S.  W.  534. 

As  the  award,  both  by  the  terms  of  the  submission  to  ap- 
praisers and  by  the  terms  of  the  policy,  merely  limited  the  deter- 
mination of  the  amount  of  loss  without  reference  to  other  ques- 
tions or  matters  of  differences,  it  had  only  the  effect  of  fixing 
the  amount  of  the  liability  in  the  event  the  company  should  be 
found  liable. 

Smith  v.  British  Am.  Assur.  Co.,  110  Ky.  56,  60  S.  W.  841. 

Where  the  appraisal  agreement  provided  that  the  appraiser 
should  ascertain,  pursuant  to  the  terms  and  conditions  of  the 
policy,  the  actual  cash  value,  etc.,  and  further  that  the  appraise- 
ment "does  not  in  any  respect  waive  any  of  the  provisions  or 
conditions  of  said  policies  of  insurance  or  of  any  forfeiture 
thereof,  or  the  proof  of  such  loss  and  damages  required  by  the 
policies  of  insurance  thereon."  The  company  may  refuse  to 
accept  proofs  not  made  out  in  conformity  with  the  award  of 
appraisers,  but  if  the  proofs  were  not  served  within  the  sixty 
days  after  the  fire  as  provided  for  in  the  policy,  the  company's 
construction  of  the  policy  contract  was  sound  when  it  informed 
the  insured,  "if  it  shall  be  alleged  or  claimed  by  you  that  award, 
of  appraisers  for  any  reason  is  not  binding  upon  you,  then  this 
company  objects  to  the  papers  purporting  to  be  proofs  of  loss, 
and  declines  to  accept  them  for  the  reason  that  they  were  not 
served  upon  this  company  within  sixty  days  after  the  fire  as 
required  by  the  term.s  and  conditions  of  said  policy.  The  papers 
are  returned  herewith." 

Commercial  Union  Assur.  Co.  v.  Dalzell,  210  Fed.  Rep.  605   (C.  C. 
A.  3d  Circuit  Jany.  29,  1914,  Nos.  1792,  1793.). 

Having  once  waived  the  appraisal  by  its  conduct  (in  select- 


APPRAISAL — ARBITRATION — AWARD.  131 

ing  a  professional  appraiser),  the  insurer  can  not  require  another 
appraisal. 

Continental  Ins.  Co.  v.  Vallandingham   (Ky.  C.  A.),  32  Ins.   L,.   J. 
1032. 

The  refusal  of  an  insurance  company  to  join  in  an  appraisal 
of  the  loss  with  the  insured  and  the  other  companies  does  not 
estop  it  from  disputing  the  loss  as  estimated  by  the  appraisers 
so  appointed  and  such  an  appraisement  is  never  conclusive,  and 
is  not  even  evidence  at  all,  unless  made  so  by  the  parties  uniting 
in  it.  It  gets  its  entire  force  from  the  joint  act  of  the  parties 
through  their  agents,  and  where  it  is  exparte,  and  though 
averred  by  plaintiff  in  his  statement,  is  denied  by  defendant,  it 
goes  for  naught,  and  is  not  evidence  at  all,  either  on  motion 
for  judgment  or  at  the  trial. 

Penn.  P.  G.  Co.  v.  Spring  G.  Ins.  Co.  189  Pa.  255;  42  Atl.  138;  28 
Ins.   L.   J.    223. 

It  merely  waives  Co.'s  right  to  afterwards  insist  upon  an 
appraisal. 

McDowell  v.   Aetna  Ins.   Co.    et  al.,   164   Mass.    444;    41   N.   E.   665; 
25  Ins.  L.  J.  156. 

An  offer  to  submit  a  loss  to  appraisement  made  by  the  com- 
pany in  ignorance 'of  facts  rendering  the  policy  void,  and 
promptly  withdrawn  upon  learning  the  facts,  is  no  waiver  of  its 
right  to  deny  liability  for  the  loss. 

Greenwood  v.  Georgia  R.  Ins.  Co.,  72  Miss.  46;  17  Southern  83. 

Neither  the  company  nor  the  insured  is  bound  by  an  award 
under  appraisal  between  the  insured  and  another  company. 

Chenoweth  v.  Phenix  Ins.   Co.,  12  Ky.  L.  R.  232; 
Penn    Plate    G.    Co.    v.    Spring    G.    Ins.    Co.,    189    Pa.    255;    42   Atl. 
138;  28  Ins.  L.  J.  223. 

Where  the  insurance  company's  adjuster  did  not  take  part 
in  the  early  negotiations  for  a  joint  appraisal,  but  was  kept  in- 
formed on  the  steps  taken,  and  was  co-operating  with  the  other 
insurers  and  taking  advantage  of  whatever  was  done  that  could 
benefit  him  and  later  was  present  with  the  other  adjusters  and 
co-operated  with  them,  and  after  leaving  the  conference  was 
notified  of  what  was  being  done,  his  company  is  bound  by  and 
participated  in  the  joint  appraisal,  notwithstanding  the  fact  he 
had  demanded  a  separate  appraisal. 

North  German  Ins.   Co.   v.   Morton,   108   Tenn.   384;   68   S.  W.    816; 
31  Ins.  L.  J.  580. 


132  HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 

The  failure  of  the  insured  to  object  to  the  appraiser  selected 
by  the  company  for  bias,  prejudice  or  incompetency  before  the 
award  is  made,  will  not  estop  him  from  afterwards  setting  up 
the  existence  of  such  incompetency  in  avoidance  of  the  award. 
Whether  appraisers  were  competent  and  disinterested  is  a  ques- 
tion for  the  jury. 

Royal  Ins.  Co.  et  al.  v.  Parlin  &  Orendorff  Co.,  12  Tex.  C.  A.  572; 
34  S.  W.  401,  3  and  4. 

But  where  in  such  case  appraisal  being  a  condition  prece- 
dent the  adjuster  and  the  insured  negotiated  as  to  the  amount  of 
the  loss  without  agreeing,  and  the  company  demanded  further 
proofs  of  loss,  refusing  to  pay  anything  until  they  were  fur- 
nished, but  never  offered  to  submit  the  loss  to  appraisal,  it  can- 
not claim  that  a  suit  brought  on  the  policy  four  months  there- 
after was  a  violation  of  its  terms  as  to  arbitration. 

Milwaukee  Mchs.   Ins.  Co.  v.   Stewart,   13  Ind.  App.   640;   42  N.   E. 
'290. 

Where  the  policy  provides  that  an  appraisement  by  arbitra- 
tors shall  not  determine  the  validity  of  the  policy,  the  company's 
liability  nor  any  question  but  the  amount  of  the  loss,  an  agree- 
ment for  submission  to  appraisal  under  such  policy  by  the  com- 
pany's adjuster  appointing  appraisers,  but  stipulating  that  no 
other  question  shall  thereby  be  affected  is  no  waiver  of  a  for- 
feiture of  the  policy. 

Queen  Ins.  Co.  v.  Young:,  86  Ala.  424;  5  Southern  R.  116; 
Johnson  v.  American  F.  Ins.  Co.,  41  Minn.,  396;  43  N.  W.  R.  69. 

When  after  disagreement  with  the  insured  the  company  de- 
mands an  appraisal  to  which  both  parties  agree,  this  waives  the 
provision  of  the  policy  requiring  proofs  of  loss. 

Ross  v.  Phenix  Ins.  Co.   (Kans.  S.  C.),  114  Pac.  R.  1054. 

An  award  of  appraisers  appointed  under  a  provision  of 
the  policy,  nullifies  the  twelve  months  limitation  clause  of  the 
policy  in  which  the  insured  must  institute  suit. 

Fellman  v.  Royal  Ins.  Co.    (U.   S.   C.  C.  A.),   184  Fed.   577. 

Waiver  of  Assured's  Sale  of  Salvage. 

The  insured"s  breach  of  policy  in  selling  salvage  was 
waived  by  a  subsequent  demand  of  the  company  for  arbitration 
and  appraisal  of  the  loss. 

St.    Paul   F.    &    M.    Ins.    Co.    v.    Kirkpatrick    (Tenn.    S.    C.)(    164 
S.  W.   1186. 


APPRAISAL — ARBITRATION — AWARD.  133 

A  demand  for  appraisal  65  days  after  receipt  of  proofs  of 
loss,  and  72  days  after  the  fire  under  N,.  Y.  standard  policy 
is  too  late.  The  company  has  only  a  reasonable  period  de- 
pending on  the  facts  in  the  case  in  which  to  demand  an 
appraisal. 

Langsner  v.  German  Alliance  Ins.  Co.,  123  N.  T.   Supp.  144. 

The  loss  being  due  sixty  days  after  proofs  are  furnished 
the  company,  its  demand  for  any  appraisal  made  fifty-nine 
days  thereafter  is  too  late,  the  demand  must  be  made  early 
enough  to  permit  arbitration  to  be  had  before  the  expiration 
of  the  time. 

Firemen's  Fund  Ins.  Co.  v.  Caye  (Ky.  S.  C.),  14  Ky.  L.  R.   810. 

The  policy  stipulating  that  insured  shall  have  sixty  days 
after  fire  in  which  to  deliver  proofs,  and  that  the  loss  shall 
not  be  payable  until  sixty  days  after  such  delivery  of  proofs, 
including  an  award  by  appraisers,  where  an  appraisal  has  been 
required,  the  company  has  the  right  at  any  time  within  sixty 
days  after  proofs  are  delivered  to  demand  an  appraisal. 

North  B.  &  M.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Robinett   (Va.  S.  C.  A.),  72  S.  E.   668. 

Competent  and  Disinterested  Appraiser. 

As  a  "competent  and  disinterested  appraiser,"  the  fact 
that  the  appraiser  (a  public  insurance  adjuster)  one  who  had 
acted  in  that  capacity  for  other  persons  on  similar  occasions 
does  not,  as  a  matter  of  law,  render  him  incompetent  or 
interested;  but  that  question  is  one  of  fact  for  the  jury. 

Meyerson  v.  Hartford  F.  Ins.  Co.,  39  N.  Y.  Supp.  329;  17  Misc'l  121. 

Law  Requiring  Appraiser  to  Be  Resident  of  State  Is  Valid. 

The  Minnesota  laws  which  provide  that  referees  appointed 
to  adjust  fire  losses  under  the  Minnesota  standard  policy  must 
be  residents  of  that  state  is  mandatory,  and  a  failure  to  comply 
therewith  renders  the  award  void. 

Schoenich  v.  American  Ins.   Co.    (Minn.);   124   N.   W.   5. 

Mortgagor — Mortgagee. 

Where  policy  is  payable  to  mortgagee  as  his  interest  may 
appear,  notice  to  or  consent  of  such  mortgagee  of  the  appraise- 
ment is  not  necessary  to  its  validity. 

Chandos  v.   Amer.    Fire  Ins.   Co.    (Wis.   S.  C.,   January,   1893),   22 

Ins.   L.  J.  425; 
Collinsville  Savings  Bank  v.  Boston  Ins.   Co.   (S.  C.  of  E.  Conn.), 

34  Ins.  L.  J.  1031;  60  Atl.  Rep.  647. 


134  HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 

Mortgagee,  to  whom  a  policy  is  payable,  it  not  concluded 
by  an  appraisal  between  the  owner  and  insurance  company. 

Bergman  v.  Com'l  Ins.  Co.  et  al.    (Ky.  C.  A.),  13  Ky.  Law  Rep. 

720;  21  Ins.  L.  J.  271; 
Georgia  Home  Ins.  Co.  v.  Stein  et  al.   (Miss.  S.  C.),  18  Southern 

Rep.  414; 
Morris  v.  German  Am.  Ins.  Co.   (Ky.  Sup.  C.),  14  Ky.  L.  R.  859. 

Where  a  mortgage  clause  is  attached  to  the  policy  and 
provides  that  the  insurance  as  to  the  interest  of  the  mortgagee 
or  trustee,  should  not  be  invalidated  by  any  act  or  neglect  of 
the  owner,  the  trustee  is  not  bound  by  an  agreement  between 
the  owner  and  the  company  as  to  the  amount  of  the  loss.  The 
effect  of  attaching  the  mortgage  clause  to  the  policy  was  to 
effect  a  new  and  separate  contract  with  the  mortgagee,  and 
to  effect  a  separate  insurance  of  the  interest  of  the  mortgagee 
dependent  for  its  validity  solely  upon  the  course  of  action  of 
the  company  and  the  mortgagee,  unaffected  by  any  act  or 
,  neglect  of  the  mortgagor  of  which  the  mortgagee  is  ignorant. 
Scottish  U.  &  N.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Field,  18  Colo.  App.  68;  70  Pacif.  149. 

Under  a  policy  which  was  made  payable  to  a  mortgagee 
"as  their  mortgage  interest  may  appear,"  where  the  policy 
provided  "if  with  the  consent  of  the  company  an  interest  under 
this  policy  shall  exist  in  favor  of  a  mortgagee  or  of  any  person 
or  corporation  having  an  interest  in  the  subject  of  insurance 
other  than  the  interest  of  the  insured  as  described  herein,  the 
conditions  hereinbefore  contained  shall  apply  in  the  manner 
expressed  in  such  provisions  and  conditions  of  insurance  relat- 
ing to  such  interest  as  shall  be  written  upon,  attached  or 
appended  hereto."  The  mortgagee  is  not  entitled  to  participate 
in  the  adjustment  nor  to  question  the  validity  of  an  award  of 
appraisers  to  whom  the  insured  apd  the  company  have  sub- 
mitted the  amount  of  the  loss. 

Collinsville  S.  S.  v.  Boston  Ins.  Co.,  77  Conn.  676;  60  Atl.  647. 

The  fact  that  the  mortgagee  does  not  comply  with  the 
requirements  of  the  policy  after  the  fire,  such  as  the  furnishing 
of  proofs  of  loss,  or  his  failure  or  refusal  to  submit  the  loss 
to  appraisal  will  not  avoid  the  policy  in  so  far  as  the  mortgage 
or  trustee  is  concerned,  if  the  standard  mortgage  clause  be 
attached  to  the  policy. 

Gillespie  v.  Scottish  Union  &  N.  Ins.  Co.  61  W.  Va.  169;  56  S.  E. 

213,  36  Ins.  L.  J.  300   (annotated  in   11  L.  R.  A.    [N.   S.]   143); 
Bacot  v.  Phoenix  Ins.  Co.,  96  Miss.  223;  50  So.  729,  39  Ins.  L.  J. 

214,  (annotated  in  25  L.  R.  A.  [N.  S.]  1226); 
Franklin  F.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Martin,  40  N.  J.  L.  575; 
Kupferschmidt  v.  Agricultural   Ins.    Co.,   80   N.   J.   L.  441,   78  Atl. 

225,   (annotated  in  34  L.  R.  A.   [N.  S.]  503); 
Stanley  v.  Royal  Exch.  Assur.  Co.    (Kans.  S.  C.),  145  Pac.  563. 


APPRAISAL — ARBITRATION — AWARD.  135 

Nor  can  the  assured  bind  the  mortgagee  or  trustee  under 
a  mortgage  clause,  by  a  settlement  with  the  company  or  by  an 
award  of  appraisers. 

Hartford  F.  Ins.  Co.   v.   Alcott,   97  111.   439    (citing  and  approving 
Hastings   v.    Westchester   F.    Ins.    Co.),    73    N.    Y.    141,    7    Ins. 
IM  J.  430. 
Massachusetts  and  Ohio  hold  that  such  mortgagee  is  bound 

to  furnish  notice,  and  proofs  and  submit  loss  to  arbitration  if 
the  assured  fails  to  do  so. 

Union  Inst.   Co.  v.  Phoenix  Ins.  Co.,   196  Mass.   230,   81  N.  B.   994 

(annotated  in  14  L.  R.  A.    [N.  S.]    459)  ; 
Erie   Brewing  Co.   v.    Ohio  F.    Ins.    Co.,   81   Ohio   St.    1;    89   N.  E. 

1065,   39  Ins.   L.  J.   200    (annotated  in  25  L,.   R.  A.    [N.    S.]   740, 

-nd  in  18  Am.  &  Eng.  Anno.  Cas.  265). 

The  safest  and  surest  way  is  to  have  the  submission  to 
appraisal  agreed  to  by  both  the  owner  or  mortgagor  and  the 
mortgagee. 

The  ordinary  clause,  "Loss  if  any  payable  to  mortgagee,  as 
his  interest  may  appear"  seems  to  have  no  such  contingencies, 
as  under  such  circumstances  the  party  to  whom  the  loss  is 
payable  has  only  the  right  to  have  whatever  may  be  found  to 
be  due  the  assured  payable  to  him  as  his  interest  may  appear. 
But  even  in  such  cases  it  is  better  to  have  both  parties  agree 
to  the  adjustment,  or  submission  to  appraisal. 

While  it  is  held  in  New  Jersey  that  the  mortgagee  or 
trustee  to  whom  the  loss  is  payable  under  a  mortgage  clause 
is  not  bound  to  furnish  proofs,  nor  required  to  submit  to  ap- 
praisal of  the  loss,  the  Illinois  case  does  not  go  so  far,  it 
merely  holds  no  act  of  the  owner  or  mortgagee  may  diminish 
his  claim,  such  as  effecting  other  insurance,  or  adjusting  the 
loss  by  agreement  or  by  appraisal.  (The  Author.) 


136  HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 


CHAPTER  XIV. 

WHAT  IS  NOT  OTHER  CONTRIBUTING 
INSURANCE. 

"This  company  shall  not  be  liable  under  this  policy  for  a  greater 
proportion  of  any  loss  on  the  described  property  *  *  * 
than  the  amount  hereby  insured  shall  bear  to  the  whole 
insurance,  whether  valid  or  not,  or  by  solvent  or  insolvent 
insurers." — (N.  Y.  Standard  Policy.) 

As  to  the  term  valid  or  not,  see  Deitch,  Standard  Fire 
Policy,  p.  92,  in  which  he  cites  Parks  v.  Ins.  Co.,  100  Mo. 
373  and  Phenix  Ins.  Co.  v.  Lamar,  106  Ind.  513,  to  show  that 
absolutely  void  insurance  can  not  be  made  to  contribute, 
thereby  reducing  the  assured's  claim. 

If  a  company  fails  and  is  placed  in  the  hands  of  a  receiver, 
that  very  act  cancels  all  outstanding  policies,  and  the  holders 
of  such  policies  only  have  a  claim  for  the  unearned  premium, 
but  not  for  any  loss  that  may  occur  subsequent  to  the  appoint- 
ment of  such  receiver. 

Doane  v.  Milville  Mut.  M.  and  P.  Ins.  Co.   (N.  J.  Ch.  C.),  11  Atl. 

Rep.  739;  1  Ins.  Digest  27; 
Taylor  v.    Ins.    Co.    et   al.    (Minn.    S.   C.),   48   N.    W.   Rep.  772;    20 

Ins.  L.  J.  562; 

Reliance  Lumber  Co.  v.  Brown  (Ind.  S.  C.),  30  N.  E.  Rep.  625; 
In  re.  Commercial  Ins.  Co.   (R.  I.  S.  C.),  36  Atl.  Rep.  930;  10  Ins. 

Digest  368; 
Davis  v.   Shearer  et  al.    (Wis.   S.  C.),   62  N.  W.   Rep.  1050;   8  Ins. 

Digest  92; 
Boston   and  Albany   R.    R.    Co.    et   al.    v.    Merc.    Trust   Co.    et   al. 

(Md.  C.  A.),  34  Atl.  Rep.  778;  9  Ins.  Digest  305; 
See  also  Joyce  on  Ins.,  Sec.  1454; 
Michel,   Secty.   of  State  v.   Southern  Ins.   Co.,   128  La.   562,   54   So. 

1010  annotated  in  24  Am.  &  Eng.  Anno.  Cas.  810; 
Gleason  v.  Prudential  F.  Ins.  Co.   (Tenn.),  151  S.  W.  1030. 
Contra: 
Fink  v.  National  M.  P.  Ins.  Co.,  90  S.  C.  544,  74  S.  E.  33. 

As  a  natural  consequence,  therefore,  if  the  policy  is  can- 
celed, it  ceases  to  be  other  insurance,  and  the  assured  is  not 
liable  legally  to  have  such  canceled  insurance  brought  in  for 
contribution,  thereby  reducing  his  claim  against  the  solvent 
insurance  held  by  him,  and  this  is  so  whether  such  cancellation 
is  by  agreement  between  the  parties  or  by  operation  of  law. 

To  require  contribution  from  another  policy  it  must  have 
been  on  the  same  interest,  in  the  same  property,  or  some  part 
thereof. 

137 


138  HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 

Lowell  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Safeguard  F.  Ins.  Co.,  88  N.  Y.  591; 
Sunderlin  v.  Aetna  Ins.  Co.   (N.  Y.),   18  Hun.   522; 
Cannon  v.  Home  Ins.  Co.    (La.  S.  C.),  26  Ins.  L.  J.  737. 

If  an  equitable  owner  insure  the  property,  his  policy  is  not 
affected  by  a  subsequent  insurance  by  an  adverse  claimant  of 
the  title. 

Acer  v.  Merchants  Ins.  Co.    (N.  Y.),  57  Barb.  68. 

Where  two  policies  cover  separate  and  distinct  interests, 
that  of  the  mortgagee  and  that  of  the  owner,  it  is  not  other  in- 
surance within  the  meaning  of  the  clause. 

Hastings  v.  Westchester  P.  Ins.  Co.,  73  N.  Y.   141; 
Cannon  v.  Home  Ins.  Co.    (La.  S.   C.),  26  Ins.  L.  J.   737; 
Connecticut   F.   Ins.   Co.   v.  Merchants   and   Mech's   Ins.    Co.    (Va. 
S.  C.  A.),  15  Ins.  L.  J.  615. 


CHAPTER  XV. 

APPORTIONMENT  OF  NON-CONCURRENT 

INSURANCE— VARIOUS  RULES  AND 

EXAMPLES— CONTRIBUTION. 

READING  RULE  IN  FORCE  IN  MASSACHUSETTS  AND 
VERMONT. 

Specific  insurance  for  $2,250  covered  as  follows:  $825  on 
Item  A;  $987.50  on  Item  B;  $437.50  on  Item  C.  In  addition, 
there  was  insurance  for  $12,700  covering  blanket  on  all  the 
items.  The  loss  on  the  respective  items  was  total  as  follows: 
Item  A,  $3,491.48;  Item  B,  $6,230.37;  Item  C,  $2,014.70.  Held, 
That  the  blanket  policies  should  be  made  to  cover  specifically 
on  each  item  in  the  proportion  that  the  value  of  each  bears  to 
the  aggregate  value  of  all  the  items;  that  Item  A  was  29.748 
per  cent,  of  the  whole  value;  Item  B  53.085  per  cent,  and  Item 
C  17.166  per  cent;  it  necessarily  followed  that  these  percentages 
of  the  blanket  insurance  attached  respectively  to  the  several 
items,  hence,  the  following  apportionment: 

Item  A  Item  B  Item  C 

Insures      Pays      Insures      Pays      Insures      Pays 

Specific  Insurance  $    825.00  6    625.77  $    987.50  $    796.00  $    437.50  $    336.73 

Blanket   Insurance  3,778.09     2,865.71     6,741.82     5,434.37     2,180.09     1,677.97 

$4,603.09  $3,491.48  $7,729.32  $6,230.37  $2,617.59  $2,014.70 

Chandler  v.  Ins.  Co.  of  N.  A.  (Vt.  S.  C.),  28  Ins.  L.  J.  1028; 

Blake  v.   Exchange  M.   Ins.   Co.,   12  Gray    (Mass.)   265,   4  Bennett 

306; 
Taber  V.   Continental  Ins.    Co.,   213   Mass.   487,   100  N.   E.   636. 

CROMIE  RULE. 

The  blanket  policy  must  first  pay  the  loss  on  items  not 
covered  by  the  specific  policy  and  the  unexhausted  amount  will 
contribute  with  the  specific  policy  in  paying  the  loss  on  the 
items  covered  by  both  policies. 

Anglerodt  v.  Delaware  M.  Ins.  Co.,  31  Mo.  593,  4  Bennett  589; 
Meigs  v.  London  Assur.  Corp.  126  Fed.  781,  33  Ins.  L.  J.  251 ; 
Cromie  v.  Ky.  L.  M.  Ins.  Co..  15  B.  Monroe   (Ky.)   432,  3  Bennett 
785. 

CONNECTICUT  AND  NEW  JERSEY  RULE. 

One  set  of  policies  covered  blanket  on  building,  machinery 
and  stock;  one  set  covered  a  specific  amount  on  each  item. 

It  is  conceded  assured  must  be  paid  his  loss.     Any  method 

139 


140  HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 

of  apportionment  which  in  a  given  case  fails  to  afford  him  the 
full  measure  of  his  just  indemnity,  must  give  place  to  another 
that  will. 

The  court  rejected  the  rule  making  the  blanket  policies 
cover  specifically  on  each  item  in  the  proportion  as  the  value 
of  each  bore  to  the  aggregate  value  of  all,  also  making  them 
specific  on  each  in  proportion  as  the  loss  on  each  bears  to  the 
loss  on  all.  It  also  rejected  the  rule  proposed  by  the  specific 
insurance,  that  the  blanket  insurance  be  made  to  contribute  for 
the  full  amount  of  the  blanket  policy  on  each  item  with  the 
specific  insurance,  and  held  that  the  blanket  insurance  should 
pro  rate  with  the  specific  insurance  on  the  item  of  greatest 
loss,  the  unexhausted  amount  with  the  specific  insurance  on  the 
item  of  next  greatest  loss  and  so  on  with  each  item,  where  this 
produces  substantial  equity  to  all  parties.  But  no  rule  of 
unvarying  application  can  be  made. 

Schmaelze  v.   London  and  Lancashire   P.   Ins.    Co.,    75   Conn.   397, 

53  Atl.   853,    33  Ins.   L.  J.   632; 
Grollimund  v.  Germania  F.  Ins.  Co.,  82  N.  J.  L.  618,  83  Atl.  1108. 

PAGE  RULE. 

Company  A  insures  $10,000  specific  on  lumber  on  Block  No. 
1.  Company  B  insures  $40,000  blanket  on  lumber  on  Blocks 
Nos.  1  and  2.  If  fire  destroys  lumber  on  Block  1,  doing  no 
damage  to  lumber  on  Block  2,  Company  A  will  pay  one-fifth 
the  loss  and  Company  B  four-fifths. 

Page  v.   Sun  Ins.   Office    (U.   S.  C.   C.  A.,   8th  Dist),   20  C.   C.  A. 

397;  25  Ins.   L.   J.  865; 
Liverpool  &  L.   &  G.   Ins.  Co.  v.   Delta,   etc.    (Tex.   C.   C.   A.),   121 

S.  W.   599; 
Scottish   Union   &   N.   Ins.    Co.  v.   Moore    (Okla.),   43  Pac.   12. 

MEIGS  OR  CROMIE  RULE. 

Class  A  companies  insured  $130,000  on  main  buildings  and 
$50,000  on  contents,  permission  granted  to  make  additions, 
alterations  and  repairs,  and  this  insurance  to  cover  on  and  in 
same,  and  for  other  insurance.  Class  B  companies  insured 
$60,000  on  wing  addition  built  subsequent  to  date  of  Class  A 
policies,  and  $7,500  on  contents  thereof,  and  permitted  other 
insurance. 

Both  the  plaintiff  and  agent  for  Class  B  companies  treated 
the  insurance  on  the  wing  or  addition  as  specific  insurance  and 
supposed  the  Class  A  companies  did  not  cover  the  wing.  The 
agent  of  Class  A  companies  informed  plaintiff  no  endorsement 
was  necessary,  as  his  policies  granted  privilege  to  make  addi- 
tions and  to  take  out  other  insurance. 


APPORTIONMENT  OF  NON-CURRENT;  RULES.  141 

After  the  completion  of  the  wing  or  addition  a  fire  occurred 
which  damaged  the  property  as  follows:  East  wing  (addition), 
$26,668.50;  contents  thereof  (including  $4,500  on  students'  cloth- 
ing), $13,250;  main  building,  $1,815.65;  contents  of  main  build- 
ing, $2,332.30. 

Held,  Loss  should  be  apportioned  as  follows:  Class  A  com- 
panies first  pay  $1,815.65  on  main  building,  leaving  a  balance  of 
$218,184.35;  and  $2,332.30  on  contents  of  main  building,  leaving 
a  balance  on  contents  of  $47,667.70.  Class  B  companies  must 
pay  the  loss  of  $4,500  on  students'  clothing,  as  those  articles  are 
not  covered  under  Class  A,  hence  following  apportionment  of 
balance  of  loss: 

Addition  Contents  of    Addition. 

Insures                  Pays  Insures                     Pays 

Class    A $128,184.35            $19,527.94  $47,667.70                 $8,231.93 

Class    B 60.000.00               9,140.56  3,000.00                     518.07 

Double  insurance  is,  or  ought  to  be,  wherever  there  are 
two  separate  insurers,  liable  for  the  same  loss.  The  fact  that 
one  policy  covers  more  property  than  the  other  does  not  pre- 
vent the  insurance  being  double  on  the  subjects  covered  by 
both. 

Meigs  v.  London  Assur.  Co.   (U.   S.   C.  C.  Eastern  Dist.  Pa.),  32 
Ins.  L.  J.   251. 

» 

The  doctrine  laid  down  by  U.  S.  C.  C.,  Eastern  Dist.  Pa., 
in  the  case  of  Meigs  v.  London  Assur.,  32  Ins.  L.  J.,  251,  i.  e., 
that  Class  A  Companies  covered  the  addition  is  borne  out  by 
N.  Y.  C.  A.  in  Arlington  v.  Colonial  Assur.  Co.,  180  N.  Y. 
337;  73  N.  E.  Rep.  34. 

PENNSYLVANIA  NOT  IN  ACCORD  WITH  FEDERAL 
COURT  ON  MEIGS  RULE. 

Pennsylvania  S.  C.  held  that  Class  A  policies  did  not  cover 
the  property  covered  by  Class  B  policies. 
Meigs  v.  Ins.  Co.,  206  Pa.  378. 

MARYLAND. 

Where  a  warehouseman  takes  out  insurance  on  goods  his 
own,  held  in  trust,  or  in  which  he  has  an  interest,  the  words 
held  in  trust  will  also  cover  those  goods  with  which  he  is 
entrusted  in  the  ordinary  sense  of  the  word  and  not  those  goods 
only  that  are  held  in  trust  in  a  strict  technical  sense.  And 
where  the  owner  of  a  part  of  these  goods  stored  with  the  ware- 
houseman from  whom  he  has  borrowed  money  on  them,  takes 


142  HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 

out  insurance  on  those  specific  goods,  the  policies  being  made 
payable  to  the  warehouseman  in  case  of  loss,  such  insurance 
will  inure  to  the  benefit  of  the  warehouseman.  They  will  be 
considered  as  in  favor  of  the  same  assured,  on  the  same  inter- 
est, in  the  same  subject,  and  against  the  same  risks  as  the 
insurance  issued  directly  to  the  warehouseman;  and  with  the 
latter  policies  constitute  a  double  or  other  insurance;  and  both 
sets  of  policies  will  contribute  their  respective  proportions  of 
the  loss. 

Hough  v.   Peoples  F.  Ins.  Co.,  36  Md.  398,   2  Ins.   L..  J.  353; 
Home    Ins.    Co.    v.    Baltimore    W.    Ho.    Co.,    93    U.    S.    527,    6    Ins. 
L.  J.   39. 

NEW  YORK. 

The  Reading  rule  is  adopted  in  modified  form.  That  is, 
where  the  insurance  exceeds  the  value,  it  is  held  the  Reading 
rule  works  entire  equity  between  the  insurers.  That  rule  is 
where  several  parcels  of  property  are  insured  together  (blanket) 
under  one  policy  for  one  entire  sum,  and  one  or  each  one  of 
these  parcels  is  specifically  or  separately  insured  by  one  or  more 
policies,  the  sum  insured  by  the  more  general  or  blanket  policy 
is  to  be  distributed  among  the  several  parcels  in  the  proportion 
that  the  value  of  each  parcel  of  property  bears  to  the  aggre- 
gate value  of  all  the  parcels  of  property.  But  where  there  is 
no  over  insurance  and  where  the  loss  exceeds  the  aggregate 
insurance,  there  is  no  occasion  for  any  apportionment. 

Ogden  v.  East  River  Ins.  Co.,  50  N.  T.  388,  5  Bennett  439,  2  Ins. 
L.  J.  134; 

The  New  York  Supreme  Court  (which  is  not  a  court  of  last 
resort),  citing  the  Ogden  v.  East  River  Ins.  Co.  as  its  authority, 
applied  the  Finn  rule  of  apportionment,  which  was  applied  by 
the  arbitration  committee  of  the  New  York  Board  of  Fire 
Underwriters  in  the  instant  case  (which  merely  shows  how 
lawyers  and  courts  become  confused  in  applying  these  intricate 
rules,  and  there  is  no  wonder  when  so  few  insurance  men,  who 
are  supposed  to  understand  them,  cannot  agree  on  a  method, 
and  not  all  of  them  even  understand  the  application  of  a  rule 
when  it  is  explained  to  them). 

Meyer  v.  American  Ins.  Co.,  4  N.  T.  Supp.  617a;  appeal  dismissed, 
23  N.  T.  Supp.  71,  18  Ins.   L.  J.  166. 

When  There  Is  No  Occasion  for  Apportionment 

To  make  this  question  perfectly  clear,  we  will  say  there  arc 
five  parcels  of  property,  which  we  will  designate  A,  B,  C,  D, 


APPORTIONMENT  OF  NON-CURRENT;   RULES.  143 

and  E.  One  set  of  policies  is  divided  into  two  items.  Item 
No.  1  covers  a  specific  amount  on  parcel  A.  Item  No.  2  covers 
a  specific  amount  on  parcel  B.  Another  set  of  policies  cover 
a  specific  amount  under  item  No.  1  on  parcel  C,  a  specific 
amount  under  item  No.  2  on  parcel  D.  Another  set  of  -policies 
is  divided  into  three  items,  covering  a  specific  amount  each 
on  parcels  D  and  E.  Another  set  of  policies  cover  blanket 
on  parcels  A,  B  and  C,  another  set  of  policies  cover  blanket  on 
all  of  the  parcels  A,  B,  C,  D  and  E. 

Under  such  conditions  if  the  loss  on  all  the  parcels  exceeds 
the  aggregate  specific  insurance  on  each  and  all,  and  in  addi- 
tion the  blanket  insurance,  there  is  in  the  absence  of  any  co- 
insurance or  average  clause,  no  occasion  for  an  apportionment, 
the  loss  will  be  total  under  all  of  the  policies,  whether  blanket 
or  specific,  according  to  most  of  the  decisions. 

Ogden  v.   East  R.   Ins.   Co.,   60   N.  Y.   388;   6   Bennett   439;   2  Ins. 

L.  J.  134; 

Niagara  F.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Heenan,  81  111.  App.  678; 
American  C.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Heath,  29   Tex.  C.  A.  445;  69  S.  W.  235; 
Royal  Ins.  Co.  v.  Roedel,  78  Penn.  19;  4  Ins.   L.  J.  840; 
Baltimore  F.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Loney,  20  Md.  20;  4  Bennett  646; 
Hough  v.  Peoples  F.  Ins.  Co.,  36  Md.  398;  2  Ins.  L.  J.  353; 
LeSuer,  etc.  v.  Mutual  F.  Ins.  Co.,  101  Iowa  514;  70  N.  W.  761; 
Anglerodt  v.  Delaware  Ins.  Co.,  31  Mo.  593;  4  Bennett  589; 
Cromie  v.  Ky.  &  L.  M.  Ins.  Co.,  15  B.  Monroe  (Ky.)   432  ;  3  Bennett 

785; 
Page  v.    Sun   Ins.    Office,    20  C.    C.   A.    397;    36   U.    S.  Ap.   672;    25 

Ins.  L.  J.  865;  74  Fed.  203; 
Liverpool  &  L.   &  G.  Ins.   Co.   v.  Delta,  etc.    (Tex.   C.  C.  A.),   121 

S  W.  599; 

Scottish  U.  &  N.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Moore  (Okla.),  43  Pac.  12; 
Meigs  v.  London  Assur.  Corp.,  126  Fed.  781 ;  33  Ins.  L.  J.  251. 

Apportionment  Under  Co-Insurance  Clause. 
Where  the  policy  is  subject  to  the  co-insurance  clause  (or 
same  thing,  the  reduced  rate  agreement),  which  provides  a 
different  method  of  apportionment  if  the  insurance  be  less  than 
the  amount  required  under  such  agreement  (the  full,  or  100 
per  cent,  clause,  requires  the  assured  to  carry  insurance  equal 
to  or  exceeding  the  full  value  of  the  property.  The  90  per  cent, 
clause  requiring  the  insurance  to  equal  or  exceed  90)  per  cent, 
of  the  value  of  the  property,  the  80  per  cent,  clause  requiring 
the  insurance  to  equal  or  exceed  80  per  cent,  of  the  value  of 
the  property,  and  so  on,  down  to  the  50  per  cent,  clause),  then 
such  policy  will  pay  the  loss  in  accordance  with  the  provision 
of  such  co-insurance  without  regard  to  the  amount  apportioned 
to  the  other  policies.  And  if  the  other  policies  are  not  subject 
to  the  co-insurance  clause  or  reduced  rate  agreement,  they  will 
pay  the  loss  in  the  proportion  that  the  amount  of  insurance 
thereunder  bears  to  the  aggregate  amount  of  all  the  insurance 


144  HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 

without  reference  to  the  co-insurance  clause.  The  amount  of 
loss  which  the  assured  bears  under  one  policy  by  reason  of 
the  operation  of  the  co-insurance  clause  or  reduced  rate  agree~ 
ment,  cannot  be  added  to  the  liability  of  the  company  which 
has  no  such  clause  or  agreement  in  its  policy. 

Farmers,  etc.  v.   Scottish  U.   &  N.   Ins.  Co.,  173  N.  T.   241;  66  N. 

E.   1106; 
Kansas  City,  etc.  v.  American  F.   Ins.  Co.,   100  Mo.  App.   691;  76 

S.   W.    186; 
Barnes    v.    Hartford    F.    Ins.    Co.,    3    McCray    22;    9    Fed.    813;    11 

Ins.  L.  J.  110. 

Co-Insurance  Clause  or  Reduced  Rate  Agreement. 

Is  in  conflict  with  §7023,  R.  S.  Mo.  1909,  and  therefore  void. 
Alsop  v.  Continental  Ins.  Co.    (Mo.  App.),  162  S.  W.  313. 

It  is  void  for  the  same  reason  in  Kentucky  and  Mississippi* 

Sachs  v.  London  &  L.  Ins.  Co.,  113  Ky.  88;  67  S.  W.  23; 
Hartford  F.  Ins.  Co.  v.   Schlencker,  80  Miss.   667;   32  So.   155. 

It  is  held  not  to  conflict  with  the  Georgia  statute,  which 
provides  that  the  full  amount  of  the  fire  loss,  not  exceeding 
the  amount  of  the  policy,  must  be  paid  by  the  insurance  com- 
pany, any  policy  provision  to  the  contrary  notwithstanding. 

Fireman's  Fund  Ins.  Co.  v.  Pekor,  106  Ga.  1  ;  31  S.  E.   779. 

The  co-insurance  clause  or  reduced  rate  agreement  is  valid 
unless  in  conflict  with  the  statutes. 

Peoria  F.  &  M.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Wilson,  5  Minn.  3;  4  Bennett  497; 
Pennsylvania  F.   Ins.   Co.   v.  Moore,   21   Tex.    C.  A.  528;   51  S.  W. 

878; 

Armour  v.   Reading  F.  Ins.  Co.,   67  Mo.  App.   215; 
Chesebroug-h  v.    Home   Ins.   Co.,   61  Mich.    333;   28    N.    W.    110;   IS 

Ins.  L.  J.  515; 

Quinn  v.  Fire  Asset.,  180  Mass.   560;  62  N.  E.  980; 
Barnes  v.  Hartford  F.  Ins.  Co.,  9  Fed.  813;  11  Ins.  L.  J.  110. 

The  Average  or  Distribution  Clause. 

The  following  clause  was  held  to  apply  at  the  time  the 
policy  was  issued,  but  not  at  the  time  of  the  loss,  which  oc- 
curred some  time  after  the  issuance  of  the  policy.  But,  the 
court  added,  the  insurance  company  could  have  made  it  to 
apply  at  the  time  of  the  fire  had  it  chosen  so  to  write  it.  The 
form  on  which  the  decision  was  based  is  as  follows: 

"It  is  hereby  agreed  that  in  case  of  loss  this  policy  shall 
attach  in  or  on  each  building  or  division  in  such  proportion 
as  the  value  in  or  on  each  building  or  division  bears  to  the 
aggregate  of  the  subjects  insured." 

Scottish  U.  &  N.  Ins.   Co.  v.  Moore  (Okla.),   143  Pac.   12. 


APPORTIONMENT  OF  NON-CURRENT;  RULES.  145 

It  was  held  otherwise  as  to  almost  identically  the  same 
clause  in  Missouri  and  Iowa,  where  it  seems  it  does  not  conflict 
with  the  statute  law  prohibiting  the  use  of  the  co-insurance  or 
other  clause  providing  for  the  payment  of  a  sum  less  than  the 

loss. 

U.   S.  Cooperage  Co.  v.  Fireman's  Fund  Ins.   Co.    (Mo.  App.),   174 

S.  W.  193; 
Dahms  v.   German  F.  Ins.  Co.    (Iowa  S.  C.),  132  N.  W.   870. 

Three-Quarter  Clause. 

The  three-fourths  clause  is  valid. 
Coffey  v.  East  Tex.  Ins.  Co.,  61  Tex.  287. 

But  it  is  not  valid  when  in  conflict  with  the  statutes. 
Queen  v.  Jefferson  Ice  Co.,  64  Tex.  578,  15  Ins.  L.  J.  109; 
Darden  v.  L.  &  L.  &  G.  Ins.  Co.  (Miss.  S.  C.),  68  So.  485. 

FORMS     SUGGESTED     AS     COMPLYING     WITH     THE 

OKLAHOMA    COURT'S    SUGGESTIONS. 

i 

Average  Clause.  It  is  understood  and  agreed  that  this 
insurance  shall  at  the  happening  of  any  loss  cover  and  attach 
in  or  on  each  building  or  location  in  the  proportion  that  the 
value  in  or  on  each  building  or  location  shall  at  that  time  bear 
to  the  aggregate  value  of  the  property  insured  in  or  on  all  of 
within  described  buildings  or  locations.  If  this  policy  be 
divided  into  two  or  more  items,  the  foregoing  average  clause 
shall  apply  to  each  item  separately. 

Full  or  100%  Co-Insurance  Clause.  It  is  understood  and 
agreed  that  in  case  of  loss  or  damage  by  fire,  this  company 
shall  not  be  liable  for  any  greater  proportion  thereof  than  the 
amount  hereby  insured  shall  then  bear  to  50,  75,  80,  90  or  any 
other  per  cent,  of  (as  the  case  may  be  if  you  want  a  50,  75, 
80  or  90  per  cent,  clause)  the  whole  cash  value  of  the  property 
hereby  insured,  and  in  no  event  shall  this  company  be  liable 
for  a  greater  proportion  of  any  loss  on  the  described  property 
than  the  amount  hereby  insured  shall  bear  to  the  whole  in- 
surance, whether  valid  or  not,  or  by  solvent  or  insolvent  in- 
surers, covering  such  property.  If  this  policy  be  divided  into 
two  or  more  items  the  foregoing  co-insurance  clause  shall  apply 
to  each  item  separately. 

Reduced  Rate  Agreement  In  consideration  of  the  rate  ol 
premium  at  which  this  policy  is  written  it  is  expressely  stipu- 
lated and  made  a  condition  of  this  contract  that  this  company 

10 


146  HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 

shall  not  be  liable  for  a  greater  proportion  of  any  loss  than 
the  amount  hereby  insured  shall  then  bear  to  (50,  75,  80  or 
90  per  cent,  of  as  the  case  may  be)  the  whole  cash  value  of  the 
property  hereby  insured,  and  in  no  event  shall  this  company 
be  liable  for  a  greater  proportion  of  any  loss  on  the  described 
property,  than  the  amount  hereby  insured  shall  bear  to  the 
whole  insurance,  whether  valid  or  not,  or  by  solvent  or  in- 
solvent insurers,  covering  such  property.  If  this  policy  be 
divided  into  two  or  more  items  the  foregoing  reduced  rate 
agreement  shall  apply  to  each  item  separately. 

While  there  is  a  slight  difference  in  the  phraseology  there 
is  none  in  the  result  of  the  application  of  the  co-insurance  and 
the  reduced  rate  agreement.  The  assured  collects  the  same 
amount  under  each.  The  object  of  both  is  the  same,  to  force 
the  assured  to  carry  a  reasonable  amount  of  insurance.  A 
clause  not  worded  like  our  full  value  co-insurance  clause,  but 
having  the  same  effect,  is  used  in  Germany,  France  and  Eng- 
land. 

CO-INSURANCE  AND  AVERAGE  CLAUSES 

The  following  report  made  by  the  Committee  on  Fire 
Insurance  to  the  National  Association  of  Credit  Men,  and  a 
reply  thereto  by  the  author,  gives  two  views  upon  the  subject 
of  co-insurance  and  the  workings  of  co-insurance  and  average 
clauses: 
% 

"Average  Clause  in  Blanket  Insurance  Not  Recommended." 

"One  of  the  members  of  a  California  Association  has 
written  to  this  committee,  and  submitted  what  is  known  as  an 
Average  Clause,  which  is  a  rider  attached  to  a  Blanket  Insur- 
ance Policy,  whereby  stocks  and  merchandise  in  two  separate 
buildings  are  supposed  to  be  insured  jointly.  He  has  requested 
that  a  detailed  explanation  be  furnished  as  to  the  settlement 
which  would  be  effected  in  the  event  of  loss  on  either  or  both 
properties. 

"The  principal  clause  in  this  Average  Clause  rider,  reads  as 
follows: 

"'It  is  hereby  understood  and  agreed  that  in  case  of  loss 
this  policy  shall  attach  in  each  of  the  two  buildings  in  such 
proportion  as  the  value  in  each  building  bears  to  the  aggregate 
value  of  the  property  hereby  insured/ 

"This  clause  alone,  in  the  event  of  a  fire  or  total  loss  would 


APPORTIONMENT  OF  NON-CURRENT;  RULES.  147 

mean  the  loss  of  considerable  money  to  the  party  insured,  and 
we  would  explain  the  matter  in  the  following  manner: 

"The  clause  referred  to  in  this  form  is  what  is  known  as 
the  Average  Clause.  Its  chief  effect  is  to  eliminate  the  blanket 
feature  from  what  might  otherwise  be  a  blanket  form,  and 
really  transforms  a  blanket  form  into  a  specific  one. 

"The  practical  workings  of  this  Clause  are  as  follows: 
Suppose  the  insured  had  two  buildings,  A  and  B,  with  a  total 
value  therein  of  $10,000  and  total  insurance  of  $10,000.  If 
the  Values  in  building  A  and  building  B  are  equal,  namely, 
$5,000  each,  the  recovery  under  this  set  of  facts  would  be  full, 
namely,  in  a  loss  on  building  B  the  insured  would  recover 
under  the  terms  of  the  clause  5-10  or  y-2.  of  the  amount  of  in- 
surance, or  $5,000,  which  really  amounts  to  two  specific  items 
of  $5,000  each  on  the  contents  of  each  building. 

"If  the  values  were  $6,000  in  building  A  and  $4,000  in 
building  B  and  the  amount  of  insurance  equal  to  the  aggregate 
value,  the  recovery  would  still  be  in  full,  and  not  be  affected 
by  this  clause. 

"Suppose,  however,  that  the  aggregate  value  were  $15,000, 
distributed  as  follows:  Building  A,  $10,000  and  building  B, 
$5,000,  with  total  insurance  of  $10,000.  In  this  case,  in  a  total 
loss  on  building  B  the  insured  would  recover  one-third  of  the 
amount  of  insurance,  or  $3,333.33,  and  in  the  same  proportion 
on  building  A.  Without  this  clause  the  insured  would  recover 
the  full  amount  of  $5,000  in  a  loss  on  building  B,  and  could  in 
any  case  recover  the  full  amount  of  his  insurance  and  would 
only  lose  the  difference  between  the  amount  of  insurance  and 
the  aggregate  value.  Many  persons  carry  a  blanket  form  with 
this  clause  inserted,  and  labor  under  the  impression  that  they 
have  all  the  advantages  of  a  blanket  form,  whereas  in  reality 
it  is  a  specific  form.  It  can  be  also  seen  that  it  differs  radically 
from  flat  insurance. 

"We,  therefore,  feel  justified  in  stating  that  in  the  event 
of  a  total  loss,  the  insured  would  be  able  to  recover  a  far 
greater  proportion  of  his  loss  if  he  would  carry  either  co-insur- 
ance or  straight  insurance  than  he  would  be  able  to  recover 
under  the  present  conditions  with  this  Average  Clause  attached, 
and  we  hope  that  our  members  will  investigate  their  insurance, 
and  be  satisfied  that  this  clause  would  operate  against  them  in 
the  event  of  a  loss.  Yours  very  truly, 

"FIRE  INSURANCE  COMMITEE, 

•"Geo.  W.   Ryan, 

"Chairman." 


148  HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 

Chicago,  111.,  March  20,  1907, 

Editor  "Bulletin  National  Association  of  Credit  Men,"  41  Park 
Row,  New  York: 

Dear  Sir — I  notice  an  article  in  the  March  "Bulletin,"  under 
title,  "Average  Clause  in  Blanket  Insurance  Not  Recom- 
mended," and  the  statement  is  signed,  "Fire  Insurance  Com- 
mitee,  Geo.  W.  Ryan,  Chairman." 

Answering  the  statement  in  seventh  paragraph,  will  say  Mr. 
pany  will  insure  a  stock  contained  in  two  separate  and  distinct 
buildings,  without  either  the  average  clause,  or  at  least  a  90 
per  cent,  co-insurance  clause,  and  in  most  instances  they  would 
insist  on  writing  the  policy  with  either  the  average  or  full 
value  co-insurance  clause.  Otherwise,  by  issuing  a  $5,000 
policy  they  would  be  carrying  double  liability  for  one  premium. 

Answering  the  statement  in  seventh  paragraph,  will  say  Mr. 
Ryan  is  right  in  his  statement,  that  with  value  in  building  A 
$10,000.  Value  in  building  B  $5,000.  Insurance  $10,000,  blanket 
policy  covering  both  buildings  with  the  average  clause,  the 
policy  would  pay  $3,333.33  in  case  building  B's  contents  were 
totally  destroyed. 

If  any  company  were  foolish  enough  to  write  a  blanket 
policy  without  an  average  clause,  but  containing  an  80  per  cent, 
co-insurance  clause,  the  assured  would  recover  the  loss  in 
proportion  as  his  insurance  of  $10,000  would  bear  to  80  per  cent, 
of  the  value,  or  $12,000,  or  10/12,  equalling  $4,166.66. 

Under  the  90  per  cent,  co-insurance  clause  he  would  re- 
cover in  proportion  as  his  insurance  would  bear  to  90  per  cent, 
of  the  value  or  100/135,  equalling  $3,703.70. 

Under  the  100  per  cent,  or  full  co-insurance  clause,  he  would 
recover  in  proportion  as  his  insurance  would  bear  to  the  full 
value,  or  10/15,  equalling  $3,333.33. 

But  suppose  with  the  same  insurance  and  same  values  the 
loss  in  building  B  was  only  $3,333.33,  and  the  value  of  the 
salvage  was  $1,666.67,  then  we  find  that  under  the  average 
clause  the  assured  would  collect  $3,333.33. 

Under  the  80  per  cent,  co-insurance  clause  he  would  collect 
$2,777.77. 

Under  the  90  per  cent,  co-insurance  clause  he  would  collect 
$2,466.67. 

Under  the  full  co-insurance  clause  he  would  collect 
$2,222.22. 


APPORTIONMENT  OF  NON-CURRENT;  RULES.  149 

Here  is  an  example  of  the  workings  of  the  90  per  cent, 
co-insurance  clause: 

Insurance  Co.  insures $10,000  Pays    $2,466.67 

Assured  co-insures    3,500  Pays    866.66 

Insurance  required  under 
90  per  cent,  clause $13,500  Pays    $3,333.33 

Suppose  that  with  what  Mr.  Ryan  calls  "flat  insurance"  (the 
term  is  new  to  me,  but  I  presume  he  means  specific  insurance), 
of  say  $5,000  in  each  building,  a  fire  should  entirely  destroy  the 
contents  of  both,  the  assured's  books  would  show  the  aggregate 
value  of  the  stock  in  both  buildings,  but  there  would  be  no 
way  of  telling  how  much  was  in  each.  Hence,  how  much  does 
the  Chicago  Insurance  Company  owe  and  how  much  does  the 
New  York  Insurance  Company  owe?  With  the  average  clause, 
both  companies'  interests  are  identical  and  both  know  they  must 
pay  a  total  loss.  Truly  yours, 

THRASHER   HALL. 

WISCONSIN   RULE. 

The  insured  is  entitled  to  full  indemnity  under  his  contract, 
and  a  rule  of  apportionment  which  fails  to  furnish  this  is  error. 

The  Insurance. 

Company  A  insured  on  live  stock  $1,500,  no  limitation. 
Company  B  insured  on  live  stock  $1,667,  being  not  to  exceed 
$500  on  any  one  animal.  Company  '  C  insured  on  live  stock 
$1,667,  no  one  animal  to  be  valued  at  more  than  $500. 

The  Loss. 

One  bull,  $2,000;  three  steers,  $336;  total  loss  $2,336. 

The  companies  first  pay  the  loss  on  the  three  steers. 

Insures  Pays 

Company  A    $1,500  $104.00 

Company   B    1,667  116.00 

Company   C    1,667  116.00 

$4,834  $336.00 

Company  A  pays  $1,345  on  bull,  Company  B  pays  $482,  and 
Company  C  $173  (in  round  numbers). 

Sherman  v.  Madison  M.  Ins.  Co..  39  Wis.  104;  6  Ins.  L.  J.  285. 


150  HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS.     •   • 

CANADIAN  (OR  ALBANY  RULE). 

The  defendant  insured  $2,000  on  building  and  $2,000  on  fur- 
niture, the  British  America  insured  $2,000  in  one  amount  cover- 
ing blanket  on  building  and  furniture.  There  was  a  partial 
loss  to  both  building  and  furniture.  The  defendant  was  held  for 
two-thirds  the  loss. 

Trustees  First  Unitarian  Church  v.  Western  Assur.  Co.,  26  Upper 
Can.  2  B.  175;  6  Bennett  94. 

FLOATING  POLICY. 

Floating  or  excess  insurance  will  not  contribute  in  the  pay- 
ment of  any  loss  on  property  until  such  property  is  brought 
within  its  protection. 

Peabody  v.  Liverpool  &  L.  &  G.  Ins.  Co.,  171  Mass.  114;  50  N.  B. 
526. 

When  a  Specific  Policy  is  Exhausted. 

A  specific  policy  is  exhausted  when  neither  the  loss  nor  the 
policy  is  paid  in  full  by  reason  of  a  co-insurance  or  other  clause 
which  may  have  the  effect  of  limiting  the  amount  to  be  paid 
under  such  policy. 

Cutting,  Ins.  Comr.  v.  Atlas  M.  Ins.  Co.  In  re.  Downs,  199  Mass. 
380;  85  N.  E.  174;  37  Ins.  L.  J.  924. 

READING  RULE. 
Value  to  Value. 

The  compound  or  blanket  policy  will  be  made  to  cover  as 
many  parcels,  groups  or  items  of  property  as  are  fixed  by 
specific  insurance,  in  the  proportion  that  the  value  of  each 
parcel,  item  or  group  of  property.  For  instance,  if  stock  be 
insured  specifically  under  policy  of  Company  A,  which  also  in- 
sures a  specific  amount  on  furniture  and  fixtures,  and  a  third 
specific  amount  on  machinery,  this  makes  three  items,  parcels 
or  groups.  Therefore,  Company  B's  policy,  which  insures  all  of 
these  items,  parcels  or  groups  under  a  single  sum,  is  called  a 
blanket  or  compound  policy.  The  Reading  rule  makes  this 
blanket  policy  cover  on  each  item  in  proportion  as  the  value  of 
each  bears  to  the  aggregate  value  of  all  three  items,  and  the 
amounts  thus  found  will  contribute  with  the  specific  insurance 
on  each  item  in  the  payment  of  the  loss  thereon. 

In  the  opinion  of  the  author  there  is  very  little  reason  in 
this  apportionment  and  it  is  an  arbitrary,  unfair  rule.  Nothing 
in  the  policy  contract  provides  for  any  such  rule  of  apportion- 
ment, and  it  is  liable  to  cause  the  assured  to  lose  heavily.  Why 


APPORTIONMENT  OF  NON-CURRENT;  RULES.  151 

blanket  insurance  should  be  made  to  cover  the  several  items 
in  a  different  method  from  what  they  would  ordinarily,  merely 
because  there  was  other  insurance  which  separated  these  blanket 
items  by  covering  them  specifically,  is  beyond  the  writer's 
knowledge.  The  Federal  Courts  and  those  of  Missouri,  Mary- 
land and  Connecticut  have  adopted  the  most  equitable  rule,  and 
the  only  one  which  seems  to  the  writer  to  be  in  accordance 
with  the  idea  that  assured  must  not  bear  any  part  of  his  loss 
so  long  as  there  is  enough  insurance  to  pay  it.  However,  it  has 
the  approval  of  the  courts  of  Massachusetts  and  Vermont. 

FINN  RULE. 

Substitute  the  word  loss  wherever  the  word  value  appears 
in  the  Reading  rule  and  you  have  this  rule,  i.  e.,  the  blanket 
policy  covers  each  item,  parcel  or  group  of  property,  in  propor- 
tion as  the  loss  on  each  group,  item  or  parcel  of  property  bears 
to  the  aggregate  loss  on  all  of  the  groups,  items  or  parcels 
of  property,  and  the  amounts  thus  found  will  pro  rate  with  the 
specific  insurance  on  each  group,  item  or  parcel.  There  will  be 
as  many  groups,  items  or  parcels  as  there  are  specific  items  in 
the  specific  policy  on  which  there  is  a  loss,  and  sometimes  one 
more,  as  where  one  policy  insures  a  specific  amount  on  stock, 
and  a  specific  amount  on  store  furniture,  and  the  blanket  or 
compound  policy  insures  both  of  these  items,  groups  or  parcels 
as  well  as  another  group  consisting  of  machinery. 

This  rule  seems  more  in  line  with  the  Page  rule,  but  differs 
from  the  Cromie  and  Missouri  rule  in  that  it  does  not  first  pay 
the  loss  on  the  items  covered  only  by  the  blanket  policy  and  the 
remainder  or  unexhausted  amount  is  not  then  made  to  pro  rate 
with  the  specific  policy  in  paying  the  loss  on  the  other  items. 
This  rule  is  the  first  rule  of  apportionment  of  the  Kinne  rule, 
which  has  been  approved  and  agreed  to  by  all  of  the  insurance 
companies  operating  west  of  the  Rocky  Mountains.  It  seems 
the  Finn  rule  is  used  in  the  New  York  Board  of  Fire  Under- 
writers. See  Meyer  v.  American  Ins.  Co.,  23  N.  Y.  Supp.  71;  18 
Ins.  L.  J.  156. 

If  the  loss  is  on  but  one  item,  group  or  parcel  of  property, 
the  Finn  rule  makes  the  entire  blanket  or  compound  policy  con- 
tribute with  the  specific  policy,  and  therein  it  conforms  to  the 
Page  rule. 

ALBANY  RULE. 

This  rule  means,  that  in  so  far  as  the  assured  is  concerned, 


152  HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 

that  in  dealing  with  each  company  all  other  insurance,  to  its 
full  amount,  must  be  treated  as  other  contributing  insurance. 
To  illustrate:  If  Company  A's  policy  covered  $1,000  on  house- 
hold furniture,  Company  B's  policy  covered  $1,000  on  house- 
hold furniture  and  wearing  apparel,  and  Company  C's  policy 
covered  $1,000  on  household  furniture,  wearing  apparel  and 
jewelry.  The  loss  being  $1,000  on  furniture,  $500  on  wearing 
apparel,  $500  on  jewelry.  Under  the  Albany  rule  there  would  be 
three  apportionments.  First,  Company  A  would  apportion  the 
loss  as  follows: 

Insures  on  Pays  on 

Furniture  Furniture 

Company  A $1,000  $333.33 

Company  B   1,000  333.33 

Company  C  1,000  333.34 


Totals    $3,000  $1,000.00 

Company  B  would  apportion  the  loss  as  follows: 

Insures  on  Pays  on 

Furniture  Furniture 

&  Wearing  &  Wearing 

Apparel  Apparel 

Company  A $1,000  $500.00 

Company  B 1,000  500.00 

Company  C  1,000  500.00 


Totals    $3,000  $1,500.00 

Company  C  would  apportion  the  loss  as  follows: 

Insures  on  Pays  on 

Jewelry  Jewelry 

Furniture  Furniture 

&  Wearing  &  Wearing 

Apparel  Apparel 

Company  A $1,000  $666.66  2/3 

Company  B  1,000  666.66  2/3 

Company  C  1,000  666.66  2/3 

Totals    $3,000  $2,000.00 

Under  this  apportionment  the  insured  would  receive  from 
Company  A,  as  per  its  apportionment,  $333.33.  From  Company 
B,  as  per  its  apportionment,  $500.  From  Company  C,  as  per  its 
apportionment,  $666.67,  or  a  total  of  $1,500  for  his  loss  of 
$2,000. 


APPORTIONMENT  OF  NON-CURRENT;  RULES.  153 

This  apportionment  may  seem  very  unfair,  but  it  is  in  accord 
with  the  New  York  standard  policy  provision,  which  reads: 
"This  company  shall  not  be  liable  under  this  policy  for  a  greater 
proportion  of  any  loss  on  the  described  property  than  the 
amount  hereby  insured  shall  bear  to  the  whole  insurance 
whether  valid  or  not,  or  by  solvent  or  insolvent  insurers."  The 
standard  policies  of  other  states  are  not  materially  different. 
The  only  construction  that  can  be  placed  on  the  language  of 
the  policy  is  that  given  it  in  the  Albany  rule.  Where  two 
separate  companies  are  liable  for  the  same  loss,  the  fact  that 
one  of  them  covers  more  property  and  in  more  locations  than 
the  other  does  not  give  it  the  right  to  have  less  than  its  policy 
pro  rate  with  the  more  specific  policy  in  paying  the  loss. 

Liverpool  &  L.   &  G.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Delta,  etc.    (Tex.  C.  C.  A.),  121 

S.  W.  599; 

Scottish  U.  &  N.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Moore  (Okla.),  143  Pac.  12; 
Page  v.  Sun  Ins.  Office,  20  C.  C.  A.  397;  36  U.  S.  App.  672;  25  Ins. 
L.  J.  865. 

Giving  a  correct  construction  to  the  language  of  the  contri- 
bution provision  of  the  policy  quoted  above,  and  applying  the 
reasoning  of  the  courts  in  the  foregoing  cases,  how  can  a  result 
be  reached  differing  with  the  Albany  rule? 

FINN  RULE. 

Applying  the  Finn  rule  to  the  loss  stated  in  the  preceding 
case  illustrating  the  Albany  rule,  we  get  the  following  result. 

Insures  on      Pays  on     Insures  on        Pays  on 
Furniture       Furniture     Wear.  Ap.     Wear.  Ap. 

Company  A $1,000.00          $   461.53 

Company  B  666.67  307.70          $333.33          $285.71 

Company  C 500.00  230.77  250.00  214.29 


Totals    $2,166.67          $1,000.00          $583.33  $500.00 

Insures  Pays  on 

Jewelry  Jewelry 

Company  C  insures  jewelry  alone  for $250.00  $250.00 

KINNE  RULE. 

Applying  the  Kinne  rule,  we  get  the  following  result: 
As  the  loss  to  loss  method  of  the  Finn  rule  does  not  pay 
but  half  the  loss  on  jewelry,  we  must  take  enough  of  Company 
C's  policy  to  pay  the  $500  loss  on  that  group,  parcel  or  item 
(i.  e.,  jewelry).     Company  B's  policy  and  the  $500  unexhausted 


154  HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 

insurance  under  Company  C's  policy  is  then  made  to  apply  on 
furniture  proportionately  as  the  loss  on  that  group  of  property, 
$1,000,  bears  to  aggregate  loss  on  that  group,  and  the  group 
consisting  of  wearing  apparel  (on  which  the  loss  is  $500),  or  a 
total  on  both  groups  of  $1,500.  The  loss  on  furniture  being 
two-thirds  of  the  whole  loss  on  furniture  and  wearing;  apparel, 
and  the  loss  on  wearing  apparel  being  one-third  of  this  whole 
loss,  two-thirds  of  Company  B's  policy,  or  $666.67,  and  of  the 
remaining  $500  under  Company  C's  policy,  or  $333.33,  covers 
furniture;  one-third  of  Company  B's  policy,  or  $333.33,  and  one- 
third  of  the  remainder  under  Company  C's  policy,  or  $166.67, 
covers  wearing  apparel,  the  loss  is,  therefore,  re-apportioned 
as  follows: 

Company  A  insures  furniture $1,000.00        Pays...$    500.00 

Company  B  insures  furniture 666.67         Pays...      333.33 

Company  C  insures  furniture 333.33         Pays...      166.67 

Company  B  insures  wearing  apparel  333.33  Pays...  333.33 
Company  C  insures  wearing  apparel  166.67  Pays...  166.67 
Company  C  insures  jewelry 500.00  Pays...  500.00 


Assured  therefore  collects $2,000.00 

CROMIE  RULE. 

Applying  the  Cromie  (Kentucky  and  Missouri)  rule,  i.  e., 
"the  more  general  policies  first  pay  the  loss  not  covered  by  the 
other  policies,  leaving  the  remainder  or  unexhausted  amount  to 
pro  rate  with  the  other  insurance  in  paying  the  balance  of  the 
loss,"  we  obtain  the  following  result: 

Company  C- first  pays  the  $500  loss  on  jewelry,  which  is 
not  insured  by  either  Company  A  or  B.  The  unexhausted 
amount  of  Company  C's  policy,  i.  e.,  $500,  pro  rates  with  Com- 
pany B's  $1,000  policy  in  paying  the  loss  of  $-3^00  on  wearing 
apparel,  Company  B  paying  two-thirds  of  the  loss,  or  $333.33, 
and  Company  C  paying  one-third,  or  $166.66.  This  leaves 
Company  B  with  $666.66  unexhausted  insurance  and  Company 
C  with  $166.66  to  pro  rate  with  Company  A's  $1,000  to  pay 
the  $1,000  loss  on  furniture,  Company  A,  therefore,  pays  $545.46, 
Company  B  pays  on  furniture  $363.63,  Company  C  pays  on 
furniture  $90.91. 

CONNECTICUT  AND  NEW  JERSEY  RULE. 

Under  the  New  Jersey  and   Connecticut  rule,  "the  blanket 


APPORTIONMENT  OF  NOX-CURRENT;  RULES.  155 

policy  pays  the  largest  loss  first,  the  second  largest  loss  next 
and  so  on  until  the  entire  loss  is  paid,  but  states  there  can  be 
no  fixed  rule  to  govern  all  cases."  Hence  the  following  appor- 
tionment: The  largest  loss  being  on  furniture,  each  policy  is 
made  to  pay  that  loss  first,  and  each  policy  being  for  $1,000  and 
the  loss  being  $1,000,  each  pays  on  that  item,  $333.33.  The  next 
step  is  for  Company  C,  with  its  $666.67  unexhausted  insurance, 
to  pay  the  $500  loss  on  jewelry,  which  neither  of  the  other  com- 
panies insure,  thus  leaving  it  with  $166.67  unexhausted  insurance 
to  pro  rate  with  Company  B's  $666.67  unexhausted  insurance  to 
pay  $500  loss  on  wearing  apparel,  not  insured  by  Company  A, 
but  which  is  insured  by  Companies  B  and  C,  hence  Company  B 
pays  on  wearing  apparel  $400  and  Company  C  $100. 

WISCONSIN  RULE. 

Under  the  Wisconsin  rule,  the  smallest  loss  is  first  paid  by 
the  more  general  or  blanket  policy;  applying  that  rule  we  get  the 
following  result:  The  smallest  loss  to  the  companies  in  the 
instant  case  would  be  wearing  apparel,  as  there  are  two  com- 
panies to  pay  it,  whereas  there  is  but  one  to  pay  the  jewelry 
loss,  the  loss  on  both  items  being  the  same,  i.  e.,  $500.  Both 
Companies  B  and  C  have  $1,000  insurance  each,  so  that  each 
pays  $250  on  wearing  apparel.  The  next  smallest  loss  being  on 
jewelry,  Company  C  pays  the  whole  $500,  that  item  not  being 
insured  by  either  of  the  other  policies. 

This  leaves  $750  unexhausted  insurance  under  Company  B's 
policy,  and  $250  unexhausted  insurance  under  Company  C's  pol- 
icy to  pro  rate  with  Company  A's  $1,000  policy  in  paying  the 
$1,000  loss  on  furniture.  So  that  company  having  half  the  insur- 
ance, pays  $500.  Company  B  having  37*/&  per  cent.,  pays  $375, 
and  Company  C  having  12^  per  cent.,  pays  $125  on  the  furni- 
ture. 

READING  RULE. 

In  order  to  apply  the  Reading  rule,  we  must  assume  values; 
we  will  therefore  assume  the  whole  value  was  $4,000,  the  value 
of  the  furniture  being  $3,000,  with  a  loss  of  $1,000,  the  value  and 
loss  being  $500  each  on  jewelry  and  wearing  apparel.  Company 
B's  liability  being  fixed  on  furniture  and  wearing  apparel  pro- 
portionate to  value,  and  Company  C's  on  those  two  items  and 
jewelry  in  the  same  manner. 


156  HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 

Furniture        Wearing  Apparel          Jewelry 
Insures          Pays      Insures      Pays      Insures      Pays 

Co.  A $1,000.00    $   383.57 

Co.  B 857.14    328.76  $142.86  $142.86 

Co.  C 750.00    287.67   125.00   125.00  $125.00  $125.00 

$2,627.14  $1,000.00  $267.86  $267.86  $125.00  $125.00 

RECAPITULATION  OF  NET  RESULTS  OF  THE  VARI- 
OUS RULES,  APPLIED  TO  THE  SAME  LOSS. 

The  Value  and  Loss. 

Value  Loss 

Household   furniture    $3,000  $1,000 

Wearing  Apparel 500  500 

Jewelry   500  500 

Totals    $4,000  $2,000 

The  Insurance 

Wearing 
Furniture  Apparel        Jewelry 

Company  A   $1,000  Nil  Nil 

Specific  on  furniture 

Company  B   $1,000  Nil 

Blanket  on  furniture  and  wearing 
apparel. 

Company  C   $1,000 

Blanket  on  furniture,  wearing  ap- 
parel and  Jewelry. 

Reading  Rule. 

Company  A  pays $   383.57 

Company  B   pays 471.62 

Company  C  pays 537.67 


Total    .  $1,392.86 


Albany  Rule. 

Company  A  pays $  333.33 

Company   B   pays 500.00 

Company  C  pays 666.67 


APPORTIONMENT  OF  NON-CURRENT;  RULES.  157 

Finn  Rule. 

Company  A  pays $   461.53 

Company   B  pays 593.41 

Company   C  pays 464.21 


Total $1,519.15 


Kinne  Rule. 

Company  A  pays $  500.00 

Company   B  pays 666.67 

Company   C  pays 833.33 


Total    $2,000.00 


Wisconsin  Rule. 

Company  A  pays $    500.00 

Company   B   pays 625.00 

Company   C  pays 875.00 


Total    $2,000.00 


New  Jersey  and  Connecticut  Rule. 

Company  A  pays $  333.33 

Company  B   pays 733.34 

Company   C   pays 933.33 


Total    $2,000.00 


Cromie,  or  Kentucky  and  Missouri  United  States  Rule. 

Company  A   pays '. $    545.46 

Company   B   pays 696.96 

Company   C  pays 757.58 


158  HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 

The  author,  as  already  stated,  is  of  the  opinion  that  if  the 
provisions  of  the  contract  are  to  be  followed,  the  Albany  rule 
should  govern.  Of  course,  this  works  a  hardship  on  the  assured, 
but  the  contract  in  each  policy  provides  that  it  shall  pay  in  pro- 
portion as  its  policy  bears  to  the  total  insurance.  The  fact  that 
some  other  policy  covers  other  property  does  not  give  the  as- 
sured the  right  to  have  that  part  lopped  off  from  contribution. 

If  the  contract  is  not  to  be  followed,  pay  your  money  and 
take  your  choice  of  any  of  the  foregoing  rules.  It  would  seem 
to  the  author  if  the  courts  and  insurance  men  depart  from  the 
contract,  then  the  thing  to  do  is  take  that  rule  which  is  the 
simplest  and  the  easiest  to  apply,  or  the  complicated  Kinne  rule. 
The  assured  will  collect  his  full  loss  under  either  as  long  as 
there  is  any  insurance  unexhausted  which  will  cover  his  loss.  It 
will  require  a  very  competent  expert  to  apply  the  Kinne  rule  in 
some  cases,  but  not  in  a  simple  case  like  that  in  the  foregoing 
example,  but  in  the  preceding  example  the  Cromie  rule  comes 
nearer  equalizing  the  amounts  paid  by  the  several  companies 
than  does  any  of  the  others. 

The  Kinne  rule  and  some  examples  of  its  workings  by  its 
author  follow: 

THE  KINNE  RULE. 
The  Principle. 

The  principle  governing  all  apportionments  of  non-concur- 
rent policies  is  that  general  and  specific  insurances  must  be 
regarded  as  co-insurances;  and  general  insurance  must  float  over 
and  contribute  to  loss  on  all  subjects  under  its  protection,  in  the 
proportions  of  the  respective  losses  thereon,  until  the  insured  is 
indemnified,  or  the  policy  exhausted. 

Steps  to  be  Taken. 

The  correct  method  of  applying  the  principle  has  been 
formulated  in  the  following: 

First — Ascertain  the  non-concurrence  of  the  various  policies 
and  classify  the  various  items  covered,  into  as  many  groups  as 
the  non-concurrence  demands,  whether  of  property,  location  or 
ownership. 

Second — Ascertain  the  loss  on  each  group  of  items  sep- 
arately. 


APPORTIONMENT  OF  NON-CURRENT;  RULES.  159 

Third — If  but  a  single  group  is  found  with  a  loss  upon  it, 
the  amount  of  all  policies  covering  the  group  contribute  pro 
rata. 

Fourth — If  more  than  one  group  has  sustained  a  loss,  and 
such  loss  on  one  or  more  groups  be  equal  to  or  greater  than  the 
totals  of  general  and  specific  insurance  thereon,  then  let  the 
whole  amount  of  such  insurances  apply  to  the  payment  of  loss 
on  such  groups. 

Apportionment. 

Fifth — If  more  than  one  group  has  sustained  a  loss,  and 
such  loss  be  more  than  the  totals  of  unexhausted  general  and 
specific  insurances  thereon,  then  apportion  the  amount  of  each 
policy  covering  on  such  groups  generally,  to  cover  specifically 
on  each  group,  in  the  same  proportion  that  the  sum  of  the 
losses  on  such  groups  bears  to  the  loss  on  each  individual  group. 

Note. — When  a  group  is  covered  by  one  or  more  general 
policies  it  would  be  well  to  see  at  once  if  an  apportionment  as 
above  on  that  group  would  equal  the  loss,  as  in  case  it  will  not, 
it  will  show,  without  further  calculation,  that  the  whole  amount 
of  loss  on  such  group  must  be  met  by  such  policies  pro  rata,  and 
the  remainder  only  apportioned.  In  such  cases,  carrying  out 
step  6  simply  accomplishes  by  a  longer  process  what  is  indi- 
cated above. 

Reapportionment. 

Sixth — If  the  loss  on  any  group  or  groups  is  then  found  to 
be  greater  than  the  sum  of  the  now  specific  insurance  is  appor- 
tioned, add  sufficient  to  such  specific  insurances  to  make  up  the 
loss  on  the  group,  taking  the  amount  of  the  deficiency  from  the 
now  specific  insurances  of  the  heretofore  general  amounts  pre- 
viously covering  the  now  deficient  groups,  which  cover  on 
groups  having  an  excess  of  insurance,  in  the  proportion  that 
their  sums  bear  to  their  individual  amounts. 

Note. — Very  rarely  are  new  deficiencies  created  by  the  re- 
apportionment,  but  if  so,  repeat  step  6. 

Seventh — Cause  the  amounts  of  all  the  now  specific  insur- 
ances to  severally  contribute  pro  rata  to  pay  the  partial  losses, 
and  it  will  be  found  that  the  whole  scheme  has  resulted  in  the 
claimant  being  fully  indemnified  in  accordance  with  the  various 
contracts  and  on  a  basis  which  preserves  the  equity  between 
the  companies  throughout. 


160  HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 

The  Argument. 

Mr.  Griswold  says  that  "it  is  only  a  question  of  how  to 
properly  apply  a  proportional  rule  to  cause  it  to  become  en- 
tirely general,"  and  in  this  connection  I  beg  attention  to  the 
following,  in  which  the  theory  of  evolution  is  plainly  evident. 

Rules. 

Reading Value  to  Value. 

Finn Loss  to  Loss — no  reapportionment. 

Albany Insurance  to  Insurance. 

Rule  IV Insurance  to  Value. 

National  Board Value  to  Value — Value  to  Insurance. 

Griswold.... Loss  to  Ins. — Loss  to  Loss — Ins.  to  Ins. 

Kinne Loss  to  Loss — Loss  to  Loss — Loss  to  Loss. 

Compound  policies  give  rise  to  three  general  classes  of 
problems,  viz.:  When  their  non-concurrency  is  Partial,  Gen- 
eral or  Mixed. 

SOME  PRACTICAL  WORKINGS  OF  THE  KINNE  RULE. 

The  following  examples,  if  thoroughly  analyzed,  will  enable 
the  adjuster  more  fully  to  understand  the  propriety  and  un- 
changing equity  of  the  rule: 

Example  1.  ' 

Example,  Page  732,  Text  Book   (Griswold). 


Groups 
School  Books  

A              B                 CD           Ins.   to  Pay. 
1)                    )                             8  000 

Other  Books  

f                   [    5,000 
>      5  000     )                            2  000 

Stationery  

5,000     ( 
3  500 

Pictures  

500 

Fancy   Goods  

2,000 

10,000        5,000  5,000          5,000       25,000      16,000 

2-16  of  $10,000  is  less  than  $2,000,  required  to  pay  loss  on 
fancy  goods,  we  have  $2,000  of  A  to  pay  loss  on  fancy  goods. 
Dividing  the  remaining  $8,000  of  A  and  the  $5,000  each  of  B  and 
C  as  stated  in  step  5,  we  have  the  following: 


APPORTIONMENT  OF  NON-CURRENT;  RULES. 


161 


Apportionment. 


Groups 
School  Books. 
Other   Books.. 
Stationery    .  .  . 
Pictures        . 

.A 
.4,671.41 
1,142.87 
2,000.00 
285  72 

2, 
1, 

B 

867.16 
714.28 
250.00 
178  56 

C 
2,962.96 
740.74 
1,296.30 

D 

6,000 

Ins. 
15,391.63 
2,697.89 
4,546.30 
464.28 

To  pay 
8,000 
2,000 
3,500 
500 

Def. 
36.72 

Fancy    Goods. 

2,000.00 

2,000.00 

2,000 

Totals     ...10,000.00     6,000.00     5,000.00     5,000     25,000.00      16,000      35.72 

The  deficiency  of  $35.72  on  pictures  is  made  up  under  step  6, 
by  taking  pro  rata  sums  from  the  now  specific  amounts  of  A 
and  B,  which  have  an  excess  of  insurance,  which  is  quickly  done* 
and  we  have  the  following: 


Reapportionment. 


Groups 
School  Books    .  . 
Other   Books    .  . 

A 

.  ..   4,558.38 
.  .  .   1,139.62 

B 

2,849.02 
712.24 
1,246.44 
192.30 

5,000.00 

2,962.96 

740.74 
1,296.30 

5,000.00 

D 

5,000.00 

5,000.00 

Ins.      To  pay 

15,370.36       8,000 
2,692.60      2,000 
4,637.04      3,600 
500.00          500 
2,000.00       2,000 
25,000.00     16,000 

Stationery 

1  994  30 

Pictures     

.    .      307.70 

Fancy   Goods    .  . 
Totals    

.   2,000.00 
...10,000.00 

Paying-     
Saving     

.  .  ,    7,098.45 
.   2,901.55 

3, 

1. 

686.60 
813.40 

3, 

1, 

112.31 
887.69 

2,602.64 
2.397.36 

16 

9 

.500.00 
.000.00 

16,000 

Example  2. 

An  actual  case  of  recent  date. 

Apportionment. 

Item  1.    Hotel 

Item   2.     Hall 

Item   3.     Addition  . . . ) 
Item  '4.    Coops f 

Item  5.     Barn / 

1,500       1,100       1,500.00       1,100.00       2,600.00     770 

A  covers  $1,000  on  Item  No.  1,  and  $500  on  Items  Nos.  2,  3, 
4  and  5;  B  covers  $1,000  on  Items  Nos.  1  and  2,  and  $100  on 
Items  Nos.  3  and  4. 


1,000.00 

666.67 

1,666.67  400 

1,000 

270.27 

333.33 

603.60  200 

) 

108.11 

66.67 

174.78   80 

500 

100 

) 

54.06 

33.33 

87.39   40 

67.56 

67.56   50 

162  HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 


CHAPTER  XVI. 

COURT  DEFINITIONS  OF  INSURANCE 
TERMS. 

"This  entire  policy,  unless  otherwise  provided  by  agreement 
hereon,  or  added  hereto,  shall  be  void  *  *  *  if  (any  usage 
or  custom  of  trade  or  manufacture  to  the  contrary  notwithstand- 
ing) there  be  kept,  used  or  allowed,  on  the  above  described 
premises,  benzine,  benzole,  dynamite,  ether,  fireworks,  gasoline, 
greek  fire,  gun  powder,  exceeding  twenty-five  pounds  in  quan- 
tity, naphtha,  nitroglycerine  or  other  explosives,  phosporus, 


"Premises"  means  the  building  insured  or  containing  the 
property  insured  and  not  the  yard  or  other  buildings  adjacent 
thereto. 

Allemannia  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.   Pittsburg  Expo.  Co.    (Pa.   S.   C.),   11 

Atl.  Rep.   572; 
Sperry  v.   Ins.  Co.  of  N.   A.    (U.   S.   C.    C.),   14  Ins.   L.   J.   141;   22 

Fed.  Rep.  516; 
Rau  v.   Westchester  F.    Ins.    Co.    (N.    T.    S.    C.),    36   N.   T.    S.   C. 

App.  Div.  516;  28  Ins.  L.  J.  182; 
Fireman's  Fund  Ins.  Co.   v.   Shearman,    20   Tex.   C.    C.   A.   243,   60 

S.  W.  Rep.  598; 

Thomas  v.  Hartford  F.  Ins.  Co.    (Ky.  C.  A.),   53  S.  W.  Rep.  297; 
Northwestern    Mut.   Life.    Ins.    Co.    v.    Germania    F.    Ins.    Co.,    40 

Wis.  446. 

When  the  use  of  any  such  prohibited  articles  is  usual  and 
necessary  in  the  conduct  of  the  insured's  business,  or,  if  they 
be  usually  kept  in  similar  establishments,  it  will  not  avoid  the 
policy.  On  the  doctrine  that  when  a  repugnancy  exists  between 
the  written  portion  of  the  policy  or  rider  attached  thereto,  and 
the  printed  conditions  of  the  policy,  the  provisions  of  the  rider 
or  written  portion  will  prevail.  It  would  be  an  absurdity  to  say 
that  a  policy  is  void  because  of  the  keeping  of  such  prohibited 
articles,  when  the  policy  itself  insured  them,  as  for  instance,  "on 
stock  of  paints,  oil,  varnishes  and  other  articles  usually  kept  in 
a  paint  shop,"  and  by  insuring  them  it  is  "otherwise  provided  by 
agreement,  indorsed  on  the  policy,"  that  such  articles  may  be 
kept  on  the  premises. 

Plinsky  v.  Germania  Ins.   Co.   (U.  S.  C.  C.),  32  Fed.  Rep.  47; 
Faust  v.  American  F.  Ins.  Co.   (Wis.  S.  C.),  64  N.  W.  Rep.  883; 
Maril  v.  Connecticut  F.  Ins.  Co.  (Ga.  S.  C.),  23  S.  E.  Rep.  463; 
Fink  v.  Lancashire  F.  Ins.  Co.,  60  Mo.  App.  673; 

163 


164  HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 

Tubb  v.  L.  &  L.  &  G.  Ins.  Co.    (Ala.  S.  C.),  17  Southern  Rep.  615; 
Yoch  v.  Home  Mut.  Ins.  Co.   (Cal.   S.  C.),  44  Pacif.  Rep.   189; 
Fraim  v.  National  P.  Ins.  Co.   (Pa.  S.  C.),  32  Atl.  Rep.  613; 
Mascot  v.  Granite  State  F.  Ins.  Co.    (Vt.   S.   C.),  35  Atl.  Rep.  75; 
Barnard  v.    National  F.   Ins.    Co.,   27   Mo.    App.    26; 
Phoenix  Ins.  Co.  v.  Fleming  et  al.    (Ark.  S.  .C.),  27  Ins.  L.  J.  584; 

44   S.   W.   Rep.   464; 
Amer.  Cent'l  Ins.   Co.  v.   Green  et  al.    (Tex.   C.  C.   A.),   41   S.  W. 

Rep.  74; 
Davis  v.    Pioneer   Furn.   Co.    (Wis.    S.    C.),    28   Ins.    L.    J.    474;    78 

N.  W.   Rep.   596; 

Ackley  v.  Phenix  Ins.  Co.   (Mont.  S.  C.),  64  Pacif.  Rep.  665; 
Traders  Ins.  Co.  v.  Dobbins   (Tenn.  S.  C.),  86  S.  W.  Rep.  383; 
Haley  v.  Dorchester  M.  Ins.   Co.,  12  Gray  545; 
Collins  v.  Farmville  Ins.  &  Bkg.  Co.,  79  N.  C.  279; 
Baumgartner  v.  Ins.  Co.,  1  W.  N.  C.   (Penn.),  119. 

It  is  not  admissible  to  show  custom  among  merchants  to 
keep  such  prohibited  articles  in  limited  quantities  as  part  of 
the  stock. 

Beer  v.  Ins.  Co.,  39  Ohio  St.  109; 

Birmingham  F.   Ins.   Co.   v.   Kroegher,    83   Pa.    St.   64; 
Lancaster  F.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Lenheim,  89  Pa.  St.  497; 
Mason  v.  Hartford  F.  Ins.  Co.,  29  Up.  Can.  Q.  B.  585; 
Western  Assur.  Co.  v.  Rector,  9  Ky.  Law  Rep.  3. 

It  is  for  the  jury  to  determine  whether  such  prohibited  ar- 
ticles were  included  in  the  description  of  the  property  insured. 

Carrington  v.  Lycoming  F.   Ins.  Co.,   53  Vt.  418; 
Niagara  F.  Ins.  Co.  v.  De  Groff,  12  Mich.  124. 

i 

It  is  not  sufficient  to  show  that  the  prohibited  article  was 
one)  usual  to  the  trade;  it  must  be  shown  that  it  is  included  in 
the  specific  words  used  to  describe  the  property  insured. 

Liverpool  &  L.   &  G.   Ins.   Co.   v.   Van   Os.,   63  Miss.  431. 

"Mechanics"  as  used  in  a  policy  does  not  mean  common 
painters,  and  a  condition  rendering  policy  void  if  "gasoline  be 
kept,  used  or  allowed  in  the  building"  does  not  prevent  the 
keeping  in  the  building  of  gasoline  to  be  used  in  the  filling 
of  gasoline  torches  for  use  by  painters  in  removing  paint  from 
the  building.  (The  fire  originated  in  cornice  about  fifteen  feet 
from  where  painter  had  last  used  the  torch.)  The  use  of  such 
torch  does  not,  as  a  matter  of  law,  increase  the  hazard. 

Smith,  County   Treasurer,    v.    German   Ins.    Co.    (Mich.    S.    C.),    25 
Ins.  L.  J.   192;  65  N.  W.   Rep.  236. 

As  to  definition  of  total  loss  and  rights  of  insured  in 
party  wall,  see  N.  W.  Mut.  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Ins.  Cos.,  88  N.  W. 
Rep.  265  and  272. 

"Fire-proof  safe"  means  a  safe  of  the  kind  generally  known 
as  fire-proof. 

Knoxville  F.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Hird   (Tex.  C.  C.  A.),  23   S.  W.  Rep.   393; 
23   Ins.    L.    J.    16. 


COURT  DEFINITIONS  OF  INSURANCE  TERMS.  165 

"Plate"  does  not  mean  articles  of  common  or  ordinary  use 
such  as  silver  forks  or  spoons,  but  only  the  more  pretentious 
articles  which  are  displayed  on  the  tables  of  the  wealthy  or  os- 
tentatious, and  which  are  to  be  considered  rather  as  articles 
of  luxury  than  as  household  furniture. 

Hanover  F.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Manassen  (Mich.  S.  C.),  3  Ins.  L.  J.  668. 

"Store"  means  shop  and  includes  a  bakery  or  restaurant. 
Richards  v.  Washington  Ins.   Co.,  60  Mich.  420. 

"£250.  Insurance  against  any  one  accident."  (One  of  the 
plaintiff's  cars  overturned,  injuring  forty  persons)  means  that 
£250  is  the  limit  of  liability  for  accident  to  any  one  person, 
and  that,  if  more  than  one  is  hurt,  plaintiff  may  recover  for 
its  liability  not  exceeding  £250  to  each  person. 

South  Staffordshire  Tramways  Co.,  Ltd.  v.  Sickness  &  Accident 
Ass'n,  Ltd.  (Eng.  C.  A.  Q.  B.  Div.),  1  Queen's  Bench  Div. 
Law  Reports  (March  2,  1891),  402. 

"Any  and  all  risks  and  perils  of  fire,  and  inland  navigation, 
and  transportation,  while  on  vessels,  steam-boats,  railroads,  or 
in  hotels,  stores,  or  depots  in  the  United  States,  and  while  in 
custody  of  the  assured  or  traveling  salesman.  The  printed  con- 
ditions of  the  policy  providing  that  the  insurer  would  be  lia- 
ble for  loss  to  the  property  insured  laden  on  board  the  good 
vessel  or  vessels,  boat  or  boats,  railroad  or  carriages,  lost  or 
not  lost,  at  and  from  port  or  places,  to  ports  and  places  on  a 
regular  and  lawful  route,  named  herein,"  covers  a  loss  to  the 
property  from  water  wetting  the  goods  where  the  salesman 
with  the  goods  in  a  carriage,  crossed  a  stream  at  the  usual 
place  of  crossing. 

Kratzenstein  v.  Western  Assur.  Co.  (N.  Y.  C.  A.),  22  N.  E.  Rep. 
221. 

"Subject  to  three-fourths  value  clause"  is  meaningless, 
there  being  nothing  in  the  policy  to  explain  the  meaning  there- 
of, furnishes  no  intelligent  agreement  for  the  court  to  construe. 

Parks  et/al.  v.  Hartford  F.  Ins.  Co.  (Mo.  S.  C.),  12  S.  W.  Rep. 
1058. 

"Concurrent  insurance"  is  that  which  to  any  extent  in- 
sures the  same  interest,  against  the  same  casualty,  at  the  same 
time,  and  that  would  bear  the  loss  proportionately  with  the 
primary  insurance. 

New  Jersey  Rubber  Co.  v.  Commercial  U.  Assur.  Co.  (N.  J.  C.  B. 
and  A.),  46  Atl.  Rep.  777. 


166  HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 

"Their  own,  held  in  trust  or  on  commission,"  plaintiff  must 
show  that  he  adopted  warehouseman's  act  in  procuring  such  in- 
surance, and  so  notified  him,  before  he  can  claim  any  benefit 
under  a  policy  issued  to  defendant. 

Pittman  v.  Harris   (Tex.  C.  C.  A.),  59  S.  W.  Rep.  1121. 

"Plate  glass  in  windows  and  doors,  the  dimensions  whereof 
are  nine  square  feet  or  more,"  does  not  mean  a  plate  glass  front 
which  was  immovable  and  stationary,  though  the  glass  therein 
was  of  greater  dimensions  than  nine  square  feet. 

Hale  v.   Springfield  F.   &  M.   Ins.   Co.,   46  Mo.   App.  608. 

"Sporting  House,"  has  an  innocent  as  well  as  a  guilty  mean- 
ing. Without  proof  of  the  sense  in  which  it  was  used,  it  does 
not  show  conclusively  that  premises  were  occupied  for  unlawful 
purposes. 

White  v.  Western   Assur.   Co.    (Minn.   S.   C.),   54   N.   W.   Rep.   195; 
22  Ins.  L.  J.  305. 

"Gasoline  clause  in  policy,"  the  word  "allowed"  is  to  be 
construed  as  meaning  "allowed  to  be  kept  or  used,"  and  the 

condition  is  not  violated  by  merely  permitting  gasoline  to  be 
carried  through  the  building  on  the  premises. 

London  &  Lane.  F.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Fischer   (U.   S.  C.   C.  A.   6th  Cir.), 
92  Fed.  Rep.  500. 

"$750  on  building  on  lot  6;  $250  on  boiler  contained  there- 
in; $1,000  on  machinery,  patterns  and  other  tools,"  will  in- 
clude patterns  not  in  the  building. 

Aetna  Ins.  Co.  v.  Strout,  16  Ind.  App.  160;  44  N.  E.  Rep.  934. 

"Adjacent"   means   "near,"   "close,"   "in   proximity." 

Hanover   F.    Ins.   Co.    et   al.    v.    Stoddard   et  al.    (Neb.    S.    C.),   27 
Ins.   L.  J.  120  ;  73  N.  W.  Rep.  291. 

"$3,300  on  horses  being  not  over  $110  per  head,"  does  not 
limit  the  risk  to  30  head  of  horses. 

Springfield  F.   &  M.   Ins.  Co.  v.  Crozier   (Ky.   Super.   Ct.),  12  Ky- 
L.  J.  143. 

"$2,500  total  concurrent  insurance  permitted"  in  a  policy 
for  $2,500  held  to  mean  assured  could  take  out  $5,000  total  in- 
surance. 

L'Engle  v.    Scottish   U.    &   N.  F.    Ins.   Co.    (Fla.    S.    C.),    37   S.   W. 
Rep.   462. 

"Twelve  o'clock  noon"  means  the  common  or  solar  time. 

Grabbs  v.    Farmers   Mut.    F.    Ins.   Assn.    (N.   C.    S.    C.),    34  S.    B. 
Rep.   603. 


COURT  DEFINITIONS  OF  INSURANCE  TERMS.  167 

Parol  evidence  is  admissible  to  show  that  standard  time 
had  been  adopted  by  established  custom. 

Rochester  German  Ins.  Co.  v.  Peaslee-Gaulbert  Co.  (Ky.  C.  A.), 
and  Pacific  Ins.  Co.  v.  Louisville  Lead  and  Color  Co.  (Ky.  C. 
A.),  87  S.  W.  Rep.  1115. 

WHAT  IS  NOT  INSURED. 

"Fixtures"  does  not  include  casks,  bottles  and  packing  cases 
in  a  brewery. 

Fitzgerald  v.  Atlanta  Home  Ins.  Co.  (N.  T.  S.  C.,  App.  Div.),  70 
N.  Y.  Supp.  55'2: 

"All  other  implements  of  trade"  does  not  include  sta- 
tionery and  glove  boxes  of  a  glove  manufacturer. 

Stemmer  v.  Scottish  U.  &  N.  Ins.  Co.  (Ore.  S.  C.),  53  Pacif. 
Rep.  498. 

"Saloon  fixtures"  does  not  include  chairs. 

Manchester  F.  Assur.  Co.  v.  Feibelman  (Ala.  S.  C.),  23  Southern 
Rep.  759. 

"Carriages  and  all  such  goods  usually  kept  in  a  livery  barn 
and  sales  stable"  does  not  include  goods  held  in  trust  or  on 
commission,  and  $3,000  additional  concurrent  insurance"  the 
assured  having  taken  out  that  much  additional  insurance  which 
covered  not  only  those  goods  belonging  to  the  assured,  but 
goods  held  in  trust  or  on  commission  did  not  render  them  non- 
concurrent  with  first  policy. 

Corkery  v.   Security  F.  Ins.   Co.    (Iowa  S.  C.),  68  N.  W.  Rep.  792. 

"Harvester  while  in  use"  does  not  mean  while  it  is  stored 
in  a  shed. 

Slinkard  v.  Manchester  F.  Assur.  Co.  (Cal.  S.  C.),  55  Pacif.  Rep. 
417. 

"Harvesting  machine  operating  in  grain  fields  and  in  transit 
from  place  to  place  in  connection  with  harvesting,"  does  not 
cover  a  loss  to  the  machine  after  it  had  been  taken  from  place 
of  storage  and  sent  to  shop  for  repair,  and  there  burned  about 
the  day  the  harvesting  season  opened. 

Mawhinney  v.  Southern  Ins.  Co.  (Cal.  S.  C.),  32  Pacif.  Rep. 
945;  22  Ins.  L.  J.  596. 

"Household  furniture"  does  not  include  furniture  pur- 
chased after  policy  was  issued. 

Phoenix  Ins.  Co.  v.  Dunn.    (Tex.   C.   C.   A.),   41   S.   W.   Rep.   109. 


168  HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 

"Machinery,  shafting,  belting,  iron  working  lathes,  planers, 
upright  drills,  milling  machinery  and  fixtures  and  other  machin- 
ery and  implements  used  in  his  business  as  a  machinist"  does 
not  include  articles  carried  in  stock  for  sale. 

Michel  v.  American  Central  Ins.   Co.,   17  Hun.  87. 

"Builders'  risk"  on  a  house  plaintiff  contracted  to  remove 
does  not  cover  his  loss  on  tools  in  the  house  at  time  of  fire. 

Planters  &  Merchants  Ins.  Co.  v.  Thurston   (Ala.  S.  C.),   9  South- 
ern Rep.  268;   20  Ins.   L.  J.  746. 

"Stock  of  vinegar  in  store  and  in  tank,  mash  and  low  wines" 
does  not  cover  mixtures  in  process  of  manufacture. 

Purves  v.    Germania  Ins.    Co.    (La.    S.    C.),    10   Southern   Rep.   495; 
21  Ins.   L.   J.   306. 

"Decorations  to  walls  and  ceilings"  does  not  include  paint- 
ing of  the  outside  walls  of  the  building. 

Sherlock  v.   German  Amer.  Ins.  Co.    (N.  Y.  S.  C.),   47  N.  Y.   Supp. 
315. 

"Frame  barn,  and  contents  therein,"  does  not  cover  against 
loss  on  a  horse  usually  kept  in  the  barn,  when  the  loss  to  such 
horse  was  sustained  when  it  was  50  feet  distant  from  the  barn. 

Farmers  Mut.   F.   Ins.  Ass'n.   v.  Kryder    (Ind.  App.   C.),   31   N.  B. 
Rep.    851. 

"Materials"  do  not  include  benzine,  unless  it  is  commonly 
used  in  the  business. 

McFarland  v.  Peabody  Ins.  Co.,  6  W.  Va.  425. 

"On  property  belonging  to  the  insured,  or  on  any  property 
for  which  they  may  be  liable,"  does  not  include  those  articles 
from  which  the  policy  exempts  the  insurer  from  liability,  unless 
specifically  insured. 

The  Commonwealth  v.  Hide  &  Leather  Ins.  Co.    (S.  J.  C.  Mass.), 
3  Ins.  L.  J.  671. 

But  it  does  include  merchandise  in  transit  over  their  road 
whether  in  their  own  cars  or  on  the  cars  of  other  common 
carriers. 

The  Commonwealth  v.  Hide  and  Leather  Ins.  Co.   (S.  J.  C.  Mass.), 
3  Ins.  L.  J.  671. 

"Three-story  brick  building  occupied  as  a  pottery,  and 
known  as  'Pottery  Building' "  does  not  include  a  boiler  house 
adjoining,  used  on  one  floor  as  a  boiler  house  and  one  floor  for 


COURT  DEFINITIONS  OF  INSURANCE  TERMS.  169 

storage  of  pottery,  power  being  furnished  from  said  boiler 
house  to  the  pottery,  and  to  box  and  yarn  factories  in  adjoin- 
ing buildings. 

Forbes  v.  American  Ins.  Co.    (S.  J.   C.  Mass.),   41  N.   E.   Rep.   656. 

"Blankets  purchased  with  insurer's  consent,  to  protect  in- 
«ured's  property  from  fire  burning  in  adjacent  building,"  is  not 
a  loss  within  the  policy. 

Welles  v.  Boston  Ins.  Co.,  6  Pick.   182. 

"Unfinished  house"  does  not  include  timbers  lying  in  ad- 
joining building  to  be  used  in  its  construction. 

Ellmaker  v.  Franklin  F.  Ins.  Co.,  5  Penn.  St.  183;  6  W.  S.  439. 

"Jewelry  and  clothing,  being  stock  in  trade,"  limits  liability 
to.  jewelry  and  clothing  only. 

Rafel  v.   Nashville  M.   &  F.   Ins.   Co.,   7   La.   An.   244. 

"English,  American  and  West  India  goods"  does  not  in- 
clude tea  or  nutmegs  unless  they  are  English,  American  and 
West  Indian  goods. 

Huckins  v.  People's  M.   F.   Ins.   Co.,   31  N,   H.   238. 

"Merchandise"  means  all  those  things  which  assured,  as  a 
merchant,  sells,  and  not  articles  of  personal  property  not  in- 
tended for  sale. 

Kent  v.  Liverpool  &  L.  &  G.  Ins.  Co.,  26  Ind.  294. 

"Stock  of  wearing  apparel  and  household  furniture"  does 
not  include  linen  sheets  and  shirts  smuggled  and  kept  for  clan- 
destine sale. 

Clary  v.    Protection   Ins.    Co.,    1   Wright   228; 
Watchorn  v.  Langford,  3  Camp.  422. 

"Stock  and  Materials"  do  not  include  retorts  in  a  smelting 
plant. 

American    Smelter    Co.    v.     Providence-Wash.'  Ins.    Co.,    64    Mo. 
App.    438. 

"Lumber,  Lath  and  Pickets"  do  not  include  shingles,  though 
if  the  word  lumber  alone  is  used  it  might. 

West  Branch  Lumberman's  Exch.   v.  American  Ins.  Co.,   183   Pa. 
St.   136;   27   Ins.   L.  J.   305;   38  Atl.   Rep.   1081. 

"Stock  of  hair  manufactured  or  in  process"  does  not  include 
goods  of  other  material,  even  though  usually  kept  in  such  stocks. 
Medina  v.   Builders  Ins.   Co.,   120  Mass.   225. 


170  HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 

"Household  Furniture"  does  not  include   a  watch. 
Clary  v.   Protection  Ins.   Co.,  1  Wright  Ohio  228. 

"Oil  in  tank  cars  in  transit"     *     *     *     "insurance  to  con- 
tinue and  endure  until  said  goods  and  merchandise  are  safely 

landed  at ,  as  aforesaid,"  means  that  the  latter  clause^ 

when  properly  filled  out,  applied  only  to  sea  carriage,  and  was 
no  part  of  contract  made  by  this  policy,  which  insured  "oil  in 
tank  cars  in  transit,"  and  when  a  tank  car  of  oil  covered  by  the 
policy  had  been  delivered  by  the  railroad  which  transported  ta 
the  insured,  by  being  placed  by  its  direction  upon  its  private 
switch  alongside  its  warehouse,  the  oil  was.  no  longer  "in  tran- 
sit." 

Crew   v.    British    and   Foreign    M.    Ins.    Co.    (U.    S.    C.    C.    A.,    3rd 
Di'st.),  103  Fed.   Rep.   48. 

"Occupied  as  a  dwelling"  is  a  warranty  that  the  building  is. 
so  occupied  at  the  time. 

Hamburg-Bremen    F.    Ins.    Co.    v.    Lewis    (D.    C.    C.    A.),    4    App. 
D.    C.   66. 

"Occupied  as  a  dwelling"  does  not  permit  building  to  be 
used  in  part  as  a  grocery  store. 

Greenwich  Ins.  Co.  v.  Dougherty  (N.  J.  S.  C.),  42  Atl.  Rep.  485. 

Permission  to  use  the  building  for  "any  mercantile  purpose"" 
does  not  authorize  its  use  as  a  restaurant. 

Garretson   v.    Mcts.    &    Bkrs.    Co.     (Iowa    S.    C.),    45    N.    W.    Rep. 
1047. 

WHAT  IS  INSURED. 

"On  lines  owned,  leased  or  operated  by,"  means  owned,, 
leased  or  operated  at  the  time  the  policy  was  issued,  though  not 
so  owned,  leased  or  operated  at  time  of  fire;  to  hold  otherwise 
would  make  insurer  liable  for  loss  it  never  had  in  contempla- 
tion. 

Northern  Pacif.  Exp.  Co.  v.  Traders  Ins.  Co.    (111.  S.  C.),  65  N.  E. 
Rep.   702. 

"Baled  cotton  held  for  compression  or  compressed,  but  not 
loaded  on  cars,  and  for  which  a  compress  shipper's  receipt  has 
been  issued  for  certain  railroads,  while  contained  on  open  plat- 
forms, and  under  sheds  of  insured,  loss,  if  any,  payable  to  said 
railroads  as  their  several  interests  may  appear  at  the  time  of 
the  fire,"  covers  all  cotton  held  by  plaintiff  for  any  owner,  situ- 


COURT  DEFINITIONS  OF  INSURANCE  TERMS.  171 

ate  as  described  for  which  compress  receipt  had  been  issued  for 
shipment  over  any  of  the  railroads,  that  the  word  "for"  in  con- 
nection "for  which,"  etc.,  is  not  used  to  indicate  ownership  of 
the  cotton,  but  simply  the  lines  over  which  it  is  to  be  routed. 

Hope   Oil   Mill   Comp.    &   Mfg.    Co.    v.    Phoenix   Assur.    Co.    (Miss. 
S.  C.),  21  Southern  Rep.  132. 

"On  cotton  in  bales  for  which  bills  of  lading  have  been/  is- 
sued by  its  duly  authorized  agents,  and  for  which  it  may  be  lia- 
ble." (Policy  containing  this,  clause  was  issued  to  H.  &  T.  C. 
R.  R.  Co.  The  bills  of  lading  provided  the  carriers  were  not  to 
be  liable  for  any  loss  or  damage  by  fire.  The  R.  R.  Co.,  accord- 
ing to  custom  placed  the  cotton  in  the  yards  of  a  compress  to 
be  compressed.  While  there  it  was  accidentally  damaged  by 
fire).  It  was  held  that  insurer  was  liable. 

Germania  Ins.  Co.  v.  Anderson  (Tex.  C.  C.  A.),  40  S.  W.  Rep.  200. 

"Rolling  stock  on  line  of  assured's  road,  its  branches,  spurs, 
side  tracks  and  yards,  owned  or  operated  by  assured,  but  not  on 
line  of  any  road  leased  by  assured  unless  such  road  is  specified 
as  being  insured  in  part  under  this  policy,"  covers  rolling  stock 
which  is  destroyed  in  a  yard  operated  by  the  insured  in  con- 
nection with  its  own  line  of  road,  but  not  owned  by  it,  though 
the  owner  of  the  yard  is  not  specified. 

L.    &  L.   &  G.   Ins.   Co.   v.   McNeill    (U.   S.  C.   C.   A.   9th  Cir.),   89 
Fed.  Rep.  131. 

"Cars  leased  and  for  which  assured  is  liable"  must  be  con- 
strued with  reference  to  the  known  business  of  the  insured  and 
covers  foreign  cars  coming  into  its  possession  in  such  business. 
The  assured  owned  orly  a  few  cars,  and  was  engaged  in  the 
handling  of  cars  for  other  railroad  companies. 
Phenix  Ins.  Co.  v.  Belt  Ry.  Co.,  82  111.  App.  266. 

"Freight  cars  owned  or  used  by  assured"  will  cover  cars 
owned  by  others  while  in  transit  on  assured's  tracks. 

The  Commonwealth  v.  Hide  &  Leather  Ins.  Co.    (S.  J.  C.   Mass.), 
3  Ins.  L.  J.  671. 

"Insurance  by  warehouseman  to  secure  property  held  in 
trust  for  others"  are  floating  policies,  and  broad  enough  to 
cover  property  of  others  stored  with  him,  subsequently  to  their 
issue. 

Smith  v.  Carmack  et  al.   (Tenn.  Ch.  App.),  64  S.  W.  Rep.  372. 

"Held  in  trust"  embraces  goods  held  by  the  insured  as 
bailee. 

Beideman  v.  Powell,  10  Mo.  App.  280. 


172  HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 

"Their  own,  held  in  trust,  on  commission,  or  on  joint  ac- 
count with  others,  or  sold  but  not  delivered,  contained  in  their 
warehouse,"  covers  goods  stored  with  assured. 

Pelzer  Mfg.   Co.  v.  St.  Paul  F.   &  M.   Ins.   Co.   and  other  Ins.   Cos. 
(U.  S.   C.  C.  Dist.   S.  C.),   19  Ins.   L.  J.   372. 

"Held  in  trust,  or  sold  and  not  delivered,"  covers  lumber 
sold,  piled  by  itself  and  marked  for  purchaser  ready  for  ship- 
ment. 

Michigan   Pipe   Co.    v.    Michigan  F.   &  M.   Ins.    Co.    (Mich.    S.    C.), 

52  N.  W.   Rep.   1070; 
Waring    et    al.    v.    Indemnity    F.    Ins.    Co.    (N.   Y.    C.    A.),    1    Ins. 

L.   J.   672. 

"Its  own,  held  in  trust,  on  commissions,  or  in  storage  or  for 
repairs,  or  sold,  but  not  removed,"  will  cover  full  value  of  goods 
left  for  repair  or  sale,  and  not  merely  the  insured's  insurable 
interest  therein. 

Johnson   v.    Arbresch    (Wis.    S.    C.),    101    N.   W.    Rep.    395,    34    Ins. 
L.   J.   203. 

"Held  in  trust"  will  cover  goods  held  by  an  agent  employed 
to  manage  a  store,  carrying  on  business  in  his  own  name,  who 
is  required  to  keep  an  account  of  all  transactions  to  his  prin- 
cipal and(  turn  over  all  the  property  at  the  end  of  his  employ- 
ment. 

Roberts  v.  Firemen's  Ins.  Co.   et  al.    (Pa.  S.  C.),   30  Atl.   Rep.  450. 

"Their  own,  or  held  by  them  in  trust,  or  on  which  they 
have  an  interest  or  liability,  and  have  agreed  to  insure  under 
this  policy,  and  not  removed,  stored  or  hereafter  stored  during 
the  continuance  of  this  policy,"  insures  to  the  extent  of  in- 
sured's storage  liens  on  merchandise  stored  with  them  as  ware- 
housemen, and  for  which  they  have  issued  warehouse  receipts, 
expressly  stipulating  they  would  not  be  liable  for  loss  by  fire. 

Pittsburgh  Storage  Co.  v.   Scottish  U.   &  N.   Ins.   Co.    (Pa.   S.  C.), 
32  Atl.   Rep.   58. 

"Assured,  a  warehouseman,  insured  his  goods  and  those  of 
others."  One  of  the  depositors  who  had  paid  the  warehouse- 
man for  insurance  was  only  entitled  to  share  with  the  ware- 
houseman and  other  depositors  in  the  amount  paid  on  the  loss, 
less  the  amount  paid  for  the  insurance. 

Boyd  v.  McKee  et  al.   (Va.  S.  C.  A.),  37  S.  E.  Rep.  810. 

"For  account  of  whom  it  may  concern,  or  equivalent  terms," 
clearly  indicates  a  purpose  to  keep  insured  the  entire  title  to 


COURT  DEFINITIONS  OF  INSURANCE  TERMS.  173 

the  property,  and  one  who  purchases  an  interest  therein  and 
adopts  the  insurance  may  recover,  though  printed  stipulation  of 
the  policy  is  inconsistent  with  such  right. 

Hagan  v.   Scottish  U.  &  N.   Ins.   Co.    (U.   S.   D.   C.,   Eastern  Dist, 
Pa.),   98  Fed.  Rep.    129. 

"Held  in  trust"  will  include  goods  stored  with  assured,  a 
warehouseman. 

Southern   Cold   Storage  W.   Ho.   v.   Dechman    (Tex.    C.    C.   A.),    73 
S.  W.  545. 

"Held  in  store"  will  embrace  the  property  of  others  kept  in 
assured's  warehouse  at  time  of  fire. 

Strohn  v.  Hartford  F.   Ins.  Co.,   3  Ins.   L.  J.   288. 

"Held  in  trust"  means  goods  with  which  the  insured  is  in- 
trusted in  the  ordinary  sense  of  the  word  and  not  in  the  strict 
technical  sense. 

Hough  et  al.  v.  Peoples  Ins.  Co.   (Md.  C.  A.),  2  Ins.  L.  J.  353. 

This  is  one  of  the  well  known  Baltimore  Warehouse  cases, 
citing: 

Waters  v.  Assur.  Co.,  85  Eng.  C.  L.  Rep.  879. 

"Contained  in  their  factory"  will  include  all  buildings  con- 
stituting the  factory,  as  factory  does  not  necessarily  mean  one 
building  or  edifice. 

Liebenstein   v.    Baltic  F.   Ins.   Co.,    45   111.    301. 

"Articles  used  in  packing  hogs,  cattle,  etc.,"  includes  coal  or 
fuel  used  to  generate  steam  for  purpose  of  packing. 

Home  Ins.  Co.  v.  Favorite,  46  111.  263; 
Phoenix  Ins.  Co.  v.  Favorite,  49  111.   259. 

Clause  in  policy  reading,  "$800  on  household  and  kitchen  fur- 
niture" *  *  *  and  "$ on  family  wearing  apparel"  cov- 
ers wearing  apparel. 

German  F.   Ins.   Co.  v.   Seibert   (Ind.  A.  C.),   56  N.  E.  Rep.   686. 

"Three-story  building  occupied  as  a  store  at  No.  72  E. 
street"  includes  a  one-story  addition  in  rear  and  opened  into  it 
by  a  window  and  a  door,  and  for  a  long  time  occupied  as  part  of 
the  store. 

Boyer  v.  Grand  Rapids  F.   Ins.   Co.    (Mich.   S.   C.),   83   N.   W.   Rep. 

And  the  keeping  of  gasoline  in  such  addition  will  render 
the  policy  void. 

Boyer  v.   Grand  Rapids  F.  Ins.  Co.    (Mich.   S.  C.),  83  N.  W.   Rep. 
124. 


174  HALI,  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 

"Church  Building"  includes  altars  therein. 

Caraker  v.  Royal  Ins.  Co.,  63  Hun.  82;    17  N.  Y.   Supp.   858;    aff'd 
•  no  op.  136  N.  Y.   645. 

"Brick  building  and  additions,  including  gas,  steam  and 
water  pipes,  yard  fixtures,  railings,  stoops  and  sidewalks  in  front 
of  and  all  fixtures  contained  in  or  attached  thereto  at  160  M 
Street,  occupied  for  stores  and  dwellings"  covers  either  or  both 
of  two  buildings  owned  by  assured  at  that  number,  one  at  front 
and  other  at  rear  of  the  lot  and  connected  externally  by  an  in- 
tervening structure. 

Rickerson  v.  Hartford  F.  Ins.  Co.,  149  N.  Y.  307. 

"Brick  building  and  additions  thereto  occupied  as  a  dwell- 
ing" includes  a  building  occupied  by  his  servants,  and  as  a  laun- 
dry, even  though  it  is  not  annexed  to  the  brick  dwelling  pro- 
vided there  is  no  other  building  in  assured's  yard  which  can 
possibly  be  claimed  as  an  addition  to  the  main  building  and  not 
built  in  it  as  part  of  the  house  originally. 

Phenix  Ins.    Co.   v.    Martin    (Miss.   S.    C.),    16    Southern   Rep.   417; 
24  Ins.  L.   J.   319. 

"Steam  Saw  Mill"  includes  no{  only  building  but  machin- 
ery. 

Bigler  v.   N.  Y.   Central  Ins.  Co.,  20  Bail.  635;    aff'd  22  N.  Y.  402. 

"Starch  factory,  including  machinery  and  fixtures,"  includes 
all  fixtures  used  in  the  manufacture  of  starch. 
Peoria  M.   &  F.   Ins.   Co.  v.   Lewis,   18  111.  553. 

"Frame  dwelling  house,"  covers  frame  wing  sodded  up  on 
three  sides. 

McNamara  v.  Dakota  F.  &  M.  Ins.  Co.    (S.  Dak.  S.  C.),  47  N.  W. 
Rep.  288. 

"Planing  mill  building  and  addition,  and  machinery  therein" 

covers  engine  room  and  machinery  therein,  22  feet  distant,  the 
only  connection  between  them  being  a  shaft  for  motive  power 
and  a  spout  or  shavings  conveyor. 

Home  Mut.   Ins.   Co.  v.   Roe   (Wis.   S.   C.),   36   N.  W.   Rep.   594. 

"Ill 

"Two-story  brick  dwelling  house  and  its  additions,  adjoin- 
ing and  communicating,"  includes  a  frame  addition,  adjoining 
and  communicating. 

Carpenter  v.  Allemannia  F.  Ins.  Co.   (Pa.  S.  C.),  26  Atl.  Rep.  781. 

"Main  building  and  all  additions  thereto,  adjoining  and  com- 


COURT  DEFINITIONS  OF  INSURANCE  TERMS.  175 

municating,"  includes  dryhouse,  twelve  feet  away,  and  the  en- 
gine house,  four  feet  from  dryhouse. 

Marsh   v.    New    Hampshire    P.    Ins.    Co.    (N.    H.    S.    C.),    49    Atl. 
Rep.   88. 

"Two-story  frame  building  and  additions  thereto  with  shin- 
gle roof  occupied  by  insured  as  a  dwelling"  covers  a  room  called 
his  carriage  house  in  which  he  kept  his  carriages  and  horses, 
and  which,  was  under  the  same  shingle  roof  as  the  rest  of  the 
building,  and  was  separated  from  the  woodshed  which  connected 
with  the  kitchen  by  a  single  partition  of  plain  boards.  This  par- 
tition did  not  extend  to  the  second  story.  Insured's  hired  man 
slept  in  room  over  carriage  house,  which  was  furnished  same  as 
any  bed  room  in  the  house. 

Hannan   v.    Williamsburgh    City   Fire   Ins.   Co.    (Mich.    S.    C.),    45 
N.  W.  Rep.  1120. 

"Three-story  brick  building,  basement,  additions,  founda- 
tions and  area  walls"  includes  gas  piping  and  fixtures,  heating 
apparatus,  elevator  and  plumbing,  and  this,  too,  when  those  arti- 
cles are  specifically  insured  under  another  item  of  the  policy, 
when  the  insurance  under  that  item  is  not  sufficient  to  cover  the 
value  of  such  articles. 

Niagara  v.   Heenan    (111.    S.   C.),   54   N.   B.   Rep.    1052. 

"One-story  brick  building,  and  attached  additions  occupied 
as  saloon,  No.  129l/2  L  street,"  is  question  for  the  jury  to  deter- 
mine, whether  or  not  a  one-story  frame  building  occupied  as  a 
restaurant,  No.  131  L  street,  attached  to  and  communicating 
with  the  brick  building,  was  insured. 

Connecticut   P.    Ins.    Co.    v.    Hilbrant    (Tex.    C.    C.    A.),    7$    S.    W. 
Rep.    558. 

"Eggs  in  pickle,"  where  agent  who  wrote  policy  testifies  he 
understood  the  insurance  was  to  cover  the  stock  "while  being 
pickled  and  disposed  of,"  covers  the  entire  stock  whether  in 
pickling  vats  or  not. 

Hall  v.  Concordia  F.  Ins.  Co.    (Mich.  S.  C.),  51  N.  W.  Rep.  524. 

"Wholesale  stock  of  drugs,  paints,  oils,  dye  stuffs,  and  other 
goods  on  hand  for  sale"  covers  not  only  the  wholesale  stock  but 
all  other  goods  contained  in  the  building,  and  this,  too,  notwith- 
standing assured's  wholesale  and  retail  stores  were  separated  by 
a  partition. 

Wilson   Drug  Co.   v.   Phoenix  Assur.   Co.    (N.   C.    S.    C.),  14   S.   E. 
Rep.  790. 


176  HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 

"Tools  used  in  the  manufacture  of  boots  and  shoes"  covers 
patterns  for  making  boots  and  shoes. 

Adams  v.  N.  T.  Bowery  F.  Ins.  Co.   (Iowa  S.  C.),  51  N.  W.  Rep. 
1149. 

Contra: 

Johnston  v.   Niagara  F.   Ins.   Co.    (N.   C.   S.  C.),   25   Ins.   L.   J.   558 1 
24  S.  E.  Rep.  424. 

"Grain"  in  barn  includes  corn  and  millet  hay. 
Norris   v.    Farmers   Mut.    F.   Ins.   Co.,    65   Mo.   App.   632. 

"Stock  in  two-story  brick  building,"  includes  stock  in  a  one- 
story  rear  addition. 

Carr  v.  Hibernia  Ins.  Co.,  2  Mo.  App.  466. 

"Grain"  includes  broom  corn  in  bale,  but  not  the  baled  pani- 
cles from  which  the  seed  has  been  threshed. 

Reavis  v.   Farmers  M.  F.   Ins.   Co.,  78  Mo.  App.   14. 

"Grain  and  seed"  includes  flax  seed  which  was  afterwards 
converted  into  oil  cake,  especially  so,  as  the  agent  who  took  the 
risk  knew  that  the  oil  cake  was  the  only  subject  to  be  included 
in  the  description. 

Marsh   Oil  Co.   v.  Aetna  Ins.    Co,,   79  Mo.   App.   21. 

Policy  issued  to  painter,  "on  his  paints,  oils,  brushes,  var- 
nish and  such  other  merchandise,"  covers  such  other  articles  of 
convenience  or  necessity  as  are  used  in  his  business,  whether 
intended  for  sale  or  not. 

Hartwell  v.   California  Ins.  Co.    (Me.   S.  J.  C.),  24  Atl.  Rep.   954. 

"Merchandise"  includes  butter  and  eggs. 

Lake  Sup.  P.  &  Cold  Storage  Co.  v.  Concordia  F.  Ins.  Co.   (Minn. 
S.  C.),  104  N.  W.  Rep.  560. 

"Blacksmith  and  carriage  maker's  stock,  manufactured  and 
in  process  of  manufacture,"  will  include  unmanufactured  or  raw 
stock. 

Spratley  v.  Hartford  F.  Ins.   Co.,  1  Dil.  C.  C.  392. 

"Stock  in  trade  as  a  baker"  includes  tools  and  implements 
necessary  for  carrying  on  the  business  of  a  baker. 
Moadinger  v.  Mechanics  F.  Ins.  Co.,  2  Hall  490. 

"Stock  of  watches,  watch  trimmings,  etc.,"  was  not  limited 
to  watches  and  watch  trimmings,  but  included  general  stock. 
Crosby  v.   Franklin   Ins.   Co.,   5   Gray  504. 


COURT  DEFINITIONS  OF  INSURANCE  TERMS.  lit 

"Engine  and  machinery  for  the  manufacture  of  tinware"  in- 
cludes dies. 

Seavy  v.  Central  Mut.  F.  Ins.  Co.,  Ill  Mass.  540. 

"Stock  of  merchandise  consisting  of  family  groceries,  lamps, 
scales  and  other  such  merchandise"  includes  lamps  and  scales 
used  by  assured  as  store  furniture  and  not  kept  for  sale. 

Georgia  Home   Ins.   Co.   v.   Allen    (Ala.   S.    C.),   24   Southern   Rep, 
399. 

Lumber  piled  in  mill  building,  on  cars  under  mill  sheds,  and 
in  sheds  adjoining  to  said  mill  sheds."  Held,  To  cover  five  sheds 
where  lumber  was  piled,  and  not  merely  to  lumber  piled  in  mill 
under  ten  or  twelve  feet  of  projecting  roofs  at  either  side  of 
mill,  built  to  protect  men  and  lumber  when  loading  and  unload- 
ing cars  in  stormy  weather. 

Wolverine    Lumber   Co.    v.    Palatine    Ins.    Co.    (Mich.    S.    C.),    102 
N.   W.   Rep.    991. 

"Stock  in  brick  building  and  additions  attached"  will  include 
stock  in  a  frame  building  on  next  lot,  extending  over  and 
against  the  rear  of  the  brick  building  two  inches  and  used  in  con- 
nection therewith  as  a  store  room,  it  being  the  only  building 
attached  or  connected  with  the  brick. 

Maisel  v.    Fire  Ass'n    (N,   Y.    S.   C.,   App.    Div.),    69    N.   T.    Supp. 

lol* 

"Farming  utensils"  includes  hay  press  used  on  assured's 
farm. 

Phenix  Ins.  Co.  v.   Stewart,  53  111.  App.  273. 

"Engine  and  machinery  used  for  the  manufacture  of  tin- 
ware, sheet  iron,  japaned  and  fancy  painted  ware,"  includes 
"dies"  and  all  essential  parts  of  the  machinery  used  in  manufac- 
turing such  articles  as  the  insured  manufactured. 

Seavy  et  al.  v.   Central  Mut.   F.  Ins.  Co.    (S.   J.  C.  Mass.),   3  Ins. 
L.  J.   576. 

"Butter  and  cheese  manufactured  and  in  process  of  manu- 
facture, and  all  materials  and  supplies  used  in  the  manufacture 
of  same,  including  packages,"  includes  milk  cans. 

Cronin  v.  Fire  Ass'n  (Mich.  S.  C.),  70  N.  W.  Rep.  448. 

"Implements  including  binders  and  such  goods  kept  for  sale 
in  a  general  implement  store"  includes  binding  twine. 

Davis  v.  Anchor  Mut.  F.  Ins.  Co.  (Iowa  S.  C.),  64  N.  W.  Rep.  687. 
12 


178  HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 

"Ship  tackle,  ordnance,  ammunition,  artillery  and  furniture 
of  ship"  includes  provisions  for  use  of  crew. 
Brough  v.   Whitmore,   4   Term.  206. 

"On  grain,  while  contained  in  frame  iron-clad  building  oc- 
cupied by  storage  and  handling  grain,  known  as  'St.  Anthony 
Elevator' "  covers  in  either  "Main  Building"  or  "Annex  A,"  300 
feet  distant  connected  by  an  iron-clad  gallery.  Both  buildings 
were  of  same  construction  and  the  entire  plant  was  known  as 
St.  Anthony  Elevator. 

Pettit  et  al.  v.   State   Ins.   Co.    (Minn.    S.   C.),   19   Ins.    L.   J.    138; 

43  N.  W.  Rep.  378; 
Cargill   et  al.  v.  Millers  &  Mfrs.  Mut.  Ins.  Co.    (Minn.   S.   C.).   19 

Ins.  L.  j.  876. 

"Fixtures"  include  anything  that  is  a  fixture  as  between 
the  insured  and  his  landlord. 

Clark  v.  Svea  Ins.  Co.  (Cal.  S.  C.),  36  Pacif.  Rep.  587. 

"Threshing  outfit"  includes  self-feeder. 

Minneapolis   Threshing   Mch.   Co.  v.    Darnall    (S.   Dak.    S.    C.),    83 
N.  W.  Rep.  266. 

/ 

"Household  furniture,  useful  and  ornamental"  includes  Jap- 
anese vase. 

Bowne  v.   Hartford  F.  Ins.   Co.,   46  Mo.   App.   473. 

"Household  furniture,  useful  and  ornamental,  and  family* 
stores"  includes  books,  games,  writing  materials,  child's  swing, 
and  child's  walker. 

Huston  v.  State  Ins.  Co.   (Iowa  S.  C.),  69  N.  W.  Rep.  674. 

Household  furniture  includes  carpets  and  bedding. 

Patrons  Mut.  Aid  Society  v.  Hall  (Ind.  A.  C.),  49  N.  E.  Rep.  279. 

"Household  furniture"  includes  all  articles  necessary  and 
convenient  for  housekeeping  such  as  sausage  mill,  churn,  cook- 
stove,  dishes,  kettles,  etc.,  not  particularly  specified. 

Reynolds  et  al.  v.   Iowa  &  Neb.   Ins.   Co.   et  al.    (Iowa   S.   C.),   46 
N.   W.   Rep.    659. 

"Loss  of  rents  *  *  *  during  such  period  as  may  be  nec- 
essary to  restore  the  premises  to  same  condition!  as  before  the 
fire"  includes  the  period  necessary  to  make  the  contract  as  well 
as  the  time  actually  necessary  in  making  the  repairs. 

Hartford  F.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Pires  (Tex.  C.  A.  A.),  165  S.  W.  565. 


COURT  DEFINITIONS  or  INSURANCE  TERMS.  179 

"Merchandise  of  every  description  incidental  to  assured's 
business  consisting  chiefly  of  grain  and  grain  products,"  will 
include  malt. 

Johnson  v.  Stewart,  243  Pa.  486,  90  Atl.  349. 

"Held  in  trust"  as  used  in   a   warehouseman's   policy  will 

cover  goods  stored  with  him,  such  a  policy  cannot  be  subject  to 

the  construction  that  it  was   only  intended  to  cover  goods  of 

shippers  who  had  made  arrangements  with  assured  to  that  effect. 

Johnson  v.   Stewart,  243  Pa.  485,  90  Atl.  349. 

"In  cars  on  side  tracks  within  100  feet"  covers  only  in  such 
cars  as  are  within  100  feet,  and  not  in  cars  on  side  track  within 
100  feet.  The  policy  refers  to  the  cars  rather  than  to  the  tracks. 

Smith  v.  Phoenix  Ins.  Co.   (Mo.  App.)  168  S.  W.  831. 

"Premises"  as  used  in  an  insurance  policy  means  merely  the 
space  leased  by  the  insured  and  does  not  include  other  parts  of 
the  building  over  which  he  has  no  control. 

Central  &  Co.  v.  North  B.  &  M.  Ins.  Co.,  245  Pa.   St.  272;  91  Atl. 
662. 

"Renewal  of  lease"  does  not  constitute  a  change  of  lessees 
interest. 

Home  Ins.  Co.  v.  Coker,  43  Okla.  331,  142  Pac.  1195^ 

Coinsurance — Concurrent  Insurance;  coinsurance  is  where 
the  assured  bears  a  portion  of  the  loss;  concurrent  insurance  is 
other  insurance  covering  the  same  property  against  same  risks. 

Oppenheim  v.  Fireman's  F.  Ins.  Co.   (Minn.  S.  C.),  138  N.  W.  777. 

"Lien  for  rent"  is  not  a  chattel  mortgage  within  the  mean- 
ing of  a  fire  insurance  policy. 

Phoenix  Ins.    Co.   v.    Fleenor,    104  Ark.   119,   148   S.   W.  650; 
Raulet  v.  Northwestern  N.  Ins.  Co.,  157  Cal.  213,  107  Pac.  292. 

"Open  for  business."  A  store  is  not  open  for  business  with- 
in the  meaning  of  a  fire  insurance  policy,  where  the  assured 
closes  his  store  to  go  to  lunch,  only  intending  to  be  gone  a  half 
hour. 

Joffee  v.   Niagara  F.   Ins.   Co.,   116  Md.   155;    81  Atl.    281. 

"Within  60  days  after  the  fire,"  means  after  the  fire  has  ter- 
minated. Slocum  v.  Saratoga  &  W.  F.  Ins.  Co.,  134  N.  Y.  Supp. 
78,  National  W.  P.  Co.  v.  Associated  Mfrs.  M.  F.  Ins.  Co.,  175 
N.  Y.  226.  The  time  begins  to  run  after  destruction  of  the  prop- 


180  HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 

erty.  Johnson  v.  Humboldt  Ins.  Co.,  91  111.  92.  It  begins  to  run 
from  the  time  the  fire  started.  Western,  etc.,  v.  Traders  Ins. 
Co.,  122  111.  App.  138.  The  Illinois  Court  of  Appeals  is  not  as 
high  as  the  Illinois  Supreme  Court,  (The  Author.) 

"Ready  to  proceed  under  the  provisions  of  the  policy,"  a 

statement  to  that  effect  is  not  a  compliance  with  the  policy  pro- 
visions requiring  the  loss  to  be  submitted  to  referees. 

Vera  v.  Mercantile  P.  &  M.  Ins.  Co.,  216  Mass.  154,  103  N.  E.  292. 

"Void"  as  used  in  a  fire  insurance  policy  means  null  and 
of  no  effect. 

Tolliver  v.  Granite  St.  F.  Ins.  Co.,  Ill  Me.  275,  89  Atl.  8. 

"Insurance  proceeds  exempt"  when  collected  for  destruc- 
tion of  a  homestead. 

Johnson  v.  Hall  (Tex.  C.  C.  A.),  163  S.  W.  399. 

"While  occupied  as"  constitutes  a  warranty  that  the  prop- 
erty would  be  used  as  warranted.  Occupied  implies  an  actual 
use  for  the  purpose  designated. 

Washington  F.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Cobb   (Tex.  C.  C.  A.),  163  S.  W.  608. 

"Toilet  articles,  labels,  bottles  and  powder"  will  also  include 
corn  starch. 

Aachen   &  Munich   F.    Ins.    Co.  v.   Arabian   T.    G.    Co.,   64    So.    635, 
(10  Ala.   App.   395). 

"Red  Top  Seed,"  whether  it  is  grain  or  not  is  for  the  jury. 
Coen  v.  Denver  T.  M.   F.   Ins.   Co.,   155  111.  App.  332. 

"Stock — Merchandise,"  in  mercantile  law  "stock"  is  the 
goods  which  a  tradesman  holds  for  sale  or  traffic,  "merchan- 
dise" is  the  object  of  commerce. 

Spring  Garden  Ins.  Co.  v.  Brown  (Tex.  C.  C.  A.),  143  S.  W.  292. 

"Inventory."  An  inventory  is  not  an  invoice,  an  inventory 
means  a  list  of  goods  in  the  store,  an  invoice  is  also  a  list  of 
goods  but  is  made  out  by  the  seller  or  consignor  and  does  not 
show  that  the  goods  so  listed  were  ever  received  in  the  as- 
sured's  store.  Hartford  F.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Adams  (Tex.  C.  C.  A.), 
158  S.  W.  231;  Day  v.  Home  Ins.  Co.,  177  Ala.  600,  58  So.  549, 
and  the  same  doctrine  applies  where  the  assured  himself  shipped 
the  goods  from  a  branch  store.  Phoenix  Ins.  Co.  v.  Dorsey 
(Miss.  S.  C.),  58  So.  778. 


COURT  DEFINITIONS  OF  INSURANCE  TERMS.  181 

"Furniture"  will  include  an  iron  safe  not  attached  in  any 
way  to  the  building. 

Mecca.   Ins.  Co.   v.  First   State   Bank   (Tex.   C.   C.   A.),  135   S.   W. 

1083. 

"Stock  of  grain"  will  include  bran,  a  product  thereof. 
German  P.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Walker  (Tex.  C.  C.  A.),  146  S.  W.  606. 

"Inventory."  The  bunching  of  articles  without  itemizing 
i.  e.  giving  the  total  value  of  each  group  is  not  an  inventory  as 

Shawnee  F.   Ins.  Co.  v.   Thompson,  30  Okla.  466,   119  Pac.   985. 
Houff  v.   German  Am.  Ins.  Co.,  3  Va.  App.   986,   66  S.  E.  831. 

"Inventory."  But  while  the  grouping  of  articles  is  not  a 
compliance  with  the  policy  provisions  requiring  an  inventory, 
this  does  not  affect  that  part  of  the  inventory  which  is  item- 
ized and  therefore  does  not  avoid  the  policy. 

Arnold  v.  Indemnity  F.  Ins.  Co.,  152  N.  C.  232,  67  S.  E.  574. 

"Vacant  and  unoccupied."  Vacancy  can  only  occur  when 
the  building  is  empty,  contains  substantially  nothing;  while  oc- 
cupancy, when  speaking  of  residences,  refers  more  particularly 
to  human  habitation,  or  actually  living  in  the  house. 

Norman  v.  Missouri  T.  M.  Ins.   Co.,   74  Mo.  App.  456. 

"Vacant  or  unoccupied"  when  applied  to  a  dwelling  house 
means  that  no  ones  lives  in  it,  a  mere  supervision  of  it  does  not 
constitute  occupancy. 

Cook  v.  Continental  Ins.   Co.,   70  Mo.  App.  610; 

Hoover  v.  Mercantile  T.  M.  Ins.  Co.,  93  Mo.  App.  Ill;  69  S.  W.  42; 
Craig  v.   Springfield  F.   &  M.  Ins.   Co.,  34  Mo.  App.   481; 
Wheeler  v.   Phoenix  Ins.   Co.,   53  Mo.  App.   446; 

Waddle  v.    Commonwealth   Ins.  Co.,   170   S.   W.   682,   184  Mo.   App. 
571. 

"Dental  books"  are  not  covered  under  the  description,  "fur- 
niture, chairs,  gas  apparatus,  pictures,  paintings,  instruments, 
appliances,  and  material  incidental  to  a  dental  office." 

American  F.   Ins.  Co.   v.  Bell    (Tex.   C.  C.  A.),   75  S.  W.   319. 

"Grain,"  includes  millet  hay. 
Norris  v.   Farmers  M.   F.   Ins.   Co.,  65  Mo.  App.   639. 

"Valued  policy  law  of  Texas,"  means  that  neither  notice  nor 
proofs  of  loss  is  necessary,  the  claim  being  due  on  demand,  in- 
terest begins  to  run  from  the  date  of  the  fire  or  from  the  date 
of  the  demand. 

Camden  F  Ins.   Ass'n.   v.   Bomar   (Tex.   C.   C.   A.)!    176  S.   W.    156. 


182  HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 

"Machinery"  is  realty  when  owned  by  the  same  owner  who 
owns  the  building  and  is  within  the  purview  of  the  valued  policy 
law,  when  the  policy  insures  the  building  and  machinery  of  a 
mill.  A  special  agreement  between  the  insured  and  the  insurer 
attempting  to  fix  the  legal  status  of  machinery  in  a  building  as 
personality  is  void  under  the  valued  policy  law. 

Havens  v.    Germania   F.    Ins.    Co.,   135    Mo.    649,    37    S.   W.    497;    24 

Ins.   L.  J.   321; 

Murphy  v.   N.   Y.   Bowery  Ins.   Co.,   62  Mo.  App.   495. 
Darden  v.  L.  &  L.  &  G.  Ins.  Co.   (Miss.  S.  C.),  68  So.  485. 

"A  building"  is  personal  property  when  it  stands  on  leased 
ground.  (The  Author.)  See  also  Fixtures,  Bouvier's  Law  Di- 
rectory and  Sharp  v.  Niagara  F.  Ins.  Co.,  147  S.  W.  154,  164  Mo. 
App.  475.  But  it  is  held  otherwise  by  Tex.  Civil  Appeals  Court 
in  Orient  Ins.  Co.  v.  Parlin,  38  S.  W.  60,  and  Fidelity-Phenix  Ins. 
Co.  v.  O'Bannon,  178  S.  W.  731,  although  the  Texas  valued  pol- 
icy specifically  excludes  from  its  protection  personal  property. 

"Mortgage  clause"  relates  to  the  owners  subsequent  acts  or 
neglect  and  does  not  apply  to  his  application  for  insurance  or  his 
statements  of  omission  therein.  The  policy  may  be  void  from  its 
inception.  Liverpool  L.  &  G.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Agricultural  S.  &  L. 
Co.,  33  Can.  S.  C.  94.  When  after  the  loss  the  mortgage  is  fore- 
closed, the  mortgagee  can  only  recover  the  balance  due>  on  the 
mortgage.  Hadley  v.  New  Hampshire  Ins.  Co.,  55  N.  H.  110. 
The  mortgage  clause  creates  a  separate  and  distinct  contract  for 
the  benefit  of  the  mortgagee,  Bacot  v.  Phoenix  Ins.  Co.,  96  Miss. 
223,  50  So.  729;  39  Ins.  L.  J.  214;  Reed  v.  Ins.  Co.,  76  N.  J.  L.  11, 
69  Atl.  724;  Smith  v.  Union  Ins.  Co.,  25  R.  I.  260,  55  Atl.  718; 
Franklin  F.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Martin,  40  N.  J.  L.  575;  Kupferschmidt  v. 
Agricultural  Ins.  Co.,  80  N.  J.  L.  441,  78  Atl.  225;  Burnham  v. 
Royal  Ins.  Co.,  57  Mo.  App.  394.  If  the  owner  or  mortgagor 
takes  out  other  insurance  it  cannot  pro  rate  in  paying  the  loss, 
as  he  can  not  do  anything  by  which  the  mortgagee's  insurance 
will  be  diminished.  Laurenzi  v.  Atlas  Ins.  Co.  (Tenn.  S.  C.), 
176  S.  W.  1022;  Hastings  v.  Westchester  F.  Ins.  Co.,  73  N.  Y. 
141,  7  Ins.  L.  J.  430;  Union  Inst.,  etc.,  v.  Phoenix  Ins.  Co.,  196 
Mass.  230,  81  N.  E.  994;  Hartford  F.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Olcott,  97  111. 
439.  Neither  can  he  make  an  adjustment,  nor  enter  into  an  ap- 
praisal agreement  which  will  bind  the  mortgagee  or  trustee. 
Laurenzi  v.  Atlas  Ins.  Co.  (Tenn.  S.  C.),  176  S.  W.  1022;  Hart- 
ford F.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Olcott,  97  111.  439;  Hastings  v.  Westchester, 
73  N.  Y.  141,  7  Ins.  L.  J.  430.  But  it  is  held  otherwise  in  Massa- 
chusetts and  Ohio,  not  only  this,  but  that  the  mortgagee  has  no 


COURT  DEFINITIONS  OF  INSURANCE  TERMS.  183 

standing  in  court  until  the  amount  of  the  loss  has  been  arbitrat- 
ed or  arbitration  waived.  Union  Inst.  Co.  v.  Phoenix  Ins.  Co., 
196  Mass.  230,  81  N.  E.  994;  Erie  Brewing  Co.  v.  Ohio/  F.  Ins. 
Co.,  81  Ohio  St.  1,  89  N.  E.  1065,  39  Ins.  L.  J.  200.  New  Jersey 
holds  to  the  contrary  and  that  the  mortgage  clause  relieves  the 
mortgagee  from  every  compliance  with  conditions  to  be  per- 
formed after  the  fire.  Reed  v.  Firemen's  Ins.  Co.,  81  N.  J.  L. 
523,  80  Atl.  462. 

"Loss  if  any  payable  to — as  interest  may  appear."  This 
merely  gives  the  payee  the  right  to  have  paid  over  to  him  any 
money  that  may  be  found  due  under  the  contract  and  takes  from 
the  assured  none  of  his  rights.  He  is  not  the  assured,  but  only 
his  appointee.  Brecht  v.  Law  M.  &  C.  Ins.  Co.,  160  Fed.  399,  87 
C.  C.  A.  351  (annotated  in  18  L.  R.  A.  ([N.  S.]  197);  Woods  v. 
Ins.  Co.  St.  of  Pa.,  87  Wash.  563,  144  Pac.  650.  Such  a  loss  pay- 
able clause  is  not  even  notice  to  the  insurance  company  that  the 
payee  holds  a  chattel  mortgage  on  the  property.  Woods  v.  Ins. 
Co.  St.  of  Pa.,  82  Wash.  563,  144  Pac.  650.  But  it  is  held  in 
Mississippi  by  reason  of  a  statute,  and  in  Kentucky  that  a  mort- 
gagee to  whom  a  policy  is  made  payable  is  not  bound  by  an 
adjustment  or  appraisal  made  by  the  owner  or  mortgagor.  In 
entering  into  an  appraisal  it  is  always  best  to  be  on  the  safe 
side  and  have  the  mortgagee  to  whom  the  policy  is  payable  a 
party  to  the  appraisal  agreement,  so  that  he  cannot  be  heard 
to  complain.  (The  Author.) , 

"Merchandise  and  materials  for  making  same"  as  used  in 
a  policy  of  fire  insurance  means  all  articles  which  are  neces- 
sarily or  conveniently  used  in  insured's  business,  embracing 
tools,  apparatus,  and  implements  used  by  him  in  his  business. 
Oklahoma  F.  Ins.  Co.  v.  McKey  (Tex.  C.  C.  A.),  152  S.  W.  440. 

Proximate  cause  of  loss  is  the  one  which  puts  the  other 
cause  into  motion. 

Hocking  v.  British  Am.  Assur.  Co.,  62  Wash.  73,  113  Pac.  259. 

"Life  estate  and  reversioner,"  both  are  entitled  to  have  the 
funds  from  a  fire  insurance  policy  applied  to  the  repair  of  the 
damaged  building. 

Brough  v.  Higgins,  2  Gratt.  (Va.)  408;  2  Bennett  443. 

"Insurance  on  boat,"  does  not  cover  materials  and  lumber 


184  HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 

in  the  shipyard  where  it  was  being  built  and  intended  for  use 
in  its  construction. 

Mason  v.  Franklin  F.  Ins.  Co.,  12  Gill  &  J.  (Md.)  468;  2  Bennett 
214. 

Same  principle  of  law: 

Ellmaker's  Exec.  v.  Franklin  F.  Ins.  Co.  (Pa.  S.  C.),  5  Barr.  183; 
2  Bennett  519. 

"Loss  by  mob."  A  destruction  of  a  building  by  fire  caused 
by  mob  is  not  a  loss  by  "any  usurped  power  whatsoever." 

Drinkwater  v.  London  Assur.  Corporation  (Eng.),  2  Wilson  363; 
1  Bennett  12. 

"Civil  commotion."  A  clause  in  a  policy  exempting  the  in- 
surers in  case  of  a  loss  by  "civil  commotion,"  applies  to  a  de- 
struction by  a  riot. 

Landsdale  v.  Mason  et  al.  (Eng.),  1  Marshall  on  Ins.  688;  1 
Bennett  16. 

"Linen,"  as  used  in  a  fire  insurance  policy  covering  house- 
hold furniture,  will  not  protect  linen  drapery  goods  subsequent- 
ly purchased  on  speculation. 

Watchorn   v.    Langford   (Eng.),    3    Campbell   422;    1   Bennett   91. 

"Held  in  trust."  A  policy  taken  out  by  the  consignee  in  his 
own  name  insuring  goods  held  "in  trust"  will  only  cover  his  in- 
interest  in  such  goods,  and  not  any  loss  which  the  consignor 
alone  sustains. 

Parks  v.  General  Interest  Assur.  Co.,  5  Pick.  (Mass.)  34;  1  Ben- 
nett 184.  Contra. 

De  Forest  v.  Fulton  F.  Ins.  Co.  (S.  C.f  N.  Y.),  1  Hall  84,  and 
many  other  cases;  in  fact,  the  author  knows  of  but  one 
other  in  harmony  with  the  Massachusetts  case,  i.  e.  a  Louisi- 
ana case. 

"Blowing  up,  drowning,  etc."     A  shipment  of  negroes  in- 
sured  against  the  dangers   of  navigation,   such  as  blowing  up, 
drowning,  etc.,  will  cover  the  loss  of  a  negro  by  drowning  with- 
out any  disaster  happening  to  the  boat. 
Moore  v.  Perpetual  Ins.  Co.,  16  Mo.  98. 

"Property  on  premises  owned  or  occupied  by  assured"  will 
include  a  dredge  fastened  to  a  wharf  owned  by  them. 

Farmers'  Loan  &  Tr.  Co.  v.  Harmony  F.  &  M.  Ins.  Co.  (S.  C., 
N.  Y.),  51  Barbour  33;  5  Bennett  174. 

"Prosecuted,"  as  used  in  a  fire  insurance  policy,  is  synony- 
mous with  the  word  suit. 

Merchants  M.  Ins.   Co.   v.   Lacroix,   35   Tex.   249;  5  Bennett  455. 


COURT  DEFINITIONS  OF  INSURANCE  TERMS.  185 

"Assured's  working  interest"  in  leased  property,  which  he 
agreed  to  restore  at  end  of  lease  in  good  condition,  and  to  re- 
place with  other  of  equal  if  destroyed,  will  include  the  entire 
value  of  the  property. 

Imperial  Ins.  Co.  v.   Murray,  73  Pa.   St.  13;  5  Bennett  526. 

"Merchandise,  his  own,  in  trust,  or  on  commission,  for 
which  he  is  responsible,"  does  not  include  merchandise  sold  and 
paid  for  where  warehouse  receipts  were  endorsed  over  to  the 
purchaser. 

-North  B.   &  M.   Ins.   Co.   v.   Moffat,    (Eng.)    Law   Reports  7;  Com- 
mon Pleas  25;  5  Bennett  381. 

"Stock  of  watches,  watch  trimmings,  etc.,"  will  include  as- 
sured's  entire  stock  of  jewelry. 

Crosby  v.   Franklin  Ins.   Co.,   5   Gray   (Mass.)   504;   4  Bennett  35. 

"Manufacturer  of  brass  clocks,"  as  describing  the  insured's 
business  in  a  fire  insurance  policy,  covers  and  permits  the  use 
of  all  articles  ordinarily  employed  in  that  manufacture. 

Bryant  v.   Poughkeepsie  M.   P.   Ins.  Co.    (S.   C.,   N.   Y.),   21  Barb. 
154;  4  Bennett  37. 

"Tax  title,"  where  the  tax  collector  was  not  shown  to  have 
made  his  return  of  the  sale  within  the  time  prescribed  by  law, 
must  be  regarded  as  fatally  defective.  See  Shimmin  v.  Inman, 
26  Me.  228;  Andrews  v.  Senter,  32  Me.  394. 

Pinkham    v.    Morang    &    Monmouth    M.    F.    Ins.    Co.,    40    Me.    587; 
4  Bennett  43. 

"Clerk  sleeps  in  store"  in  an  application  for  fire  insurance  is 
merely  descriptive  of  present  occupancy  and  not  a  warranty  for 
the  future. 

Frisbie  v.  Fayette  M.  Ins.  Co.,  27  Pa.  St.  325;  5  Bennett  159. 

"Insurance  against  fire  by  lightning"  does  not  contemplate 
a  loss  by  lightning  unless  fire  ensued. 

Babcock  v.  Montgomery  Co.  M.  Ins.  Co.,  4  Comstock  (N.  Y.)   326; 
3  Bennett  154. 

"Policy  to  co-partners"  does  not  cover  the  interest  of  one 
who  purchases  his  partner's  interest,  where  the  policy  provides 
it  shall  be  void  if  the  property  be  alienated  by  sale  or  other- 
wise. 

Tillou  v.  Kingston  M.  Ins.  Co.,  5  N.  Y.  405;  3  Bennett  238. 

"For  account  of  whom  it  may  concern,"  as  used  in  a  fire  in- 


186  HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 

surance  policy,  only  protects  such  interests  as  were  intended  to 
be  insured  at  the  time  the  insurance  was  effected. 

Steele  v.   Franklin  F.  Ins.  Co.,  17  Pa.   St.   290;   3  Bennett  278. 

"Held  in  trust"  includes  goods  held  by  pawnbroker,  and  are 
not  covered  by  a  policy  which  provides  goods  held  in  trust  or 
on  commission  are  not  covered  unless  mentioned  in  the  policy 
as  being  insured,  nor  does  the  term,  "Jewelry  and  Clothing,  Be- 
ing Stock  in  Trade,"  include  such  articles  as  musical  instru- 
ments, surgical  instruments,  guns,  pistols  and  books. 

Rafel  v.  Nashville  M.  &  F.  Ins.  Co.,  7  La.  An.  244;  3  Bennett  336. 

"Dissolution  of  partnership"  and  division  of  the  property  is 
such  a  change  of  title  as  will  avoid  the  policy  provisions,  ren- 
dering it  void  if  there  be  any  transfer  or  change  of  title  in  prop- 
erty insured. 

Dreher  v.  Aetna  Ins.  Co.,  18  Mo.  128;  3  Bennett  514. 

"Insured  and  or  assured"  is  the  person  who  owns  the  prop- 
erty, applies  for  the  insurance,  pays  the  premiums  and  signs  the 
deposit  note,,  and  not  another  to  whom  the  money  may  be  made 
payable  in  case  of  loss,  though  he  may  have  a  lease  on  the 
premises, 

Sanford  v.   Mechanics  Mutual   F.   Ins.    Co.,   12   Cush.    (Mass.)    641  j 
3  Bennett  619. 

"Crude  petroleum — Camphene."  The  keeping  of  u  little 
crude  petroleum  for  medical  purposes  is  not  a  storing  within 
the  meaning  of  a  policy,  and  it  seems  that  using  camphene  for 
a  light  in  a  sleeping  apartment  will  not  avoid  a  policy  pro- 
hibiting its  use. 

Williams  v.  Fireman's  F.  Ins.  Co.,  54  N.  Y.  569;  5  Bennett  537. 

"Foreclosure."  Filing  a  mechanic's  lien  is  not  a  commence- 
ment of  foreclosure  proceedings,  nor  is  a  levy  obtained  under  an 
execution  to  enforce  the  lien  on  real  estate  within  the  meaning 
of  a  policy  referring  to  levy  on  personal  property. 

Colt  v.  Phoenix  F.  Ins.  Co.,  54  N.  T.  595;  5  Bennett  537. 

"Until  a  certain  date"  includes  that  date. 
Isaacs  v.  Royal  Ins.  Co.,  Law  Reports;  5  Exchequer  296. 

"Warranty — Representation."  A  representation  is  part  of 
the  preliminary  proceedings  to  a  contract,  a  misrepresentation 


COURT  DEFINITIONS  OF  INSURANCE  TERMS.  187 

of  an  immaterial  matter  not  fraudulently  made  will  not  avoid- the 
policy,  but  a  warranty  must  be  literally  performed. 

Dewees  v.  Manhattan  Ins.  Co.,  34  N.  J.  Law  244;  6  Bennett  244; 
American  Ins.  Co.  v.  Barnett,  73  Mo.  364; 
Hamilton  v.  Home  Ins.  Co.,  92  Mo.  353. 

"Gunpowder."  The  policy  insuring  "general  stock  of  hard- 
ware" does  not  include  gunpowder  nor  permit  the  keeping  of 
same  in  stock,  where  the  policy  provisions  rendered  the  policy 
void  if  it  were  kept  in  stock. 

Mason  v.  Hartford  F.  Ins.  Co.,  29  Up.  Can.  O.  B.  585;  5  Bennett  294. 

Same  principle  of  law: 

Pindar  v.  Continental  Ins.  Co.  et  al.,  47  N.  Y.  114;  5  Bennett  185; 

Dewees  v.   Manhattan  Ins.   Co.,  35  N.   J.  Law  366;    5  Bennett  314; 

Appleby  v.  Astor  F.  Ins.  Co.,  54  N.  Y.  253;  45  Barbour  454;  5  Ben- 
nett 490; 

McFarland  v.  Peabody  Ins.  Co.  et  al.,  6  West  Va.  425,  437;  5  Ben- 
nett 490. 

"Immediate  notice,"  as  used  in  a  fire  insurance  policy, 
means  reasonable  time  under  the  circumstances. 

Cashau  v.  Northwestern  N.  Ins.  Co.,  5  Bissell  (U.  S.  C.  C.)  476; 
5  Bennett  501. 

"In  quantities  exceeding  one  barrel."  In  view  of  the  punc- 
tuation, the  permit  was  applicable  to  all  the  prohibited  mate- 
rials specified. 

Ins.  Co.  v.  Slaughter  (U.  S.  S.  C.),  12  Wallace  404;  5  Bennett  340. 

"Laws  relating  to  fire  insurance"  do  not  apply  to  tornado 
insurance. 

Nally  v.  Home  Ins.  Co.,  250  Mo.  452;  157  S.  W.  769. 

"Keeping  or  storing."  Keeping  a  wooden  barrel  of  benzine 
on  the  premises  only  for  the  time  required  to  fill  the  receptacle 
permitted  by  the  policy  was  not  a  keeping  or  storing  within 
the  meaning  of  the  policy. 

Maryland  F.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Whiteford,  31  Md.  219;  5  Bennett  240. 

"Refined  coal  or  earth  oils,"  as  used  in  a  fire  insurance 
policy,  refers  only  to  articles  as  dangerous,  as  naphtha,  benzine 
or  benzole. 

Morse  v.  Buffalo  F.  &  M.  Ins.  Co.,  30  Wis.  534;  5  Bennett  424. 

"Leasehold  or  other  interest  not  absolute"  in  the  property 
insured  by  a  fire  insurance  policy.  A  mortgagor  under  such  pol- 
icy holds  an  equitable  fee  simple,  which  need  not  be  represented 
to  the  company  or  expressed  in  the  policy. 

Washington  F.  Ins.  Co.  et  al.  v.  Kelly,  32  Md.  421;  5  Bennett  303. 


188  HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 

"Machine  and  repair  shop"  has  no  technical  insurance 
meaning.  It  is  for  the  jury  to  determine  whether  assured's  busi- 
ness was  or  was  not  included  in  the  term. 

Chaplin  v.  Provincial  Ins.  Co.,  23  Up.  Can.  C.  P.  218;  5  Bennett  503. 

"Particular  and  detailed  account  of  the  loss."  A  policy  re- 
quiring such  is  complied  with  where  the  assured's  account 
showed  value  of  stock  at  a  given  date;  the  amount  of  stock  re- 
ceived since  that  date;  the  amount  of  stock  saved,  and  the 
amount  of  the  loss  claimed. 

Stickney  v.  Niagara  F.  M.  Ins.  Co.,  23  Up.  Can.  C.  P.  372;  5  Ben- 
nett 503. 

"Mortgagee."  His  indorsement  of  mortgage  note  to  his  as- 
signee of  the  mortgage  gives  him  an  insurable  interest  in  the 
mortgaged  property. 

Williams  v.  Roger  Williams  Ins.  Co.,  107  Mass.  377;  5  Bennett  373. 

"Owner"  has  no  definite  meaning,  and  is  a  question  for  the 
jury,  where  the  assured  represented  himself  as  the  owner  of  a 
building  that  stood  on  leased  ground. 

Hopkins  v.  Provincial  Ins.  Co.,  18  Up.  Can.  C.  P.  74;  5  Bennett  159. 

"Plate,"  as  used  in  a  policy  which  excludes  it  as  not  insured, 
does  mean  silver  forks,  tea  and  tablespoons. 

Hanover  F.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Mannasson,  29  Mich.  316;  5  Bennett  541. 

"Change  within  the  control  of  assured"  material  to  the  risk, 
as  used  in  a  fire  policy,  refers  to  police  regulations  to  prevent 
fires,  and  not  to  the  erection  of  buildings,  or  the  use  of  neigh- 
boring premises. 

Commercial  Ins.  Co.  v.  Mehlman,  48  111.  313;  5  Bennett  190. 

"Contained;  in,"  as  used  in  a  fire  insurance  policy,  contem- 
plates a  limitation  of  the  risk  taken,  so  that  the  insurer  will  not 
be  liable  for  a  loss  occurring  while  the  engine  and  car  are  out 
of  the  house  in  which  they  were  described  as  contained  in. 

Annapolis,  Etc.,  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Baltimore  F.  Ins.   Co.,  32  Md.   37;   5 
Bennett  258. 

"Deliver  in,"  as  used  in  a  fire  insurance  policy,  means  de- 
liver in  writing. 

Davis   v.    Scotland   Provincial  Ins.   Co.,   16   Up.    Can.    C.  »P.    176;    5 
Bennett  61. 

"Dwelling."     The  fact  that  the  owner  of  the  store  and  his 


COURT  DEFINITIONS  OF  INSURANCE  TERMS.  189 

clerk  slept  in  a  back  room  of  the  store  does  not  constitute  the 
store  a  dwelling. 

Cerf  v.  Home  Ins.  Co.,  44  Cal.  320;  5  Bennett  426. 

"Factory,"  as  used  in  a  fire  insurance  policy,  may  mean  a 
single  building,  or  several  when  all  are  used  for  a  common  pur- 
pose and  together  constitute  the  factory. 

Liebenstein  v.  Baltic  Fire  Ins.   Co.,  also  v.  Metropolitan  Ins.  Co., 
45  111.  301,  305;  5  Bennett  115. 

"Fireworks."  Where  a  policy  prohibited  the  keeping  of  fire- 
works, evidence  showing  that  such  articles  constitute  the  busi- 
ness of  a  "German  jobber  and  importer"  is  inadmissible  where 
the  policy  covered  that  kind  of  stock  and  permitted  assured  to 
keep  firecrackers  for  sale. 

Steinbach  v.  Ins.  Co.,  13  Wallace  (U.  S.  S.  C.)  183;  6  Bennett  394. 

"Fire  insurance  on  a  certain  quantity  of  coal"  will  cover  not 
only  the  coal  deposited  at  the  time,  but  that  deposited  since,  and 
covers  also  the  risk  arising  from  spontaneous  combustion  of 
such  coal. 

British  Am.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Joseph,  9  Lower  Can.  R.  448;  4  Bennett  161. 

"Consisting  of"  excludes  everything  not  enumerated,  so  that 
while  "Stock  in  Trade"  would  include  the  articles  sued  for,  but 
where  this  term  is  limited  in  its  meaning  by  the  words  "con- 
sisting of"  and  the  articles  sued  on  are  not  named  and  do  not 
come  under  the  meaning  of  those  articles  enumerated,  the  in- 
surer is  not  liable. 

Joel  v.  Harvey  (England),  5  Weekly  Rep.  488;  4  Bennett  185. 

"Privileged  for  a  printing  office"  will  permit  the  use  of  a 
prohibited  article  by  the  policy,  where  such  article  is  in  common 
use  among  printers,  and  this  too  where  the  case  of  such  article 
accidentally  caused  the  fire. 

Harper  v.  Albany  M.  Ins.  Co.,  17  N.  Y.  194;  4  Bennett  247; 
Harper  v.  N.  Y.  City  Ins.  Co.,  22  N.  Y.  441; 
Whitmarsh  v.  Conway  F.  Ins.  Co.,  16  Gray  (Mass.)  359; 
Niagara  F.  Ins.  Co.  v.  De  Graff,  12  Mich.  124;  4  Bennett  707. 

"Stone  dwelling  house"  will  include  a  frame  kitchen  at- 
tached; it  will  include  the  building  and  such  attachments  as  are 
usually  occupied  and  used  by  the  family  for  the  ordinary  pur- 
poses of  a  house.  A  dwelling  house  is  an  entire  thing. 

Chase  v.  Hamilton  Ins.  Co.,  20  N.  Y.  52;  4  Bennett  416. 


190  HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 

"Store  fixtures"  in  a  policy  of  fire  insurance  are  applied  to 
all  furniture  and  other  articles  in  a  shop  or  warehouse.  Evi- 
dence is  admissible  of  a  well  settled  custom  to  that  effect. 

Whitmarsh  v.  Conway  F.  Ins.  Co.,  16  Gray  (Mass.)  359;  4  Bennett 
486. 

"Change  of  title."  Partition  between  co-tenants  is  an  alien- 
ation or  change  of  title  within  the  meaning  of  a  fire  insurance 
policy. 

Barnes  v.  Union  M.  F.  Ins.  Co.,  51  Me.  110;  4  Bennett  728. 


CHAPTER  XVII. 

EXPERT  ACCOUNTING  IN  ITS  RELATION 
TO  THE  ADJUSTMENT  OF  LOSSES. 

I  will  now  take  up  the  method  of  making  up  a  statement  of 
loss  from  the  books,  and  will  show  the  wrong  and  right  way 
to  treat  that  question,  and  first,  will  show  a  statement  of  loss 
as  actually  adjusted  by  the  adjusters  (see  Exhibit  "A").  In  or- 
der to  arrive  at  a  basis  of  settlement,  they  first  ascertained 
the  profits  of  the  preceding  year,  including  freights,  but  exclud- 
ing cash  discounts,  to  be  18.63  per  cent.,  but  stated  they  figured 
discounts  on  purchases  and  a/  1  per  cent,  wastage  in  the  state- 
ment of  loss,  because  that  was  the  only  way  they  could  get  a 
depreciation  which  they  were,  in  their  judgment,  entitled  to; 
hence  settled  the  loss  as  shown  in  Exhibit  "A." 

Exhibit  "A." 

Inventory  of  stock  on  hand  Dec.  26,  1900 $42,189.71 

Subsequent  purchases  to  April  30,  1901. .  .$80,436.17 

Less  cash  discounts   .  793.31         79,642.86 


$121,832.57 

Deduct  sales  $99,321.23 

Less  profit  per  rridse.  ace.  18.63  per  cent,  on 
cost,  no  items  being  debited  or  cred- 
ited to  mdse.  other  than  mdse.,  except 
freights  15,597.69  $83,723.54 


Stock  on  hand  at  time  of  fire $38,109.03 

Deduct  1  per  cent,  for  wastage,  etc 381.09 


Cash  value  at  time  of  fire $37,727.94 

Agreed  value  of  stock  saved 8,889.35 


Total  loss    $28,838.59 

The  profits  covered  the  1  per  cent,  wastage,  because  the 
profit  of  18.63  per  cent,  was  made  on  top  of  wastage  of  all 
kinds.  Hence  the  $381.09  wastage  should  not  have  been  deduct- 
ed from  the  statement. 

191 


192  HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 

The  correct  method  of  arriving  at  the  loss  is  shown  in  Ex-, 
hibit  "B." 

Exhibit  "B." 

Inventory,  Dec.  26,  1900  $42,189.71 

Add  purchases,  including  freights    80,436.17 


$122,625.8& 

Sales    $99,321.23 

Less  18.63  per  cent 15,597.69        83,723.54 


$38,902.34 
Value  of  Salvage  8,889.35 


$30,012.99- 
Less  .00986  per  cent,  cash  discount 295.93 


Assured  should  have  collected $29,717.06 

Assured  did  collect   28,838.59 


Net  loss  to  assured  $878.47 

The  reason  for  including  freights  with  the  purchases  in  the 
correct  statement  is  that  freights  were  considered  in  arriving 
at  preceding  year's  profit,  but  discounts  were  not,  and  should 
therefore  be  applied  to  goods  destroyed  in  the  statement  of  loss. 

The  correct  measure  of  damage  is  the  market  value  not  ex- 
ceeding what  it  would  cost  the  assured  to  replace  the  property 
destroyed  with  other  of  like  kind  and  quality  at  the  time  imme- 
diately preceding  the  fire,  which,  in  merchandise,  means  bill 
cost  less  rebates  and  discounts,  if  any,  and  plus  freight  and  dray- 
age,  if  any. 

It  is  not  always  wrong  to  apply  freights  and  discounts  to 
purchases;  its  correctness  depends  on  how  you  get  at  your  ratio- 
of  profits.  So  also  cross  entries  in  merchandise  account  of  re- 
turn sales,  return  purchases,  rebates,  allowances,  etc.,  are  all  im- 
portant factors  in  getting  at  the  profits,  and,  in  figuring  a  state- 
ment of  loss,  the  important  question  is  in  knowing  how  and 
when  to  apply  them. 

The  whole  question  is  one  of  bookkeeping.  The  following 
are  some  hypothetical  statements  of  how  profits  are  arrived  at. 


EXPERT  ACCOUNTING.  193 

Showing1  Hypothetical  Book  Statements  of  Loss,  and  Methods 
of  Showing  Profits. 

I  will  now  not  only  prove  the  correctness  of  the  statement  as 
shown  in  Exhibit  "B'k  by  giving  some  hypothetical  statements 
of  the  method  of  correctly  figuring  profits  of  the  preceding^ 
year's  business  and  how  to  apply  those  profits  in  arriving  at  the 
amount  of  stock  on  hand  at  the  time  of  the  fire,  showing  the 
correct  method  (see  Exhibit  "D")  and  the  method  adopted  by 
the  adjusters  in  arriving  at  the  profit  (see  Exhibit  "C")  and 
the  wrong  manner  in  which  they  applied  the  discounts  (see  Ex- 
hibit "E"). 

To  make  the  statement  perfectly  clear  I  will  treat  it  as 
though  the  entire  stock  dealt  in  consisted  of  one  kind  of  mer- 
chandise and  will  have  to  assume  that  each  article  weighed  the 
same,  cost  the  same,  was  sold  for  the  same  and  did  not  fluctuate 
in  price.  I  will,  therefore,  call  the  articles  sacks  of  coffee  which 
cost  $12.50  per  sack  or  bag,  less  4  per  cent,  cash  discounts  if 
paid  in  10  days  and  5  per  cent,  freight  drayage  on  the  net  cash 
price,  making  the  net  cash  cost  of  each  bag  $12.60.  In  the 
course  of  a  year's  business  1  per  cent,  of  the  amount  of  the 
coffee  handled  is  lost  through  wastage  and  other  ways  of  han- 
dling, resacking,  etc.,  hence 

Exhibit  "C." 

Profit  statement  for  year  1904.     (In  this  statement  freights 
are  included  but  not  discounts.) 
Stock   on   hand   January    1,    1904,  10,000  bags   coffee 

at  $13.10    $131,000.00 

Purchased  during  the  year,  including  freights,  20,000 

bags  at  $13.10   262,000.00 

Goods  to  be  accounted  for  January  1,  1905,  not  for-~ 

getting  that  1  per  cent.,  or  300  bags,  were  lost  in 

wastage,  rehandling,  etc $393,000.00 

The  inventory  of  January  1,  1905,  accounts  for  8,700 

bags  at  $13.10   113,970.00 

The  difference  shows  the  cost  of  all  goods  that  were 

sold,  wasted,  stolen  or  given  away  to  have  been.  .$279,030.00 
We  also  know  that  this  $279,030.00  represents  21,300 

bags  of  coffee;  we  also  know  that  300  bags  went 

to  wastage  in  some  shape  or  other  as  the  books 

show  that  21,000  bags  of  coffee  were  sold  for $330,102.00 

These  21,000  bags  having  cost,  as  shown  above 279,030.00 

The  profit  exclusive  of  discounts  is  the  difference $51,072.00 


194  HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 

The  ratio  of  profit  on  cost  is  18.3034  per  cent.,  but  as  before 
explained  this  profit  excludes  cash  discounts,  but  includes  freight 
as  part  of  the  cost  of  the  goods,  hence  our  statement  of  loss 
must  be  treated  in  same  manner  and  made  up  exclusive  of  dis- 
counts until  the  amount  of  the  goods  burned  is  ascertained  and 
then  the  ratio  of  cash  discounts  must  be  deducted!  as  shown  in 
Exhibit  "D,"  which  follows: 

Exhibit  "D." 

(Same  method  as  Exhibit  "B,"  and  proves  correctness  of 
Exhibit  "B.") 
Stock  on  hand  January  1,  1905,  8,700  bags  coffee  at 

$13.10  $113,970.00 

Subsequent  purchases,   17,400  bags  at  $13.10 227,940.00 


$341,910.00 

Sales   (18,270  bags)    $287,204.00 

Less  18.3034  per  cent,  profit 44,435.04      242,769.36 


$99,140.64 
Cash  discounts  4  per  cent,  on  bill  cost,  but  only  3.8168 

per  cent,  on  bill  and  freight  cost 3,784.00 


Net  loss   $95,356.64 

Exhibit  "E." 
(Same  method  as  used  in  Exhibit  "A.") 

Stock  on  hand  January  1,  1905 $113,970.00 

Subsequent  purchases  and  freights $227,940.00 

Less  3.8168  per  cent,  discount 8,700.00      219,240.00 


$333,210.00 

Sales    $287,204.00 

Less  18.3034  per  cent,  profit 44,435.04      242,769.36 


$90,440.64 
Wastage  1  per  cent 904.40 


Net  loss $89,536.24 

Now  we  know  we  have  7,569  bags  coffee  on   hand, 

worth  $12.60  each    $95,369.40 


Hence  the  assured  would  be  a  loser  by  this  method  to 

the  tune  of   .  $5,833.16 


EXPERT  ACCOUNTING.  195 

Exhibit  "F." 
(Profit  statement,  all  articles  figured  net.) 

1904  inventory,  10,000  bags  at  $12.60 $126,000.00 

Purchases,  20,000  bags  at  $12.60 252,000.00 


30,000  bags  of  coffee  to  be  accounted  for  Jan.  1, 

1905 $378,000.00 

1905  inventory  accounts  for  8,700  bags  at  $12.60 $109,620.00 


Leaving  21,300  bags  coffee  that  went  out  of  the 

house  that  cost   $268,380.00 

Sold  21,000  bags  and  300  bags  went  to  waste,  sales..  330,102.00 


Profit    :  $61,722.00 

Ratio  of  profits  22.998  per  cent. 

Exhibit  "G." 

Statement  of  loss: 

Inventory   1905    $109,620.00 

Purchases    219,240.00 


$328,860.00 

Sales $287,204.40 

Less  22.998  per  cent 53,701.09      233,503.40 


On  hand  at  time  of  fire $95,356.60 

Exhibit  "H." 
Statement  of  loss  by  quantities: 

1905  inventory  and  purchases 26,100  bags 

Sold  18,270  bags 
Wasted         261  bags   ...18,531  bags 


Leaving  on  hand  at  time  of  fire ....  7,569  bags 

At  $12.60   '. $95,369.40 

Note  the  small  difference  of  4  cents  in  statements  of  loss 
in  Exhibits  "D"  and  "G"  from  th,e  actual  loss  as  shown  in  Ex- 
hibit "H,"  which  is  due,  no  doubt,  to  the  ratio  of  profits,  but 
a  4-cent  error  in  a  loss  of  $95,000  is  of  no  importance. 


196  HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 

Before  giving  any  more  hypothetical  statements  of  loss 
and  methods  of  arriving  at  profits  it  may  be  worth  while  to 
make  a  few  statements  concerning  the  treatment  of  inventories, 
discounts,  freights,  etc. 

The  inventory  should  be  closely  scrutinized  and  the  prices 
carefully  compared  with  the  bills  of  purchases  made  prior  to 
the  date  of  the  inventory.  Of  course,  it  is  out  of  the  question 
to  compare  every  item  or  even  half  of  them,  but  enough  com- 
parisons may'be  made  to  convince  you  either  of  its  correctness 
or  of  its  having  been  loaded.  I  remember  settling  a  loss  in  one 
of  the  Southern  States  (and  by  the  way  Southern  merchants 
have  quite  a  proneness  for  loading  their  inventories  from  5  per 
cent,  to  20  per  cent,  to  cover  cost  and  carriage,  but  making  no 
deductions  whatever  for  cash  discount)  where  the  adjusters 
offered  assured  a  sum  that  I  thought  should  settle  the  loss,  but 
I  could  not  induce  the  assured  to  settle.  Finally  I  went  through 
their  books  again.  Beginning  with  the  inventory,  I  found  that 
the  price  of  each  article  would  divide  by  6.  I  then  taxed  them 
with  having  loaded  their  inventory  20  per  cent.  They  never 
did  admit  it,  but  the  loss  was  adjusted  upon  the  figures  offered 
by  the  adjusters.  Draw  your  own  conclusions  as  to  whether 
I  was  right  or  wrong. 

If  the  prices  in  an  inventory  have  been  loaded  5  per  cent, 
each  price  per  article  can  be  divided  by  1.05,  if  loaded  10  per 
cent,  then  by  11,  if  loaded  20  per  cent,  then  by  6,  and  if  loaded 
33  1/3  per  cent.,  each  price*  can  be  divided  by  4. 

In  taking  their  inventories  very  few  if  any  merchants  ever 
deduct  anything  from  the  cost  of  the  goods  for  cash  discounts, 
and  I  have  never  known  any  of  them  to  do  so,  but  quite  a  num- 
ber do  add  a  percentage  to  cover  cost  of  freight  and  drayage. 

If  the  loss  requires  you  to  go  into  the  books,  commence 
with  the  inventory  and  get  it  down  to  a  cost  basis,  not  by  depre- 
ciation (I  will  treat  of  depreciation  later)  but  by  deducting  cash 
discounts  and  adding  the  freights,  then  go  back  to  the  next  pre- 
ceding inventory  and  treat  it  in  the  same  manner.  Remember 
both  inventories  must  always  be  treated  alike,  add  to  the  last 
preceding  inventory  the^purchases  less  the  cash  discounts  the 
assured  could  have  gotten  if  he  had  discounted  all  bills,  then 
add  freight  and  drayage  on  purchases  only,  being  careful  to 
eliminate  freight  and  drayage  on  goods  sold  or  on  goods  sold 
and  returned.  Get  the  net  purchases,  deducting  goods  pur- 
chased and  returned  to  seller,  and  allowances  made  on  pur- 
chases. The  inventory  and  purchases  of,  I  will  say  year  1904, 


EXPERT  ACCOUNTING.  197 

gotten  at  in  this  manner  show  the  cost  of  the  goods  to  be  ac- 
counted for  on  January  1,  1905.  The  January  1,  1905,  inventory 
deducted  from  the  sum  of  1904  inventory  and  purchases,  shows 
the  cost  of  the  goods  that  went  out  of  the  house.  (See  Exhibit 
"C.")  This  amount  deducted  from  the  net  amount  of  sales 
shows  the  profit. 

To  arrive  at  the  percentage  of  profit  on  cost  divide  the  cost 
of  goods  sold  into  the  profit.  In  getting  the  sales  take  the  gross 
sales,  less  goods  sold  and  returned,  also  deduct  from  the  sales 
allowances  and  rebates  made  on  same,  but  never  deduct  cash 
discounts  allowed  assured's  customers,  the  reason  being  if  1904 
was  a  good  year,  with  money  plentiful,  a  larger  proportion  of 
his  customers  would  discount  their  bills  than  in  1905  if  busi- 
ness was  dull  and  money  tight,  as  in  that  case  assured  would 
be  a  considerable  loser  by  the  operation.  If,  on  the  other  hand, 
conditions  were  reversed  and  a  greater  proportion  of  bills  were 
discounted  in  1905  than  in  1904,  your  company  would  be  the 
loser.  If  the  profits  arrived  at  in  the  methods  shown  be  abnor- 
mally large,  unless  the  assured  can  give  you  some  satisfactory 
reason  therefor,  you  may  rest  assured  the  last  inventory  has 
been  loaded.  Then  you  had  better  go  back  two  or  three)  years 
and  ascertain  what  profits  he  had  been  in  the  habit  of  making. 

And  don't  go  off  half  cocked  and  offer  to  settle  your  loss 
arrived  at  by  the  ratio  of  profits  made  last  year  until  your 
investigation  is  complete,  suppose,  for  instance,  his  business 
last  year  was  entirely  retail,  on  which  his  profits  were  37J/2  and 
this  year  he  had  branched  out  into  the  jobbing  business  as  well 
as  retail  and  is  making  or^ly  20  per  cent.,  or  he  may  be  handling 
an  article  this  year  on  which  he  makes  a  small  profit,  but  which 
swells  his  sales',  very  materially,  and  you  are  liable  to  do  your 
company  out  of  quite  a  neat  little  sum  of  money.  Better  make 
a  thorough  inquiry  into  the  class  of  goods  handled  as  compared 
with  last  year.  And  as  to  making  up  statement  of  loss  don't 
you  think  the  safer  plan  is  first  to  draw  the  other  fellow's  fire? 
L,et  him  make  up  his  claim  against  you,  see  what  he  wants,  it's 
easier  to  criticise  and,  maybe  he  won't  ask  you  to  pay  as  much 
as  you  contemplated  paying.  The  assured,  better  than  any  one 
else,  knows  what  his  loss  actually  is  if  everything  is  burned. 
You  are  in  the  dark  and  had  better  find  out,  if  you  can,  all  he 
knows  about  it  before  expressing  your  own  opinion.  If  he  is 
honest  you  can  get  him  to  present  an  honest  claim;  if  he's  not, 
you  are  no  worse  off. 


198  HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 

DISCUSSION  OF  DEPRECIATION  AND  ITS  RELATION 
TO  PROFITS. 

As  to  the  question  of  profits,  it  is  not  only  not  always  right 
to  base  your  profits  in  the  statement  of  loss  on  the  result  of  the 
preceding  year's  business  on  account  of  the  harm  it  may  do 
your  company,  but  sometimes  it  may  harm  the  assured  just  as 
much,  as  he  may  have  made  a  much  larger  profit  during  the  cur- 
rent year  than  he  did  during  the  year  preceding. 

Almost  every  adjuster  has  met  with  losses  where  the  as- 
sured kept  a  daily  record  of  his  profits  by  putting  the  cost  price 
of  the  articles  sold  in  one  column,  and  the  selling  price  in  an- 
other, the  difference  being  the  profit.  This  method  is  not  sat- 
isfactory and  is  never  correct,  notwithstanding  the  assured's 
statement  that  it  is  infallible.  Nothing  will  prove  its  mistakes 
until  the  year's  business  is  wound  up,  when  the  inventory  will 
be  found  to  be  far  short  of  what  the  system  would  show  the 
stock  on  hand  ought  to  be,  and  the  reason  is  this:  such  a  system 
deals  merely  with  the  goods  actually  sold  and  in  so  far  as  they 
are  concerned  it  might  be  correct  provided  the  profits  were 
figured  accurately  in  every  instance,  which  is  almost  impossible, 
but  in  every  business,. small  or  large,  there  is  more  or  less  steal- 
age  and  mistakes,  not  only  by  employes,  but  by  shoplifters  and 
non-employes,  there  is  more  or  less  wastage  and  leakage;  from 
causes  too  numerous  to  mention,  and  if  you  don't  believe  it,  just 
interview  the  proprietors  of  some  of  the  large  department  stores. 
All  these  leaks  and  wastage  from  different  causes  amount  to  a 
very  large  sum  in  the  course  -of  the  year,  and  are  not  provided 
for  by  the  system  of  figuring  profits  daily.  This  system,  how- 
ever, is  a  very  good  one  and  enables  merchants  to  locate  the 
leaks  as  far  as  it  is  possible  to  do  so,  at  the  end  of  the  year 
when  the  inventory  is  taken,  as  the  inventory  will  show  the 
amount  of  stock  actually  on  hand  in  each  line,  whereas  the  daily 
profit  system  will  show  how  much  ought  to  be  on  hand  in  each 
line  or  department. 

There  is  no  method  of  figuring  profits  which  will  always 
pan  out  exactly  correct.  I  suggest  as  the  one  which  I  have 
found  most  satisfactory,  that  shown  in  Exhibit  "F,"  i.  e. :  where 
both  inventories  are  figured  on  a  cash  cost  basis  as  well  as  the 
purchases.  Though  the  method  used  in  Exhibit  "C"  is  just  as 
correct.  You  will  note  the  profits  in  one  are  shown  to  be 
18.3034  per  cent.,  in  the  other  22.998  per  cent.,  and  yet  in  ap- 
plying these  different  ratios  to  the  two  statements  of  loss  as 
shown  in  Exhibits  "D"  and  "G,"  both  dealing  in  the  same  quan- 


EXPERT  ACCOUNTING.  199 

tities  of  goods  as  to  inventories,  purchases,  wastage  and  sales, 
that  there  is  only  4  cents  difference  in  the  final  result.  The 
reason  the  methods  pointed  out  in  Exhibits  "C"  and  "F"  will 
not  always  pan  out  exactly  right,  is  that  the  wastage  is  figured 
on  the  total  goods  handled — that  is,  inventory  and  purchases; 
now  then  your  profits  of  18.3034  per  cent,  in  "C"  and  22.998 
per  cent,  in  "F"  were  figured  on  sales  of  $330,102.00.  If  these 
sales  had  been  larger,  the  wastage  would  not  have  interfered 
with  the  profits  in  the  same  ratio  and  consequently  the  profit 
ratio  would  have  been  increased.  And  you  will  notice  the  ratios 
are  the  same  in  the  loss  statements  as  those  in  the  profit  state- 
ment, i.  e.,  the  purchases  are  double  the  amount  of  the  inven- 
tory, the  sales  are  70  per  cent,  of  the  sums  of  the  inventory  and 
purchases  combined.  Had  this  not  been  the  case  I  could  not 
have  made  the  statements  figured  in  dollars  and  cents  agree 
so  closely  with  that  figured  in  quantities.  (See  Exhibits  "D," 
"G"  and  "H"  for  the  reasons  already  explained,  i.  e.,  the  wast- 
age interfering  with  the  profits.)  But  the  difference  is  not 
great  and  the  methods  used  in  arriving  at  profits  shown  in 
Exhibits  "C"  and  "F"  are  more  accurate  than  any  other  known 
method,  but  as  I  have  already  observed,  I  consider  that  shown 
in  "F"  the  most  satisfactory. 

As  an  evidence  of  the  importance  in  knowing  how  and 
where  to  apply  freight,  discounts  and  rebates,  and  how  to  figure 
profits,  I  remember  in  one  of  the  suits  of  the  famous  Kahn- 
weiler  v.  one  of  the  Companies,  in  the  statement  of  loss  the 
adjusters  had  applied  the  discounts  to  the  purchases,  assured's 
lawyer,  in  cross  questioning  the  company's  adjuster,  put  this 
hypothetical  question  to  him:  "Suppose  I  buy  10  pianos  at 
$100  each,  on  which  the  discounts  for  cash  payment  are  10  per 
cent.,  and  I  sell  9  for  $100  each,  according  to  your  method 
of  figuring  losses  I  am  entirely  sold  out  and  have  none  on 
hand,  whereas,  you  and  I  know  that  I  still  have  one  and  that 
it  is  worth  $90.  Is  this  not  so?"  And  Mr.  Adjuster  was  so 
confused  he  could  not  explain  it.  He  should  have  answered, 
"No."  And  if  the  lawyer  demanded  an  explanation  he  could 
have  "sewed  him  up"  by  saying  10  pianos  bought  at  $100,  less 
10  per  cent,  off  for  cash,  equals  $900.  Nine  pianos  sold  at 
$100,  less  10  per  cent,  profit  would  make  the  sales  $810,  leaving 
the  stock  on  hand  $90,  and  that's  the  method  I  used  in  figuring 
that  statement. 

If  the  assured  depreciates  his  stock  10  per  cent,  each  year 
you  have  no  right  to  take  off  a  further  depreciation  of  10  per 


200  HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 

cent,  unless  you  think  you  are  entitled  to  a  depreciation  on  top 
of  a  depreciation,  because  the  books  will  show  a  stock  on  hand 
amounting  to  10  per  cent,  less  than  an  inventory  would  amount 
to  if  it  were  taken  at  time  fire  occurred — that  is,  unless  the  pur- 
chases during  the  current  year  were  out  of  proportion  with 
former  years.  You  don't  believe  this,  you  say;  well,  I'll  prove 
it,  and  to  do  so  will  take  statements  shown  in  Exhibits  "F" 
and  "G"  and  depreciate  both  inventories  10  per  cent.  (See 
Exhibits  "I"  and  "J"  following.) 

Exhibit  "I."— Profit  Statement. 

Inventory  stock  on  hand  Jan.  1,  1904 $126,000 

Deduct  10  per  cent,  depreciation 12,600 


$113,400 
Purchases 252,000 


Goods  to  be  accounted  for"  Jan.  1,  1905 $365,400 

Inventory  of  Jan.  1,  1905,  accounts  for $109,620 

Deduct    10    per    cent,    depreciation 10,962       98,658 


Cost  of  goods  that  went  out  of  store $266,742 

These  goods  were  sold  for  330,102 


Profit    $  63,360 

Ratio  of  profit  to  cost,  23.754  per  cent. 

Exhibit  "J" — Statement   of   Loss. 

Inventory  of  stock  on  hand  Jan.  1,  1905 $109,620.00 

Deduct  10  per  cent,  depreciation   10,962.00 


$98,658.00 
Subsequent  purchases    219,240.00 


$317,898.00 

Sales    $287,204.40 

Less  23.754  per  cent,  profit  55,127.54      232,076.86 


Stock   on   hand    at   time    of   fire $85,821.14 

Stock  on  hand  at  time  of  fire  as  shown 

by   Exhibit   "H"   $95,386.60 

Less  10  per  cent,  depreciation   9,538.66        85,849.94 


Difference    $         26.80 


EXPERT  ACCOUNTING.  201 

If  the  current  year's  inventory  be  depreciated  10  per  cent., 
but  no  depreciation  whatever  be  taken  off  the  1904  inventory,  it 
will  show  a  reduction  of  over  20  per  cent,  in  the  amount  of  stock 
On  hand  at  time  of  fire  as  shown  by  the  books — that  is,  of 
course,  taking  a  reasonable  length  of  time  after  the  last  inven- 
tory when  the  sales  have  reached  the  proportion  shown  in 
Exhibit  "G."  This  may  be  easily  proven  by  depreciating  the 
1905  inventory  as  shown  in  Exhibit  "F,"  10  per  cent.,  which 
will  show  a  profit  of  $50,760,  which  is  18.171  per  cent,  on  the 
cost,  then  use  same  statement  as  shown  in  Exhibit  "G,"  except 
depreciate  the  inventory  10  per  cent,  and  use  18.171  per  cent, 
profit  on  cost  instead  of  22.998  per  cent,  and  the  statement  will 
show  a  stock  on  hand  at  time  of  fire  of  $74,856.64  instead  of 
$95,356.60,  as  shown  in  Exhibit  "G."  The  better  way  to  treat 
the  loss  would  be  to  restore  the  depreciation  on  both  inven- 
tories for  the  purpose  of  arriving  at  the  profit,  then  restore 
depreciation  on  the  last  inventory  in  making  up  statement  of 
loss  and  then  depreciate  only  the  goods  burned. 

I  very  well  remember  a  loss  that  occurred  in  one  of  the 
Western  cities  some  years  ago,  where  the  assured  had  deducted 
10  per  cent,  from  his  last  inventory  and  it  was  plainly  evident 
that  he  had  done  so,  but  he  had  not  taken  his  former  inven- 
tories in  that  way.  After  the  fire  he  claimed  that  he  had  arbi- 
trarily marked  off  10  per  cent.,  not  as  a  depreciation,  but 
merely  to  be  on  the  safe  side.  Some  of  the  adjusters  were  for 
standing  pat  on  the  value  he  had  placed  on  his  goods,  some 
were  in  favor  of  restoring  the  depreciation  on  his  inventory,  and 
that  was  what  was  finally  done.  I  favored  restoring  the  de- 
preciation for  the  purpose,  merely,  of  arriving  at  the  true  ratio 
of  profits,  then  taking  the  depreciated  inventory  as  a  basis  to 
start  our  statement  of  loss.  If  a  merchant  is  not  bound  by 
the  value  he  places  on  his  own  goods,  what  value  is  binding? 
Can  he  say  to  himself  and  his  stockholders,  we  will  depreciate 
these  goods  10  per  cent,  and  enter  them  in  their  books  at  the 
depreciated  value,  then  in  case  of  fire  say  to  the  insurance  com- 
panies, it  was  all  a  mistake,  the  goods  were  worth  100  cents 
on  the  dollar  and  not  90  cents,  as  shown  by  the  books? 

Of  course,  with  up-to-date  merchants  the  custom  is  to  keep 
the  price  of  goods  down  to  real  value  in  taking  inventories. 
Most  of  them  ignore  both  freight  and  cash  discounts,  and  the 
insurance  company  is  in  such  cases  entitled  to  whatever  per 
cent,  the  discounts  exceed  freights.  But  the  great  majority 
of  merchants  do  not  take  off  enough  depreciation;  they  tell 
you  they  have  marked  everything  way  down,  but  make  them 


202  HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 

show  you  what  goods  were  marked  down  and  how  much.  Study 
the  inventory  and  study  the  purchases  and  sales,  and  where 
there  is  any  part  of  the  stock  left,  study  its  character  and  suit- 
ableness for  the  market  in  which  it  was  to  have  been  sold* 
Sometimes  a  day  or  so  spent  in  this  sort  of  work  and  posting 
yourself  as  to  conditions,  will  repay  your  company  for  the  cost 
of  your  time  and  expenses. 

Unquestionably  your  company  is  a  subscriber  to  one  of 
the  mercantile  agencies.  If  not,  they  should  be,  and  you  should 
be  furnished  with  a  full  and  complete  report  on  every  mercan- 
tile loss  you  are  called  upon  to  adjust.  I  remember  a  few 
years  ago  at  a  Hannabal  (Mo.)  fire,  the  assured  either  added 
a  flat  $50,000  to  their  last  inventory  or  else  lied  to  their  cred- 
itors, because  after  the  fire  they  issued  a  circular  letter  to 
their  creditors,  giving  a  copy  of  their  statement  of  loss  as 
adjusted  with  the  insurance  companies,  the  amount  of  the  in- 
ventory showed  $50,000  in  excess  of  what  they  had  stated 
it  amounted  to  in  their  statement  to  Dun  and  Bradstreet.  Their 
explanation  to  their  creditors  was,  they  had  concealed  $50,000 
they  had  owed,  and  had  reduced  their  inventory  that  amount  in 
their  statement  to  mercantile  agencies  to  make  things  even. 
If  they  would  lie  once  they  would  lie  twice,  maybe  they  lied 
about  owing  that  $50,000  which  they  concealed  from  their 
creditors,  and  maybe  they  lied  to  the  insurance  companies  when 
they  handed  in  the  amount  of  their  inventory  as  being  $50,000 
in  excess  of  the  amount  they  had  stated  it  to  be  to  their  cred- 
itors. At  any  rate  the  truth  would  have  been  known  and  possi- 
bly the  companies  wou4d  have  been  saved  $50,000  if  the  ad- 
justers had  taken  the  precaution  to  have  gotten  a  special  report 
from  Bradstreet  or  Dun. 

How  many  independent  adjusters  representing  a  long  list 
of  companies  in  every  large  fire  are  subscribers  to  a  mercantile 
agency?  I  dare  say  not  half  a  dozen  in  the  whole  country,  and 
yet  it  is  information  they  should  not  be  without.  Every  one 
of  them  should  be  a  subscriber  to  Dun  or  Bradstreet.  If  not, 
they  are  just  as  certain  to  overpay  some  loss  as  that  daylight 
follows  night. 

Sample  Page  Merchandise  Account  on  Ledger  and  Statement 
of  Loss  Therefrom — Profits  in  Manufacturing  Plant. 

The  following  is  a  fair  sample  of  a  merchandise  account  as 
it  appears  in  the  ledger  of  a  merchant's  book: 


EXPERT  ACCOUNTING. 


203 


1904. 


1904. 


"       31 
"       31 
Feb.  28 
"       28 
Mar.  31 
"       31 
Apr.  30 
"       30 
May  31 
"      31 
June  30 
"       30 
July  31 
"       31 
Aug.  31 
"       31 
Sep.  30 
"       30 
Oct.  31 
"       31 
Nov.  30 
"       30 
Dec.  31 
"       31 
"       31 

Me 
P. 

Ise.   Pur. 
Ret. 
Pur. 

&  A'. 

10,800 
700 
8,600 
375 
9,675 
567 
6,756 
437 
7,693 
842 
6,957 
359 
10,764 
653 
12,786 
689 
19,436 
347 
10,798 
878 
11,745 
1,087 
8,649 
983 
51,306 

"       31 
Feb.  28 
"       28 
Mar.  31 
31 
Apr.  30 
"       30 
May  31 
31 
June  30 
"      30 
July  31    ' 
"       31 
Aug.  31 
"       31 
Sep.  30 
"       30 
Oct.  31 
31 
Nov.  30 
"       30 
Dec.  31 
"       31 
"       31 

1    Inv 

Ret  

250 
10,575 
325 
16,425 
435 
12,150 
193 
14,236 
178 
20,789 
237 
15,283 
364 
19,476 
113 
8,679 
147 
17,124 
236 
22,187 
475 
4,851 
122 
32,232 

Sales.  .  .  . 
Ret  
Sales.  ..  . 
Ret  

Ret. 
'        Pur 

&  A. 

Ret. 
Pur. 
Ret. 
Pur. 
Ret. 

&  A. 
&  A.'. 
&  A'. 

Sales.... 
Ret  . 

Sales.... 
Ret 

Sales.... 
Ret  . 

Ret. 
Pur 

&  A. 

Sales  
Ret  

Ret. 
Pur 

&  A. 

Sales.  .  .  . 
Ret.  .  .  . 

Ret. 
Pur 

&  A. 

Sales.  ..  . 
Ret  .  .  . 

Ret. 

&A. 

Sales.... 
Ret 

Ret. 
Pur. 
Ret. 
Pur 

&A. 

&'A. 

Sales  
Ret 

Sales.... 
Ret  

Ret. 
&  L 

&  A. 

entory 

$210,882 
1905. 
Jan.     1  To  Inventory $32,232 


31 
31 
Feb.  28 
"       28 
Mar.  31 
"       31 


Mdse.   Pur 9,786 

Ret.  &  A.  329 

Pur 9,873 

Ret.  &  A.  597 

Pur 11,397 

Ret.  &  A.  324 


$210,882 
1905. 
Jan.  31  By  Mdse.  Pur $14,287 

"       31     "         "       Ret 342 

Feb.  28     "         "       Pur 11,364 

"       28     "         "      Ret 239 

Mar.  31     "         "       Pur 17,747 

"       31     "         "       Ret..  539 


On  the  night  of  March  31,  1905,  a  fire  occurs  which  destroys 
the  greater  portion  of  the  stock.  All  bills  were  entered,  plus 
freight,  and  minus  cash  discounts,  so  that  merchandise  account 
shows  net  cost  of  stock.  But  all  cross  entries  should  be  de- 
ducted, as  the  sales  that  were  returned  are  debited  to  merchan- 
dise, not  at  cost,  but  with  the  profit  added  and  to  add  them  to 
the  purchases  is  unfair  to  the  companies;  also  purchases  that 
were  returned  to  the  seller  and  are  credited  to  merchandise 
and  should  come  out  of  the  sales  as  it  reduces  the  assured's 
profits.  A  great  many  adjusters  are  in  the  habit  of  taking  the 
ledger  footings  as  the  purchase  and  sales  and  deducting  the 
sum  of  the  returns  on  both  sides  from  the  debit  and  credit  side 
and  while  this  method  will  bring  the  same  results  as  getting 
at  the  exact  purchases,  yet  it  is  not  correct  in  this  case  to  call 
the  purchases  for  1905  $32,306,  because  they  were  not  that 
amount,  being  merely  the  debit  side  of  the  merchandise  account, 
less  the  amount  of  the  inventory,  and  if  the  statement  be  made 
up  in  that  way  it  is  confusing  and  is  liable  to  cause  you  to 
make  a  mistake.  I  will  give  an  example  of  both  ways  of 
figuring,  which  will  show  exactly  the  same  result.  (See  Ex- 
hibits "K"  and  "L.") 


204 


HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 
Exhibit  "K"— Correct   Method. 


PROFIT  STATEMENT. 

Inventory  January  2,   1904 $26,000.00 

Subsequent   purchases    $125,659.00 

Less  purchases  returned  3,075.00 

122,584.00 

Goods  to  be  accounted  for  Jan.   1,    1905 $148,584.00 

Inventory  of  January  1,  1905,  accounts  for 32,232.00 

Showing1   that   goods   that  went   out  of   store 

cost   $116,352.00 

Merchandise    sales $175,575.00 

Less  goods  sold  and  returned 7,917.00 

167,658.00 
The  difference  is  the  profit,  or $51,306.00 

A  profit  ratio  of  30.60  per  cent,  on  sales,  or  44.09  per  cent,  on  cost, 
hence  following 

STATEMENT   OF  LOSS. 

Stock  on  hand  Jan.  1,  1905,  per  inventory $32,232.00 

Subsequent   purchases    $  31,056.00 

Less  purchases  returned  1,120.00 

29,936.00 

$62,168.00 

Merchandise   sold    $  43,398.00 

Less  goods  sold  and  returned 1,250.00 

Net   sales    $  42,148.00 

Less  30.60  per  cent,   profit  on  sales 12,897.29 

29,250.71 
Book  value  of  stock  on  hand  at  time  of  fire  $32,917.?9 

Exhibit  "L." 

PROFIT    STATEMENT. 

1904  inventory  and  purchases $159,576.00 

(It  is  not;  it  is  debit  side  of  Mdse.  acct.  for 

1904.) 
Less  cross  entries,  returns  and  allowances 10,992.00 

Goods  to  be  accounted  for  Jan.  1,  1905 $148,584.00 

Inventory  Jan.  1,  1905,  accounts  for 32,232.00 

Showing  that  goods  that  went  out   of  store 

cost   $116,352.00 

Merchandise  sales  in  1904 $178,650.00 

(The  sales  were  only  $175,575.) 
Less  cross  entries  10,992.00 

167,658.00 

The  difference  is  the  profit,  or $51,306.00 

Same  as  Exhibit  "K,"  therefore  same  ratio,  hence  following 


EXPERT  ACCOUNTING. 

STATEMENT  OF  LOSS. 


205 


Stock  on  hand  Jan.  1,  1905,  per  inventory 

Subsequent  purchases $  32,306.00 

(The  purchases  were  $31,056  and  $32,306  is 
the  debit  side  of  Mdse.  acct.,  less  the  inven- 
tory.) 

Less  cross  entries,  returns  and  allowances 2,370.00 


Merchandise   sales    $  44,518.00 

(This  is  cr.  side  of  Mdse.  acct.,  and  not  sales.) 
Less  cross  entries,  returns  and  allowances 2,370.00 


$42,148.00 
Less  profit,  30.60  per  cent,  on  sales 12,897.29 


Book   value    stock    on    hand   at   time    of 
fire   


the 


$32,232.00 


29,936.00 
$62,168.00 


29,250.71 


$32,917.29 


If  the  loss  be  on  the  stock  of  a  manufacturer,  the  profit  is 
arrived  at  in  the  same  manner  except  that  pay-roll  is  added 
to  the  cost  of  the  goods  the  same  as  purchases;  also,  fuel, 
water,  heat  and  power,  but  if  labor  and  fuel  costs  about  the 
same  per  centage  of  amount  of  purchases  of  raw  material  dur- 
ing the  current  year  that  it  did  during  the  preceding  year,  it 
makes  very  little  difference  in  the  general  result  whether  cog- 
nizance be  taken  of  these  items  or  not,  it  merely  decreases  the 
profit  (see  Exhibit  "M"),  which  is  same  statement  as  Exhibit 
"K,"  except  20  per  cent,  is  added  to  purchases  for  labor  in 
manufacturing. 


Exhibit  "M." 


Inventory  Jan.   2,   1904 

Subsequent  net   purchases $122,584.00 

Labor,  fuel,  etc.,  in  manufacturing 24,5i6.80 


Goods  to  be  accounted  for  Jan.   1,   1905. 
Inventory  of  Jan.  1,  1905,  accounts  for. 


Showing  that  goods  sold  .cost. 
The  net  sales  amounted  to 


The  difference  is  the  profit. 


$26,000.00 


147,100.80 

$173,100.80 
32,232.00 

$140,868.80 
167,658.00 

$26,789:20 


A  profit  ratio  of  15.98  per  cent,  on  sales,  hence  the  following- 
STATEMENT   OF  LOSS. 


Jan.  1,  1905,  inventory 

Subsequent  purchases  net   

Labor,  fuel,  etc.,  in  manufacturing. 


$32,232.00 

29,936.00 

5,987.20 

$68,155.20 


206  HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 

Net  sales   $  42,148.00 

Less  15.98  per  cent,  profit  on  sales.. 6,735.25 


35,412.75 
Book  value  of  stock  at  time  of  fire $32,742.45 

Or  $174.84  less  than  statement  of  loss  as  shown  in  Exhibits  "K" 
and  "L." 

Ai 

If  the  amount  paid  for  labor  during  current  year  be  a 
greater  per  centage  of  the  purchases  of  raw  material  than  pre- 
ceding year  the  advantage  is  with  the  insured,  if  the  propor- 
tion was  larger  the  preceding  year,  the  advantage  is  with  the 
company. 

Why  is  it  that  insurance  companies  and  adjusters  lay  so 
much  stress  on  figuring  on  cost,  rather  than  on  sales  as  the 
merchants  and  manufacturers  do?  A  merchant  marks  his  goods 
to  sell  for  what  they  will  bring,  and  at  the  end  of  the  day  if 
his  sales  have  been  $1,500  on  goods  that  cost  him  $1,000,  he 
calls  his  profits  33  1/3  per  cent. — that  is,  on  sales.  The  insur- 
ance adjuster  calls  it  50  per  cent. — that  is,  on  cost.  What 
is  the  difference,  pray?  The  bookkeeper,  at  the  end  of  the 
year,  figures  his  profit  ratio  on  sales.  Why  stand  for  an  old 
fogy  way  of  doing  things  when  it  is  entirely  different  from  the 
methods  in  general  use  by  merchants  and  manufacturers 
throughout  the  country?  It  is  just  as  easy  to  determine  the 
ratio  of  profit  on  sales  as  it  is  on  cost,  and  a  great;  deal  easier 
to  figure  loss  by  multiplying  the  amount  of  the  sales  by  the 
profit  ratio  as  was  done  in  Statement  of  Loss  in  Exhibit  "K," 
than  it  would  be  to  divide  the  profit  ratio  on  cost — i.  e.,  44.09 
per  cent,  plus  $1.00,  into  the  amount  of  the  sales  when  both 
methods  give  practically  the  same  results  or  should  do  so  with- 
in a  dollar  or  so,  owing  entirely  to  the  accuracy  of  your  figures. 
In  this  particular  case  the  difference  is  but  .24  cents. 

I  have  known  adjusters  to  ascertain  a  merchant's  profits 
from  his  books  to  be  33  1/3  per  cent,  of  the  sales  and  in  mak- 
ing up  his  statement  of  loss  apply  that  ratio  of  profit  to  the 
cost,  and  I  am  firmly  of  the  opinion  they  did  it  because  they 
did  not  know  any  better  and  not  through  any  desire  to  harm 
the  assured. 

I  know  one  adjuster  who  was  selected  by  a  committee  of 
adjusters  because  of  his  supposed  ability  as  an  expert  accountant 
to  go  through  a  set  of  books  and  draw  off  a  statement  of  the 
loss.  He  worked  on  these  books  for  more  than  a  month,  the 
adjusters  who  employed  him  had  to  raise  his  figures  on  the  book 
statement  alone  $22,000  because  he  had  reduced  the  preceding 


EXPERT  ACCOUNTING. 


207 


year's  sales  by  deducting  the  rebates  and  allowances  on  sales, 
thereby  reducing  the  profit  ratio,  and  refusing  to  treat  the 
current  year's  sales  in  the  same  manner. 

Another  adjuster  in  adjusting  a  loss  wanted  to  deduct  from 
the  purchases  (the  debit  side  of  merchandise  account)  the  re- 
turned sales  charged  to  merchandise  without  deducting  them 
from  the  sales  or  credit  side  of  merchandise.  A  man  who  would 
make  a  mistake  of  that  kind  against  the  insured  is  just  as  apt 
to  make  one  against  his  company.  And  this  happened  only 
a  short  time  ago  and  the  adjuster  referred  to  is  looked  on  as 
a  leader  in  his  territory.  But  an  older  and  more  experienced 
adjuster  happened  to  be  on  the  loss  and  finally  convinced 
him  of  his  mistake. 

Accurate  Method  of  Apportionment — Treatment  of  Fraud 
Losses,  and  Losses  Where  Books  Should  Be  Ignored. 

As  to  certain  criticism  of  my  statements  of  loss  I  will  say 
I  attempted  to  make  it  clear  that  all  of  them  were  supposed 
to  be  computed  in  dollars  from  the  books.  The  statement  by 
count  was  given  merely  as  an  illustration  to  prove  the  correct- 
ness of  the  book  statement.  If  a  count  might  be  had  of  the 
goods  on  hand  at  the  time  of  the  fire,  there  would  be  no  use 
in  trying  to  determine  the  ratio  of  profits,  or  making  a  long 
drawn  out  statement  concerning  them.  It  would  be  necessary 
only  to  apply  the  market  price  to  each  article,  making  it  short 
and  to  the  point  as  was  shown  in  Exhibit  "H." 

The  following  is  a  very  good  rule  for  the  apportionment 
of  the  loss  to  the  policies,  and  is  as  nearly  perfect  as  it  is  pos- 
sible for  human  rules  to  be.  The  loss  is  $71,836.93,  the  insur- 
ance $87,593.78,  consisting  of  one  policy  of  $60,000,  one  of 
$8,625,  one  of  $7,031.42  and  one  of  $11,937.36.  We  first  find  the 
loss  ratio  to  each  $1,000  of  insurance  which  is  $820.1145. 


3,000 
4,000 
5,000 
6,000 
7,000 
8,000 
9,000 
10,000 

1,640.2290   ' 
2,460.3435 
3,280.4580   ' 
4,100.5725 
4,920.6870 
5,740.8015 
6,560.9160 
7,381.0305 

820.1145 
820.1145 
820.1145 
820.1145 
820.1145 
820.1145 
820.1145 
820.1145 

2,460.3435 
3,280.4580 
4,100.5725 
4,920.6870 
5,740.8015 
6,560.9160 
7,381.0305 
8,201.1450 

Hence   following  apportionment,   a  $60,000  policy   will  pay   10 
times  as  much  as  $6,000,  or  $49,206.87. 


208 


HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 


We  divide  the  $11,937.36  policy  as  follows:    $10,000.00  pays  $8,201.14 


The  $7,031.42  policy  is  divided  as  follows: 


The   $8,625   policy   is    divided   as   follows: 


Total  paid  by  all  the  policies, 


1,000.00 

820.11 

900.00 

738.10 

30.00 

24.60 

7.00 

5.74 

.30 

.2R 

.06 

.05 

7,000.00 

6,740.80 

30.00 

24.60 

1.00 

.82 

.40 

.33 

.02 

.02 

8,000.00 

6,560.92 

600.00 

492.08 

20.00 

16.40 

5.00 

4.10 

$71,836.93 


All  done  by  changing  the  decimal  in  the  table  from  right 
to  left  or  vice  versa  as  the<  case  may  be.  I  never  use  but  one 
column  of  figures  shown  in  the  table  and  that  is  the  last  or 
right  hand  column.  The  figures  prove  themselves,  as  when  you 
have  added  what  $1,000  pays  to  the  amount  paid  by  $9,000,  the 
result  will  be  ten  times  the  sum  that  $1,000  pays,  otherwise 
you  will  have  made  a  mistake.  The  other  figures  in  the  table 
are  given  to  make  the  method  perfectly  clear. 

Having  given  a  number  of  book  statements  in  my  former 
letters  and  I  hope  having  made  them  clear  to  the  mind  of  the 
average  man,  I  will  take  up  the  adjustment  of  some  losses 
where  the  books  ought  to  be  left  out  of  the  adjustment  or 
method  of  arriving  at  the  loss. 

Some  years  ago,  I  was  appointed  by  the  companies  as  ap- 
praiser on  a  fraud  loss  in  an  Illinois  town.  We  found  on  ar- 
riving at  the  place  that  all  of  the  goods  had  been  removed 
from  the  building  where  the  loss  occurred,  to  a  building  some 
distance  away,  the  goods  all  straightened  out  and  inventoried. 
The  insurance  was  about  $10,000  or  $12,000.  The  saved  goods 
inventoried  about  $1,800  or  $2,000.  The  adjusters  claimed  as- 
sured's  stock  never  was  over  $3,500,  and  I  think  they  were 
right.  I  found  assured  had  shipped  a  lot  of  old  goods  that 
he  had  collected  together  in  St.  Louis,  that  he  bought  a  few 
goods  subsequently  and  I  believe  obtained  a  lot  of  fraudulent 
bills  for  a  great  deal  more  than  he  bought,  judging  from  the 
class  of  people  he  bought  of.  I  obtained  from  other  merchants 
information  to  the  effect  that  their  purchases  from  St.  Louis 
amounted  to  so  many  dollars  and  that  the  freight  paid  on  same 
was  a  certain  per  cent. 

Taking  the  assured's  freight  bills  and  giving  him  credit 
for  the  same  ratio  of  purchases  to  the  amount  of  freight  paid 
by  him,  it  would  have  given  him  a  stock  of  about  $3,500.  And 


FORM  OF  PROOF;    STATEMENT;    IRON-SAFE  CLAUSE.          209 

that  would  have  been  a  perfectly  fair  method  of  settling  his 
loss,  because  his  were  the  commonest  kind  of  goods,  whereas 
the  several  merchants  from  whom  I  obtained  the  information 
dealt  in  a  much  better  grade  or  class  of  goods.  Therefore,  it 
is  plain  that  if  goods  costing  25c  to  50c  per  yard,  and  boots 
and  shoes  costing  $25.00  to  $36.00  per  dozen,  can  be  shipped 
from  St.  Louis  to  the  town  where  the  fire  was  for  one-half  per 
cent,  of  their  value  the  same  kind  of  goods  costing  only  half 
as  much  would  cost  one  per  cent,  of  their  value  for  transporta- 
tion. So  that  a  $25.00  freight  bill  paid  on  the  better  class  of 
goods  would  mean  the  bill  of  g.oods  amounted  to  $5,000,  where- 
as on  the  poorer  quality  it  would  mean  but  $2,500.  But  my 
co-appraiser  wouldn't  stand  for 'that  way  of  figuring  at  all, 
and  the  umpire  stood  with  him.  And  as  the  adjusters  had 
ordered  the  assured  to  remove  his  stock  to  another  building, 
the  damaged  goods  separated  from  the  undamaged  and  an  in- 
ventory made  of  the  stock,  the  assured  forthwith  complied  with 
their  requirements,  thereby  destroying  all  evidence  of  the  total 
loss  or  rather  placing  the  claim  in  such  condition  that  they 
were  not  in  position  to  disprove  his  claim  for  a  large  amount 
of  totally  destroyed  goods.  Just  think  of  them  placing  them- 
selves at  the  mercy  of  that  rascal,  with  over  $10,000  insurance 
involved,  for  the  sake  of  .preserving  the  salvage  on  a  stock  that 
was  not  worth  $2,000!  Had  they  insisted  on  the  stock  remain- 
ing where  it  was,  they  would  have  shown  to  the  appraisers  the 
impossibility  of  assured's  claim  for  total  loss  by  the  space 
the  saved  stock  occupied  and  the  conditions  and  appearances 
of  the  store.  The  other  appraiser  and  umpire  salted  the  com- 
panies for  about  $8,000,  and  would  have  given  assured  about 
$1,700  more,  only  the  other  appraiser  got  too  smart  and  I 
tripped  him  on  some  figures. 

Suppose  on  arriving  at  the  scene  of  the  loss  you  find  the 
fire  has  caused  practically  a  total  loss  in  so  far  as  the  value 
is  concerned,  but  the  greater  part  of  the  property  can  be  identi- 
fied for  the  purpose  of  taking  an  inventory,  and  from  its  con- 
dition and  relative  position  it  then  occupies,  it  gives  you  a 
pretty  fair  idea  of  what  the  total  loss  is  as  well  as  the  char- 
acter and  amount  of  the  entire  stock  on  hand  immediately  b'e- 
fore  the  fire.  In  such  cases  don't  permit  the  goods  to  be  re- 
moved or  put  in  order  until  you  have  some  good  evidence  by 
other  merchants  of  the  condition  of  affairs,  or  until  your  loss 
is  adjusted.  If  an  appraisal  has  to  be  had,  let  the  appraisers 
see  it  as  you  saw  it.  Don't  look  at  the  books,  bring  into  play 
all  the  good  "horse"  sense  at  your  command.  If  the  goods 

14 


210  HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 

have  been  knocked  off  the  shelves  or  have  been  thrown  on  the 
floor,  sometimes,  but  not  always,  get  the  insured  to  replace  them 
on  the  shelves  in  as  near  the  same  order  as  they  were  before 
the  fire.  When  this  is  done  it  will  refresh  his  memory  as  to 
what  he  had  there  that  was  totally  obliterated  by  the  fire,  and 
will  help  you  to  judge  as  to  the  truth  or  falsity  of  the  claim. 

How  many  times  has  the  friction  of  a  $3,000  stock,  rubbing 
against  $10,000  insurance,  caused  a  fire?  How  many  times  in 
such  cases,  where  the  fire  caused  a  50  per  cent,  to  75  per  cent, 
damage  to  such  a  stock,  has  all  evidence  of  the  value  been 
destroyed  by  removing  and  conditioning  the  stock.  To  save 
$750  to  $1,500  from  the  salvage,  many  young  and  inexperienced 
adjusters  have  destroyed  all  evidence  their  companies  had  to 
establish  the  value  of  the  stock.  If  they  had  insisted  on  the 
stock  being  kept  intact  until  they  could  have  called  in  two  or 
three  responsible  people  to  take  an  inventory,  cautioning  them 
to  look  carefully  into  conditions  and  circumstances  of  the  stock, 
noting  the  class  of  goods  and  what  proportion  if  any  of  it, 
could  have  been  or  was  actually  burned  beyond  identification, 
thus  making  of  them  good  witnesses  for  you,  should  you  be 
forced  into  court.  It  might  also  be  a  good  idea  to  photograph 
the  stock  before  allowing  it  to  be  handled  even  for  the  pur- 
pose of  inventorying  it. 

Remember  it  is  hard  to  burn  the  heels  of  boots  and  shoes. 
It  is  hard  to  burn  a  book.  A  fire  that  will  burn  a  full  bolt  of 
cloth  is  very  apt  to  entirely  destroy  the  shelving  which  held 
it,  and  while  the  remnants  of  such  articles  may  not  be  a  cor- 
rect basis  on  which  to  fix  the  value  of  the  thing  destroyed"  it 
will  at  least  serve  you  in  forming  a  fair  estimate  as  to  quan- 
tities destroyed. 

I  very  well  remember  that  when  I  first  commenced  adjust- 
ing losses  I  was  called  to  San  Antonio,  Texas,  on  a  wholesale 
and  retail  grocery  loss.  It  was  badly  damaged  by  a  flash 
fire.  There  were  two  or  three;  other  youngsters  who  had  fully 
as  much  experience  as  I  did,  so  we  appointed  our  committees, 
I  being  in  charge  of  the  one  on  the  books.  We  had  assured 
send  their  books  to  us  at  the  Menger  Hotel  and  we  proceeded 
to -wade  through  them,  they  showed  a  hopelessly  total  loss.  We 
could  see  everyone  looking  at  us  as  we  supposed  wondering 
how  such  young  men  secured  such  important  positions. 

Every  adjuster  has  no  doubt  at  some  time  or  other,  felt 
his  importance  and  knows,  therefore,  how  we  felt.  Well,  as  I 
say,  we  had  figured  out  a  total  loss,  we  hadn't  asked  the  as- 
sured if  they  would  accept  a  total  as  we  were  waiting — merely 


EXPERT  ACCOUNTING.  211 

out  of  courtesy  though,  for  the  arrival  of  another  adjuster,  one 
of  the  older  ones — (Mr.  J.  R.  Polak)  (now  of  Atlanta,  Georgia). 
When  he  came  he  looked  over  our  statement,  took  our  word 
that  the  schedule  of  insurance  was  correct,  examined  his  own 
policy  and  then  asked  us  to  show  him  the  loss.  We  introduced 
him  to  the  assured,  he  asked  for  a  small  blank  book  and  com- 
menced taking  down  the  various  items,  he  and  the  assured 
agreeing  on  damages  and  the  amount  of  goods  totally  destroyed 
as  they  went  along.  In  about  two  and  a  half  hours  the  loss 
was  adjusted  at  about  65  cents  on  the  dollar  and  then  I  began 
wondering  how  in  the  world  I  secured  my  job  and  how  I  was 
going  to  hold  it,  but  did  not  look  quite  so  important  about 
the  hotel  as  I  had  for  several  days  previous  thereto.  This 
merely  shows  that  we  either  had  no  brains,  or  that  we  were 
acting  like  machines  following  a  beaten  path  and  forgetting  to 
bring  into  play  what  common  sense  we  had.  It.  shows,  too, 
that  an  adjuster  wants  to  consider  carefully  what  is  the  best 
method  for  handling  the  particular  loss  he  is  rolled  upon  to 
adjust  and  that  no  fixed  rule  will  govern  all  casos. 

I  also  had  a  loss  where  nearly  if  not  quite  all  of  a  stock 
of  nearly  $100,000  that  was  badly  damaged  by  fire  could  be  in- 
ventoried. Assured  claimed  to  have  taken  an  inventory  which 
was  completed  twenty-four  hours  before  the  fire,  but  the  ex- 
tensions and  additions  were  not  complete.  The  adjusters  did 
not  like  the  looks  of  things  and  had  another  inventory  made, 
which  was  $9,000  less  than  the  one  assured  made  before  the 
fire.  Then  recourse  was  had  to  the  books,  which  showed  the 
inventory  made  by  the  adjusters  was  about  correct.  So  you 
see  the  books  sometimes  play  an  important  part  and  sometimes 
they  don't. 

As  to  buildings,  if  you  don't  know  how  to  make  an  estimate 
of  the  cost  to  rebuild,  learn.  Get  a  carpenter,  a  brick  mason, 
a  plasterer  and  a  painter  to  show  you  how  to  make  an  estimate, 
then  when  you  are  sent  to  adjust  a  loss,  tell  the  assured  to 
hire  a  builder  to  represent  him,  let  assured  sit  down  with  you 
and  his  builder  and  give  you  a  description  of  his  building,  then 
you  and  his  builder  make  your  estimate  agreeing  on  each  item 
as  you  go  along.  This  method  will  save  money  for  your  com- 
pany, and  will  post  you  so  that  in  a  very  short  time  you  will 
know  all  about  it,  and  nearly  always  get  your  loss  adjusted. 

Don't  take  any  stock  in  estimates  of  so  much  per  cubic 
foot.  If  you  get  within  500  cubic  feet  of  the  right  measure  you 
will  still  have  to  guess  at  the  price  per  cubic  foot,  for  if  7l/2 


212  HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 

cents  per  cubic  foot  don't  land  you  where  you  wish  it  to,  maybe 
9  cents  will  and  there  you  are,  it's  a  guess  from  start  to  finish. 
You  would  not  dare  agree  with  assured  on  the  price  per  cubic 
foot  unless  you  first  knew  the  number  of  cubic  feet,  which  is 
proof  enough  the  rule  won't  work. 

The  estimate  in  detail,  is  the  most  accurate  method  known 
and  is  easily  mastered  in  a  few  months'  time. 

POINTS  RAISED  ON  A  LOSS  IN  ACTUAL  PROCESS  OF 
ADJUSTMENT. 

There  is  now  in  process  of  adjustment  a  loss  involving  the 
rules  qr  principles  laid  down  in  Exhibits  "I"  and  "J"  in  my 
third  letter,  but  the  adjusters  refuse  to  see  it  that  way.  They 
insist  on  figuring  it  the  wrong  way,  claiming  2^4  per  cent,  de- 
preciation on  top  of  a  depreciation  of  over  6  per  cent.,  which 
will  not  be  conceded  by  the  assured,  as  it  would  be  manifestly 
unfair  to  do  so. 

The  figures  which  are  shown  in  the  profit  Statement  No. 
1  and  Statement  No.  2  are  agreed  to  by  both  sides.  The  only 
question  left  open  for  adjustment  being  the  one  of  deprecia- 
tion, if  any.  Before  taking  up  the  statements,  I  will  say  as- 
sured charged  their  purchases  less  all  discounts  to  merchan- 
dise account,  hence  all  bills  are  entered  net,  exclusive  of  freights. 
The  inventory  was  taken  each  year  net,  i.  e.,  bill  cost,  less 
discounts,  and  plus  actual  freights  except  such  items  as  were 
reduced  for  depreciation,  the  inventory  plainly  showing  which 
goods  were  depreciated.  After  the  inventory  taken  at  cost  and 
value  was  completed,  a  flat  $2,500  was  deducted  each  year. 
Statements  of  profits  and  the  loss  follow: 

(Profit)  Statement  No.  1. 

Total  debit  side  of  merchandise  account  year  1904. .  .  .$286,892.05 
From  which  deduct  inventory  of  Jan.  1,  1904,  entered 

in  ledger  at    50,646.52 


$236,245.53 
Also    deduct    returns    and    allowances     on 

sales  debited  to  merchandise  account. $1,156.58 
And  items  that  should  have  been  charged 

to  Profit  and  Loss 70.98          1,227.56 


Making    the    gross   sales    $235,017.97 


EXPERT  ACCOUNTING.  213 

Less  reclamations  on  purchases  credited  to  merchan- 
dise account   .  21.95 


Net  purchases  for  year  1904 $234,996.02 

Freight  paid  on  purchases  for  1904 16,172.54 

Inventory  January  1,  1904 $53,146.52 

Less  depreciation   2,500.00        50,646.52 


Stock  to  be  accounted  for  Jan.  1,  1905 $301,815.08 

Of  which  the  inventory  of  Jan.  1,  1905,  ac- 
counts for $48,342.63 

Less  depreciation   2,500.00        45,842.63 


Showing   the   goods  that  went    out   of  the   store 

cost    $255,972.45 

Credit  side  of  merchandise  account  year  1904 $325,812.82 

Less   reclamations  on   purchases    credited    to 

merchandise    $21.95 

And  amounts  which  should  have  been  credited 

to  profit  and  loss 188.47  210.42 


Making  the  gross  sales $325,602.40 

Deduct  returned  sales  and  allowances  debited  to  mer- 
chandise   account    1,156.58 


Thus  showing  net  sales  for  1904  to  be $324,445.82 

As  shown  aKove  these  goods  cost  assured 255,972.45 


Making  the  gross  profit  for  year  1904 $68,473.37 

The  ratio  of  profit  on  sales  being  21.105  per  cent,  and  on 
cost  26^4  Per  cent.,  hence  following  book  statement  agreed  to 
between  assured  and  adjusters.  The  only  question  left  to  be 
determined  is  that  of  depreciation,  or  sound  cash  value  at  time 
of  fire,  hence 

(Loss)  Statement  No.  2 

Debit  side  of  merchandise  account  year  1905 $246,459.74 

Less  inventory  of  Jan.  1,  1905,  as  entered  in  ledger. . .     45,842.63 


$200,617.11 


214  HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 

Deduct  returned   sales   and   allowances     on 

sales    $1,042.45 

And  items  not  merchandise   .  55.75  1,098.20 


Making   gross    purchases   for    1905 $199,518.91 

Deduct    reclamations    on    purchases    108.10 


Net  purchases  year  1905  $199,410.81 

Net   freight    on   purchases    of    1905 13,521.65 


Credit   side   merchandise   account    1905 $237,381.29 

Less  reclamations  on  purchases    $108.10 

And  items  not  merchandise 166.21  274.31 


Gross  sales  for  year  1905 $237,106.98 

Less  returned  sales  and  allowances 1,042.45 


Net  1905  sales   $236,064.53 

Inventory  stock  on  hand  Jan.  1,   1905 $  48,342.63 

Less  depreciation 2,500.00 


Value  of  stock  Jan.  1,  1905,  as  entered  in  ledger. $  45,842.63 

Net  purchases  as  previously  shown 199,410.81 

Net  freight  on   purchases 13,521.65 


$258,775.09 

Net  sales  as  shown  above $236,064.53 

Less  profit  on  cost,  26^4  per  cent. 49,820.33       186,244.20 


Stock  on  hand  at  time  of  fire $  72,530.89 

Agreed  value  of  stock  in  annex  building  not  covered. .       2,414.00 


Book  value  of  stock  insured  as  agreed $  70,116.89 

Which  adjusters  want  to  depreciate  2^  per  cent.       1,752.92 


Company  adjusters  want  to  adjust  loss  at $  68,363.97 

My  claim  is  that  the  profit  takes  care  of  the  depreciation. 
(See  my  third  letter,  Exhibits  "I"  and  "J")  and  that  if  an  in- 
ventory could  have  been  taken  of  the  stock  on  hand  at  time 
of  fire  it  would  have  amounted  to  $75,030.89,  from  which  the 
companies  would  be  entitled  to  $2,500  depreciation  following  as- 
sured's  usual  custom  of  depreciating  the  stock  $2,500  each  year. 
In  this  the  adjusters  say  I  am  wrong.  To  prove  the  correct- 


EXPERT  ACCOUNTING.  215 

ness  of  my  position,  I  will  make  up  a  statement  for  the  year 
1904  treating  it  precisely  as  the  adjusters  want  to  treat  the 
assured's  loss. 

Statement  No.  3. 

Inventory  stock  on  hand  Jan.  1,  1904 $  53,146.52 

Less  depreciation 2,500.00 


Value  of  stock  as  entered  in  ledger. $  50,646.52 

Net  purchases  for  1904  as  heretofore  shown 234,996.02 

Net  freight   on   1904  purchases    16,172.54 


$301,815.08 

Net  sales  1904  as  heretofore  shown $324,445.82 

Less  26^4  per  cent,  profit  on  cost  or  21.105 

on  sales    .  68,473.37      255,972.45 


Stock  on  hand  at  time  of  fire  book  value $  45,842.62 

Deduct  2Y-2  per  cent,  depreciation   1,146.06 


Net  value   on  basis  adjusters  want  to  adjust  as- 
sured's  loss    $  44,696.57 

Now  we  know  that  statement  No.  3  is  not  correct,  because 
that  statement  only  shows  a  stock  on  hand  of  $44,696.57,  and 
we  know  that  assured  did  at  that  time  take  an  inventory  of 
their  stock  then  on  hand,  and  that  it  amounted  to  $48,342.63,. 
that  after  they  had  depreciated  all  articles  that  ought  to  be 
depreciated,  they  arbitrarily  deducted  $2,500  more  depreciation.. 

This  proves  that  the  profits  take  care  of  the  depreciation.. 
It  proves  that  the  insurance  companies  get  the  benefit  of  the 
depreciation  in  a  book  statement.  It  proves  that  assured,  if  he 
could  have  taken  an  inventory  of  the  stock  he  had  on  hand  at 
the  time  of  fire,  would  have  had  a  larger  amount  to  depreciate 
than  his  books  will  show,  and  it  proves  the  correctness  of  the 
position  taken  in  Exhibits  "I"  and  "J." 

To  further  substantiate  the  correctness  of  my  position,  I 
will  suppose  that  each  article  of  merchandise  dealt  in  is  a 
suite  of  furniture  and  that  its  net  cost  is  $10.00  each,  and  apply 
those  prices,  as  nearly  as  possible,  to  the  foregoing  statement.. 
See  (Hypothetical)  Statement  No.  4,  following: 


216  HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 

(Hypothetical)  Statement  No.  4. 

January,  1904,  inventory,  5,314  suites  at  $10.00 $  53,140.00 

Net  purchases  1904,  25,117  suites  at  $10.00 251,170.00 


To  be   accounted  for  Jan.   1,   1905,  30,431   suites 

at  $10.00    $304,310.00 

Inventory  Jan.    1,   1905,   accounts   for  4,834   suites   at 

$10.00    48,340.00 


Making  the  sales  for  1904,  25,597  suites  at  $10.00. $255,970.00 
These  goods  were  sold  for .   319,962.50 


Gross  profit  is   the   difference,   or $63,992.50 

Which  is  25  per  cent,  on  cost  or  20  per  cent,  on  sales. 
Jan.  1,  1904,  stock  on.  hand,  4,834  suites  at  $10.00....$  48,340.00 
Net   purchases    1905,   21,293   suites   at   $10.00 212,930.00 


Total   inventory   and   purchases,   26,127   suites   at 

$10.00  $261,270.00 

Sold   18,624  suites  at  $12.50 $232,800.00 

Less  25  per  cent,  profit 46,560.00       186,240.00 


Stock  on  hand  at  time  of  fire $  75,030.00 

Foregoing   statement  shows   that: 

Inventory    and    purchases    were    26,127  suites 

That   sales   were    18,624  suites 

Necessarily  there  were  left  7,503  suites  at  $10.00..$  75,030.00 

On  the  $75,030,  the  companies  would  be  entitled  to  a  de- 
preciation of  $2,500  because  the  assured  had  been  in  the  habit 
of  taking  that  amount  off  each  year. 

As  was  noted  in  Letter  No.  3,  Exhibits  "I"  and  "J,"  the 
only  fair  way  to  treat  a  loss  where  assured  has  arbitrarily  taken 
off  a  percentage  of  flat  depreciation,  is  to  restore  it  in  the 
beginning  of  the  statement  and  take  off  the  depreciation  that 
assured  has  been  in  the  habit  of  taking  off,  and  more  besides  if' 
you  are  entitled  to  it. 

The-  loss  referred  to  in  this  letter  is  on  a  wholesale  furni- 
ture stock,  common  and  medium  priced  stuff.  You  will  note 
from  the  statements  that  assured's  sales  are  six  times  greater 
than  the  inventories,  that  the  sales  less  the  profits  show  that 
assured  turned  the  stock  five  times  in  a  year.  To  do  this  they 
could  Mot  have  had  a  very  heavy  depreciation.  An  old  or  out 
of  date  stock  won't  sell  that  fast,  but  when  a  wholesale  furni- 


EXPERT  ACCOUNTING.  217 

ture  merchant  can  get  rid  of  his  stock  five  times  in  one  year, 
he  is  going  some.  This  particular  merchant  is  ordering  the 
same  kind  of  goods  as  were  destroyed  by  the  fire  and  is  pay- 
ing about  5  per  cent,  more  for  about  half  of  them  than  he 
paid  before  the  fire  and  none  are  any  cheaper.  Why  should  his 
stock  be  depreciated  under  these  circumstances?  If  you  owned 
it  would  you  stand  for  depreciation?  Yet  one  of  the  adjusters 
on  this  loss  insists  that  assured  is  unfair  and  unreasonable  be- 
cause he  will  not  submit  to  a  further  depreciation  than  he 
himself  deducted  in  January.  I  esteem  him  as  a  level-headed 
adjuster  and  among  the  top-notchers  in  the  profession.  I  am 
sure  he  wants  to  be  fair,  but  in  this  case  it  seems  to  me/  he  is 
biased.  All  of  us  are  human  and  sometimes  even  an  adjuster 
errs,  or  as  David  Harum  expresses  it,  "There's  as  much  human 
nature  in  some  folks!  as  th'  is  in  others,  if  not  more." 

The  foregoing  described  loss  was  finally  adjusted,  the  basis 
of  settlement  being  as  follows:  The  depreciation  of  $2,500  de- 
ducted from  the  inventory  in  January,  1905,  was  restored,  and 
then  5  per  cent,  depreciation  deducted  from  the  total  stock  on 
hand  at  time  of  fire,  which  makes  the  loss  to  the  insurance 
companies  $68,986.05,  a  fair  and  square  deal  for  both  sides. 


218  HALL  ON  INSUKANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 


CHAPTER  XVIII. 

FORM   OF  PROOF  AND  STATEMENT   OF 
LOSS  ACTUALLY  ADJUSTED— IRON- 
SAFE  CLAUSE— APPRECIATION. 

The  following  is  a  model  form  of  proof  of  loss,  which  may 
look  simple  enough,  but  at  the  time  worried  the  adjusters  not 
a  little,  as  at  least  seven  different  sets  of  proofs  could  have 
been  made,  but  all  were  embraced  in  the  one  form  set  out  as 
follows: 

CLAIM  FOR  LOSS 

Under  policy  No of  the 

Insurance  Company  of  

By  your  policy  of  insurance,  issued  at  your  Podunk,  Texas, 
agency,  the  number,  date,  expiration,  amount  of  policy  and  the 
amount  claimed  thereunder  being  shown  in  "Schedule  of  In- 
surance and  Apportionment  of  Claim"  here  to  attached,  you  in- 
sured Richard  Roe  Company,  the  party  herein  and  therein 
named,  against  loss  or  damage  by  fire  in  the  amount  shown  in 
said  "Schedule  of  Insurance  and  Apportionment  of  Claim"  on 
the  following  described  property: 

$ On  stock  in  trade  in  building  No.  232  W.  Commerce 

street,  $150,000.  Total  concurrent  insurance  per- 
mitted. 

$ On  stock  in  trade  in  building  Nos.  234  and  236  W. 

Commerce  street,  $250,000.  Total  concurrent  in- 
surance permitted. 

$ On  stock  in  trade  in  building  Nos.  238  and  240  W. 

Commerce  street,  $150,000.  Total  concurrent  in- 
surance permitted.  All  in  the  city  of  Podunk, 
Texas. 

(Iron-safe  clause  attached  to  policy.  Exact  wording  of 
policy  is  not  given  on  account  of  its  length.) 

A  fire  occurred  at  about  2  o'clock  a.  m.,  November  19,  1900, 
and  originated  in  building  Nos.  238  and  240  W.  Commerce 
street,  occupied  by  us  as  a  wholesale  grocery,  from  cause  un- 
known to  assured  or  his  affiant,  which  damaged  and  destroyed 
assured's  property  insured  by  you  under  said  policy,  as  shown 
in  "Statement  of  Loss"  hereto  attached. 

219 


220  HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 

There  was  no  other  insurance  except  such  as  is  shown  in 
"Schedule  of  Insurance  and  Apportionment  of  Claim"  hereto 
attached.  All  of  the  insurance  on  each  stock  is  concurrent  in 
form.  Note — Those  policies  dated  prior  to  July  3,  1900,  only 
permitted  $220,000  total  insurance  on  stock  in  building  Nos.  234 
and  236  W.  Commerce  street  and  were  changed  by  endorsement 
to  permit  $250,000  total  insurance,  and  those  which  permitted 
but  $100,000  total  insurance  on  stock  in  building  Nos.  238  and 
240  W.  Commerce  street  were,  by  endorsement,  changed  to 
permit  $150,000  total  insurance.  The  "Schedule  of  Insurance 
and  Apportionment  of  Claim"  shows  which  stock  and  how  much 
each  policy  covered  at  the  time  of  fire,  if  any  of  them  did 
not  insure  the  property  in  that  manner  when  first  written,  they 
were  subsequently  made  to  do  so  by  endorsement. 

At  the  time  your  policy  was  issued  and  at  the  time  of  the 
fire,  the  said  property  insured  by  you  was  owned  by  Richard 
Roe  Company  and  there  has  been  no  change  in  the  title,  use, 
occupation,  location,  possession  or  exposure  of  said  property 
since  the  issuance  of  your  policy. 

There  was  no  mortgage  or  other  encumbrance  on  any  part 
of  said  property. 

The  actual  cash  value  of  the  property  insured  by  you  and 
the  amount  of  loss  claimed  thereon  is  shown  in  "Statement  of 
Loss"  hereto  attached. 

The  assured  occupied  all  of  the  following  buildings  on  W. 
Commerce  street  for  wholesale  purposes  as  follows:  No.  232 
as  boot,  shoe,  hat,  cap  and  clothing  store;  Nos.  234  and  236 
as  dry  goods  and  notion  store;  Nos.  238  and  240  as  a  grocery 
store,  and  for  no  other  purpose. 

Richard  Roe  Company's  claim  against  your  company  or 
association,  by  reason  of  said  loss,  damage  and  policy  of  insur- 
ance, is  shown  in  "Schedule  of  Insurance  and  Apportionment  of 
Claim"  hereto  attached. 

All  statements  and  schedules  hereto  attached  are  hereby 
sworn  to  and  made  part  of  these  proofs. 

Podunk,  Texas,  December  21,  1900. 

RICHARD  ROE  COMPANY, 

(By  John  Doe,  President.) 

(Usual  form  of  oath  before  notary,  and  certificate  of  notary 
follows.) 


FORM  OF  PROOF;    STATEMENT;    IRON-SAFE  CLAUSE.  221 

STATEMENT  OF  LOSS. 

Richard  Roe  Company— (Exhibit  "A.") 

Statement  of  loss  in  building  No.  232  W.  Commerce  street: 
Stock  on   hand   at   time   of  fire   per  inventory   taken 

after  fire   $108,092.82 

Freight  and  marine  insurance  in  excess  of  cash   dis- 
counts           2,215.90 


Agreed  book  value  of  stock $110,308.72 

Add  5  per  cent,  appreciation  per  agreement 5,515.44 


Agreed    cash    market    value $115,824.16 

Salvage  apportioned  to   this   stock 85,726.47 


Net  loss  and  damage  $  30,097.69 

Note. — As  to  disposition  and  apportionment  of  salvage  see 
Exhibit  "B." 

Exhibit  "B." 

Statement  of  loss  in  Building  Nos.  234  and  236   W.   Com- 
merce street: 

Inventory  stock  on  hand  January  1,  1900 $285,531.10   - 

Add  subsequent  purchases    616,203.01 

And  purchases  received  in  stock  subsequent  to  Jan- 
uary 1,  but  paid  for  and  charged  to  merchandise 
prior  thereto  2,364.75 


$904,098.86 
Contra. 

Returns  and  allowances  on  sales  charged 

to   merchandise    , $  11,040.74 

Merchandise  in  transit 6,766.10 

Received  prior  to  January  1,  1900,  but 
paid  for  and  charged  subsequent 
thereto  53,066.91 

Cash  charged  to  merchandise  by  default- 
ing clerk  2,000.00 

Sales    since   Jan.    1,    1900 $684,842.64 

Less  credited  to  mer- 
chandise a/c  to 
entry  of  default- 
ing clerk  .  ..$2,000.00 


222  HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 

Returns      and      allow- 
ances   on    sales. .  .11,040.74 
Sold,  not  removed....   1,044.76     14,085.50 


Net  sales    $670,757.14 

Less     28.88     per     cenl. 

profit    150,306.02 

520,451.12 

Stock  in    warehouse    at    508-10    Market 

street    10,220.63 

Stock  in  building  238  and  240  W.   Com- 
merce   street    2,682.26      606,227.76 


$297,871.76 
Freights  and  marine  insurance  exceed  cash  discounts 

2.05   per   cent 6,106.35 


$303,977.45 
Deduct  in  compromise  to  agree  with  adjusters 236.95 


Book  value  of  stock  in  buildings  232,  234  and  236 $303,740.50 

Agreed   appreciation   5   per   cent 15,187.02 


Agreed    cash    market   value $318,927.52 

Deduct   cash  market  value   of  stock  in  building   No. 

232  W.  Commerce  street   115,824.16 


Cash   market  value   stock  in  234  and  236  W.   Com- 
merce street   $203,103.36 

Salvage   apportioned   to  this   stock 81,136.83 


Agreed  loss  and  damage   $121,966.53 

Note. — The  Notion  stock  in  second  story  of  Nos.  234  and 
236  W.  Commerce  street  was  damaged  to  such  an  extent  that 
it  was  found  impossible  to  inventory  it  correctly;  but  the  first 
story  and  basement  stock  was  saved  in  a  damaged  condition 
and  inventoried  (cost  price),  $96,782.24.  The  companies  took 
the  stock  in  both  buildings  at  its  agreed  value,  invited  mer- 
chants and  wreckers  from  Chicago,  Kansas  City,  San  Antonio, 
Waco,  Galveston,  Dallas  and  Houston  to  bid  for  the  stock  at 
open  sale  December  19,  1900.  After  deducting  all  expenses,  the 
salvage  netted  $166,863.30,  of  which  $81,136.83  was  apportioned 
ta  the  stock  in  building  Nos.  234  and  236  W.  Commerce  street 
and  $85,726.47  to  stock  in  No.  232  W.  Commerce  street. 


FORM  OF  PROOF;    STATEMENT;    IRON-SAFE  CLAUSE.          223 

Exhibit  "C." 

Statement  of  loss  in  building   Nos.  238  and  240  W.   Com- 
merce street: 

Grocery  department.  Assured  took  an  inventory 
every  Saturday  evening  as  to  quantities,  but  did 
not  place  the  prices  on  the  articles;  hence,  hav- 
ing taken  an  inventory  on  Saturday  evening,  No- 
vember 17,  1900,  and  the  fire  having  occurred 
early  the  following  Monday  morning,  no  sales 
or  purchases  having  in  the  meanwhile  been 
made,  all  that  was  necessary  was  to  price  the 
goods,  make  the  extensions  and  additions,  which 

when  completed  amounted  to $  87,328.59 

Add    for    merchandise    from    dry    goods    department, 

as    shown   in    Exhibit  "B." 2,682.26 

Goods  on  consignment   1,586.23 


$  91,597.08 

Inventory  of  stock  saved    $31,433.04 

Less  agreed  damage    15,751.99         15,681.05 


Agreed    loss    and   damage $  75,916.03 

SCHEDULE   OF  INSURANCE  AND   APPORTIONMENT  OF   CLAIM. 


I 

Stock  in  Bldg. 
232  W.  Commerce 

Stock  in  Bldg. 
234-36  W.  Oom'erce 

Stock  in  Bldg. 
238-40  W.Com'ce 

Grand  Total 

Ins. 

Claimed 

Ins. 

Claimed 

Ins. 

Claimed 

Ins. 

Claimed 

A... 
B 

$62,250 

$16,521.88 

$62,250 
116,250 
34,000 
32,500 
16,000 
12,500 
127.000 

$16,521.88 
67,573.50 
83,402.07 
14,158.53 
11,205.83 
8,336.66 
76,786.78 

$116,250 

$67,573.50 

ft 

$34,000 

$33,402.07 

D.. 
TJ 

15,000 

8,981.18 

17,500 
11,250 

10,172.35 
6,539.37 

4,750 
7,000 
81,525 

4,666.46 
6,876.90 
30,970.60 

F.. 

a.. 

5,500 
80,650 

1,459.76 
8,134.87 

64,825 

37,681.31 

$113,400 

$30,097.69 

$209,825 

$121,966.53 

877,275 

$75,916.03 

$400,500 

$227,980.25 

The  dates  and  numbers  are  not  given  on  account  of  space  it  would 
require. 

There  are  ninety-seven  policies.  I  have  consolidated  them  into 
seven. 


224  HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 

THE  EFFECT  OF  THE  IRON-SAFE  CLAUSE. 

It  will  be  seen  from  the  foregoing  statements,  that  assured'^ 
books  for  their  grocery  stock  were  kept  separate  from  the 
others,  and  consequently  they  complied  with  the  iron-safe  clause 
in  so  far  as  that  stock  was  concerned.  But  there  was  a  techni- 
cal, if  not  a  flagrant,  violation  of  the  iron-safe  clause  on  the 
other  two  stocks,  because  both  were  kept  track  of  by  one  set 
of  books,  and  had  both  buildings  been  wholly  destroyed  the  as- 
sured could  have  shown  by  their  books  the  sum  total  of  both 
stocks,  but  it  would  have  been  impossible  to  have  shown  the 
value  of  either  one  separately.  But  the  fact  that  the  contents 
of  one  store  was  saved  intact,  no  goods'  being  destroyed  there- 
in, enabled  the  assured  to  show  the  value  of  the  stock  in  each, 
building.  (See  Exhibits  "B"  and  "A.") 

While  a  great  many  of  the  adjusters  took  non -waiver  agree- 
ments, yet  there  was  no  attempt  made  by  them  to  penalize  the 
assured  for  a  violation  of  the  iron-safe  clause.  As  we  all  know,, 
the  clause  is  a  warranty.  The  Missouri  Court  of  Appeals  holds 
that  a  warranty  is  in  the  nature  of  a  condition  precedent  in  the 
contract  and  no  inquiry  is  allowed  as  to  the  materiality  of  the 
fact  warranted.  Brooks  v.  Standard  Ins.  Co.,  11  Mo.  App.  349. 
1st  Phillips,  Sec.  755,  gives  practically  the  same  definition. 

I  am  not  ready  to  admit  that  this  is  so,  in  so  far  as  the 
definition  of  a  warranty  relates  to  the  iron-safe  clause,  for 
where  is  the  insurer  harmed  by  reason  of  a  breach  of  such 
warranty,  if  the  loss  be  only  a  damage  to  the  goods  in  sight 
or  if  a  partial  loss  and  some  of  the  goods  be  wholly  destroyed 
and  the  assured  abandons  claim  for  such  goods  and  only  claims 
a  damage  on  those  that  can  be  identified?  Yet,  on  the  other 
hand,  the  insurance  companies  might  claim,  and  with  some 
reason,  they  would  not  have  been  on  the  risk  at  all  had  they 
known  the  facts  in  the  case. 

However,  for  the  sake  of  argument,  let  us  concede  the 
Missouri  doctrine  as  to  the  meaning  of  a  warranty  does  apply 
to  the  iron-safe  clause  and  that  assured  in  this  particular  case 
did  not  so  keep  their  books  as  to  show  a  true  record  of  sales 
and  purchases  in  each  store,  but  that  they  were  so  kept  as  to 
show  the  aggregate  in  both  stores,  then  those  policies  of  com- 
panies "A"  and  'B"  would  be  void  entirely,  "E"  void  as  to  the 
amount  covered  in  building  Nos.  234  and  236,  "F"  void  as  to 
the  amount  covered  in  building  No.  232.  Those  of  companies 
"D"  and  "G"  would  be  valid.  The  reason  being  the  iron-safe 


FORM  OF  PROOF;   STATEMENT;   IRON-SAFE  CLAUSE.          225 

clause  does  not  require  the  assured,  who  has  one  set  of  policies 
which  insures  two  or  more  stores,  to  keep  a  record  of  pur- 
chases and  sales  in  each  store,  and  this,  too,  even  when  such 
policies  insure  a  specific  amount  on  each  store.  If,  however, 
under  a  statement  of  facts  he  should  have  two  other  sets  of 
policies,  one  set  covering  entirely  in  one  store,  the  other  cov- 
ering entirely  in  the  other  store,  both  sets  of  such  policies 
would  be  void  by  reason  of  breach  of  the  iron-safe  clause. 

The  iron-safe  clause  is  unlike  lines  7  and  11  of  the  standard 
policy,  in  that  it  does  not  render  the  entire  policy  void  by  rea- 
son of  breach  of  its  conditions,  but  merely  renders  void  that 
portion  insuring  the  property  to  which  the  clause  itself  refers. 

Most  of  the  courts  hold  that  the  clause  is  a  warranty  and 
that  it  must  be  strictly  complied  with.  Tennessee  holds  that  a 
substantial  compliance  is  all  that  is  necessary.  (See  McNutt  v. 
Va.  F.  and  M.  Ins.  Co.),  and  so  too  do  some  of  the  United 
States  Courts  (see  L.  and  L.  and  G.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Kearney  et  al. 
U.  S.  C.  C.  A.  8th  District,  94  Fed.  Rep.  314),  Kentucky  holds 
that  its  violation  does  not  work  a  forfeiture,  it  not  being  com- 
petent to  contract  with  the  insured  for  the  preservation  of 
testimony  in  behalf  of  either  party.  Phenix  Ins.  Co.  v.  Angel 
et  al.,  Ky.  C.  A.,  38  S.  W.  Rep.  1067. 

Where  a  promise  in  a  policy  of  insurance  is  declared  to  be 
a  warranty,  the  only  concern  of  the  courts,  in  the  absence 
of  a  contract  statutory  enactment,  is  to  ascertain  whether  or 
not  it  has  been  complied  with. 

Where  a  policy  is  issued  for  a  gross  amount  in  considera- 
tion of  a  single  premium,  paid  or  to  be  paid,  for  the  whole, 
though  part  of  the  amount  is  placed  on  a  building  and  part 
on  a  stock  of  merchandise  therein  contained,  and  by  its  terms 
becomes  void,  whether  by  reason  of  a  breach  of  the  promise 
to  make,  preserve  and  produce  an  inventory  of  the  merchan- 
dise or  by  reason  of  a  breach  of  the  condition  as  to  the  owner- 
ship of  the  ground  upon  which  the  insured  building  stands, 
the  contract  is  indivisible,  and,  though  there  be  but  one  such 
breach,  there  can  be  no  recovery. 

St.  Landry  Wholesale  Mercantile  Co.  (Ltd.)  v.  New  Hampshire 
Fire  Ins.  Co.,  113  La.  1053,  38  Southern  Reporter  (April  8,  1905) 
87. 

I  apprehend,  however,  that  in  case  part  of  the  assured's 
stock  be  burned  beyond  identification  and  the  remainder  be  not 
so  badly  damaged  but  what  it  can  be  identified,  that  most,  if 
not  all,  of  the  courts  would  hold  the  contract  valid  if  the  insured 
should  abandon  all  claim  for  loss  on  those  goods  wholly  de- 


226  HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 

stroyed,  and  try  to  enforce  collection   of  claim  on   only  such 
goods  as   could  be  identified. 

One  Set  of  Books  for  Two  Stores. 

Where  the  assured  has  two  or  more  stores,  with  one  set 
of  policies  covering  the  stocks  in  such  stores  and  one  set  of 
books  which  merely  shows  the  aggregate  sales  and  purchases 
of  all,  but  not  that  of  each  and  such  stores  be  separate  and 
distinct  risks,  being  divided  by  fire  walls,  all  openings  protected 
by  fire  doors,  there  is  but  one  safe  rule  to  follow  for  both  the 
insurance  company  and  the  insured,  and  that  is  to  write  a 
blanket  form  covering  all  of  the  stock  under  one  amount  in 
all  the  locations  which  might,  by  any  possible  chance,  be  de- 
stroyed by  one  fire,  with  an  average  clause  making  the  insur- 
ance attach  in  each  location  as  the  value  in  each  bears  to  the 
aggregate  value  in  all.  If  you  do  not  do  this,  Mr.  Agent;  and 
Mr.  Daily  Report  Examiner,  you  are  liable  to  cause  all  kinds 
of  trouble  for  both  your  adjuster  and  the  assured.  If  the  risks 
be  remote  from  each  other  so  that  in  no  possible  contingency 
will  more  than  one  of  them  be  destroyed  by  one  fire,  then 
it  is  all  right  to  write  each  for  a  specific  amount,  but  not  other- 
wise, unless  assured's  books  be  so  kept  that  they  keep  track 
of  what  goes  in  and  out  of  each  building.  Remember,  too, 
that  if  the  risks  be  located  in  a  territory  where  the  iron-safe 
clause  is  required,  that  such  clause  does  not  apply  separately 
to  each  stock  insured,  but  to  the  aggregate  business  of  all  the 
stocks  insured  and  this,  too,  whether  such  stocks  be  insured 
under  one  policy  or  a  specific  amount  on  each  or  under  a 
blanket  policy  of  one  amount  on  all.  It  seems  most,  if  not  all, 
the  courts  hold,  that  compliance  with  the  iron-safe  clause  is  a 
condition  precedent  to  recovery. 

Appreciation. 

There  is  one  point  I  wish  to  refer  to — the  item  of  5  per 
cent,  appreciation  which  the  adjusters  agreed  to.  The  insured 
had  been  engaged  in  business  for  a  great  many  years  and,  while 
the  average  rate  of  advance  in  prices  had  been  even  greater 
than  5  per  cent.,  yet  I  very  seriously  question  the  wisdom  of 
allowing  appreciation,  as  I  believe  the  depreciation  in  this  case 
should  have  offset  any  advance  in  the  price  it  cost  to  buy  a 
new  stock. 


FORM  OF  PROOF;   STATEMENT;   IRON-SAFE  CLAUSE.          227 

The  assured  is  entitled,  though,  to  whatever  it  would  cost 
him  in  cash  to  replace  his  property,  less)  whatever  depreciation 
from  any  cause  there  may  have  been  to  the  property. 

In  this  particular  case,  however,  the  adjusters  were  con- 
fronted'with  either  a  law  suit  or  allowing  the  claim  for  appre- 
ciation, after  selecting  appraisers  and  they,  being  unable  to 
agree  on  an  umpire,  adjuster  finally  decided  to  allow  the  claim, 
rather  than  be  annoyed  by  a  long  legal  fight,  especially  one  in- 
volving no  law  point,  but  entirely  on  a  question  of  fact  for 
the  jury,  for  we  all  know  in  advance  what  the  decision  will  be. 


228  HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 


CHAPTER  XIX. 

^ 

FACTS  WORTH  KNOWING. 
WEIGHTS  AND  MEASURES. 

MEASURES  OF  LENGTHS. 

12  inches   1  foot 

3  feet  1  yard 

16%  feet   1  rod 

6&  yards    1  rod 

1.760  yards— 5,280  feet 1  mile 

320  rods   1  mile 

40  rods   1  furlong 

8  furlongs   1  sta.  mile 

3  miles   1  league 

LAND— SURVEYOR'S    MEASURE. 

7.92  inches    1  link 

100  links— 66  ft.  4  rods 1  chain 

10  chains— 220  yards 1  furlong 

8  furlongs   1  mile 

10  sq.  chains— 160  sq.  rods 1  acre 

25  links   1  rod 

80  chains  1  mile 

640  acres   1  sq.  mile 

36  sq.  miles   1  township 

MISCELLANEOUS. 

1,000  mils   1  inch 

4  inches  1  hand 

6  inches  \  span 

3  inches  1  palm 

18  inches  1  cubit 

21.8  inches    1  Bible  cubit 

2%  feet    1  military  pace 

2  yards    1  fathom 

SQUARE    MEASURE. 

144  sq.  inches  or  183.3  circular  inches 1  sq.  foot 

9  sq.  feet 1  sq.  yard 

3034  sq.  yards  or  272%   sq.  feet 1  sq.  rod 

10  sq.  chains  or  160  sq.  rods  or  4,840  sq.  yards 

or  43,560  sq.   feet 1  acre 

640  acres 1  sq.  mile 

An  acre  equals  a  square  whose  side  is  208.71  feet. 

SOLID  OR    CUBIC    MEASURE. 

1,728  cubic  inches 1  cubic  foot 

27  cubic  feet   1  cubic  yard 

1  cord  wood  a  pile  4x4x8 128  cubic  feet 

1  perch  of  masonry  16%xl%xl  ft 24%  cubic  feet 

40  cubic   feet -. i  ton   (shipping) 

J.160.42  cubic  inches 1  standard  bushel 

cubic  inches 1  standard  gallon 

1  cubic  foot  equals  about  4/5  of  a  bushel. 

229 


230  HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 

LIQUID     MEASURE. 

4  gills  1  pint 

2  pints     1  quart 

4  quarts    1  gallon 

31%  gallons  1  barrel 

42  gallons  1  tierce 

2  barrels  or  63  gallons 1  hogshead 

84  gallons  or  2  tierces : 1  puncheon 

2  hogsheads  or  126  gallons 1  pipe  or  butt 

2  pipes  or  3  puncheons 1  tun 

A  gallon  of  water  at  62°  P.  weighs  8.3356  Ibs. 
The  U.  S.  gallon  contains  231  cu.  ins.,  7.4805  gal.,  1  cu.  ft. 

APOTHECARIES'    FLUID    MEASURE. 

60  minums 1  fluid  drachm 

8    drachms 1  fluid  ounce 

DRY   MEASURE,   U.   S. 

2  pints 1  quart 

8  quarts , 1  peck 

4  pecks 1  bushel 

A  bushel  contains  2,150.42  cubic  inches. 

A  bushel  contains  1.2445  cubic  feet. 

36  bushels  equal  1  chaldron. 

MEASURES    OF   WEIGHT— AVOIRDUPOIS    OR    COMMERCIAL 
WEIGHT. 

16  drachms  or  437.5  grains 1  ounce 

16  ounces  or  7,000  grains 1  pound 

28  pounds    1  quarter 

4  quarters     1  hundredweight  112  Ibs. 

20  hundredweight    1  ton  of  2,240  Ibs.  or  long  ton 

2,000  pounds    1  metric  ton 

2,240.6  pounds    1  net  or  short  ton 

14  pounds  iron,   lead,   etc 1  stone 

2iy2  stone  iron,  lead,  etc 1  pig 

8  pigs    1  f other 

100  pounds  grain  or  flour 1  cental 

100  pounds,  raisins 1  cask 

100  pounds  dry  fish    1  quintal 

100  pounds  nails    1  keg 

196  pounds  flour     1  barrel 

200  pounds  pork,  beef  or  fish .M  barrel 

240  pounds  lime   1  cask 

280  pounds  salt    1  barrel 

TROY    WEIGHT. 

24  grains  1  pennyweight 

20  pennyweights     1  ounce — 480  grains 

12  ounces    1  pound — 5,760  grains 

APOTHECARY'S    WEIGHT. 

20  grains     1  scruple 

3  scruples   1  drachm — 60   grains 

8  drachms    1  ounce — 480  grains 

12  ounces    1  pound — 5,760  grains 

The  ounce  and  pound  in  this  case  are  the  same  as  in  Troy  Weight. 

CIRCULAR   MEASURE. 

60  seconds 1  minute 

60  minutes 1  degree 

90  degrees 1  quadrant 

360  degrees 1  circle 

30  degrees 1  sign 

4  quadrants  equal  12  signs  or  360  degrees  or  circumference. 


FACTS  WORTH  KNOWING.  231 

TIME    MEASURE. 

60  seconds 1  minute 

60  minutes 1  hour 

24  hours 1  day 

7  days . . . , 1  week 

366  days — 5  hours,  48  minutes,  48  seconds 1  year 

30  days  equal  1  month  in  computing  interest. 
366  days  in  leap  year. 

CLOTH    MEASURE. 

2%  inches 1  nail 

4  nails 1  quarter 

4  quarters 1  yard 

MARINER'S    MEASURE. 

6  feet     1  fathom 

120  fathoms    1  cable  length 

7%  cable  lengths 1  mile   or   knot 

5,280  feet     1  stat.  mile 

6,086  feet 1  naut.  mile 

9  inches     1  span 

3  miles    1  league 

LINEAR    MEASURE— METRIC    EQUIVALENTS. 

1  centimeter    0.3937   in. 

1  decimeter    3.937  in.  0.328  feet 

1  meter    39.37  in.  1.0936  yards 

1  dekameter     1.9884  rods 

1  kilometer    0.62136  mile 

1  inch   2.54  centimeters 

1  foot    3.048  decimeters 

1  yard     0  9144  meter 

1  rod   0.5029   dekameter 

1  mile   1,6098  kilometer 

SQUARE   MEASURE. 

1  sq.  centimeter    0.1560  sq.  inch 

1  sq.  decimeter    0.1076  sq.  foot 

1  sq.  meter    1.96  sq.  yards 

1  are  equals    3,954  sq.   rods 

1  hektar    2.47  acres 

1  sq.  kilometer     0.386  sq.   mile 

1  sq.  inch    6.452  sq.   centimeters 

1  sq.  foot 9.?903    sq.    decimeters 

1  sq.  yard     0.8361  sq.  meter 

1  sq.  rod      0.2629  are 

1  acre    0.4047  hektar 

I  sq.  mile    2.59  sq.  kilometer 

WEIGHTS. 

1  gram     0.0527  ounce 

1  kilogram    2.2046  pounds 

I  metric  ton   1.1023  English  tona 

1  ounce    28.85   grams 

1  pound    0  4536  kilogram 

1  English  ton   0.9074  metric    ton. 

APPROXIMATE  METRIC  EQUIVALENTS. 

1  decimeter     4  inches 

1  meter     1.1  yards 

1  kilometer %  mile 

1  hektar   2%  acre 

1  stere  or  cubic  meter *4  cord 

1  liter 1.06  quarts  liquid 

0.9  quart  dry 

1  hektoliter     2  %    bushels 

1  kilogram     ,2  1/5  pounds 

1  metric  ton   2,200  pounds 


232  HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 

TO   FIND   CAPACITY   OF  TANKS  AND   BINS. 

TO    FIND    CAPACITY    OF    TANKS    AND    BINS. 

To  find  number  of  cubic  feet  in  four-sided  tank  or  bin,  multiply 
width  by  length  by  height. 

To  find  number  of  cubic  feet  in  round  tank  or  bin,  multiply  the 
square  of  diameter  by  .7854  by  height. 

To  find  number  of  bushels  in  tank  or  bin,  multiply  the  number  of 
cubic  feet  in  same  by  .8035. 

To  find  number  of  gallons  in  tank  or  bin,  multiply  the  number  of 
cubic  feet  in  same  by  7.4805. 

CAPACITY    OF   CIRCULAR   TANKS. 

(For  each  ten  inches  in  depth.) 

2  feet  in  diameter  holds 19  gals. 

2%  feet  in  diameter  holds 30  gals. 

3  feet  in  diameter  holds 44  gals. 

4  feet  in  diameter  holds 78  gals. 

4%  feet  in  diameter  holds 99  gals. 

6  feet  in  diameter  holds 122  gals. 

6%  feet  in  diameter  holds 176  gals. 

7  feet  in  diameter  holds 206  gals. 

8  feet  in  diameter  holds 239  gals. 

9  feet  in  diameter  holds 313  gals. 

10  feet  in  diameter  holds 396  gals. 

11  feet  in  diameter  holds 489  gals. 

12  feet  in  diameter  holds  592  gals. 

13  feet  in  diameter  holds 705  gals. 

14  feet  in  diameter  holds 820  gals. 

16  feet  in  diameter  holds 959  gals. 

20  feet  in  diameter  holds 1101  gals. 

26  feet  in  diameter  holds 3059  gals. 

Tabular  view  of  the  number  of  barrels  contained  between  the  walls 
for  each  foot  in  depth. 

SQUARE    TANKS. 

6  feet  by    6  feet  holds 5.92  barrels 

6  feet  by    6  feet  holds 8.54  barrels 

7  feet  by    7  feet  holds 11.63  barrels 

8  feet  by     8  feet  holds 15.19  barrels 

9  feet  by    9  feet  holds 19.39  barrels 

10  feet  by  10  feet  holds ' 23.74  barrels 

MEASUREMENTS  AND  WEIGHTS. 

Five  stricken  measures  are  equal  to  four  heaped  measures. 
The  standard  bushel  of  the  United  States  contains  2,150.42   cubic 
Inches,  and  the  imperial  bushel  of  Great  Britain,  2,216.192  cubic  inches. 

BUSHELS  AND   BINS. 

To  find  the  number  of  bushels  in  a  bin,  divide  the  contents  in 
cubic  inches  by  the  number  of  cubic  inches  in  a  bushel,  or  in  the 
United  States,  for  all  practical  purposes,  diminish  the  number  of  cubic 
feet  by  one-fifth. 

And  to  find  the  number  of  cubic  feet  in  a  given  number  of  bushels, 
multiply  the  number  of  bushels  by  the  number  of  cubic  inches  in  a 
bushel,  and  divide  the  product  by  1,728,  or  in  the  United  States,  for 
all  practical  purposes,  increase  the  number  of  bushels  by  one-fourth. 

To  find  the  number  of  bushels  of  apples  or  potatoes  in  a  bin  (in 
the  United  States),  multiply  the  number  of  cubic  feet  by  4-5  or  by  .8. 

A  ton  of  coal  contains  36%  cubic  feet,  and  a  box  4  feet  long,  3 
feet  wide  and  3  feet  deep  contains  36  cubic  feet. 


FACTS  WORTH  KNOWING. 


233 


TO  MEASURE   CORN    IN   CRIB. 

Find  the  length,  breadth  and  depth  of  the  body  of  corn,  in  feet, 
und  multiply  these  three  dimensions  together;  then  multiply  this 
product  by  .63.  This  will  give  the  heaped  bushels  of  corn.  Some- 
times 1^4  bushels  of  ear  corn  are  allowed  for  a  bushel  of  shelled  corn, 
and  sometimes  two  bushels,  the  amount  depending  upon  the  shape  of 
the  ear,  the  size  of  the  cob,  etc. 

THE  WEIGHT  OF   HAY. 

In  estimating  the  weight  of  hay,  allow  640  cubic  feet  for  a  ton, 
if  on  the  wagon  or  newly  stored °,  but  if  well  settled  in  mow  or  stack, 
allow  512  cubic  feet.  Two  hundred  and  seventy  cubic  feet  of  baled  hay 
will  weigh  a  ton. 

NOTE — To  find  the  number  of  cubic  feet  in  a  circular  stack,  mul- 
tiply the  average  circumference  in  yards  by  itself,  and  this  product  by 
four  times  the  height  in  yards; -then  divide  this  product  by  100  and 
multiply  the  quotient  by  27.  » 

To  find    diameter  of  a  circle,  multiply  circumference  by  .31831. 
To  find  circumference  of  a  circle,  multiply  diameter  by  3.1416. 
To  find  area  of  a  circle,  multiply  square  of  diameter  by  .7854. 
To  find  surface  of  a  ball,  multiply  square  of  diameter  by  3.1416. 
To  find  side  of  an  equal  square,  multiply  diameter  by  .8862. 
To  find  cubic  inches  in  a  ball,  multiply  cube  of  diameter  by  .5236. 

CONTENTS   IN   FEET  OF  JOISTS,   SCANTLING,  AND  TIMBER. 
LENGTH   IN   FEET 


SIZE 

12 

14 

16 

18 

20 

22 

24 

26 

28 

80 

FBI 

ET  BO 

\RD  ]V 

[EAST 

FRE 

2  x  4   .. 
2x6 

8- 
12 

9 
14 

11 
16 

12 
18 

13 
20 

15 

22 

16 
24 

17 
26 

19 

28 

20 
80 

2x  8.... 

16 

19 

21 

24 

27 

29 

82 

35 

37 

40 

2  x  10 

20 

23 

27 

80 

83 

87 

40 

43 

47 

50 

2  x  12 

24 

2A 

32 

86 

40 

44 

48 

62 

66 

60 

2  x  14 

.28 

83 

87 

42 

47 

51 

56 

61 

65 

70 

8x8 

24 

28 

82 

36 

40 

44 

48 

52 

66 

•  60 

8  x  lo  . 

80 

35 

40 

45 

50 

65 

60 

65 

70 

75 

8  x  12 

86 

42 

48 

54 

60 

66 

72 

78 

84 

90 

8  x  14  

42 

49 

56 

63 

70 

77 

84 

91 

9d 

105 

4  x  14 

56 

65 

75 

84 

93 

103 

112 

121 

181 

140 

6x  6... 

36 

42 

48 

54 

60 

66 

72 

78 

84 

90 

6x8 

48 

56 

64 

72 

80 

88 

96 

104 

112 

120 

6  x  10 

60 

70 

80 

90 

100 

110 

120 

130 

140 

150 

6  x  12   

72 

84 

96 

108 

120 

132 

144 

156 

168 

180 

6  x  14 

84 

98 

112 

126 

140 

154 

168 

182 

196 

210 

8x8 

64 

75 

85 

96 

107 

117 

128 

139 

149 

160 

8  x  10 

80 

93 

107 

120 

183 

147 

160 

173 

187 

200 

8  X  12  ... 

96 

112 

128 

144 

T60 

176 

192 

208 

224 

240 

8  x  14  
10  x  10.... 

112 
100 

131 
117 

149 
183 

168 
150 

187 
167 

205 
183 

224 
200 

243 

217 

261 
233 

280 
250 

10  x  12 

120 

140 

160 

180 

200 

2-20 

240 

260 

280 

300 

10  x  14  
32  x  12.... 

140 
144 

163 

168 

187 
192 

210 
216 

233 

240 

257 
264 

280 
288 

303 
312 

827 
836 

850 

360 

12  x  14....,  

14  x  14  

168 
196 

196 

229 

224 
261 

252 
294 

280 
327 

308 
359 

836 

392 

864 
425 

392 
457 

420 
490 

234  HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 

TABLE  OF  WEIGHTS. 

Avg.  Wt. 

of  a 
Cub.  ft. 

Ibs. 

Air,  at.nospheric;  at  60°  Fah.   and  under  the  pressure  of  one 
atmosphere   or  14.7  Ib.   per   sq.    inch,    weighs   1/815   part 

as  much  as  water  at  60° 0766 

Alcohol,,    pure 49.43 

of  commerce   52.1 

proof  spirit  57.2 

Ash,    perfectly    dry average . .     47. 

1,000  feet,  board  measure,  weighs  1.748  tons. 

Ash,  American  white,   dry "       .  .     38. 

1,000  feet,  board  measure,  weighs  1.414  tons. 

Alabaster,  falsely  so  called,  but  really  marbles 168. 

real;  a  compact  white  plaster  of  Paris 144. 

Aluminum    162. 

Antimony,  cast,   6.66  to  6.74 average..  418. 

native    "       ..   416. 

Asphaltum,    1   to   1.8 "  87.$ 

Basalt "       ..   181. 

Bath  Stone,  Oolite "       ..  131. 

Bismuth,  cast.     Also  native "       . .   607. 

Bitumen,  solid.     See  Asphaltum 

Brass,  (Copper  and  Zinc)  cast,  7.8  to  8.4 "      ..  504. 

rolled   "       ..524. 

Bronze,  Copper  8  parts;    Tin  1  (Gun  Metal) "       ..  629. 

Brick,  best  pressed 150. 

common  hard   125. 

soft   inferior    100. 

Boxwood,   Dry    average . .         .60 

Calcite,    transparent    . .  169.9 

Charcoal,  of  pines  and  oaks. average.  .15  to    30. 

Chalk,   2.2  to  2.8 average..  156. 

Clay,  potters'  dry,  1.8  to  2.1         "       . .  119. 

dry,  in  lump,   loose ..     63. 

Coke,  loose,  of  good  coal average.  .23  to    32. 

Coke,  a  heaped  bushel,  loose  35  to  42  Ibs. 

Cherry,  perfectly  dry   average. .     42. 

1,000  feet,  board  measure  weighs  1.562  tons. 

Coal,  anthracite,  1.3  to  1.84  of  Penn.  1.3  to  1.7  usual 93.5- 

broken,  any  size,  loose average.. 52  to    56. 

moderately  shaken  ...        "       ..56  to    60. 
A  cubic  yard,  solid,  averages  about  1.75  cubic  yards  when 

broken   to  any  market  size,  and  loose. 
A  ton  loose,  averages  from  40  to  43  cubic  feet. 
At  54  Ibs.  per  cubic  foot,  a  cubic  yard  weighs  1,458  pounds 
—0.651  ton. 

Coal,  bituminous,  1.2  to  1.5 =0.651  ton 84. 

broken,    any   size,    loose          "       47  to    52. 

moderately   shaken  "        51  to    56. 

A  cubic  yard,  solid,  averages  about  1.75  yards  when  broken 
to  any  market  size,  and  loose. 

Chestnut,  perfectly  dry   average . .     41. 

1,000  feet,'  board  measure,  weighs  1.525  tons. 

Cement,  hydraulic,  American,  Rosendale;  ground,  loose    "       ..     56. 

Louisville,  struck  bush.   62  Ibs...     49.$ 

Copley,  struck  bush.  67  Ibs 53.6 

English    Portland,    U.    S.    struck   bush., 

by  Gilmore,   100  to  128 81  to  102. 

hydraulic,    English    Portland,    various,    weighed  by 

writer  95  to  102 76  to    81.6 

hydraulic,  English  Portland,  a  barrel  400  to  430  Ib. 
French  Boulogne  Portland,  struck  bush., 

95   to  110    76  to     88. 

Cork   15.6. 

Elm,  perfectly  dry  average. .     35. 


FACTS  WORTH  KNOWING. 


235 


Glass.   2.5   to   3.46 ..  186. 

"       common,  window  . .  157. 

"      Millville,  N.  J.,  thick  flooring  glass . .  158. 

Hemlock,  perfectly  dry   . .  25. 

1,000  feet,  board  measure,  weighs  1.971  tons. 

India   Rubber    . .  68. 

Lard    ..  59.3 

Mahogany,  Spanish,  dry  . .  63. 

Honduras,  dry   . .  35. 

Maple,  dry ..  49. 

Mica,   2.75   to  3.1 183. 

Naphtha 52.9 

Oak,  live,  perfectly  dry,  .88  to  1.02 average..  69.3 

"      white,         "  "      .66  to    .88 "       ..  48. 

"     red,  black,  etc average.  .32  to  43. 

Oils,  whale,  olive    average. .  57.3 

"      of  turpentine   . .  64.3 

Petroleum   64.8 

Peat,  dry,  unpressed  20  to  30. 

Pine,  white,  perfectly  dry,  .35  to  .46 25. 

1,000  feet,  board  measure,  weighs  .930  ton. 

"      yellow,  Northern,  .48  to  .62 34.3 

1,000  feet,  board  measure,  weighs  1,276  tons. 

yellow,  Southern,  .64  to  .80 45. 

1,000  feet,  board  measure,  weighs  1.674  tons. 

"      Heart  of  long-leafed  Southern  yellow,  unseasoned 65. 

1,000  feet,  board  measure,  weighs  2.418  tons. 

Pitch  71.7 

Powder,    slightly   shaken    62.3 

Salt,  coarse,  per  struck  bushel;  Syracuse,  N.  Y 56  Ibs 45. 

Turk's    Island,    Cadiz.  .76  to  80  62. 

St.    Barts    84  to  90  70. 

West  India    90  to  96  74. 

Liverpool    50  to  56  42. 

Liverpool,  fine,  for  table  use 60  to  62  49. 

Tallow  average . .  58.6 

Tar  "       ..  62.4 

Wines,  .993  to  1.04 "       ..  62.3 

Walnut,  black,  perfectly  dry "       . .  38. 

Wax,  bees  "       ..  60.6 


MATERIAL 


MEASUREMENTS 


WOOL 


Bale  East  India 

'     Australia    

South   America. . . . 

'    Oregon  

"     California  

Bag  Wool    

Stack  of  Scoured  Wool. 


Floor 
Space 

3.0 
5.8 
7.0 
6.9 
7.5 
5.0 


Cubic 
feet 

12. 
26. 
34. 
33. 
33. 
30. 


Gross 

340 
385 
1000 
482 
550 
200 


WEIGHTS 

Per 

Per        cubic 
sq.  ft.        foot 


113 
66 

143 
70 
73 
40 


28 

16 

29 

15 

17 

7 

5 


WOOLEN   GOODS 


Case  Flannels  

heavy 
Dress  Goods   . . . 

" .    Cassimeres    

Underwear    

Blankets    

Horse  Blankets 


6.6 

7.1 

5.5 

10.5 

7.3 

10.3 

4.0 


12.7 
15.2 
22.0 
28.0 
21.0 
35.0 
14.0 


220 
330 
460 
560 
360 
450 
250 


40 
46 
84 
62 
48 
44 
63 


17 
22 
21 
20 
16 
13 
18 


236  HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 

COTTON,   ETC. 


Bale 


8.1 

Compressed  4.1 

Dederick  Compressed. . .  1.26 

Jute    2.4 

Jute  Lashings    2.6 

Manilla    3.2 

Hemp 8.7 

Sisal    5.3 


44.2 

21.6 

3.13 

9.9 

10.5 

10.9 

34.7 

17.0 


515 
550 
125 
300 
450 
280 
700 
400 


64 

134 

100 

125 

172 

88 

81 

75 


12 
25 
40 
30 
43 
26 
20 
24 


COTTON   GOODS 


Bale  Unbleached  Jeans 

Piece  Duck  , 

Bale  Brown  Sheetings , 

Case  Bleached  Sheetings 

Case  Quilts   

Bale  Print  Cloth 

Case  Prints    

Bale  Tickings  

Skeins  Cotton  Yarn 

Burlaps    

Jute  Bagging  , 


4.0 
1.1 
3.6 
4.8 
7.2 
4.0 
4.5 
3.3 


1.4 


12.5 

2.3 

10.1 

11.4 

19.0 

9.3 

13.4 

8.8 


5.3 


300 
75 
235 
330 
295 
175 
420 
325 

iso 

100 


70 


24 
33 
23 
30 
16 
19 
31 
37 
11 
30 
24 


RAGS   IN    BALES 

White  Linen   8.5  39.5  910  107  23 

White   Cotton    9.2  40.0  715  78  18 

Brown  Cotton   7.6  30.0  442  59  15 

Paper  Shavings    7.5  34.0  507  68  15 

Sacking   16.0  -65.0  450  28  7 

Woolen    .' 7.5  30.0  600  80  20 

Jute  Butts   2.8  11.1  400  143  36 


PAPER 


Calendered  Book   

Super-calendered  Book 

Newspaper    

Straw  Board    

Leather  Board    

Writing  

Wrapping    

Manilla    . 


GRAIN 


Wheat  in  Bags. 
"         "    Bulk 


mean 

Barrels  Flour  on  side , 

on  end 

Corn   in   Bags 

Cornmeal  in  Barrels 

Oats  in  bags , 

Bale   of  Hay 

Hay,  Dederick  Compressed. 
Straw          " 
Tow 
Excelsior  " 


4.2 


4.1 

3.1 

3.6 

3.7 

3.3 

5.0 

1.75 

1.75 

1.75 

1.75 


4.2 


5.4 
7.1 
3.6 
5.9 
3.6 
20.0 
5.25 
5.25 
5.25 
5.25 


165 


218 
218 
112 
218 
96 
284 
125 
100 
150 
100 


39 


50 
69 
38 
33 

59 
64 
10 
37 


DYE  STUFFS 

Hogsheads  Bleaching  Powder  11.8  39.2  1200  102  31 

Soda  Ash 10.8  29.2  1800  167  62 

Box  Indigo 3.0  9.0  385  128  43 

"  Cutch  4.0  3.3  150  38  45 

"  Sumac  1.6  4.1  160  100  39 


FACTS  WORTH  KNOWING.  237 

80 
23 
S3 
70 
50 
69 
73 
63 
48 
34 
42 


Caustic  Soda  in  iron  drum... 
Barrel  Starch       .  ' 

4.3 

3.0 

6.8 

10.5 

600 
250 

140 
83 

3.0 

10.5 

350 

117 

Box  Extract  Logwood     •  • 

1.06 

.8 

55 

52 

Barrel    Lime        

3.6 

4.5 

225 

63 

"        Cement,  American  .  .  . 
English     .... 
"         Plaster   

3.8 
3.S 
3.7 

5.5 
5.5 
6.1 

325 
400 
325 

86 

105 
88 

3.0 

9.0 

430 

143 

"         Lard  Oil         ... 

4  3 

12.3 

422 

98 

Rope    . 

MISCELLANEOUS. 


2.7 

0.5 

139 

99 

"     Glass 

Crate   Crockery    ...              .  . 

9.9 

39.6 

1600 

162 

13.4 

42.5 

600 

52 

Bale   Leather          .... 

7  3 

12  2 

190 

26 

11.2 

16.7 

300 

27 

"    Raw    Hides 

6  0 

30  0 

400 

67 

"     Compressed 
'    Sole  Leather   

6.0 
12.6 

30.0 
8.9 

700 
200 

117 
22 

Pile  Sole   Leather 

Barrel   Granulated   Sugar.  .  .  . 
Brown   Sugar  

3.0 
3.0 

7.5 
7.5 

317 
340 

106 
113 

Cheese    . 

278 
60 
40 
14 
16 
18 
13 
23 
16 
17 
42 


MEASURES  AND  WEIGHTS  OF  VARIOUS  MATERIALS. 

(Approximate) 

Brickwork: — Brickwork  Is  estimated  by  the  thousand,  and  for  vari- 
ous thickneses  of  wall  runs  as  follows: 

8%  in.  wall,  or  1      brick  In  thickness,  14  bricks  per  superficial  foot. 

12%  in.  wall,  or  1%  brick  In  thickness,  21  bricks  per  superficial  foot. 

17      in.  wall,  or  2      brick  in  thickness,  28  bricks  per  superficial  foot. 

21%  in.  wall,  or  2%  brick  In  thickness,  35  bricks  per  superficial  foot. 

An  ordinary  brick  measures  about  8^4x4x2  inches,  which  is  equal 

to  66  cubic  inches,  or  26.2  bricks  to  a  cubic  foot.     The  average  weight 

is  4%  pounds. 

Fuel: — A  bushel  of  bituminous  coal  weighs  76  pounds  and  contains 
2686  cubic  inches  =  1.554  cubic  feet.    29.47  bushels  =  1  gross  ton. 
A  bushel  of  coke  weighs  40  Ibs.     (35  to  42  Ibs.) 

One  acre  of  bituminous  coal  contains  1600  tons  of  2240  Ibs.  per  foot 
of  thickness  of  coal  worked.  15  to  25  per  cent,  must  be  deducted  for 
waste  in  mining. 

41  to  45  cu.  ft.  bituminous  coal  when  broken  down  —  1     ton,  2240  Ibs. 


31  to  41 
123 

70.9 


1  cubic  foot  of  anthracite  coal  =  5fi  to  66  Ibs. 


anthracite,  prepared  for  market       =  1     ton,  2240  Ibs. 
of  charcoal  =  1    ton,  2240  Ibs. 

of  coke  =  1     ton,  2240  Ibs. 


bituminous  coal  —  50  to  55  Ibs. 

"  Cumberland  coal  =  53  Ibs. 

"  Cannel  coal  =  50.3  Ibs. 

"  Charcoal  (hardwood)  =18.5  Ibs. 

"  Charcoal  (pine)  =  18     Ibs. 


A  bushel  of  charcoal. — In  1881  the  American  Charcoal-Iron  Work- 
ers' Association  adopted  for  use  in  its  official  publications  for  the 
standard  bushel  of  charcoal  2748  cubic  inches,  or  20  pounds.  A  ton  of 
charcoal  to  be  taken  at  2000  pounds.  This  figure  of  20  pounds  to  the 
bushel  was  taken  as  a  fair  average  of  different  bushels  used  through- 
out the  country,  and  it  has  since  been  established  by  law  in  some 
states. 


238  HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 

ORES,   EARTHS,(  ETC. 

13  cubic  feet  of  ordinary  gold  or  silver  ore,  in  mine=  1  ton  =  2000  Ibs. 

20      ' broken  quartz  =  1  ton  =  2000  Ibs 

18  feet  of  gravel  in  bank  =  1  ton. 

27  cubic  feet  of  gravel  when  dry  =  1  ton. 

25       sand  =1  ton. 

18                         '    earth  in  bank                                                         —  1  ton. 
27                        "    earth  when  dry                                                      —  1  ton. 
17      "        "      "    clay                                                                         =  1  ton. 
Cement.— English  Portland,  sp.  gr.  1.25  to  1.61  per  bbl.     .400  to  .430  Ibs. 
Rosendale,  U.  S.,  a  struck  bushel                           .62    to  .70    Ibs. 
Lime.— A  struck  bushel                                                              .72    to  .75    Ibs. 
Grain.— A  struck  bu.  of  wheat=60  Ibs.;  cornr=56  Ibs.;  of  oats=30  Ibs. 
Salt.— A  struck  bushel  of  salt,  coarse,  Syracuse,  N.  Y =.56  Ibs. 

WEIGHT  OF   EARTH  FILLING. 

Average  Weight  in  Pounds 
Per  Cubic  Foot 

Earth,  common  loam,   loose 72    to      80 

shaken      82    to      92 

"         rammed   moderately    ....  90    to    100 

Gravel    90    to    106 

Sand     90    to    106 

Soft  flowing  mud  104    to    120 

Sand,  perfectly  wet   118    to    129 

WEIGHTS  OF  LOGS,  LUMBER,  ETC. 

WEIGHT  OF  GREEN    LOGS  TO   SCALE   1000  FEET,   BOARD   MEAS. 

Yellow  Pine  (Southern) 8000  to  10000  pounds 

White  Pine  (Michigan)  off  stump 6000  to    7000 

out   of   water 7000  to    8000 

Norway  Pine   (Michigan)    7000  to    8000 

White  Pine   (Pennsylvania)    bark  off 5000  to    6000 

Hemlock  (Pennsylvania)  bark  off 6000  to    7000 

Four  acres  of  water  are  required  to  store  1,000,000  feet  of  logs. 

WEIGHT  OF  1000  FEET  OF   LUMBER,  BOARD  MEASURE. 

Yellow  or  Norway  Pine Dry,  3000  pounds  Green,   5000  pounds 

White   Pine Dry,  2500  pounds  Green,   4000  pounds 

Weight  of  One  Cord  of  Seasoned  Wood— 128  Cubic  Feet  Per  Cord. 

i 

Hickory  or  Sugar  Maple 4500  pounds 

White  Oak 3850 

Beech,   Red  Oak  or  Black  Oak 3250 

Poplar,  Chestnut  or  Elm 2350 

Pine    (white  or  Norway) 2000 

Hemlock   bark,    dry 2200 

One  cubic  foot  of  anthracite  coal  weighs  about  53  pounds. 

One  cubic  foot  of  bituminous  coal  weighs  from  47  to  50  pounds. 

A  gallon  of  water  (United  States  standard)  weighs  8    1/3  pounds 
and  contains  231  cubic  inches. 


PACTS  WORTH  KNOWING.  239 

AMOUNT  OF  PAPER  REQUIRED  FOR  A  ROOM. 
HEIGHT  OF  WALL  TO  CEILING. 


No.  ft. 

around 

room 

8ft. 

9ft. 

10ft. 

lift. 

12ft. 

13ft. 

14ft. 

28 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

11 

12 

32 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

36 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

16 

40 

10 

11 

12 

14 

15 

16 

17 

44 

11 

12 

14 

15 

16 

18 

19 

48 

12 

13 

15 

16 

18 

19 

21 

62 

13 

16 

16 

18 

19 

21 

22 

56 

14 

16 

17 

19 

21 

22 

24 

60 

IB 

17 

19 

20 

22 

24 

26 

el 

16 

17 

18 
19 

20 
21 

22 
23 

24 
25 

26 
27 

28 
29 

i 

18 
19 

20 
21 

22 
23 

24 
26 

27 
28 

29 
30 

i 

22 

25 

27 

30 

32 

34 

II 

21 
22 

23 
24 

26 

27 

28 
30 

31 
32 

33 
35 

ii 

92 

23 

26 

28 

31 

34 

37 

39 

96 

24 

'  27 

30 

32 

35 

38 

41 

100 

25 

28 

31 

34 

37 

40 

43 

104 

26 

29 

32 

35 

38 

41 

44 

108 

27 

30 

33 

36 

40 

43 

46 

112 

28 

31 

34 

38 

42 

44 

48 

116 

29 

32 

36 

39 

43 

46 

60 

120 

30 

33 

37 

40 

45 

48 

61 

EXPLANATION. 

Look  for  height  of  ceiling  at  top  of  column,  number  of  feet  of  wall 
around  the  room  in  the  left-hand  column;  in  angle  will  be  found  the 
number  of  single  rolls  required. 


EXAMPLE. 

Number  of  feet  around  the  room,  36;  height  of  wall  of  ceiling,  11 
feet;  in  the  angle  will  be  found  twelve  rolls.  Subtract  one  roll  for  each 
opening. 

FOR    CEILING. 

Multiply  the  length  of  room  by  the  breadth,  divided  by  30,  and  the 
result  will  be  the  number  of  rolls  required. 

FOR    BORDER. 

Divide  the  number  of  feet  around  the  room  by  3,  and  it  gives  you 
the  number  of  yards  of  border  required. 

There  are  8  yards  in  a  roll  of  18-inch  border,  and  —  yards  in  a 
roll  of  9 -inch  border. 


240 


HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 


Table    showing  number    of    square    feet    in    veneered   doors    upon 
which  prices   are   based. 

HEIGHT. 


Width 

6.8 

6.10 

7 

7.2 

7.4 

7.6 

7.8 

7.10 

8 

8.2 

8.4 

8.6 

8.8 

8.10 

9 

2.2 

17.6 

17.6 

17.6 

If  '.6 

17.6 

17.6 

17.6 

17.6 

17.6 

18. 

18. 

18.6 

19. 

19. 

19.6 

2.4 

17.6 

17.6 

17.6 

17.6 

17.6 

17.6 

1&. 

18.6 

19. 

19, 

19.6 

20. 

20.6 

20.6 

21. 

2.6 

17.6 

17.6 

17.6 

18. 

18.6 

19. 

10. 

19.6 

20. 

20.6 

21. 

21.6 

22. 

22. 

22.6 

2.8 

18. 

18.6 

19. 

19. 

19.6 

20. 

20.6 

21. 

21.6 

22. 

22.6 

23. 

23.6 

23.6 

24. 

2.10 

19. 

19.6 

20. 

20. 

21. 

21.6 

22. 

22. 

23. 

23. 

23.6 

24. 

24.6 

25. 

25.6 

3. 

20. 

20.6 

21. 

21.6 

22. 

22:6 

23. 

23.6 

24. 

24.6 

25. 

25.6 

26. 

26.6 

27. 

3.2 

21. 

22. 

22. 

23. 

23. 

24. 

24.6 

25. 

25.6 

26. 

26.6 

27. 

27.6 

28. 

28.6 

3.4 

22.6 

23. 

23.6 

24. 

24.6 

25. 

25.6 

26. 

27. 

27.6 

28. 

28.6 

29. 

29.6 

30. 

3.6 

23.6 

24. 

24.6 

25. 

26.6 

26.6 

27. 

27.6 

28. 

29., 

29. 

30. 

30.6 

31. 

31.6 

3.8 

24.6 

25. 

26. 

26.6 

27. 

27.6 

28. 

29. 

29.6 

30. 

30.6 

31. 

32. 

32.6 

33. 

3.10 

25.6 

26. 

27. 

27.6 

28. 

29. 

29.6 

30. 

31. 

31.6 

32, 

32.6 

33.6 

34; 

34.6 

4 

27. 

27.6 

28. 

29. 

29.6 

30. 

31. 

31.6 

32. 

33. 

33.6 

34. 

35. 

35.6 

36. 

4.2 

28. 

28.6 

29. 

30. 

30.6 

31.6 

32. 

33. 

33.6 

34. 

35. 

35.6 

36. 

37. 

37.6 

4.4 

29. 

29.6 

30.6 

31. 

32. 

32.6 

33.6 

34. 

35. 

35.6 

36. 

37. 

37.6 

38.6 

39. 

4.6 

30. 

31. 

31.6 

32.6 

33. 

34. 

34.6 

35.6 

36. 

37. 

37.6 

38.6 

39. 

40, 

40.6 

4.8 

31.6 

32. 

33. 

33.6 

34.6 

35, 

36. 

36.6 

37.6 

38. 

3,9.  ' 

40. 

40.6 

41.6 

42. 

4.10 

32.6 

33. 

34. 

35. 

35.6 

36.6 

37. 

38. 

39. 

39.6 

40.6 

41. 

42. 

43. 

43.6 

6. 

33.6 

34. 

35. 

36. 

37. 

37.6 

38.6 

39. 

40. 

41. 

42. 

42.6 

43.6 

44. 

45. 

6.2 

34.6 

35.6 

36. 

37. 

38. 

39. 

39.6 

40.6 

41.6 

42. 

43. 

44.. 

45. 

46. 

46.6 

5.4 

35.6 

36.6 

37.6 

38.6 

39. 

40. 

41. 

42. 

43. 

43.6 

44.6 

45.6 

46.6 

47.6 

48. 

6.6 

37. 

37.6 

38.6 

39.6 

40.6 

41.6 

42. 

43. 

44. 

45. 

46. 

47. 

48. 

48.6 

49.6 

6.8 

38. 

39. 

40. 

40.6 

41.6 

42.6 

43.6 

44.6 

45.6 

46.6 

47.6 

48. 

49. 

50. 

51. 

6.10 

39 

40 

41 

42 

43 

44 

45. 

46 

47. 

48 

48  6 

49  6 

50  6 

51.6 

52.6 

6. 

40. 

41. 

42. 

43. 

44. 

45. 

46. 

47. 

48. 

49. 

50. 

51. 

52. 

53; 

54. 

6.2 

41. 

42. 

43. 

44. 

45.6 

46.6 

47.6 

48.6 

49.6 

50.6 

51.6 

52.6 

53.6 

54.6 

55.6 

6.4 

42.6 

43.6 

44.6 

45  6 

46  6 

47.0 

48,6 

50 

51. 

5? 

53. 

54. 

55 

56 

58. 

6.6 

43.6 

44.6 

45.6 

46.6 

48. 

49. 

50. 

51. 

52. 

53. 

54. 

55.6 

56.6 

57.6 

58.6 

6.8 

44.6 

45.6 

47. 

48. 

49. 

50. 

51. 

52.6 

53.6 

54.6 

55.6 

57. 

58. 

59. 

60. 

6.10 

45.6 

47. 

48. 

49. 

50. 

51.6 

52.6 

53.6 

55. 

56. 

57. 

58. 

59.6 

60.6 

61.6 

7. 

47. 

48. 

49. 

50. 

51.6 

52.6 

54. 

55. 

56. 

57. 

58.6 

59.6 

61. 

62, 

63. 

7.2 

48 

49 

50 

51  6 

52  6 

54. 

55 

56 

57  6 

58  6 

60 

61 

62 

63  6 

64  6 

7.4 

49. 

50. 

51.6 

52.6 

54. 

55. 

56.6 

57.6 

59. 

59.6 

61. 

62.6 

63'.  6 

65. 

66. 

7.6 

50. 

51.6 

52.6 

54. 

55. 

56.6 

57.6 

59. 

60. 

61.6 

62.6 

64. 

65. 

66.6 

67.6 

7.8 

51. 

52.6 

54. 

55. 

56.6 

57.6 

59. 

60. 

61.6 

62.6 

64. 

65. 

66.6 

68. 

69. 

7.10 

52.6 

53.6 

55. 

56. 

57.6 

59. 

60. 

61.6 

63. 

64. 

65.6 

66.6 

68. 

69. 

70.6 

8. 

53.6 

55. 

56. 

57.6 

59. 

60. 

61.6 

63. 

64. 

65.6 

67. 

68. 

69.6 

71. 

72. 

As  labor  is  the  principal  item  in  cost  of  doors,  we  figure  no  door 
less  than  17.6  square  feet. 


FACTS  WORTH  KNOWING. 


241 


NUMBER   OF  BRICK  REQUIRED   TO    CONSTRUCT 
ANY  BUILDING. 

(Reckoning  7  Brick  to  Each  Superficial  Foot.) 


Superficial 
Feet  of 
Wall. 

NUMBER  OF  BRICKS  TO  THICKNESS  OF 

4  in. 

Sin. 

12  in. 

16  in. 

20  in. 

24  in. 

1 

7 

15 
23 
30 
38 
45 
53 
60 
68 
75 
150 
225 
300 
375 
450 
525 
600 
675 
750 
1500 
2250 
3000 
3750 
4500 
5250 
6000 
6750 
7500 

15 
30 
45 
60 
75 
90 
105 
120 
135 
150 
300 
450 
600 
750 
900 
100O 
1200 
1350 
1500 
3000 
4500 
6000 
7500 
9000 
10500 
12000 
13500 
15000 

23 
45 

68 
90 
113 
135 
158 
180 
203 
225 
450 
675 
900 
1125 
1350 
1575 
1800 
2025 
2250 
4500 
6750 
9000 
11250 
13500 
15750 
18600 
20250 
22500 

30 
60 
90 
120 
150 
180 
210 
240' 
270 
300 
600 
900 
1200 
1500 
1800 
2100 
2400 
2700 
3000 
6000 
9000 
12000 
15000 
18000 
21000 
24000 
27000 
30000 

38 
75 
113 
150 
188 
225 
263 
300 
338 
375 
750 
1125 
1500 
1875 

3000 
3375 
3750 
7500 
11250 
15000 
18750 
22500 
26250 
30000 
33750 
37500 

45 
90 
135 
180 
225 
270 
315 
360 
405 
450 
900 
1350 
1800 
2250 
2700 
3150 
3600 
4050 
4500 
9000 
13500 
18000 
22400 
27000 
31500 
36000 
40500 
45000 

2:::::::::: 
3  
4  

5  
6.  . 

7 

8 

9  
10  
20  
30 

40  
50 

60.  . 

70 

80  
90  

100 

200.  . 

300 

400.  . 

600 

600 

700 

800 

900.  . 

1000 

In  brick  work,  corners  are  not  measured  twice  as  in  stone  work. 
Openings  over  two  feet  square  are  deducted.  Arches  are  counted  from 
spring.  Fancy  work  counted  one  and  one-half  bricks  for  one.  Pillars 
are  measured  on  their  face  only. 


16 


242 


HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 


FACTS  WORTH  KNOWING. 


243 


MADE  TO  ORDER  SHADES. 

List  price  of  shades  made  to  order  of  Victor  cloth,  mounted  on 
Hartshorn  rollers,  ready  to  hang. 

PRICE  PER  SHADE,  YEAR  1913. 


Width  in 
Inches. 

38 

42 

45 

48  1   54 

63 

72 

81 

90 

102 

114 

120 

150 

4  feet.    .. 

$.  88 

$1.32 

$1.38 

$1.56 

$1.82 

$2.38 

$3.18 

$3.80 

$4.32 

$5.36 

$8.82 

$10.30 

$17.40 

5    " 

1.00 

1.50 

1.56 

1.78 

2.08 

2.70 

3.56 

4.26 

4.86 

6.08 

9.76 

11.62 

10.60 

6    " 

1.10 

1.66 

1.74 

2.00 

2.34 

3.02 

3.96 

4.72 

5.40 

6.78 

10.70 

12.90 

21.78 

7    " 

1.24 

1.84 

1.94 

2.22 

2.60 

3.34 

4.36 

5.20 

5.94 

7.52 

11.64 

14.22 

23.98 

8    " 

1.34 

2.00 

2.12 

2.44 

2.82 

3.68 

4.76 

5.66 

6.48 

8.24 

12.58 

15.54 

26.16 

9    " 

1.46 

2.30 

2.44 

2.78 

3.30 

.4.18 

5.40 

6.38 

7.34 

9.32 

13.90 

17.20 

28.36 

10    " 

1.76 

2.48 

2.62 

2.98 

3.56 

4^50 

5.80 

6.86 

7.88 

10.06 

14.84 

18.52 

30.54 

11    " 

1,88 

2.66 

2.82 

3.20 

3.80 

4.84 

6.20 

7.32 

8.42 

12.90 

15.78 

19.84 

38.98 

12    " 

1.98 

2.94 

3.12 

3.56 

4.24 

5.34 

6.82 

8.02 

9.26 

13.98 

17.08 

21.48 

41.16 

13    " 

2.54 

3.28 

3.48 

3.84 

4.92 

5.88 

7.46 

8.50 

9.80 

14.72 

18.02 

22.80 

43.36 

14    " 

2.64 

3.46 

3.68 

4.06 

5.20 

6.20 

7.84 

8.96 

10.34 

15.44 

18.96 

24.12 

45.54 

15    " 

2.88 

3.74 

3.96 

4.52 

5.62 

6.70 

8.46 

9.68 

11.20 

16.50 

20.28 

25.78 

47.74 

All  shades  under  38  inches,  charged  at  38-inch  price.    When  shades 
are  longer  than  even  feet,  take  next  length  price. 

DUPLEX   OR   DOUBLE  FACED   OIL   OPAQUE  SHADE. 

List  price  of  Duplex  shades  made  to  order,  mounted  on  Hartshorn 
rollers,  ready  to  hang. 

PRICE   PER  SHADE. 


Width  in 
Inches. 

38 

42 

45 

48 

54 

63 

72 

81 

90 

102 

114 

120 

150 

4  feet     . 

$1.18 

$1.74 

$1.84 

$2.06 

$2.40 

$3.10 

$4.12 

$4.94 

$5.62 

$6.96 

$11.58 

$13.56 

$23.06 

5    " 

1.36 

1.98 

2.06 

2.34 

2.74 

3.50 

4.60 

5.52 

6.32 

7.88 

12.78 

15.26 

25.96 

6    "       . 

1.50 

2.18 

2.30 

2.62 

3.08 

3.92 

5.10 

6.10 

7.00 

8.87 

14.00 

16.94 

28.84 

7    " 

1.68 

2.42 

2.56 

2.92 

3.42 

4.32 

5.60 

6.70 

7.68 

9.72 

15.20 

18.64 

31.74 

8    "       . 

1.80 

2.64 

2.80 

3.20 

3.74 

4.76 

6.12 

7.28 

8.38 

10.62 

16.42 

20.36 

34.62 

9     '       . 

1.98 

3.02 

3.22 

3.64 

4.34 

5.42 

6.94 

8.20 

9.48 

12.02 

18.14 

22.54 

37.52 

10     '       .. 

2.38 

3.26 

3.44 

3.90 

4.68 

5,82 

7.44 

8.82 

10.18 

12.96 

19.34 

24.24 

40.38 

11     '     ... 

2.56 

3.50 

3.701 

4.20 

5.00 

6.26 

7.94 

9.40 

10.86 

16.70 

20.54 

25.96 

51.60 

12     '     ... 

2.70 

3.86 

4.1Q 

4.66 

5.58 

6.90 

8.74 

10.30 

11.94 

18.10 

22.24 

28.10 

54.48 

13     '     ... 

3.44 

4.32 

4.5S 

5.04 

6.50 

7.60 

9.56 

10.90 

12.64 

19.04 

23.44 

29.83 

57.38 

14     '     ... 

3.58 

4.54 

4.84 

5.32 

6.84 

8.02 

10,04 

11.48 

13.32 

19.96 

24.66 

31.54 

60.26 

Duplex  combination,  with  colors,  shown  in  this  book,  will  be  fur- 
nished at  above  prices. 

VICTOR  HAND   MADE  OIL  OPAQUE  SHADE  CLOTH. 

Made  from  the  finest  grade  of  shade  muslin  and  painted  with  best 
oil  paint.    Will  not  crack  or  face.     About  60  yards  to  piece. 

PRICE    PER  YARD. 


Width  in 
Inches. 

38 

42 

45 

48 

54 

63 

72 

81 

90 

102 

114 

120 

150 

fall  piece  per 
yard  .  . 

$0.44 
.48 

$0.60 
.64 

$0.64 
.68 

$0.72 
.78 

$0.84 
.92 

$1.20 
1.30 

$1.40 
1.50 

$1.60 
1.76 

$1.80 
2.00 

$2.20 
2.50 

$2.80 
3.20 

$3.80 
4.50 

$6.00 
6.00 

Less  per  yard.. 

244  HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 

BUILDING  HINTS. 

One  thousand  shingles  laid  four  inches  to  the  weather  will  cover 
100  square  feet  of  surface,  and  five  pounds  of  shingle  nails  will  fasten 
them  on. 

One-fifth  more  siding  and  flooring  is  needed  than  the  number  of 
square  feet  of  surface  to  be  covered,  because  of  the  lap  in  the  siding 
and  matching-. 

One  thousand  lath  will  cover  70  yards  of  surface,  and  11  pounds 
of  lath  nails  will  fasten  them  on.  Eight  bushels  of  good  lime,  16 
bushels  of  sand  and  1  bushel  of  hair  will  make  enough  good  mortar  to 
plaster  100  square  yards. 

A  cord  of  stone,  three  bushels  of  lime,  and  a  cubic  yard  of  sand 
will  lay  100  cubic  feet  of  wall. 

Five  courses  of  brick  will  lay  1  foot  in  height  on  a  chimney;  16 
bricks  in  a  course  will  make  a  flue  8  inches  wide  and  16  inches  long. 

Cement  1  bushel  and  sand  2  bushels  will  cover  3%  square  yards 
1  inch  thick,  4%  square  yards  %  inch  thick,  and  6%  square  yards  % 
Inch  thick.  One  bushel  of  cement  and  one  of  sand  will  cover  2^4 
square  yards  1  Inch  thick. 

Stone  walls  are  measured  by  the  perch  (24%  cubic  feet).  Openings 
less  than  3  feet  wide  are  counted  solid;  over  3  feet,  deducted;  but  18 
inches  are  added  to  the  running  measure  for  e'ach  jamb  built.  Arches 
are  counted  solid  from  the  spring;  corners  of  buildings  are  measured 
twice;  pillars  less  than  3  feet  are  counted  on  three  sides  as  lineal,  mul- 
tiplied by  fourth  side  and  depth. 

It  is  customary  to  measure  all  foundations  and  dimensions  of  stone 
by  the  cubic  foot;  water  table  and  base  courses  by  lineal  feet;  all  sills 
and  lintels  or  ashler  by  superficial  feet,  and  no  wall  less  than  18  inches 
thick. 

PRICES  QUOTED  THE  WM.  WINDHORST  DRY  GOODS 
CO.  BY  RELIANCE  TEXTILE  AND  DYE  WORKS 
CO.,  BOTH  OF  CINCINNATI,  OHIO,  FOR  CON- 
DITIONING SALVAGE,  DEC.  4TH,  1907. 

Linens    2c          Linings    2c 

Toweings    %c       Dress  goods    3c 

Buntings     %c       Outing  flannel   

Crash   %c       Blankets,  cotton   15c 

Danish   cloth    l*4c       Blankets,  wool 26c 

Poplar  cloth   l%c       Quilts  12%c 

Woolen  serge   3c          Comforts    12%c 

Canton  flannel   l%c       Cashmeres  l%c 

Cotton  domestic   l%c       Mor.    sateens    2%o 

Wool  flannel   2%c       Sheetings    %c 

Bleached  sheeting   l%c       Ticking    Ic 

Unbleached  sheeting    %c       Ginghams   Ic 

Prints     %c 

Doubling  Ic  per  yard  extra. 

This  stock  was  conditioned  as  per  the  above  bid.  The  author  never 
saw  a  damaged  fire  stock  put  into  better  condition.  Captain  Comway 
and  his  salvage  corps  put  part  of  the  stock  in  condition  and  did  grand 
work. 

When  iron  or  machinery  has  been  damaged,  dip  in  the  following 
solution,  or  apply  solution  with  a  brush. 

1  part  muriatic  acid 
20  parts  kerosene  oil 
40  parts  paraffine  oil. 

Then  when  you  want  to  clean  them  off  (this  solution  will  protect 
from  further  rust),  redip  them  in  paraffine  oil  and  rub  off  with  waste. 

A  good  wash,  but  expensive,  is  water  with  oxalic  acid.  This  is 
good  for  knives  and  saw  blades.  Let  lay  in  solution  about  ten  minutes, 
then  take  out  and  dip  in  paraffine  oil  and  rub  off. 

Black  goods,  such  as  hangers,  etc.  Iron  filler  thinned  with  tur- 
pentine. This  gives  a  bluish  tint.  If  you  want  a  Jet  black  color,  mix 
in  some  lampblack  ground  in  oil.  , 

To  clean  brass  goods,  dip  in  oil  of  vitriol. 


FACTS  WORTH  KNOWING.  245 

RECEIPT  FOR  LAUNDERING  CLOTHES  SMOKED  BY 

FIRE. 

This  receipt  by  a  colored  woman,  a  former  slave,  owned  by  the 

"Fust  Ah  puts  the  smoked  and  soiled  clothes  into  a  tub  of  cold 
watah,  into  which  Ah  has  already  put  a  handful  of  common  bakin' 
soda.  Then  Ah  lets  'em  soak  all  night.  Next  momin'  Ah  puts  on  a 
boiler  of  watah,  into  which  Ah  poah's  a  cup  of  kerosene  oil,  two- 
thirds  of  a  bar  of  soap  and  a  handful  of  washing  powder.  Ah  lets 
them  clothes  boil  in  that  watah  a  while,  then  Ah  takes  'em  out  and 
washes  'em.  They  come  out  clean,  too." 

WHAT  CHICAGO  BUILDING  COST. 

COMPILED    BY    HARRY   FOX, 

Cook  Co.  Manager,   Milwaukee  Mechanics   Ins.   Co. 
Up-to-date  table  for  estimating  the  approximate  value  of  buildings 
at  present  1915  prices  for  labor  and  materials. 

Good  judgment  must  be  exercised  in  estimating  values  by  taking 
Into  consideration  the  manner  of  construction  and  the  quality  of  ma- 
terials put  into  the  building. 

Cost  of  buildings  new  at  price  in  cents  per  cu.  ft.  in  structure.  To 
obtain  cu.  ft.  multiply  length  of  building  by  the  width  and  then  by 
the  average  height,  measuring  from  the  bottom  of  basement  to  square 
of  roof. 

DWELLINGS. 

FRAME. — Shingle  roof,  pine  floors  and  trim,  two  coats  of  paint  in- 
side and  outside,  no  bath  room  or  furnace,  plain  finish 8c  to  lOc 

BRICK.— Same  class   lOc  to  12c 

FRAME.— rShingle  roof,  hardwood  floor  in  hall  and  parlor,  bath, 
furnace,  fair  plumbing 9c  to  lie 

BRICK.— Same  class,  composition  roof lie  to  13c 

FRAME. — Shingle  roof,  hardwood  floor  and  trim  on  first  floor,  pine 
floor  and  Georgia  pine  trim  on  second  floor,  good  plumbing,  furnace, 
artistic  design,  some  interior  ornamentation,  well  painted.. I3c  to  16c 

HANDSOME  BRICK. — Pressed  brick  and  stone  trim  front,  artistic 
design,  hardwood  floors  and  trim  throughout,  good  plumbing,  furnace, 
tasty  interior  ornamentation,  very  desirable  residence 14c  to  17o 

FIRST-CLASS  BRICK. — The  kind  you  find  on  the  boulevards, 
pressed  brick  and  stone  trimmed  front,  hot  water  or  steam  heat,  elab- 
orate design  and  interior  ornamentation,  hardwood  floors  and  trim 
throughout,  best  of  plumbing 17c  to  22c 

PALATIAL  STONE  FRONT. — Quarter-sawed  oak  or  mahogany 
trim,  hardwood  floors,  steam  heat,  extra  plumbing,  very  artistic  de- 
sign, every  modern  convenience 25c  to  35c 

BARNS. 

PRIVATE  BARNS— FRAME— Shingle  roof,  painted,  good  founda- 
tions, stall  and  bins  complete 6c  to  lOc 

PRIVATE  BARNS — BRICK.— Composition  roof,  stalls  and  bins 
complete lOc  to  12c 

FLATS. 

(Complying  with  City  Ordinance.) 

FRAME. — Shingle  or  composition  roof,  hardwood  floors  and  trim, 
good  plumbing,  furnace,  artistic  design,  well  painted lOc  to  12c 

BRICK. — Pressed  brick  front,  composition  roof,  good  plumbing, 
furnace,  bath,  Georgia  pine  or  oak  trim,  hardwood  floors....  12c  to  15c 

FIRST-CLASS  BRICK.— Pressed  brick  and  stone  front,  hot  water 
or  steam  heat,  elaborate  design,  interior  ornamentation,  hardwood 
throughout,  best  of  plumbing 15c  to  18c 

PALATIAL  STONE  FRONT — Quarter- sawed  oak  or  mahogany 
trim  and  hardwood  floors,  steam  heat,  extra  plumbing,  artistic  de- 
sign, every  modern  convenience,  marble  entrance 20c  to  30c 


246  HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 

CHURCHES   AND   SCHOOLS. 

FRAME      lOc  to  12c 

BRICK    12c  to  14c 

STONE 15c  to  25c 

If  slate  or  metal  roof,  add  *4c  per  foot  to  above. 

STORES  AND  FLATS. 

(Stores  1st  floor  and  flats  above,  2  to  3  stories  in  height.) 
FRAME. — Composition   roof,   pine   floors  and  trim,   bath,   furnace, 

fair  plumbing   lOc  to  12c 

BRICK. — Pressed    brick,    stone    trimmings,    hardwood    floors    and 

trim,  good  plumbing,  hot  water  or  steam  heat 12c  to  15c 

STORE    BUILDINGS. 

(Stores  and  Lofts,  2  to  3  stories  in  height.) 
FRAME. — Ordinary   construction,   gravel  or  metal   roof,   hydraulic 

elevator 6c  to    8c 

BRICK. — Same   construction    7c  to  lOc 

REINFORCED   CONCRETE    12c  to  15c 

REINFORCED  CONRETE.— Above  3  story,  heavy  carrying  ca- 
pacity   17c  to  20c 

BUILDINGS  OF  LARGE  AREA. 

(Mill   Construction) 

BRICK  AND  STONE.— For  factories  and  warehouses 7c  to    9c 

Smaller   area    lOc  to  12c 

FIREPROOF  OFFICE   BUILDINGS. 

BRICK  AND  STONE. — Steel  construction,  every  modern  conven- 
ience, measuring  from  floor  to  basement  to  top  of  roof,  omitting 
courts 35c  to  66c 

FIREPROOF  STORES,    FACTORIES   AND   WAREHOUSES. 

BRICK,  STONE  AND  STEEL  CONSTRUCTION— Modern  Equip- 
ment  18c  to  22c 

FIREPROOF  APARTMENT   BUILDINGS. 

BRICK,  STEEL  AND  CONCRETE  CONSTRUCTION.— Modern 
conveniences  20c  to  26c 

ESTIMATES   OF   DEPRECIATION. 

The  figures  given  above  are  for  new  buildings.  To  ascertain  the 
present  value,  a  discount  between  old  and  new  buildings  should  be 
made  as  follows: 

BRICK,  occupied  by  owner,  %  to  1  per  cent,  per  year. 

FRAME,  occupied  by  owner,  1  to  2  per  cent,  per  year. 

BRICK,  occupied  by  tenant,  1%  to  1%  per  cent,  per  year. 

FRAME,  occupied  by  tenant,  1%  to  2%  per  cent,  per  year. 

These  figures  for  depreciation  are  to  include  buildings  where  ordi- 
nary repairs  have  been  made.  If  extraordinary  repairs  have  been 
made  the  discount  should  not  be  so  heavy.  Exercise  good  Judgment 
as  to  depreciation,  as  no  accurate  rule  can  be  established,  and  when 
you  have  determined  what  the  present  worth  of  the  building  is,  insure 
it  for  about  80  per  cent,  of  same  in  the  old  reliable. 

COST  OF  LABOR  AND  MATERIAL 
For  Estimating  Repairs  to  Buildings. 

NOTE. — The    following    prices    for   lumber   and    material    are    the 
retail  prices,  labor  being  figured  at  Contractor's  prices  for  repair  work. 
A  space  30x10  feet  constitutes  one  square. 


FACTS  WORTH  KNOWING.  247 

WALL  PAPER. 

Cost  of  hanging,  16c  to  30c  per  single  roll  for  ordinary  work,  ac- 
cording to  quality  of  paper. 

Three  and  one -half  rolls  will  cover  one  square. 

PLASTERING. 

Two  coats  of  plastering  repair  work  cost  60c  per  sq.  yd. 

Three-coat  work  costs  60c  per  sq.  yd. 

For  cement  plaster  add  lOc  per  sq.  yd.  extra. 

Small  jobs  add  for  cartage. 

Plaster  labor  costs  75c  per  hour,  plus  contractor's  profit. 

Plasters'  helper  costs  45c  per  hour. 

Lathers'  labor  $6.00  per  day  of  8  hours. 

NOTE. — To  ascertain  the  number  of  yards  of  plaster,  multiply 
the  length  of  ceiling  by  the  width.  Do  the  same  with  each  side  wall 
and  add  all  together,  divide  by  nine  and  the  result  will  be  the  number 
of  yards.  Make  no  deductions  for  openings  unless  very  large. 

PLUMBING. 

30  gal.  iron  boiler,  connected $20.00  each 

Enameled  sinks,  18x24  in.,  connected 15.00  each 

6  foot  enameled  bathtub,  connected 35.00  each 

Porcelain  washout  closet  with  tank,  connected 30.00  each 

Hopper  closet,  connected 20.00  each 

Laundry  tubs,  2  divisions,  cement,  connected 35.00  each 

Wash  bowls,  plain  marble  slabs,  connected 25.00  each 

Brass  faucets,  put  on 2.00  each 

Plated  faucets,  put  on 2.25  each 

6  in  iron  soil  pipe,  put  in,   $1.00  per  running  foot. 

4  in  iron  soil  pipe,  put  in,  60c  per  running  foot. 

Plumbing  labor  costs  $6.40  per  day  of  eight  hours,  plus  contractor's 
profit. 

SEWERS. 

6  in.  sewer,  ordinary  digging,  laid  with  proper  drain,  well  cemented, 
60c  per  lineal  foot. 
Traps,  $1.50  each. 
Elbows,  $1.25  each. 
Catch  basins,  5x6,  stone  cover,  $15.00. 

ELECTRIC   WIRING. 

To  estimate  the  cost  of  electric  wiring  in  ordinary  buildings  as- 
certain the  number  of  lights  and  multiply  same  by  $3.00;  conduit,  $5.00. 

GAS   PIPING. 

To  estimate  cost  of  gas  piping  in  ordinary  buildings,  ascertain 
the  number  of  lights  and  multiply  by  $2.50.  » 

Gas  pipe  put  in,  connected,  20c  per  running  foot. 
Gas  fitters'  labor  costs  $6.50  per  day  of  eight  hours. 

ROOFING. 

Gravel  roof,  3-ply,  $3.50  per  square. 
Gravel  roof,  4-ply,  $4.00  per  square. 
Gravel  roof,  5-ply,  $4.25  per  square. 

Slate  roof,  ordinary  black  slate,   $10.00  to   $12.00  per  square. 
Slate  roof,  fancy  green  and  red,  $15.00  to  $30.00  per  square. 
Best  galvanized  iron   roofing,  standing  seams,    $9.00  to  $12.00  per 
square,  painted. 

Best  tin  roofing,  standing  seams,  $8.00  to  $11.00  per  square,  painted. 
Tile  roofing,  $12.00  to  $15.00  per  square,  according  to  design. 

METAL    CEILINGS. 

Fancy  metal  ceilings  with  cornice  cost  $8.00  to  $12.00  per  square. 
Corrugated  iron  ceiling,  $6  00  to  $7.00  per  square. 


248  HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 

CARPENTRY. 

Carpenter  labor  costs  70c  per  hour,  plus  contractor's  profit. 
Eight  hours  constitute  one  day. 

13/16x6%  in.  common  yellow  pine  flooring  costs  $25.00  per  M., 
13/16x3%— $23.00  per  M. 

1x4  or  1x6  in.  white  Norway  C.  pine  flooring  costs  $40.00  per  M. 

Labor  for  laying  6  in.  pine  flooring,  $2.00  per  square;  4  in.,  $2.60 
per  square. 

13/16x2%  in.  face  clear  maple  flooring  C9sts  $47.00  per  M. 

Labor  for  laying  2%  in.  face  maple  flooring,  smooth  for  oil  finish, 
$3.50  to  $4.50  per  square. 

13/16x2%  in.  plain  white  oak  flooring  costs  $60.00  per  M. 

13/16x2%  in.  faced  quarter-sawed  white  oak  flooring  costs  $94.00 
per  M. 

Labor  for  laying  and  scraping  oak  floor,  2%  in.  face,  for  wax  or 
varnish,  $7.00  to  $8.00  per  square. 

Smoothing  and  scraping  oak  floors  alone  costs  $2.50  to  $3.60  per 
square. 

Base,  pine,  2  member  moulded,  put  down,  8c  per  running  foot;  3 
member,  12c. 

4  and  6  in.  clear  Northern  pine  beveled  siding  costs  $32.00  per  M. 

4  and  6  in.  clear  Washington  redwood  beveled  siding  costs  $33.00 
per  M. 

4  and  6  in.  clear  Washington  spruce  beveled  siding  costs  $26.00 
per  M. 

Labor  for  putting  on  siding,  $2.75  per  square  for  4  to  6  in.  siding; 
for  narrow  mitred  siding,  $3.75  per  square. 

Labor  for  putting  on  shingles,  $2.60  to  $3.00  per  thousand  shingles. 

Best  grades  of  clear  red  cedar  shingles  cost  $4.00  per  thousand. 

Common  No.  2  pine  doors,  complete  with  frames,  placed  in  posi- 
tion, with  hardware,  not  painted,  cost  $8.00  to  $12.00  each. 

Fancy  oak  front  doors  complete,  placed  in  position,  with  hardware, 
cost  $15.000  to  $25.00  each,  according  to  style. 

Oak  veneered  doors,  1%  in.  pine  core,  20c  to  35c  per  square  foot 
for  door  only.  Labor  and  hardware  extra. 

Oak  veneered  doors,  as  above,  complete  with  frame,  placed  in 
position,  with  hardware,  $14.00  to  $18.00  each. 

Mantles — Hardwood,  artistic  design,  complete  with  mirror  and 
grate,  set  $45.00  to  $65.00  each. 

Grilles — Fancy  oak,  $1.25  to  $1.76  per  lineal  foot  set. 

Windows — With  sash,  frame,  casing,  cords,  weights  complete,  put 
in,  $9.00  to  $12.00  each.  If  hardwood  frame  and  trim,  with  sash, 
$12.00  to  $14.00. 

Stairs — Common  oak,  for  dwellings,  without  rail,  $2.50  per  riser, 
labor  included. 

Stair  Rail — Oak,  moulded  design,  30c  to  36c  per  running  foot,  labor 
Included. 

Stair  Rail — Pine  moulded  design,  16c  to  25c  per  running  foot,  labor 
included. 

Balusters— Pine,  fancy  turned  12c  to  16c  each;  oak  15c  to  30c  each, 
labor  included. 

Newels — 5  in.  quarter-sawed  oak,  moulded  cap  $6.00  to  $9.00; 
plain  oak  $5.00  to  $7.00;  pine  $4.00  to  $6.00  each,  labor  included. 

Porches — Front,  frame,  ordinary  construction,  6  to  7  feet  wide, 
shingle  roof,  ceiled,  square  or  turned  columns,  frieze  and  cornice, 
balusters  at  floor,  complete,  $8.00  to  $10.00  per  front  foot  measure, 
12x12  in.  stone  pillars  under  porches,  $1.00  per  lineal  foot. 

PAINTING    AND    GLAZING. 

Painting,  two-coat  work,  costs  20c  per  sq.  yd. 

Painting,  three- coat  work,  costs  25c  per  sq.  yd. 

Painters'  labor  cost  70c  per  hour,  plus  contractor's  profit. 

Calcimining  costs  $3.00  to  $5.00  per  room  for  small  rooms  and  80c 
per  square  for  large  rooms. 

NOTE. — To  ascertain  the  number  of  yards  painted  surface,  mul- 
tiply the  length  by  the  width,  in  feet,  and  divide  by  nine,  and  the  re- 
sult will  be  the  number  of  yards. 

Lattice  work  and  stair  balusters  are  counted  double. 

For*  reglazing  old  work,  add  20  to  50  per  cent,  to  cost  of  glass, 
according  to  quantity  set. 


FACTS  WORTH  KNOWING.  249 

STONE  WORK. 

Common  rubble  stone,  100  cu.  ft.  to  the  cord,  costs,  laid  in  wall, 
$20.00  to  $25.00  per  cord,  according  to  location  and  necessary  hauling. 

Rock  face,  4  in.  Bedford  stone  for  facing,  furnished  and  set  in 
wall,  costs  $1.75  to  $2.25  per  square  foot  face  measurement. 

Mason  labor  costs  $6.00  per  day,  plus  contractor's  profit. 

Mason  helper  costs  40c  per  hour,  plus  contractor's  profit. 

BRICK  WORK. 

Common  brick,  furnished  and  laid  in  12  in.  wall,  costs  $14.00  per 
M.  wall  count. 

Pressed  brick,  for  facing,  laid  in  wall,  colored  mortar,  rodded 
Joints,  add  to  cost  of  brick  $10.00  to  $20.00  per  thousand  for  laying, 
according  to  character  and  design  of  front. 

CEMENT    BLOCK    WALLS. 

12  in.  block  walls  cost  about  the  same  as  12  in.  common  brick  wall, 
laid,  less  25  per  cent,  of  the  cost  of  brick  for  similar  wall. 

Concrete  basement  walls  cost  28c  per  cubic  foot,  wall  measurement. 
Cement  sidewalk  costs  12c  to  15c  per  square  foot. 
Cement  basement  floors  cost  lOc  per  square  foot. 

CHIMNEYS. 

Ordinary  single  flue  chimneys  cost  $1.00  per  lineal  foot.  For 
double  flue  $1.75  per  lineal  foot. 

INTERIOR    MARBLE    WORK. 

(For  Wainscoting   and    Floors    in    Apartment    Houses    and    Office 

Buildings.) 

Wainscoting,  Italian,  white,   $1.00  per  sq.   ft.    set. 
Wainscoting,  English  Vein  Italian,  white,   $1.05  per  sq.  ft.   set. 
Wainscoting,  Tennessee  Marble,  80c  per  sq.  ft.  set. 
Wainscoting,  Vermont  white  marble,    95c  per   sq.   ft.   set. 
Wainscoting,  Vermont  green  marble,  $1.60  per  sq.  ft.  set. 
Floors — Marble  tile,  80c  per  sq.  ft.  laid;  mosaic,  75c  per  sq.  ft.  laid. 

TO    ESTIMATE    COST   OF    RADIATION    PER    CUBIC   FOOT. 

(Direct   Radiation.) 

Steam  Heat — Allow  1  foot  radiation  for  each  50  cu.  ft.  of  space. 
Figure  radiation  at  72c  per  radiation  foot. 

Hot  Water  Heat— Allow  1  foot  radiation  for  each  30  cu.  ft.  of 
space.  Figure  radiation  at  75c  per  radiation  foot. 

The  above  is  for  average  rooms.  If  rooms  have  extraordinary 
large  window  exposure,  increase  radiation.  If  smaller  window  space 
than  average,  decrease  radiation. 

Be  careful  in  the  distribution  of  radiation,  as  the  success  of  a 
heating  plant  depends  largely  upon  arrangement  and  location  of 
radiators. 

FROM   REPORT   OF   NATIONAL   BOARD   OF  FIRE 
UNDERWRITERS. 

Some  Important  Losses  on  Fire  Proof  Buildings. 

Damage 
Value    PerCt. 
Pittsburg,   Pa. — Holmes     estate,     owners     six 

story  department  store  building,  exposure 

fire,  May  3,  1897 $386,980        57 


250  HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 

Pittsburg,  Pa. — Holmes  Estate,  owners  4-story 
building,  mercantile  purposes,  1st  and  2d, 
offices  above.  Exposure  fire  May  3, 
1897  120,322  49 

New  York  City — Home  L,ife  Ins.  Co.,  owners  15 
story  building,  mercantile  purposes,  1st, 
offices  above.  Exposure  fire,  Dec.  4,  1898.  900,000  22 

Pittsburg,  Pa. — Holmes  Estate,  owners,  6-story 
Department  Store  building.  Internal  fire, 
April  7,  1900 475,000  32 

New  York  City — American  Fine  Arts  Society, 
4-story  Art  School  building.  Internal  fire, 
May  8,  1901  185,000  11 

Chicago,  111. — Iroquois  Theatre.  Internal  fire, 
Dec.  30,  1903. 

Building    311,114        18 

Scenery    100 

Other  contents   70 

Patterson,  N.  J. — City  Hall,  4-story  detached 
office  occupancy.  Conflagration  Feb.  9, 
1902  310,183  58 

New  York  City — Broadway  Improvement  Co., 
owners,  8-story  mercantile  building.  In- 
ternal fire,  Feb.  26,  1903 300,000  23 

Rochester,  N.  Y. — Granite  Building  Co.,  owners, 
12-story  department  store,  1st  and  2d,  of- 
fices above.  Exposure  fire,  Feb.  29,  1904..  600,000  41 

Rochester,  N.  Y — Granite  Building  Co.,  owners, 
7-story  stable  and  storage,  unprotected  iron. 
Exposure  fire,  Feb.  29,  1904. 

Rochester,  N.  Y. — Granite  Building  Co.,  owners, 
7-story  wholesale  dry  goods  and  depart- 
ment store,  unprotected  iron.  Exposure 
fire,  Feb.  20,  1904  247,360  92 

Baltimore  Conflagration,  February  7,  1904 — 

Calvert  Building  Co.,  owners,   12-story  of- 
fice building   634,075        57 

National    Bank    of    Commerce,    owners,    1- 

story  bank  building   92,000        50 

Union  Trust  Co.,  owners,  11-story  bank  and 

office  building    348,795        61 

International    Trust    Co.,    owners,    1-story 

bank  building   ._.'. 120,364         70 


FACTS  WORTH  KNOWING.  251 

Herald,     owners,    6-story    newspaper    and 

printing  office  building  217,131        59 

Chesapeake  and  Potomac  Telephone  Co., 
owners,  7-story  office  and  telephone  build- 
ing    115,000  39 

National  Mechanics  Bank,  owners,  4-story 

and   attic   office  building 156,854        95 

National  Union  Bank,  owners,  1-story  bank 

building   119,744        54 

Merchants  National  Bank,  owners,  7-story 

bank  and  office  building 405,000        54 

Continental  Trust  Co.,  owners,  16-story  of-       » 

fice  building   ' 1,028,461        65 

Calvert    Building    Co.,    owners,    "Equitable 

Building,"  10-story  office  building 1,037,965        74 

Baltimore  Trust  Co.,  owners,  Maryland 
Trust  Co.,  building  10-story  bank  and  of- 
fices    404,000  60 

Firemen's   Ins.   Co.,   owners,  6-story   office 

building   106,000        52 

The  insurance  loss  ratio  to  values  insured  on  all  classes  of 
property  in  the  Baltimore  conflagration  was  90  per  cent. — that 
is,  the  total  value  of  all  classes  of  property  involved  in  the  con- 
flagration was  $37,382,426.49,  covered  by  $32,245,273.39  insur- 
ance, on  which  the  losses  paid  amounted  to  $29,074,358.51. 

Excluding  seven  of  the  largest  and  best  fire-proof  build- 
ings involved,  the  loss  ratio  to  insurance  involved,  was  90.4 
per  cent. 

The  insurance  loss  on  these  seven  buildings  was  88.4  per 
cent.  The  loss  ratio  to  insurance  involved  on  these  seven  fire- 
proof buildings  and  sixteen  other  so-called  fire-proof  buildings, 
was  76.3  per  cent.  Loss  ratio  to  insurance  involved,  excluding 
these  seven  fire-proof  buildings,  and  the  sixteen  so-called  fire- 
proof buildings,  was  «92  per  cent.  Loss  ratio  to  value  of  the 
twenty-three  fire-proof  and  so-called  fire-proof  buildings  re- 
ferred to,  was  56.4  per  cent. 


252  HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 

WHAT    SOME    FIREPROOF    BUILDINGS    COST 
PER  CUBIC  FOOT. 

Cost  per 

Date  Cubic 
City                               Building 

City  Built  Foot 

Memphis    Memphis  Trust  Bldg.  1905  $0.349 

Cincinnati Traction  Bldg-.  1903  .3906 

Cincinnati First  National  Bank  1904          .31779 

Boston Chamber  of  Commerce  1892          .32 

Boston Exchange  Bldg.  1891          .32 

Chicago Borden  Block  1891          .15 

Chicago Stock  Exchange  1893          .33 

Chicago Rookery  1893  .32 

Chicago Masonic  Temple  .58 

New  York Herald  Bldg.  1893          .46 

Cincinnati Chamber  of  Commerce  .26 

San  Francisco Croker  Bldg.  .63 

Chicago Auditorium  .36 

The  following  shows  the  itemized  construction  cost  of  a 
fireproof  office  building  in  the  insurance  district  of  New  York 
City,  built  in  the  panic  year  1893,  when  both  labor  and  material 
were  to  be  had  at  low  cost — at  least  forty  per  cent,  lower  than 
at  this  time,  December,  1904.  The  cost  per  cubic  foot  (from  the 
bottom  of  the  concrete  foundation  to  the. top  of  the  roof)  was 
40  cents. 

«. 

Mason's  work  $  80,000.00 

Granite    : 4,588.00 

Terra  Cotta  8,185.00 

Steam  heating    t 23,278.00 

Carpenter  work   40,041.00 

Iron  work   89,340.00 

Exterior  marble    43,325.00 

Interior  marble   39,112.00 

Plumbing   16,535.00 

Elevators 21,000.00 

Electric  lighting,  etc % 22,311.50 

Plastering   ! 9,596.00 


$397,311.50 


FACTS  WORTH  KNOWING. 


253 


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254 


HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 


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TOPICAL  INDEX 


Assessed  Value 27 

Appraisal — Arbitration — Award : 

Before  appraisal  clause  in  policy  can  be  brought  into  operation, 
an  effort  must  be  made  to  adjust  loss,  as  only  differences 

can   be   appraised 93,     97 

Effect  of  valued  policy  law 11,  17,  93,  113 

Condition  precedent  to  suit  in  Maine  and  Massachusetts 94 

Annotated  case 94 

Neither   party    has    the    right    to    insist    the    other   shall    first 

demand   it    95 

Effect  of  common  law  A 95,     96 

Effect  of  proceeding  before  appointment  of  umpire 96 

Agreement  of  appraisers  evidence  of  impartiality. '.      97 

In  case  of  disagreement  assured  must  demand  appraisal.  .97,     98 

Condition  precedent  to  suit 98 

Not  a  condition  precedent  to  suit 98 

Must  be  a  disagreement  to  bring  clause  into  operation 99 

Pennsylvania  docs  not  uphold  A  clause 99 

Nebraska  does  not  uphold  A  clause 99 

Waiver  of  appraisal 98,  99,  101,  102,  103,  118,  130,  131 

Joint  demand  by  several  companies  is  not  good 99 

Effect  of  assured's  sale  of  goods  before  appraisal 100 

Effect  of  insisting  on  appraisal  different  in  terms  from  policy 

provision 100 

Effect  of  assured's  refusal  of  company's  demand 100 

Verbal  demando  are  merged  in  subsequent  written  demand..  .    100 

What  is   not  a   demand 100,  111 

Assured  may  serve  demand  on  company's  local  agent 101 

Effect  of  company's  failure  to  answer  assured's  statement  that 
he   would   dispose    of   goods   if    appraisal    not    granted    in 

flve   days    101 

Once    refusing    to    appraise    company    not    thereafter    compel 

an  appraisal    101 

Two  fires  to  same  property  constitutes  a  single  claim 101 

Effect  of  asured's   death 102 

What  is  not  joint  or  common  law  appraisal 102 

Appraisal  is  waiver  of  option  to  rebuild 66,  102 

Unless  the  agreement  contains  a  non- waiver  clause 102 

Effect  of  appraisal  with  other  companies 102,  131 

Effect  of  company  denying  part  of  the  property  was  covered 

by  its  policy 10S 

When  demand  for  A  too  late 103 

Assured  may  refuse  A  and  afterwards  grant  it 103 

Parties  may  agree  to  A  different  from  that  provided  in  Michi- 
gan standard    policy 104 

Effect  of  statute  making  the  amount  of  the  policy  prima  facie 

evidence  of  insurable  value  at  date  policy  was  issued.  .  .  .   104 

Assured   must  produce   books   for   appraisers   inspection 104 

Effect  of  failure  of  appraisal  due  to  assured's  bad  faith 104 

Value  of  saloon  furniture  and  fixtures  in  dry   town 104 

Assured's    right   to   introduce    evidence    before   the    appraisers 

105,  106,  107,  108,  109 

Conduct  of  appraisers 107,  108,  109,  111,  112,  113,  114, 

115,   116,   117,   118,    119,   120,   121,  122,    123,    124,   125,   126,  127 

Agreement  to  arbitrate  all  differences  is  void 110 

Meaning  of  appraisal  as  used  in  the  policy 110 

Total  loss  goods 110,  111,  112 

Damaged  goods 110,  111,  112 

Professional — unfair   appraiser    113,  114, 

115,   116,   117,  118,.  119,   120,   124,  125,  126,   127,  132 
Burden  of  proving  unfairness 116 

255 


256  HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS 

Appraisers  not  obliged  to  follow  strict  rules  of  law 121 

Appraisal  in  detail 122 

If  A  fails  through  no  fault  of  assured,  company  cannot  force 

another 127,  128 

Held  to  the  contrary t 128 

Massachusetts  on  same  question 128 

Appraisal  waives  a  prior  breach  of  policy 129 

Appraisal  waives  proofs  of  loss 129,  130,  132 

Non-waiver  clauce    129 

When    company    may    deny    liability    and    still    insist    on    ap- 
praisal   129 

When  A  waives  nothing 130,  132 

Company's    refusal    to    appraise    waives    nothing    except    the 

right  to  thereafter  have  an  appraisal 131 

What  is  not  a  waiver  of  prior  breach  of  policy 131 

Award  of  appraisers  nullifies  the  clause  limiting  time  in  which 

suit  may  be  brought 132 

Waiver  of  assured's  sale  of  goods 132 

When  demand  for  A  too  late 133 

When  demand  for  A  not  too  late 133 

Public  adjuster  may  be  competent  and  disinterested  A 133 

Mortgagee    to    whom    policy    is    payable    in   case    of    loss,    his 

rights 133,    134,  135 

Any   one  accident 165 

Allowed 166 

Adjacent 166 

Additional  insurance   167 

Any  mercantile  purposes 170 

Account  of  whom  it  may  concern 172,  185 

Assured — Insured 186 

Appreciation 226 

Apportionment;   see  Contribution. 

Average   clause    144,  145 

Articles  used  in  packing 173 

Blown  up  by  city  authorities  to  prevent  spread  of  fire 10 

Boiler  burned  by  fire  in  its  furnace 17 

Builder's   risk 168 

Brick  building  and  additions 174 

Building  and  all  additions  thereto  adjoining  and  communicating.  .    174 

Building  and  additions 175,  177 

Building    176 

Building  known  as   St.   Anthony's   elevator 178 

Building  when  personal  property 182 

Boat 183 

Books 181 

Blowing  up,  drowning,  etc 184 

City  ordinance  as  to  building  repairs 10,     17 

Condemned  building    10 

City  ordinances,  causing  increased  cost  of  repairs 11,     12 

Consequential  loss    18 

Cash  value  ;  see  Measure  of  damage 25 

Certificate  of  magistrate  or  notary  public : 

When  condition  precedent 49 

Not  concerned  in  loss  as  creditor 50 

What  is  necessary  to  compel  its  furnishing 50,     51 

Cancellation  of  policy : 

By  failure  of   company 137 

Contribution  of  Non-concurrent  insurance : 

Reading  rule    139 

Massachusetts  rule    139 

Vermont  rule 139 

Cromie  or  Kentucky   rule 139 

Connecticut  rule 139 

New  Jersey   rule 139 

Oklahoma — Page  rule 140 

Texas — Page  rule    140 

U.   S.   C.   C.  A. — Page  rule 140 

U.  S.  C.  C.— Meig's  rule 140 

Pennsylvania — Meig's  rule    141 

Maryland   rule 141 

New  York  rule   142 


TOPICAL  INDEX  257 

New  York  rule   j'f  :\''  V..V   }!!! 

Coinsurance  clause  rule 143,  144,  145,  179 

Average  distribution  clause 144,  145 

Three-fourths  clause   •  •  •   14& 

Average,      coinsurance,      reduced      rate      clauses,      suggested 

forms    145,   146 

Average  clause  advised  against  by  National  Credit  Men's  Asso- 

ciation    146,  147 

Author's  answer J*° 

Wisconsin  rule    If* 

Canadian  rule Joj> 

Floating  policy   150 

When  specific  policy  is  exhausted }pU 

Reading  rule   If} 

Finn  rule 151 

Exemplified    153 

Albany  rule 151 

Exemplified    Jj>* 

Kinne    rule 153 

Exemplified    15* 

Kentucky  rule  exemplified 154 

Wisconsin  rule  exemplified 155 

Reading  rule  exemplified 155 

Hypothetical   case   showing   what   each    of    the   various    rules 

would   pay    156,  157 

What  the  policy  contract  provides 158 

Suggestions  as  to  course  to  follow 158 

Kinne    rule,    its    author's    explanation,    and    directions    as    to 

apply,  and  exemplification  of  its  application.  .158,  159,  160,  161 

Concurrent  insurance 165,  179 

Cotton  baled,  held  for  compression  or  compressed  but  not  loaded 

on  cars,  etc 170 

Coton  in  bales  for  which  bills  of  lading  have  been  issued 171 

Cars  leased  and  for  which  assured  is  liable 171 

Cars  owned  or  used  by  assured 171 

Contribution  assured's — Goods  in  trust 172 

Contained  in  their  factory 173 

Church  building   178 

Cars  on  side  track  within  100  feet 179 

Civil  commotion    184 

Cargo  of  negroes,  insured  against  blowing  up,  drowning,  etc 184 

Clerk  sleeps   in  store : 185 

Co-partner's  purchase  of  partner's  interest 185 

Crude   petroleum — Camphene    186 

Coal  oil,  refined 187 

Change  within  the  control  of  assured 188 

Contained  in    188 

Certain  quantity  of  coal 189 

Consisting   of 189 

Change   of   title .   190 

Coinsurance  clause 143,   144,  145,  179 

Commission  clause  ;  see  Held  in  trust. 

Chattel  mortgage   179 

Change  of  title. 190 

Direct  defined    7 

Direct  loss,  what  is 7,  9,  10,  11,  12,  13,  14,  18,  19,  20,  21,  75,     76 

Direct  loss,  what  is  not 14,  15,  16,  17,  18,  19,  20,     21 

Direct  lo^  s,  what  is 10 

Decorations  to  walls  and  ceilings 168 

Dissolution   of   partnership 186 

Deliver    in    188 

Dwelling 188 

Dwelling   house,    stone 189 

Depreciation    25,  199 

Duplicate  bills    54,   56,     57 

Damaged  goods ;  see  "Options." 

Examination    under    oath     (of    assured    and    of    his    books    and 

papers)    46,  47,  53 

Assured  himself  must  appear  and  be  examined  under  oath...  54 

Company  must  name  reasonable  time  and  place 54 

Assured  must  subscribe  to  such  examination 54 

17 


258  HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS 

Must  furnish  duplicate  bills  when? 54,   56,     57 

What  is  a  certified  duplicate  bill 55,     57 

Assured  need  not  disclose  settlement  with  other  company 55 

Assured  need  not  answer  immaterial 55 

Proper  place  for  such  examinations   55 

Reasonable   place    55,     56 

Question  for  the  jury 55 

Improper  demand  by  company 56,     57 

Denial  of  liability  waives  right  to  examination 56 

When  impossible  to  produce  books,  effect  of 56 

Assured's  right  to  have  his  attorney  present 57 

Waiver  of  right  to  demand  certified  bills 57 

Effect  of  misstatement  in  examination 57,     59 

Willful  false  swearing 57 

Duplicate  bills  are  no  part  of  proofs  of  loss,  the  claim  becomes 

due  60  days  after  proofs  are  furnished 57 

Explosion 79,  81,  82,     83 

English,  American  and  West  India  goods 169 

Eggs  in   pickle 175 

Earth   oils    187 

Expert  accounting  in  its  relation  to  the  adjustment  of  losses : 

Showing  incorrect  statement  of  loss 191,  194 

Showing  correct  method 192 

Profit  statement,  how  to  make 193,  195,  200 

Statement  of  loss,  how  to  make 194,  195,  200 

Statement  of  loss  by  quantities 195 

Discussion  of  book  statements 196,  197 

Discussion  of  depreciation 198,  199,   201 

Value  of  Mercantile  Agency  Reports .    202 

Sample  page  of  (Mdse.  a/c  on)  ledger 202,   203 

Different   method    of   figuring   loss    and    arriving   at   same   re- 
sult     203,   204 

How  to  figure  manufacturing  loss 205,  206 

Some  pointers   worth  knowing 206,  207 

Accurate  method  of  apportionment 207,   208 

Pointers  on  adjusting  losses  ignoring  books  or  where  no  books 

are  kept 208,  209,  210,  211 

Cubic  foot  estimate  on  buildings 211,  212 

Points  raised  on  a  loss  in  process  of  adjustment 

212,    213,    214,   215,   216,   217 

Statements  and  proofs  of  a  loss  of  a  large  department  store 

in  Texas   219,  220,  221,  222,  223 

Excess  insurance   150 

Exhausted  insurance 150 

Fire  caused  by  windstorm   or  lightning 8 

Fire — Heating  of  wet  wool 8,   9,     16 

Fallen  building 13,  16,  79,  80,   81,  82,     83 

Friendly  fire    14 

Fire  caused  by  negligence  of  third  party 19 

Fire,  expense  of  subduing  it 19 

Fire  set  by  assured's  wife 20,     22 

Fire  caused  by  insured's  insane  wife 22 

Fire  caused  by  negligence  of  assured's  agents 20,     22 

Fire  caused  by  negligence  of  assured's  son 20 

Fire  caused  by  negligence  of  railroad 19,     20 

Fire  caused  by  recklessness  of  assured 21 

Fire  engine  going  to  fire  colliding  with  assured's  building 21 

Falling  walls    * ! 9 

Fraud  and  false  swearing : 

To  avoid  policy  must  be  willful 59 

Failure  to  correct  before  suit 59 

Relates  only  to  proofs  of  loss  or  examination  under  oath 59 

Must  be  pleaded   by   defendant 60 

Proof  as  to  F.  F 60 

Inference   as    to 60 

It  is  for  the  jury 60 

What  is 60,     61 

Wisconsin  S.  C.  on  fraud  and  false  swearing 61,  62,     63 

Fire-proof    safe    164 

Frame  barn   and   contents   therein 168 

Factory  including  machinery  and  fixtures 174 

Frame   dwelling  house 174 


TOPICAL  INDEX  259 

Farming  utensils    177 

Fixtures 167,  168,  178,  190 

Furniture    . 181 

Fire  by  lightning 185 

Foreclosure 186 

Factory    189 

Fireworks   189 

Floater  policy 150 

General  average   (Marine)   loss,  what  is  not 21 

Grain 176,  181 

Grain    and   seed 176 

Gunpowder     187 

Hop  house  while  drying  hops 15 

Held  in  trust 166,  167,  171,  172,  173,  179,  184,  185,  186 

Harvester  while   in  use 167 

Harvester   operating  in   grain  fields  and   in   transit   in   connection 

with  harvesting 167 

Household  furniture  purchased  after  policy  was  issued 167 

Household  furniture    170 

Held  in   store 173 

Household  furniture  and  $ on  wearing  apparel 173 

Household  furniture  useful  and  ornamental 178 

Homestead,   insurance  proceeds   exempt 180 

Ice  clause — Marine  Insurance 12 

Inland  navigation  and  transportation 165 

Implements  of  trade 167 

Implements  including  binders  and  such  goods  kept  for  sale  in  an 

implement  store 177 

Insurance  proceeds,  when  exempt 180 

Inventory — Invoice 180,  181 

Insured — Assured  186 

Immediate  notice 187 

Iron-safe  clause  as  applied  to  several  stores  with  only  one  set 

of  books  224,  225,  226 

Increased  cost  of  repairs  due  to  building  laws 11,  12 

Insolvent  company  in  hands  of  receiver  cancels  policy 137 

Jewelry  and  clothing  being  stock  in  trade 169,  186 

Known  as  pottery  building   168 

Keeping  or  storing 187 

Loss  when  total 9 

Loss,  liability  for,  caused  by  falling  walls  of  burned  building 9 

Lightning  as  cause  of  fire 12 

Lightning  loss    15 

Lumber,   lath   and   pickets 169 

Lines  leased,  owned  or  operated 170 

Lumber  piled  in  mill  building,  in  mill  sheds  and  in  sheds  adjoin- 
ing  mill   sheds 177 

Lease,   renewal  of    179 

Lien   for   rent >  "  •> 

Loss  payable  clause 183 

Life    estate 183 

Linen 184 

Laws  relating  to  fire  insurance  do  not  apply  when 187 

Leasehold — Interest   not   absolute 187 

Loss  as  adjusted 219 

Loss    caused    by    blowing    up    with    explosives    by    order    of    city 

authorities    10 

Moisture,  from  water  used  to  extinguish  fire. 12 

Measure   of   damage 25 

Measure  of  damage,  whiskey 26,  27 

Measure  of  damage,  building 26 

Measure  of  damage,  linotype  machine 26 

Measure  of  damage,  assessor's  value,  tax  return  value 27 

Measure  of  damage,  manufacturer 30,  33 

Measure  of  damage,  household  effects 32 

Measure  of  damage,  freight 33 


260  HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS 

Measure  of  damage,  party  walls 33 

Measure  of  damage,  discussion  as  to 33 

Measure  of  damage,  saloon  fixtures  in  dry  town 104 

Mechanics 164 

Machinery,   implements   and  fixtures 168 

Materials 168 

Merchandise 169,  176,  180 

Mill  building  and   additions 173 

Machinery  for  the  manufacture  of  tinware 177 

Manufactured,  unmanufactured  and  in  process 176,  177 

Merchandise  of  every  description 179 

Machinery  when  realty 182 

Mortgage  clause  construed 182 

Merchandise  and  materials  for  making  same 183 

Mob    184 

Manufacturer  of  brass  clocks 185 

Mechanic's    lien 186 

Machine  and  repair  shop 188 

Mortgagee    188 

Mercantile  purposes    

Notice  and  proof  of  loss 37,  45 

Separation   of  goods 41 

Statement  of  loss > 41,  44 

Inventory    42 

Expense  of  inventory 42 

Expense  of  putting   in  order 42,  43 

Itemized  inventory 43,  44 

Time  in  which  proofs  must  be  furnished 44,  45 

Waiver  of  defects : .  . .  45 

Proofs  are  not  evidence  of  amount  of  loss 46 

Denial  of  liability  waives  proofs 46 

Who  may  make  proofs 46,  53 

Examination  of  assured  under  oath 46,  47 

Objections  to  proofs  must  be  made  promptly 47 

Magistrate's  or  notary's  certificate 49,  50,  51 

Non-concurrent  insurance  ;  see  Contribution. 

Not  over  $110  on  each 166 

Notice,   immediate    187 

Notary  or  magistrate's  certificate 49,  50,  51 

Option  to  repair  or  rebuild : 

As  affected  by  city  ordinance 10,  11,   12,  65,   67,  68 

As  affected  by  condemnation  of  building  before  fire 10 

As  affected  by  valued  policy  law 11,   67,  68 

Election  to  repair  converts  policy  into  building  contract.  .  .  .65,  67 
And    assured   may   recover   full    damages    against   one    or    all 

of  the  companies,  the  contract  being  joint 65 

When  company  liable  for  rent 65 

Assured  not  compelledi  to  repair 65 

Company  cannot  enjoin  assured  from  repairing 65 

Company  must  notify  assured  when 66 

Company  will  be  discharged  from  garnishment,  when 66 

Company  liable  for  damages,  when 66 

When  the  right  of  option  begins  and  terminates 66 

Effect  of  waiver  of  proof  doesn't  waive  option 66 

Two  modes  of  settlement,  the  election  of  one  waives  other. ...  66 

The  retort  to  arbitration  waives  right  to  repair 66 

Unless  arbitration  agreement  provided  against  such  waiver.  . .  67 

Option  to  take  over  salvage : 

Company  cannot  enjoin  assured  from  removing  goods 65 

Assured's  sale  of  goods  and  preventing   company   from   exer- 
cising option  forfeits  claim 68 

After  appraisal  company  must  elect 68 

Company's  demand  that  goods  be  kept  30  days 69 

When;  company  cannot  exercise  option 69 

Cannot  take  with  having  goods  appraised 69 

Cannot  deny  appraisal  and  claim  rights  thereunder 69 

Discussion  of  the  rights  of  the  parties 69,  73 

Danger  of  taking  over  stock 73 

Other  insurance  ;  see  also  Contribution : 

The  term  valid  or  not 137 

Effect  of  failure  of  insurance  company 137 

What  constitutes  O.  1 137 


TOPICAL  INDEX  261 

Insurance  to  owners  of  separate  interests 137 

Mortgagee    and    owner 137 

On   commission    166,  1 

Oil  in  tank  cars  in  transit,  etc 170 

Occupied  as  a  dwelling .    170 

Own,  held  in  trust,  on  commission  or  sold  but  not  delivered ;  see 
Held  in  trust. 

Open  for  business 179 

One   barrel,    exceeding 187 

Owner 188 

Protection  and  care  of  property  at  flre  is  assured's  duty 21,75,     77 

Profits  from  bridge   tolls 22 

Party  walls 33,  164 

Proofs  of  loss  ;  see  "Notice  and  proofs  of  loss"  also 37,  51,  188 

Prohibited  articles    ...82,   83,  163,  164,   166,  173,  187,  189 

Premises    163,  179 

Plate 165,  188 

Plate  glass  of  9  square  feet  or  more 166 

Patterns   when    insured • 166 

Policy  that  extends  to  property  not  in  building 166 

Property  belonging  to  assured  or  for  which  he  may  be  liable 168 

Protecting  property   during  flre,   expense   of 169 

Paints,  oils,   brushes,  and  such  other  merchandise 176 

Proximate   cause    183 

Premises  owned  or  occupied  by  assured 184 

Prosecuted    184 

Pottery   building    187 

Particular  and  detailed  account  of  loss 188 

Privileged  for  a  printing  office 189 

Risks   and   perils    of  fire 165 

Rolling  stock  on  line  of  assured's  road,  its  branches,  etc 171 

Rents  during  period  necessary  to  restore  building 178 

Rent,  lien  for 179 

Ready  to  proceed  under  the  provisions  of  the  policy 180 

Red    top    seed 180 

Reversioner    183 

Representation — Warranty     186 

Risk,  change  within  control  of  assured 188 

Repair — Replace — Rebuild  ;   see   "Options." 

Removal    loss    75 

Railroad  lorses;  see  "Cars." 

Stove  pipe  removed,  flre  built  in  stove  causing  loss 13 

Smoke  and  soot  from  defective  stove  pipe 14 

Smoke  and  soot  from  mismanagement  of  insured 14 

Smoke  and  soot  from   assured's  furnace 14 

Smoke  and  soot  from  lamp  or  stove 15,  21,     23 

Subrogation,  rights   of 19 

Store    165 

Shop    165 

Subject  to  three-fourths  clause 165 

Sporting  house 166 

Standard  time 166 

Saloon  fixtures    167 

Stock  of  vinegar  in  store  and  in  tank,  mash  and  low  wines 168 

Stock  of  wearing  apparel  and  household  furniture 169 

Stock  and  materials 169 

Stock  of  hair  manufactured  or  in  process 169 

Steam  saw  mill 174 

Stock  manufactured  and  in  process 176,  177 

Stock   in  trade 176 

Stock  of  watches,  watch  trimmings,  etc 176,  185 

Stock  of  merchandise,  lamps,  scales  and  other  such  merchandise.  .    177 
Ship  tackle,  ordnance,  ammunition,  artillery  and  furniture  of  ship.    178 

Stock    180 

Stock  of  grain 181 

Sold,  paid  for  and  warehouse  receipts  delivered 185 

Storing   or   keeping 187 

Statement  of  loss 188 

Stone  dwelling  house 189 

Store  fixtures    190 


262  HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS 

Some   statistics   as    to   cost   of   fire-proof   buildings    and   losses,    in 

various  cities 249,  250,  251,  252,  253,  254 

Salvage ;  see  "Option,"  "Protection  and!  care  of  property  at  fire. 
Separation  of  damaged  and  undamaged  personal  property 41 

Tornado   preceding  fire  loss 10 

Total  loss 9,  10 

Transportation  and  inland  navigation 165 

Total  concurrent  insurance  permitted 166 

Twelve  o'clock  noon .  . . 166 

Three    story    building 173 

Tools 176 

Threshing  outfit    178 

Toilet  articles,  labels,  bottles  and  powder 180 

Texas,  valued  policy  law  construed 181 

Tax    title 185 

Title,  change  of 190 

Tables  ;   see  Weights  and  Measures. 

Theft  at  and  after  fire 75,  76 

Three-fourths  clause   145 

Tornado  insurance  not  affected  by  fire  insurance  laws 187 

Unfinished  house    . 169 

Usurped  power   184 

Until  a  certain  date 186 

Until  safely  landed  at 170 

Valued   policy   law   nullifies   provisions   of   policy   in   conflict  with 

it   11,   17,  93,  181 

Void 180 

Vacant  and   unoccupied 181 

Valid  insurance 137 

Waiver : 

Definition   of    85 

How   determined 85 

Can't  waive  right  which  is  not  known 85 

Construed 85 

What  constitutes    86 

Non-waiver  agreement: 

Adjuster  may  waive  his  non-waiver  agreement 86,     87 

Discussion  of  the  question 87 

How  to   avoid  waivers 87 

Statement    of  facts    as    to    violation    of    iron-safe    clause,    and 
attempt  to  adjust  under  non-waiver  agreement,  with  brief 

of  the  law  on  the  questions  raised 88 

Rights  under  non-waiver  agreement 89 

Effect   of    demanding   compliance    with    provisions    of   a   void 

policy    89,     90 

Assured's  statement  of  facts 90 

Wholesale  stock  and  other  goods  on  hand  for  sale 175 

Within  sixty  days  after  the  fire 179 

While  occupied  as . 180 

Working  interest  of  assured 185 

Warranty — Representation     186 

Weights  and  measures : 

Lengths 229 

Surveyors — Land    229 

Miscellaneous     229 

Square 229 

Solid  or  cubic 229 

Liquid 230 

Apothecary's 230 

U.    S.    Dry , 230 

Troy  weight 230 

Apothecary's  weight 230 

Circular  measure 230 

Time    measure 231 

Cloth   measure    231 

Mariner's  measure 231 

Linear — Metric    equivalents 231 

Square     231 

Weights     231 

Approximate   metric   equivalents 231 


TOPICAL  INDEX  263 

Capacity  of  tanks  and  bins 232 

Capacity  of  circular  tanks 232 

Capacity  of  square  tanks 232 

Measurements  and  weights 232 

Bushels    and    bins 232 

Corn  in  crib 23S 

Hay 233 

Circular  stack,  cubic  feet  in 233 

Timber 233 

Table  of  weights 234,  235,  236,  237 

Weights  of  various  materials 237,  238 

Wall  paper    239 

Veneered  doors   240 

Brick   in  walls. 241 

Depreciation  of  materials  in  building.  . . . 242 

Window  shades 243 

Building  hints 244 

Conditioning  department  store  stock 244 

Conditioning  damaged  machinery  and  iron  goods 244 

Conditioning  smoked   clothes 245 

Cost  of  building  in  Chicago 245,  246,  247,  248,  249 

Walls  of  burned  building  falling1  on  building  not  otherwise  injured 

by  fire 9 


264  HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 


TABLE  OF  CASES 


Aachen   &    Munich    F.    Ins.    Co.    v.    Arqbian    T.    G.    Co.     (64    S.    635;    10 

Ala.  App.  395)  180 

Acer  v.  Merchants  Ins.  Co.  (N.  Y.),  (57  Barb.  68)  138 

Ackley  v.  Phenix  Ins.  Co.  (Mont.),  (64  Pac.  665) 164 

Adams  v.  N.  Y.  Bowery  F.  Ins.  Co.  (la.),  (85  la.  6;  21  Ins.  L.  J. 

833;  51  N.  W.  1149)  96,  111,  127,  176 

Aetna  Ins.  Co.  v.  Bank  (62  Fed.  222)  50 

Aetna  F.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Davis  (Ky.),  (29  Ins.  L.  J.  560)  122 

Aetna  Ins/  Co.  v.  Jester  (47  L.  R.  A.  [N.  S.]  1191;  132  Pac.  130;  37 

Okla.  413)  105,  106,  127 

Aetna  Ins.  Co.  v.  McLeod  et  al.  (Kan.  S.  C.),  (25  Ins.  L.  J.  669) 57 

Aetna  Ins.  Co.  v.  Simmons  (49  Neb.  811;  69  N.  W.  125)  54,  56 

Aetna  Ins.  Co.  v.  Stephens  (Ky.  C.  A.),  57  S.  W.  583)  94 

Aetna  Ins.  Co.  v.  Strout,  (16  Ind.  App.  160;  44  N.  E.  934) 166 

Aetna  F.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Tyler  (N.  Y.  S.  C.),  (16  "Wend.  385)  50 

Agnew  v.  Ins.  Co.  (Pa.),  (3  Phil.  193)  75 

Allemannia  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  Pittsburgh  Expo.  Co.  (11  All.  572)  163 

Allen  v.  Patroup  M.  F.  Ins.  Co.  (Mich.),  (130  N.  W.  196)  97 

Alliance  Co-Operative  Ins.  Co.  v.  Arnold  (Kan.),  (31  Ins.  L.  J. 

943)  67,  102 

Alsop  v.  Continental  Ins.  Co.  (Mo.  App.),  (162  S.  W.  313)  144 

Amer.  Cent.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Bass  (90  Tex.  380;  26  Ins.  L,.  J.  718;  38  S. 

W.  1119)  97,  129 

Amer.  Cent.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Green  et  al.  (Tex.),  (41  S.  W.  74)  164 

Amer.  Cent.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Landau  (N.  J.  Ch.),  (49  Atl.  738)  121 

Amer.  Cent.  Ins.  Co.  v.  McLanathan  (Kan.  S.  C.),  (2  Ins.  L.  J.  907)  .  .  66 

Amer.  Cent.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Simpson  (43  111.  App.  98)  55,  57 

Amer.  F.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Bell  (Tex.),  (75  S.  W.  319) 106,  112,  181 

Amer.  F.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Stuart  (Tex.  C.  C.  A.),  (38  S.  W.  395)  93 

Amer.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Barnett  (73  Mo.  364)  187 

Amer.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Heath  (29  Tex.  445 ;  69  S.  W.  235)  143 

Amer.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Rodenhause  (Okla.),  (128  Pac.  502)  99 

Amer.  Smelter  Co.  v.  Prov.-Wash.  Ins.  Co.  (64  Mo.  App.  438)  169 

Amer.  Steel  Co.  v.  Ger.-Amer.  F.  Ins.  Co.  (U.  S.  C.  C.  A.),  (187 

Fed.  730)  108 

A-mpleman  v.  Citizens  Ins.  Co.  (18  Ins.  L.  J.  396),  (Mo.  App.)  67 

Amusement  &c.  v.  Prussian  Natl.  Ins.  Co.  (85  Kan.  367;  116  Pac.  620)  99 

Anglerodt  v.  Delaware  M.  Ins.  Co.  (31  Mo.  593;  4  Ben.  589)  139,  143 

Annapolis,  etc.,  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Baltimore  F.  Ins.  Co.  (32  Md.  37;  5  Ben. 

258)  188 

Appleby  v.  Astor  F.  Ins.  Co.  (54  N.  Y.  253;  45  Barbour  454;  5 

Ben.  490)  187 

Arlington  v.  Colonial  Assur.  Co.  (180  N.  Y.  337;  73  N.  E.  Rep.  34)  ....  141 

Armour  v.  Reading  F.  Ins.  Co.  (67  Mo.  App.  215)  144 

Armstrong  v.  Agricultural  Ins.  Co.  (N.  Y.),  (31  N.  Y.  St.  201)  46 

Arnold  v.  Indemnity  F.  Ins.  Co.  (152  N.  E.  232;  67  S.  E.  574)  181 

Astrich  v.  Ger.-Amer.  Ins.  Co.  (U.  S.),  (33  Ins.  L.  J.  308,  925)  ...42,  68,  100 

Aurora  Ins.  Co.  v.  Johnson  (46  Ind.  315)  ; 56 

Austin  et  al.  v.  Drewe  (6  Taunt.  436;  1  Bennett  102)  14 

Babcock  v.  Montgomery  Co.  M.  Ins.  Co.  (N.  Y.),  (4  Comstock  326; 

3  Ben.  154) 185 

Bacot  v.  Phoenix  Ins.  Co.  (96  Miss.  223;  50  S.  729;  39  Ins.  L.  J. 

214;  25  L.  R.  A.  1226)  134,  182 

Baker  v.  Phoenix  Assur.  Co.  (57  Mo.  App.  559)  . 94 

Baltimore  F.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Loney  (20  Md.  20;  4  Ben.  646)  143 

Bangor  Sav.  Bank  v.  Niagara  F.  Ins.  Co.  (Me.),  (23  Ins.  L.  J.  292) 127 

Barnard  v.  Ins.  Co.  (U.  S.),  (29  Ins.  L.  J.  631)  120 

Barnard  v.  Natl.  F.  Ins.  Co.  (27  Mo.  App.  26)  '. 164 

Barnes  v.  Hartford  F.  Ins.  Co.  (3  McCray  22;  9  Fed.  813;  11  Ins 

L.  J.  110)  144 

Barnes  v.  Union  M.  F.  Ins.  Co.  (51  Me.  110;  4  Ben.  728)  190 

265 


266  HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 

Barnum  v.  Merchant's  F.  Ins.  Co.  (98  N.  Y.  188)  51 

Bastian  v.  British  Amer.  Assur.  Co.  (Cal.  S.  C.),  (33  Ins.  L.  J.  1033)..  83 
Baumgarth  v.  Fireman's  Fund  Ins.  Co.  (Mich.),  (116  N.  W.  449;  37 

Ins.  L.  J.  577)  128 

Baumgartnor  v.  Ins.  Co.  (1  W.  N.  [Pa.]  119)  164 

Beaks  v.  Phoenix  Ins.  Co.  (143  N.  Y.  402;  24  Ins.  L.  J.  73;  38  N.  E. 

453;  Ann.  26  L.  R.  A.  267)  15 

Bean  v.  Travelers  Ins.  Co.  (Cal.),  (29  Pac.  1113)  47 

Bear  v.  Atlantic  Home  Ins.  Co.  (N.  Y.),  (34  Misc.  613;  70  N.  Y. 

Supp.  581)  60 

Beer  v.  Ins.  Co.  (39  O.  St.  109)  164 

Beideman  v.  Powell  (10  Mo.  280)  171 

Bennett  v.  Lycoming  County  M.  Ins.  Co.  (67  N.  Y.  274)  37,  38 

Bergman  v.  Commercial  Ins.  Co.  et  al.  (Ky.),  (13  Ky.  L,.  R.  720; 

21  Ins.  L.  J.  271)  134 

Bernhardt  v.  Rochester  Ger.  Ins.  Co.  (79  Conn.  388;  65  Atl.  134)  127 

Biddleford  Sav.  Bank  v.  Dwelling  House  Ins.  Co.  (Me.  S.  C. ;  18  Atl. 

298) 47 

Bigler  v.  N.  Y.  Central  Ins.  Co.  (20  Bail.  635;  22  N.  Y.  402)  174 

Birmingham  &  Co.  v.  Huitch  (157  Ala.  630;  47  So.  576)  33 

Birmingham  F.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Kroegher  (83  Pa.  St.  64)  164 

Bishop  v.  Agricultural  Ins.  Co.  (130  N.  Y.  488;  29  N.  E.  844)  127 

Bishop  v.  Ins.  Co.  (139  N.  Y.  488;  29  N.  E.  844;  130  N.  Y.  488) 118,  124 

Blackwell  v.  American  C.  Ins.  Co.  (2  Mo.  App.  516)  97 

Blake  v.  Exch.  M.  Ins.  Co.  (Mass.),  (12  Gray  265;  4  Ben.  306) 139 

Blakely  v.  Proctor  (134  Ga.  139 ;  67  S.  E.  389)  108 

Blossom  v.  Lycoming  F.  Ins.  Co.  (64  N.  Y.  1-62)  38 

Boak  Fish  Co.  v.  Manchester  F.  Assur.  Co.  (84  Minn.  419;  87  N.  W. 

932;  31  Ins.  L.  J.  253) 13 

Boston  and  Albany  R.  R.  Co.  et  al.  v.  Merc.  Trust  Co.  et  al.  (Md.), 

(34  Atl.  778;  9  Ins.  Dig.  305;  Joyce  Sec.  1454)  137 

Boyd  v.  McKee  et  al.  (Va.),  (37  S.  E.  810)  172 

Boyd  v.  Royal  Ins.  Co.  (11  N.  C.  372 ;  16  S.  E.  389)  25 

Boyer  v.  Grand  Rapids  F.  Ins.  Co.  (Mich.),  (83  N.  W.  124)  173 

Boyle  v.  Hamburg-Bremen  F.  Ins.  Co.  (169  Pa.  349;  32  Atl.  533;  24 

Ins.  L,.  J.  699)  42,  93 

Braddy  v.  N.  Y.  Bowery  F.  Ins.  Co.  (N.  C.),  (20  S.  E.  477;  115  N. 

C.  354,  355)  114,  118,  119,  127 

Brady  v.  Ins.  Co.  (11  Mich.  445) 68 

Brady  v.  Northwestern  Ins.  Co.  (11  Mich.  425;  4  Bennett  663)  10 

Bradshaw  v.  Agricultural  Ins.  Co.  (137  N.  Y.  137;  22  Ins.  L.  J.  161; 

32  N.  E.  1055)  113,  116,  119 

Bradshaw  v.  Ins.  Co.  (1?7  N.  Y.  137;  32  N.  E.  1055)  117,  124 

Branigan  v.  Jefferson  Mut.  Ins.  Co.  (102  Mo.  App.  70;  76  S.  W.  643)...  129 
Brecht  v.  Law  M.  &  C.  Ins.  Co.  (160  Fed.  399;  87  C.  C.  A.  351;  18  L. 

R.  A.  197)  183 

Breuner  v.  L.  &  L.  &  G.  Ins.  Co.  (51  Cal.  101;  6  Ins.  L.  J.  475;  Ann. 

21  Am.  R.  Ext.  Anno.  703  Notes)  13 

Briggs  v.  N.  B.  &  M.  Ins.  Co.  (N.  Y.),  (53  N.  Y.  446;  66  Barb.  325; 

2  Ins.  L.  J.  929)  82 

Brit.  Amer.  Assur.  Co.  v.  Darragh  (128  Fed.  890;  33  Ins.  L.  J.  557; 

63  C.  C.  A.  426)  93,  96 

British  Amer.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Joseph  (9  Low.  Can.  R.  448;  4  Ben.  161) 189 

Brock  v.  Dwelling  House  Ins.  Co.  (102  Mich.  583;  24  Ins.  L.  J.  464; 

61  N.  W.  67)  113,  114,  127 

Brock  v.  Ins.  Co.  (102  Mich.  583;  61  N.  W.  67;  26  L.  R.  A.  623;  47 

Am.  St.  562) 117 

Brook  v.  Ins.  Co.  (102  Mich.  583)  124 

Brooks  v.  Standard  Ins.  Co.  (11  Mo.  App.  349;  1st  Phillips  Sep.  755)...  224 

Brough  v.  Higgins  (2  Gratt.  408;  2  Ben.  443)  183 

Brough  v.  Whitmore  (4  Term.  206)  178 

Brown  v.  Ins.  Co.  (1  Ellis  &  Ellis  853)  68 

Brown  v.  London  Assur.  Corp.  (N.  Y.),  (40  Hun.  101)  38 

Brown  et  al.  v.  Royal  Co.  (Q.  B.  Eng.),  (4  Ben.  371;  1  Ellis  853) 65 

Brown  et  al.  v.  St.  Nicholas  Ins.  Co.  (61  N.  Y.  332)  12 

Browne  v.  Hartford  F.  Ins.  Co.  (46  Mo.  App.  473)  178 

Brush  v.  Fisher  (70  Mich.  469)  120 

Bt:ffalo  El.  Co.  v.  Prussian  Natl.  Ins.  Co.  (64  App.  Div.  182,  187;  71 

N.  Y.  Supp.  918;  aff' d  171  N.  Y.  25;  63  N.  E.  810)  32 

Bull  v.  North  British  &  Merc.  Ins.  Co.  (Ont.  S.  C.  of  J.),  (9  Can.  Law 

Times  26)  46 

Bullman  v.  Ins.  Cos.  (Mass.),  (22  Ins.  L.  J.  668)  114 

Bumstead  v.  Dividend  Mut.  Ins.  Co.  (12  N.  Y.  81)  44 


TABLE  OF  CASES.  267 

Burgess  v.  Alliance  Ins.  Go.  (10  Allen  [Mass.]  221;  5  Bennett  46) 25 

Burnett  v.  Amer.  Central  Ins.  Co.  (68  Mo.  App.  343)  50 

Burnham  v.  Royal  Ins.  Co.  (75  Mo.  App.  394;  57  Mo.  App.  394)..  38,  44,  182 

Burns  v.  Michigan  Mfrs.  Mut.  F.  Co.  (Mich.  S.  C.),  (31  Ins.  L.  J.  633)  53 
Bryant  v.  Poughkeepsie  M.  P.  Ins.  Co.  (S.  C.),  (21  Barb.  154;  4 

Ben.  37)  185 

Caballero  v.  Home  Ins.  Co.  (15  La.  Ann.  217;  4  Ben.  478)  82 

Caledonian  Ins.  Co.  v.  Traub  (83  Md.  524;  25  Ins.  L.  J.  791;  37  Atl. 

13,  782)  97,  121 

Camden  F.  Ind.  Ass'n.  v.  Bomar  (Tex.),  (176  S.  W.  156)  181 

Campbell  v.  Charter  Oak  Ins.  Co.  (92  Mass.  213)  59 

Cannon  v.  Home  Ins.  Co.  (La.),  (26  Ins.  L.  J.  737)  138 

Cannon  V.  Phoenix  Ins.  Co.  (110  Ga.  563;  35  S.  E.  775;  29  Ins.  L.  J. 

1023)  14 

Capitol  Ins.  Co.  v.  Wallace  (50  Kan.  453;  21  Ins.  L.  J.  516;  31  Pac. 

1070;  22  Ins.  L.  J.  397)  48,  93,  127 

Caraker  v.  Royal  Ins.  Co.  (63  Hun.  82;  17  N.  Y.  Supp.  858;  136  N.  Y. 

645) 174 

Cargill  et  al.  v.  Millers  &  Mfrs.  Mut.  Ins.  Co.  (Minn.),  (19  Ins.  L. 

J.  876)  178 

Carlston  v.  St.  Paul  F.  &  Ins.  Co.  (37  Mont.  118;  94  Pac.  756;  37  Ins. 

L.  J.  366)  106 

Carp.  v.  Queen  Ins.  Co.  (Mo.),  (78  S.  W.  757;  104  Mo.  App.  502) 128 

Carpenter  v.  Allemannia  F.  Ins.  Co.  (Pa.),  (26  Atl.  781)  47,  174 

Carpenter  v.  Ger.-Amer.  Ins.  Co.  (135  N.  Y.  298)  37,  57 

Carpenter  v.  Ins.  Co.  (61  Mich.  635)  86 

Carr  v.  Hlbernia  Ine.  Co.  (2  Mo.  App.  466)  176 

Carrington  v.  Lycoming  F.  Ins.  Co.  (53  Vt.  418)  164 

Case  v.  Mfrs.  F.  &  M.  Ins.  Co.  (82  Cal.  263;  22  Pac.  1083) 33 

Cashau  v.  N.  W.  N.  Ins.  Co.  (U.  S.),  (5  Bissell  476;  5  Ben.  501) 187 

Catlett  v.  Dougherty  (114  111.  568)  127 

Central  &  Co.  v.  North  British  &  M.  Ins.  Co.  (245  Pa.  St.  272;  91 

Atl.  662)  179 

Central  City  Ins.  Co.  v.  Gates  (86  Ala.  558;  18  Ins.  L.  J.  761) 39,  48 

Cerf  v.  Home  Ins.  Co.  (44  Cal.  320 ;  5  Ben.  426)  189 

Chainless  Co.  v.  Security  3ns.  Co.  (169  N.  Y.  304;  31  Ins.  L.  J.  324; 

62  N.  E.  392)  77 

Chainless  Cycle  Co.  v.  Security  Ins.  Co.  (160,  168,  169  N.  Y.  30,4;  31 

Ins.  L.  J.  324;  62  N.  E.  392)  69,  98,  101 

Chandlery.  Ins.  Co.  of  N.  A.  (Vt.),  (28  Ins.  L.  J.  1028)  139 

Chandos  v.  American  F.  Ins.  Co.  (84  Wis.  184;  22  Ins.  L.  J.  425; 

54  N.  W,  390)  f 97,  133 

Chaplin  v.  Provincial  Ins.  Co.  (23  Up.  Can.  C.  P.  218;  5  Ben.  503)  ....  188 
Chapman  v.  Rockford  Ins.  Co.  (Wis.),  (62  N.  W.  422;  89  Wis.  572; 

28  L.  R.  A.  405)  113,  114,  118,  127 

Chase  v.  Hamilton  Ins.  Co.  (20  N.  Y.  52;  4  Ben.  416)  189 

Chase  v.  Hartford  F.  Ins.  Co.  (13  111.  676)  75 

Cheever  v.  Scottish  U.  &  N.  Ins.  Co.  (N.  Y.  S.  C.).  86  App.  Div.  328; 

83  N.  Y.  Supp.  730)  59 

Chenoweth  v.  Pheonix  Ins.  Co.  (Ky.),  (4  Finch  Dig.  22;  12  Ky.  L.  R. 

232)  103,  105,  131 

Cheesebrough  v.  Home  Ins.  Co.  (61  Mich.  333;  28  N.  W.  110;  15  Ins. 

L.  J.  515)  144 

Chippewa  Lumber  Co.  v.  Pheonix  Ins.  Co.  (80  Mich.  116;  44  N.  W. 

1055;  19  Ins.  L.  J.  535)  97,  98,  112 

Christiansen  v.  Norwich  U.  F.  Ins.  Soc.  (84  Minn.  526;  31  Ins.  L.  J. 

218) 106,  116,  121 

Cincinnati  M.  Ins.  Co.  v.  May  (20  O.  211) 21 

Citizens  Ins.  Co.  v.  Hamilton  (48  111.  App.  593)  109,  127 

Citizens  Ins.  Co.  v.  Lockridge  (132  Ky.  1;  116  S.  W.  303;  38  Ins.  L. 

J.  491 ;  Ann.  20  L.  R.  A.  [N.  S.]  226)  33 

Citizens  Ins.  Co.  v.  Marsh  (41  Pa.  St.  386) 21 

Citizens  Ins.  Co.  et  al.  v.  Herposheimer  (Neb.),  (109  N.  W.  160)  100 

City  F.  C.  Sav.  Bank  v.  Pa.  F.  Ins.  Co.  (122  Mass.  165)  .  .  .  '. 59 

City  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  Corlies  (21  Wend.  367)  76 

City  Ins.  Co.  v.  Corlies  (N.  Y.),  (21  Wend.  367;  1  Bennett  753)  10 

Citizens  Ins.  Co.  v.  Colt  (Ind.  A.  C.),  (39  N.  E.  766)  102 

Claflin  v.  Ins.  Co.  (110  U.  S.  81) 60.  61 

Clark  v.  Farmers'  Mut.  F.  Ins.  Co.  (Ill  Wis.  65;  86  N.  W.  549;  14 

Deitch  86)  16 

Clark  v.  Svea  Ins.  Co.  (Cal.),  (36  Pac.  587)  17? 

Clary  v.  Protection  Ins.  Co.  (1  Wright  228)  169,  170 


268  HALL  OK  I.NSI  RAXCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 

Cleaver  v.  Ins.  Co.    (71   Mich.   414)    85 

Clover  v.  Greenwich  Ins.  Co.    (101  N.  Y.  277;  15  Ins.  L.  J.   214)    66 

Cobb  v.  Ins.  Co.   (11  Kan.   93)    46 

Cobbs   v.   Ins.   Co.    (68   Mich.    403)    85 

Coen  v.   Denver  T.   M.   P.   Ins.   Co.    (155  111.   App.    332) 180 

Coffey  v.  East  Tex.  Ins.  Co.    (61  Tex.   287)    145 

Coleman  v.  Ins.  Co.    (177   Pa.   St.   239)    55 

Collins  v.   Delaware  Ins.   Co.    (9   Pa.   576)    23 

Collins  v.  Farmville  Ins.  &  Bkg.  Co.    (79  N.  C.   279)    164 

Collinsville   Sav.    Bk.    v.    Boston  Ins.    Co.    (S.    C.),    (34   Ins.    L.    J.    1031; 

60  Atl.   647)    133 

Collinsville  S.   Soc.  v.  Boston    (77  Conn.   676;   60  Atl.   647)    134 

Colonial  Mut.  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  Ellinger  (112  111.  App.  302)    56 

Colt  v.  Phoenix  F.  Ins.  Co.    (54  N.  Y.  595;  5  Ben.  537)    186 

Columbian  Ins.  Co.   v.   Lawrence   (10  Pet.    507)    49 

Commercial  Assur.  Co.  ,v.  Parker   (119  111.  App.   126)    127 

Commercial    Bank   v.    Firemen's   Ins.    Co.    (Wis.    S.    C.),    (23    Ins.   L.    J. 

543)      61 

Commercial  Union  Assur.  Co.  v.  Dalzel   (210  Fed.  605;  C.  C.  A.  3rd  Cir. 

1792,   1793)    130 

Commercial   Ins.  Co.   v.   Friedlander    (156   111.    595)    60 

Commercial  Ins.  Co.  v.  Mehlman   (48  111.   313;  5  Ben.  190)    188 

The    Commonwealth    v.    Hide    &    Leather  Ins.    Co.    (Mass.),    (3    Ins.    L. 

J.    671)     168,  171 

Conn.  F.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Cohen   (97  Md.   294;   55  Atl.    675)    127 

Conn.    F.    Ins.    Co.    v.    Hamilton    (U.    S.),     (59    Fed.    258;    23    Ins.    L.    J. 

241)     97,    98,  99 

Conn.  F.   Ins.   Co.  v.  Hilbrant    (Tex.),    (73   S.  W.   558)    175 

Conn.    F.   Ins.    Co.   v.    Merchants   &  Mechanics   Ins.    Co.    (Va),    (15   Ins. 

L.    J.    615)     138 

Conn.  F.  Ins.  Co.  v.  O'Fallon   (Neb.),    (69  N.  W.   118)    116 

Continental    Ins.    Co.    v.    Garrett    (U.    S.),     (125    Fed.    589;    60    C.    C.    A. 

395,   396)    106,   122,  123 

Continental    Ins.    Co.    v.    Vallandingham    (Ky.),     (32    Ins.    L.    J.    1032; 

116   Ky.    287;   76    S.   W.    22)    93,  131 

Continental    Ins.    Co.    v.    Wilson     (45    Kan.    250;    25    Pac.    629;    20    Ins. 

L.  J.  269)    101,  127 

Cook  v.  Continental  Ins.   Co.    (70  Mo.   App.   610)    181 

Cook  v.  North  B.  &  M.  Ins.   Co.    (Mass.),    (3J.  Ins.  L.  J.  385,   396)    129 

Corkery  v.   Security  F.  Ins.   Co.    (la.),    (68  N.   W.   792)    167 

Cornell  v.   Hope  Ins.   Co.    (3   Martin    [La.]    223,)    49 

Cornell   v.    LeRoy    (N.    Y.    S.    C.),    (9    Wend.    163)     49 

Craig  v.   Springfield  F.  &  M.   Ins.  Co.    (34  Mo.  App.   481)    181 

Crew  v.  British  and  Foreign  M.  Ins.  Co.    (U.  S.   3rd  Dist.   103  Fed.  48)..  170 

Cromie  v.  Ky.  L.  M.  Ins.  Co.    (15  B.  Monroe   [Ky.]    432;   3  Ben.  785). 139,  143 

Cronin  v.    Fire   Assn.    (Mich.),    70   N.   W.    448)    177 

Crosby  v.   Franklin  Ins.  Co.    (Mass.),    (5  Gray  400,   504;   4  Ben   35).. 176,  185 

Cross    v.    Ins.    Co.    (U.    S.    C.    C.,    Ga.)    (22)    Fed.    74) 54 

Cuesta  v.   Royal  Ins.   Co.    (98   Ga.   720 ;   27   S.   R.   172)    16 

Cutting  Ins.   Comr.   v.   Atlas  M.   Ins.   Co.    in  re.   Downs    (199   Mass.    380; 

86   N.   E.    174;    37    Ins.   L.    J.    924)    '  150 

Dahms   v.    German   F.    Ins.    Co.    (la.),    (132    N.    W.    870) 145 

Dahrooge  v.   Rochester  Ger.   Ins.   Co.    (143  N.   W.   608)    85 

Dakin  v.  L.  &  L.  &  G.  Ins.  Co.   (13  Hun.  122;   [S.  C.]   77  N.  Y.   600) 45 

Darden  v.   L.   &  L.   &  G.   Ins.   Co.    (Miss.),    (68   S.    485)     145,  182 

Dautel  v.   Pa.   F.  Ins.   Co.    (65   Mo.   App.    44)    97 

Davenport  v.  Ins.   Co.    (N.  Y.),    (10  Daly  535)    128 

Davenport  v.  Long  Island  Ins.  Co.   (10  Daly  538)    127 

Davis  v.   American  Central    Ins.   Co.    (7    App.    Div.    488;    S.    C.    40   N.   Y. 

Supp.   248;   158  N.  Y.   688) 69 

Davis  v.  Anchor  Mut.   F.  Ins.  Co.    (la.),    (64  N.  W.   687)    177 

Davis   v.    Atlas  Assur.    Co.    (Wash.    S.    S.    C.),    (47    Pac.    436) 98,  99 

Davis  v.   Atlas  Ins.   Co.    (16   Wash.   232;   47  Pac.   436,   885)    127 

Davis  v.   Fireman's   Fund   Ins.   Co.    (210   Fed.    653)    125,  126 

Davis   v.    Grand    Rapids    Ins.    Co.     (15    Misc.    263;    36    N.    Y.    Supp.    792; 

157  N.  Y.  685;   5  App.  Div.   36)    44,   45,  68 

Davis  v.  Guardian  Assur.   Co.    (87   Hun.   414;   155  N.   Y.   682)    115 

Davis  v.   Imperial   Ins.   Co.    (Wash.   S.   C.),    (47   Pac.   439)    103 

Davis  Ins.  Co.  of  N.  A.    (Mich.),    (27  Ins.   L.   J.   184)    79,  82 

Davis  v.  Pioneer  Furn.  Co.    (Wis.),    (28  Ins.  L.  J.   474;  78  N.  W.   596)...  164 

Davia  v.  Scotland  Provincial  Ins.  Co.   (16  Up.  Can.  C.  P.   176;  5  Ben.  61)  188 

Davis  v.   Shearer  et  al.    (Wis.),    (62  N.  W.   1050;   8  Ins.   Dig.    92) 137 


TABLE  OF  CASES.  269 

Davis  v.  Stuyvesant  Ins.  Co.  (145  N.  Y.  Supp.  192)  126 

Day  v.  Home  Ins.  Co.  (177  Ala.  600;  58  S.  549)  89,  180 

Dee  v.  Key  City  F.  Ins.  Co.  (104  la.  167;  73  N.  W.  594)  97 

DeForest  v.  Fulton  F.  Ins.  Co.  (S.  C.),  (1  Hall  84)  184 

DeLand  v.  Aetna  Ins.  Co.  (68  Mo.  App.  277)  49 

Des  Moines  Ice  Co.  v.  Niagara  Ins.  Co.  (99  la.  193;  68  N.  W.  600) 22 

Deutel  v.  Pa.  F.  Ins.  Co.  (65  Mo.  App.  44)  101 

Devens  v.  Ins.  Co.  (83  N.  Y.  168)  86 

DeWees  v.  Manhattan  Ins.  Co.  (34  N.  J.  244;  5  Ben.  244;  35  N.  J. 

366;  5  Ben.  314)  187 

DeWitt  v.  Agricultural  Ins.  Co.  (89  Hun.  229;  S.  C.  71  St.  556;  affd. 

157  N.  Y.  353)  45 

Dinneen  v.  Amer.  Ins.  Co.  (Neb.  S.  C.),  (152  N.  W.  307)  11,  18 

Doane  v.  Milville  Mut.  M.  &  F.  Ins.  Co.  (N.  J.  Ch.),  (11  Atl.  739;  1 

Ins.  Dig.  27)  137 

Dolan  v.  Aetna  Ins.  Co.  (N.  Y.),  (22  Hun.  396) 60 

Dolliver  v.  St.  Joseph  Ins.  Co.  (131  Mass.  39;  31  Mass.  39)  49,  50 

Dolof  v.  Ins.  Co.  (82  Me.  266 ;  19  Ins.  L.  J.  450) 60 

Dollof  v.  Phenix  Ins.  Co.  and  one  other  (S.  J.  C.  Me.),  (19  Ins.  L. 

J.  450}  61 

Donohoe  v.  Ins.  Co.  (Vt.  S.  C.),  (13  Ins.  L.  J.  116)  46 

Dows  v.  Faneuil  Hall  Ins.  Co.  (127  Mass.  346)  .  .  . '. 82 

Downs  v.  Ins.  Co.  (127  Mass.  346)  79 

Doxey  v.  Royal  Ins.  Co.  (Tenn.  Ch.  App.),  (36  S.  W.  950)  94 

Doying  v.  Broadway  Ins.  Co.  (25  N.  J.  L.  569;  23  Ins.  L.  J.  304,  395; 

27  Atl.  927)  97,  121 

Dreher  v.  Aetna  Ins.  Co.  (18  mo.  128;  3  Ben.  514)  186 

Dresser  v.  United  Firemen's  Ins.  Co.  (N.  Y.),  (45  Hun.  298) 59 

Drinkwater  v.  London  Assur.  Corp.  (Eng.),  (2  Wilson  363;  1  Ben.  12)..  184 

Dunton  v.  Weschester  F.  Ins.  Co.  (Me.),  (71  Atl.  1037)  94,  98 

Dwelling  House  Ins.  Co.  v.  Gould  (Pa.  S.  C.),  (19  Atl.  793)  47 

Earley  v.  Prov.-Wash.  Ins.  Co.  (R.  I.),  (76  Atl.  753)  97,  110 

Early  v.  Prov.-Wash.  Ins.  Co.  (R.  I.),  (76  Atl.  753)  120 

Eastern  R.  R.  v.  Relief  Ins.  Co.  (98  Mass.  420)  44 

Eberhardt  v.  Federal  Ins.  Co.  (Ga.),  (80  S.  E.  856)  108 

Edwards  v.  Lycoming  Co.  Mut.  F.  Ins.  Co.  (Pa.),  (3  Ins.  L.  J.  534)...  37 

Eggleston  v.  Council  Bluffs  Ins.  Co.  (65  la.  308;  14  Ins.  L.  J.  365) 56 

Elliott  v.  Merchants  &  Bankers  F.  Ins.  Co.  (la.  S.  C.),  (28  Ins.  L.  J. 

677)  102 

Ellmaker  v.  Franklin  F.  Ins.  Co.  (5  Pa.  St.  183;  6  W.  S.  439)  169 

Ellmaker  Exch.  v.  Franklin  Ins.  Co.  (Pa.),  (5  Barr.  183;  2  Ben.  519)..  184 
Enright  v.  Montauk  F.  &  Ins.  Co.  (40  N.  Y.  642;  5  Finch  25)  ...71,  122,  123 

Equitable  F.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Quinn  (11  Low.  Can.  170)  25 

Erie  Brewing  Co.  v.  Ohio  F.  Ins.  Co.  (81  O.  St.  1;  89  N.  E.  1065; 

39    Ins.    L.    J.    200;    25    L.    R.    A.    740;    18    Am.    &    Eng.    Anno.    Gas. 

265)  135,  183 

Ermentrout  et  al.  v.  Girard  F.  &  M.  Ins.  Co.  (63  Minn.  305;  65  N. 

W.  635;  30  L.  R.  A.  346;  25  Ins.  L.  J.  81,  87;  56  Ann.  St.  481).. 7,  39,  80 

Erwin  v.  Ins.  Co.  (24  Mo.  App.  153)  85 

Exchange  Bk.  v.  Thuringia  F.  Ins.  Co.  (109  Mo.  App.  654;  83  S. 

W.  534)  98,  130 

Farmers  &  Merchants  Ins.  Co.  v.  Warner  (Neb.  S.  C.),  (34  Ins. 

L.  J.  83) 66 

Farmers,  etc.  v.  Scottish  TJ.  &  N.  (173  N.  Y.  241;  65  N.  E.  1105)  144 

Farmers'  Loan  &  Trust  Co.  v.  Harmony  F.  &  M.  Ins.  Co.  (S.  C.),  (51 

Barbour  33;  5  Ben.  174)  184 

Farmers'  Mut.  F.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Kryder  (Ind.),  (31  N.  E.  851)  168 

Farmers'  M.  Ins.  Co.  v.  New  H.  T.  Co.  (122  Pa.  St.  37;  15  Atl. 

563)  22 

Farnum  v.  Phoenix  Ins.  Co.  (83  Cal.  246;  26  Ins.  L.  J.  473;  23  Pac. 

869)  93 

Farrell  v.  Farmers'  F.  Ins.  Co.  (66  Mo.  App.  153)  8,  9,  10 

Farrell  v.  Ger.-Amer.  Ins.  Co.  (175  Mass.  340;  56  N.  E.  572;  29  Ins. 

L.  J.  341)  108,  122 

Faust  v.  Amer.  F.  Ins.  Co.  (Wia),  (64  N.  W.  883)  163 

Feibelman  v.  Manchester  F.  Assur.  Co.  (18  Ala.  180;  19  So.  540)  .  20 

Fellman  v.  Royal  Ins.  Co.  (U.  S.  C.  C.  A.),  (184  Fed.  577)  132 

Ferris  &  Eaton  v.  North  Amer.  Ins.  Co.  (N.  Y.),  (1  Hill  71;  2  Bennett 

56)  59 

Fidelity-Phenix  Ins.  Co.  v.  O'Bannon  (178  S.  W.  731)  182 

Flndeisen  v.  Ins.  Co.  (15  Ins.  L.  J.  90  Vt.)  86 

Fink  v.  Lancashire  Ins.  Co.  (60  Mo.  App.  673)  49,  163 

Pink  v.  Natl.  M.  F.  Ins.  Co.  (90  S.  C.  544;  74  S.  E.  33)  137 

Fire  Assn.  v.  Appel  (76  O.  St.  1;  N.  E.  952;  36  Ins.  L.  J.  769) 127 


270  HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 

Fire    Assn.    v.    Kosenthal    (108    Pa.    St.    474;    1    Atl.    303;    15    Ins.    L.    J. 

658)  11 

Fire  Assn  \ .  Koscntlial  supra  65 

Fire  Ins.  Assn.  v.  Wiokham  (V.  S.),  (21  Ins.  L.  J.  193) 42,  103 

Fireman's  Fund  Ins.  Co.  v.  Caye  (Ky.  S.  C.),  (14  Ky.  L,.  R.  810)  132 

Fireman's  Fund  Ins.  Co.  v.  Pekor  (106  Ga.  1;  31  S.  E.  779)  144 

Fireman's  Fund  Ins.  Co.  v.  Shearman  (20  Tex.  C.  C.  A.  243;  50  S. 

W.  598)  163 

Fireman's  Fund  Ins.  Co.  v.  Sims  (Ga.),  (42  S.  E.  268,  269;  31  Ins. 

L,.  J.  1049)  47,  53,  64 

Fireman's  Ins.  Co.  v.  Sholom  (80  111.  558)  80 

Fisher  v.  Crescent  Ins.  Co.  (IT.  S.  C.  C.)  (17  Ins.  L,.  J.  712)  25 

Fisher  v.  Merchants'  Ins.  Co.  (95  Me.  486;  50  Atl.  282;  31  Ins.  L,. 

J.  45)  94,  128 

Fitzgerald  v.  Atlanta  Home  Ins.  Co.  (N.  Y.),  (70  N.  Y.  Supp.  552)  .  .  .  167 
Fitzgerald  v.  German  Amer.  Ins.  Co.  (30  Misc.  N.  Y.  72;  62  N.  Y. 

Supp.  824)  15 

Flaherty  v.  Continental  Ins.  Co.  (20  App.  Div.  275;  46  N.  Y.  Supp.  934).  46 
Fletcher  v.  Ger.-Amer.  Ins.  C.  (79  Minn.  337;  82  N.  W.  647;  29.  Ins. 

L.  J.  752)  93 

Fleisch  v.  Ins.  Co.  of  N.  A.  (58  Mo.  App.  598;  23  Ins.  L.  J.  634)  55 

Flynn  v.  Hanover  F.  Ins.  Co.  (121  N.  Y.  Supp.  221)  77 

Forbes  v.  American  Ins.  Co.  (Mass.),  (41  N.  E.  656)  169 

Foster  v.  Fidelity  F.  Ins.  Co.  (24  Pac.  585)  21 

Fournier  v.  German-Amer.  Ins.  Co.  (R.  I.),  (30  Ins.  L.  J.  715)  129 

Fowhle  v.  Phoenix  Ins.  Co.  (106  Mo.  App.  527;  81  S.  W.  578)  114 

Fowler  v.  Old  N.  C.  S.  Ins.  Co.  (74  N.  C.  81)  25 

Fox  v.  Mason's  Frat.  Ace.  Assn.  (Wis.  S.  C.).  (71  N.  W.  363) 110 

Fraim  v.  Natl.  F.  Ins.  Co.  (Pa.),  (32  Atl.  613)  164 

Franklin  F.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Martin  (40  N.  J.  L,.  575)  134,  182 

Friedman  v.  Atlas  Assur.  Co.  (Mich.),  (32  Ins.  L.  J.  673)  80 

Frick  v.  United  Firemen's  Ins.  Co.  (67  Atl.  743:  218  Pa.  489)  29,  31 

Frisble  v.  Fayette  M.  Ins.  Co.  (27  Pac.  325;  5  Ben.  159)  185 

Furbush  v.  Ins.  Co.  (140  la.  240;  118  N.  W.  371)  82 

Furlong  v.  Agricultural  Ins.  Co.  (28  Abb.  N.  C.  444;  S.  C.  N.  Y.  45 

St.  586) 46 

Gardner  v.  North  St.  L.  Ins.  Co.  (N.  C.  S.  C.).  (79  S.  E.  806)  -85 

Garretson  v.  Mcts.  &  Bkrs.  Co.  (la.),  (45  N.  W.  1047)  170 

Gasser  v.  Sun  Fire  Office  (42  Minn.  315;  44  N.  W.  252;  19  Ins.  L.  J. 

243,  247) 97,  98,  110 

Geib  v.  Ins.  Co.  (1  Dill.  443  Fed.  Cas.  No.  5298)  60 

Georgia  Home  Ins.  Co.  v.  Allen  (28  Ins.  L.  J.  199;  119  Ala.  436;  24  S. 

399;  128  Ala.  451;  30  S.  537;  31  Ins.  L.  J.  60)  89,  177 

Georgia  Home  Ins.  Co.  v.  Kline  et  al.  (Ala.),  (21  S.  958)  112 

Georgia  Home  Ins.  Co.  v.  Stein  et  al.  (Miss.),  (18  S.  414)  134 

Ger.-Amer.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Etherton  (41  N.  W.  406)  99 

Ger.-Amer.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Evans  (Tex.  C.  C.  A.),  (61  S.  W.  536;  14  Ins. 

Dig.  41) 85 

Ger.-Amer.  Ins.  Go.  v.  Hyman  (42  Col.  156;  94  Pac.  27;  37  Ins.  L. 

J.  362) 82 

Ger.-Amer.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Jerrils  (82  Kan.  320;  108  Pac.  114;  28  L.  R.  A. 

N.  S.  1191)  127 

Ger.  F.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Grunert  (111.) 47,  53 

Ger.  F.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Roost  (O.  S.  C.),  (26  Ins.  L.  J.  699)  82 

Ger.  F.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Seibert  (Ind.),  (56  N.  E.  686)  173 

Ger.  F.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Walker  (Tex.),  (146  S.  W.  606)  181 

Germania  F.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Curran  (Kan.  S.  C.),  (1  Ins.  L..  J.  191)  38 

Germania  F.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Warner  (13  Ind.  App.  466;  41  N.  E.  969) Ill 

Germania  Ins.  Co.  v.  Anderson  (Tex.),  (40  S.  W.  200)  171 

Germania  Ins.  Co.  v.  Cincinnati  P.  B.  S.  &  P.  P.  Co.  (7  O.  Decisions 

571)  120 

German  Ins.  Co.  v.  Eddy  (Neb.  S.  C.),  (54  N.  W.  856;  22  Ins. 

L.  J.  468)  94 

German  M.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Niewiede  (11  Ind.  App.  634;  39  N.  E.  634)  27 

Gibbons  v.  Savings  Inst.  (30  111.  App.  263)  14 

Gibbs  v.  Continental  Ins.  Co.  (N.  Y.),  (13  Hun.  611)  59 

Gibson  Electric  Co.  v.  Liverpool  &  L,.  &  G.  Ins.  Co.  (N.  Y.),  (28  Ins. 

L.  J.  629)  129 

Gilllsple  v.  Scottish  U.  &  N.  Ins.  Co.  (61  W.  Va.  169;  56  S.  E.  213; 

36  Ins.  L.  J.  300;  11  L.  R.  A.  143)  134 

Gish  v.  Ins.  Co.  of  N.  A.  (16  Okla.  59;  87  Pac.  869;  Ann.  13  L.  R. 

A.  [N.  S.]  826)  89 

Gleason  v.  Prudential  F.  Ins.  Co.  (Term.),  (151  S.  W.  1030)  137 


TABLE  OF  CASES.  271 

Glover  v.  Rochester  German  Ins.  Co.    (Wash.),    (11  Wash.   143;   39  Pac. 

380)  114,  119,  124 

Godfrey  v.  Macomber  and  Ins.  Co.  (Mass.  S.  J.  C.),  (9  Ins.  L.  J.  287).  66 

Good  v.  Buckeye  Mut.  F.  Ins.  Co.  (O.  S.  C.)  (15  Ins.  L.  J.  3) 67 

Gottlieb  v.  Dutchess  Mut.  Ins.  Co.  (N.  Y.  S.  C.)  (89  Hun.  36;  S.  C. 

69  St.  250) 48 

Grabbs  v.  Farmers'  Mut.  F.  Ins.  Co.  (N.  C.),  (24  S.  E.  503)  166 

Grady  v.  Home  F.  &  M.  Ins.  Co.  (21  R.  I.  435) .  128 

Graham  v.  Ger.-Amer.  Ins.  Co.  (75  O.  374;  79  N.  E.  930;  36  Ins.  L,.  J. 

193;  Ann.  15  L.  R.  A.  [U.  S.]  1055)  95,  98 

Graham  v.  Ger.-Amer.  Ins.  Co.,  Royal  Ins.  Co.  v.  Silberman  (O.),  (79 

N.  E.  930;  36  Ins.  L.  J.  193)  98 

Grand  Rapids  F.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Finn  (60  O.  513;  54  N.  W.  545) 98 

Greenwich  Ins.  Co.  v.  Dougherty  (N.  J.),  (42  Atl.  485)  170 

Greenwood  v.  Georgia  R.  Ins.  Co.  (72  Miss.  46;  17  S.  83)  131 

Griffey  v.  N.  Y.  Central  Ins.  Co.  (76  N.  Y.  459;  100  N.  Y.  417)  37 

Grigsby  v.  Ins.  Co.  (40  Mo.  App.  276)  54 

Grollmund  v.  Germania  F.  Ins.  Co.  (82  N.  J.  L.  632)  140 

Grove  v.  Farmers'  M.  F.  Ins.  Co.  (48  N.  H.  41)  '. .  22 

Grubbs  v.  North  Carolina  Home  Ins.  Co.  (N.  C.  S.  C.),  (108  N.  C. 

472 ;  20  Ins.  L.  J.  64,  784)  25,  33 

Hadley  v.  New  Hampshire  Ins.  Co.  (55  N.  H.  110)  182 

Hale  v.  Springfield  F.  &  M.  Ins.  Co.  (46  Mo.  App.  508)  166 

Haley  v.  Dorchester  M.  Ins.  Co.  (12  Gray  545)  164 

Hall  v.  Assurance  Co.  (133  Ala.  637;  32  S.  257)  117 

Hall  v.  Concordia  F.  Ins.  Co.  (Mich.),  (51  N.  W.  524)  175 

Hall  v.  Natl.  F.  Ins.  Co.  (35  Ins.  L.  J.  507;  115  Tenn.  513;  92  S. 

W.  402)  82 

Hall  v.  Norwalk  F.  Ins.  Co.  (57  Conn.  105;  18  Ins.  L.  J.  518;  17  Atl. 

356)  96,  107,  109,  121,  126 

Hall  v.  Queen  Ins.  Co.  (39  Nova  Scotia  295;  1  E.  L.  R.  295;  21 

Ins.  Dig.  88)  112 

Hall  et  al.  v.  Western  Assur.  Co.  (Ala.),  (133  Ala.  637;  32  S.  257;). 115,  124 

Hall  v.  Western  U.  Assn.  (106  Mo.  App.  476)  60 

Hamberg  v.  St.  Paul  F.  &  M.  Ins.  Co.  (Minn.  S.  C.),  (26  Ins.  L.  J. 

782)  57,  59 

Hamburg-Bremen  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  Carlington  (66  Tex.  103;  18  S.  W. 

337 ;  15  Ins.  L.  J.  509)  10,  68 

Hamburg-Bremen  F.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Lewis  (D.  C.)f  (4  App.  D.  C.  66)  ....  170 

Hamilton  v.  Home  Ins.  Co.  (92  Mo.  253)  187 

Hamilton  v.  Ins.  Co.  (136  U.  S.  242;  10  Supp.  945;  34  L/.  Ed.  419) 100 

Hamilton  v.  L.  &  L.  &  G.  Ins.  Co.  (U.  S.  S.  C.),  (136  U.  S.  242)  98 

Hamilton  v.  Phoenix  Ins.  Co.  (U.  S.  C.  C.  A.  6th  Dist.)  (23  Ins. 

L.  J.  561)  99 

Hanley  v.  Aetna  Ins.  Co.  (Mass.),  (102  N.  E.  641)  109 

Hannan  v.  Williamsburgh  City  F.  Ins.  Co.  (Mich.),  (45  N.  W.  Rep. 

1120)  175 

Hanover  Ins.  Co.  v.  Crawford  (121  Ala.  259;  25  S.  912)  91 

Hanover  F.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Harper  (77  111.  App.  453)  93 

Hanover  F.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Manassen  (Mich.),  (3  Ins.  L.  J.  668) 165 

Hanover  F.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Mannasson  (29  Mich.  316;  5  Ben.  541) 188 

Hanover  F.  Ins.  Co.  et  al.  v.  Stoddard  et  al.  (Neb.),  (27  Ins.  L.  J. 

120;  73  N.  W.  291)  166 

Hapeman  v.  Citizens  Mut.  F.  Ins.  Co.  (126  Mich.  191;  85  N.  W.  454; 

30  Ins.  L.  J.  452)  12 

Harper  v.  Albany  M.  Ins.  Co.  (17  N.  Y.  194;  4  Ben.  247)  189 

Harper  v.  N.  Y.  City  Ins.  Co.  (22  N.  Y.  441) 189 

Harris  v.  The  Eagle  Fire  Co.  (5  Johns  368)  32 

Harrison  v.  Ger.-Amer.  Ins.  Co.  (67  Fed.  577)  93,  127 

Harrison  v.  Hartford  F.  Ins.  Co.  (la.),  (112  la.  77;  23  Ins.  L.  J. 

161;  30  Ins.  L.  J.  253,  255;  59  Fed.  732;  83  N.  W.  820) 93,  113,  118,  124 

Hartford  F.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Adams  (Tex.),  (158  S.  W.  231)  180 

Hartford  F.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Alcott  (97  111.  439;  73  N.  Y.  141;  7  Ins.  L.  J. 

430) 135 

Hartford  F.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Bonner  Merc.  Co.  (15  U.  S.  App.  134;  22  Ins. 

L.  J.  801) 120,121 

Hartford  F.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Cannon  et  al.  (Tex.  C.  C.  A.)  (46  S.  W.  851; 

11  Finch  109)  25 

Hartford  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  Meyer  (Neb.  S.  C.),  (46  N.  W.  292)  47 

Hartford  F.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Olcott  (97  111.  439)  182 

Hartford  F.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Pires  (Tex.),  (165  S.  W.  565)  178 

Hartford  F.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Schlencker  (80  Miss.  667;  32;  S.  155)  144 

Hartford  Ins.  Co.  v.  Asher  (Ky.),  (100  S.  W.  233)  119 


272  HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 

Harth    v.    Continental    Ins.    Co.    (Ky.    C.    A.),    (36    Ins.    L.   J.    603;    102 

S.  W.  242)  105,  106 

Hartwell  v.  California  Ins.  Co.  (Me.),  (24  Atl.  954)  176 

Hastings  v.  Westchester  F.  Ins.  Co.  (73  N.  Y.  141;  7  Ins.  L.  J. 

430)  135,  138 

Hastings  v.  Westchester  P.  Ins.  Co.  (73  N.  Y.  141;  7  Ins.  L.  J.  430)..  182 
Hatcher  v.  Sovereign  Ins.  Co.  (127  Pa.  588;  42  Ins.  L.  J.  137)  (Wash. 

S.  C.)  89 

Havens  v.  Germania  F.  Ins.  Co.  (135  Mo.  649;  37  S.  W.  497;  24  Ins. 

L.  J.  321)  182 

Hayward  v.  L,.  &  L.  F.  &  L.  Ins.  Co.  (7  Bosw.  385;  2  Abb.  App.  349; 

3  Keyes  456  [N.  Y.])  81 

Hebner  v.  Palatine  Ins.  Co.  (157  111.  144;  41  N.  E.  627)  42 

Hedger  v.  Ins.  Co.  (U.  S.),  (12  Ins.  L.  J.  926;  17  Fed.  498)  25,  26 

Heffron  v.  Kittanning  Ins.  Co.  (132  Pa.  580)  81 

Hellman  v.  Winchester  F.  Ins.  Co.  (75  N.  Y.  7;  8  Ins.  L.  J.  53) 65 

Helm  v.  Anchor  F.  Ins.  Co.  (109  N.  W.  605)  27 

Henderson  v.  Western  M.  &  F.  Ins.  Co.  (10  Robinson  [La.]  164) 20 

Herndon  v.  Imperial  F.  Ins.  Co.  (N.  C.),  (21  Ins.  L.  J.  193) 126 

Hewins  v.  London  Assur.  Corp.  et  al.  (184  Mass.  177;  68  N.  E.  62)... 

11,  17,  18 

Hickerson  v.  Ger.-Amer.  Ins.  Co.  (Tenn.),  (33  S.  W.  1041;  25  Ins. 

L.  J.  422)  114 

Hickerson  v.  Ins.  Co.  (96  Tenn.  193;  33  S.  W.  1041;  32  L.  R.  A.  172) 

117  118 

Hickerson  v.  Ins.  Cos.  (Tenn.),  (25  Ins.  L.  J.  422) 113,  129> 

Hickerson  v.  Royal  Ins.  Co.  (96  Tenn.  193;  33  S.  W.  1041)  127 

Hicks  v.  British  Amer.  Assur.  Co.  (8  N.  Y.  App.  Div.  444;  S.  C. 

43  N.  Y.  Supp.  623)  46 

Hilton  v.  Phoenix  Assn.  Co.  (Me.  S.  J.  C.),  (42  Atl.  412;  28  Ins. 

L.  J.  309)  26,  34 

Hocking  v.  British  Am.  Assur.  Co.  (62  Wash.  73;  113  Pac.  259) 183: 

Hoffman  v.  Aetna  Ins.  Co.  (1  Rob.  501;  [S.  C.]  19  Abb.  Pr.  325) 44,  65 

Hoffman  v.  King  (160  N.  Y.  618;  55  N.  E.  401)  21 

Hogan  v.  Scottish  U.  &  N.  Ins.  Co.  (U.  S.),  (98  Fed.  129)  173 

Holbrook  v.  Baloise  F.  Ins.  Co.  (Cal.),  (49  Pac.  555) 129 

Home  Ins.  Co.  v.  Allen  (119  Ala.  436;  24  S.  399)  87 

Home  Ins.  Co.  v.  Baltimore  W.  Ho.  Co.  (93  U.  S.  527;  6  Ins.  L. 

J.  39)  142 

Home  F.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Bean  (Neb.),  (24  Ins.  L.  J.  516)  94,  129 

Home  Ins.  Co.  v.  Coker  (43  Okla.  331;  142  Pac.  1195)  17£ 

Home  Ins.  Co.  v.  Duke  (Ind.  S.  C.),  (3  Ins.  L.  J.  363)  44 

Home  Ins.  Co.  v.  Favorite  (46  111.  263)  173 

Home  Ins.  Co.  v.  Winn.  (Neb.  S.  C.),  (24  Ins.  L.  J.  126)  60 

Home  Lodge  v.  Queen  Ins.  Co.  (21  S.  D.  165;  110  N.  W.  778) 82 

Home  Mut.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Roe  (Wis.),  (36  N.  W.  594)  174 

Hong  Sling  v.  Scottish  U.  &  Natl.  Ins.  Co.  (7  Utah  441;  27  Pac.  170)..  Ill 

Hooker  v.  Phoenix  (69  Mo.  App.  141)  97 

Hoover  v.  Mercantile  T.  M.  Ins.  Co.  (93  Mo.  App.  Ill;  69  S.  W.  42)...  181 
Hope  Oil  Mill  Comp.  &  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Phoenix  Assur.  Co.  (Miss.),  (21 

S.  132)  171 

Hopkins  v.  Provincial  Ins.  Co.  (18  Up.  Can.  C.  P.  74;  5  Ben.  159) 188 

Hough  v.  Peoples  F.  Ins.  Co.  (36  Md.  398;  2  Ins.  L.  J.  353)  142,  141 

Hough  et  al.  v.  Peoples  Ins.  Co.  (Md.),  (2  Ins.  L.  J.  353)  173 

Houff  v.  Ger.-Amer.  Ins.  Co.  3  Va.  App.  986;  66  S.  E.  831)  181 

Hubbard  v.  North  Brit.  &  M.  Ins.  Co.  (57  Mo.  App.  1)  49 

Huchberger  v.  Ins.  Co.  (4  Biss.  265  Fed.  Cas.  No.  6822)  60 

Huckins  v.  Peoples  M.  F.  Ins.  Co.  (31  N.  H.  238)  169 

Huer  v.  N.  W.  Natl.  Ins.  Co.  (111.  S.  C.),  (22  Ins.  L.  J.  518)  82 

Huer  v.  Westchester  F.  Ins.  Co.  (111.  S.  C.),  (33  N.  E.  411;  24  Ins. 

L.  J.  471)  82 

Humphreys  v.  Natl.  Benefit  Assn.  (139  Pa.  214;  20  Atl.  1047;  11  L,.  R. 

A.  564)  27 

Hurst  et  al  v.  Home  Protection  F.  Ins.  Co.  (Ala.  S.  C.),  (16  Ins.  L. 

J.  688)  66 

Huston  v.  State  Ins.  Co.  (la.),  (69  N.  W.  674)  57,  178. 

Imperial  Ins.  Co.  v.  Murray  (73  Pa.  St.  13;  5  Ben.  526)  185 

Indiana  Ins.  Co.  v.  Boehm  (88  Ind.  578)  116- 

Inman  v.  Western  Ins.  Co.  (N.  Y.),  (12  Wend.  452)  37,  4& 

In  re.  Commercial  Ins.  Co.  (R.  I.),  (36  Atl.  930;  10  Ins.  Dig.  368) 137 

In  re.  Downs  (199  Mass.  380;  85  N.  E.  174;  37  Ins.  L.  J.  924) 150- 

Ins.  Co.  of  N.  A.  v.  Hegewald  (Ind.),  (32  Ins.  L.  J.  621) 114 


TABLE  OF  CASES.  273 

Ins.  Co.  v.  Bishop  (154  111.  9;  39  N.  E.  1102;  45  Am.  St.  105)  117 

Ins.  Co.  v.  Carey  (111.  S.  C.),  (Ins.  L.  J.  493)  46 

Ins.  Co.  v.  Goehring  (99  Pa.  St.  13)  120 

Ins.  Co.  v.  Gracey  (Cal.  S.  C.),  (20  Ins.  L.  J.  28)  46 

Ins.  C.  v.  Hathaway  (43  Kan.  399)  44 

Ins.  Co.  v.  Journal  Pub.  Co.  (Wash.  S.  C.),  (20  Ins.  L.  J.  395) 46 

Ins.  Co.  v.  Lawrence  (10  Pet.  507)  22 

Ins.  Co.  v.  Maguire  (57  111.  342)  46 

Ins.  Co.  v.  Mannasson  (29  Mich.  316;  3  Ins.  L.  J.  668)  60 

Ins.  Co.  v.  Richardson  (Neb.  S.  C.),  (24  Ins.  L.  J.  690)  46 

Ins.  Co.  v.  Seyferth  (29  111.  App.  513)  44 

Ins.  Co.  v.  Slaughter  (U.  S.),  (12  Wallace  404;  5  Ben.  340) 187 

Ins.  Cos.  v.  Weide  (U.  S.  S.  C.),  (1  Ins.  L.  J.  767)  59 

Ins.  Cos.  v.  Weides  (14  Wallace  U.  S.  375)  55 

Iowa  Central  Bldg.  &  L.  Assn.  v.  Merchants  &  Bankers  P.  Ins.  Co. 

(la.  S.  C.),  (32  Ins.  L.  J.  852)  .66,  67,  102 

Irving  v.  Excelsior  F.  Ins.  Co.  (N.  Y.),  (1  Bos.  507)  44 

Isaacs  v.  Royal  Ins.  Co.  (L.  R. ;  5  Exchequer  296)  ~186 

Jerdee  v.  Ins.  Co.  (75  Wis.  345)  -. , 86 

Joel  v.  Harvey  (Eng.),  (5  Weekly  Rep.  488;  4  Ben.  185)  189 

Joffee  v.  Niagara  F.  Ins.  Co.  (116  Md.  155;  81  Atl.  281)  '179 

Johnson  v.  Amer.  F.  Ins.  Co.  (Minn.),  (41  Minn.  396;  43  N.  W. 

59)  129,  132 

Johnosn  v.  Arbresch  (Wis.),  (101  N.  W.  395;  34  Ins.  L.  J.  203)  172 

Johnson  v.  Hall  (Tex.),  (163  S.  W.  399)  180 

Johnson  v.  Humboldt  Ins.  Co.  (91  111.  92)  180 

Johnson  v.  Phoenix  Ins.  Co.  (112  Mass.  49;  69  Mo.  App.  226,  232; 

49,  57,  94,  97,  102 

Johnson  v.  Stewart  (243  Pa.  485;  90  Atl.  349)  179 

Johnston  v.  Farmers  Ins.  Co.  (106  Mich.  96;  64  N.  W.  5)  44 

Johnston  v.  Ins.  Co.  (7  Sess.  Cas.  [Scot.]  52;  1  Bennett  259)  9 

Johnston  v.  Niagara  F.  Ins.  Co.  (N.  C.),  (25  Ins.  L.  J.  558;  24  S. 

E.  424)  176 

Jones  v.  Howard  Ins.  Co.  (117  N.  Y.  103)  48 

Joy  v.  Security  F.  Ins.  Co.  (83  la.  12;  48  N.  W.  1049)  33 

Kahnweiler  v.  Phenix  Ins.  Co.  (67  Fed.  483;  23  Ins.  L.  J.  391;  57 

Fed.  562;  67  Fed.  483;  14  C.  C.  A.  485)  95,  97,  98 

Kaiser  v.  Hamburg-Bremen  F.  Ins.  Co.  (N.  Y.),  (59  App.  Div.  525; 

69  N.  Y.  Supp.  344;  172  N.  Y.  663;  65  N.  E.  1118) 107,  124,  126 

Kansas  City  etc.  v.  Amer.  F.  Ins.  Co.  (100  Mo.  App.  691;  75  S.  W. 

186)  144 

Kattleman  v.  Fire  Assn.  (79  Mo.  App.  447)  15 

Keefe  v.  Natl.  Ace.  Assn.  (N.  Y.),  (38  N.  Y.  Supp.  854;  4  App.  Div. 

392)  110 

Keeney  v.  Home  Ins.  Co.  (71  N.  Y.  396)  48 

Keisel  v.  Sun  Ins.  Office  (U.  S.  C.  C.  A.  8th  Dist.)  (28  Ins.  L.  J. 

434)  79,  80 

Kelly  v.  L.  &  L.  &  G.  Ins.  Co.  (944  Minn.  141;  102  N.  W.  380;  34 

Ins.  L.  J.  421)  93 

Kendall  v.  Holland  Purchase  Ins.  Co.  (N.  Y.),  (2  S.  C.  375;  aff'd.  in 

58  N.  Y.  682)  38 

Kenneflck-Hamrnond  Co.  v.  Norwich  Union  F.  Ins.  Soc.  (Mo.  App.) 

(13  Ins.  L.  J.  664) 83 

Kent  v.  Aetna  Ins.  Co.  (Mo.  App.),  (146  S.  W.  78)  108 

Kent  v.  L.  &  L.  &  G.  Ins.  Co.  (26  Ind.  294)  169 

Kentucky  C.  Co.  v.  Rochester  Ger.  Ins.  Co.  (20  Ky.  L.  R.  1571;  49 

S.  W.  780)  109 

Kentucky  Chair  Co.  v.  Rochester  Ger.  Ins.  Co.  (Ky.),  (28  Ins.  L,.  J. 

361)  126 

Kerelsen  v.  Sun  Fire  Office  (122  N.  Y.  545;  aff'd.  S.  C.  16  St.  239) 45 

Kernochan  v.  N.  Y.  Bowery  F.  &  M.  Co.  (17  N.  Y.  428)  47 

Kersey  v.  Phoenix  Ins.  Co.  (135  Mich.  10;  97  N.  W.  57) 98,  114,  128 

Kiernan  v.  Dutchess  Co.  Mut.  Ins.  Co.  (N.  Y.),  (44  N.  E.  698)  114 

Kingsley  v.  N.  E.  Ins.  Co.  (62  Mass.  393)  44 

Kinzer  v.  Natl.  M.  Ins.  Co.  (88  Kan.  93;  127  Pac.  762;  Ann.  44  L. 

R.  A.  [N.  S.]  121)  33 

Knickerbocker  Ins.  Co.  v.  McGinnis  (87  111.  70)  27 

Knop  v.  Natl.  Ins.  Co.  (Mich.  S.  C.),  (25  Ins.  L.  J.  181)  61 

Knoxville  F.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Hircl  (Tex.),  (23  S.  W.  393;  23  Ins.  L. 

J.    16)      ". 164 

18 


274  HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 

Kratzenstein  v.  Western  Assur.  Co.  (N.  Y.),  (22  N.  E.  221) 165 

Kupferschmidt  v.  Agricultural  Ins.  Co.  (80  N.  J.  L.  441;  78  Atl.  225; 

34  L.  R.  A.  503) 134,  182 

LaForce  v.  Williamsburgh  City  F.  Ins.  Co.  (43  Mo.  App.  518)  38,  83 

Lake  Sup.  P.  &  Cold  Storage  Co.  v.  Concordia  F.  Ins.  Co.  (Minn.), 

104  N.  W.  Rep.  560) 176 

Lamson  v.  Prudential  Ins.  Co.  (171  Mass.  433;  50  N.  E.  943;  28  Ins. 

I..  J.  70)  94 

Lancaster  F.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Lenheim  (89  Pa.  497)  164 

Landsdale  v.  Mason  et  al.  (Eng.),  (1  Marshall  688;  1  Ben.  16) 184 

Lang  v.  Eagle  F.  Ins.  Co.  (12  App.  Div.  39;  S.  C.  42  N.  Y.  Supp. 

539)  Tg,  112 

Langan  v.  Ins.  Co.  (162  Pa.  St.  357;  29  Ins.  L.  J.  878)  56 

Langan  v.  Royal  Ins.  Co.  (Pa.  S.  C.),  (29  Atl.  710)  55 

Langsner  v.  German  Alliance  Ins.  Co.  (123  N.  Y.  Supp.  144)  133 

Langworthy  v.  O.  &  O.  Ins.  Co.  (85  N.  Y.  632;  10  Ins.  L.  J.  546) 15 

Larkin  v.  Glens  Falls  Ins.  Co.  (Minn.  S.  C.),  (83  N.  W.  409)  68 

Larkins  v.  Glens  Falls  Ins.  Co.  (80  Minn.  527;  83  N.  W.  409;  29  Ins. 

L.  J.  527)  10 

Laurenzi  v.  Atlas  Ins.  Co.  (Tenn.),  (176  S.  W.  1022)  182 

Law  v.  Commercial  M.  F.  Co.  (N.  D.)(  (107  N.  W.  59)  98 

Leadbetter  v.  Aetna  Ins.  Co.  (13  Me.  265)  49 

Lebanon  Mut.  F.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Hankinson  (2  Cent.  828  [Pa.])  75 

Lee  v.  Ins.  Co.  (73  Tex.  641)  44 

Leigh  v.  Ins.  Co.  (37  Mo.  App.  542)  44 

Leigh  v.  Springfield  F.  &  M.  Ins.  Co.  (37  Mo.  App.  542)  49 

Lelican  Ins.  Co.  v.  Co-Operative  Assn.  (Tex.  S.  C.),  (19  Ins.  L.  J.  921)  80 

L'Engle  v.  Scottish  U.  &  N.  Ins.  Co.  (Fla.),  (27  S.  W.  462)  166 

Leonard  v.  Orient  Ins.  Co.  (U.  S.  C.  C.  A.  7th  Dist.),  (30  Ins.  L.  J. 

980,  981)  79,  82 

LeSuer,  etc.,  v.  Mut.  F.  Ins.  (101  la.  514;  70  N.  W.  761) 143 

Lesure  Lumber  Co.  v.  Mut.  F.  Ins.  Co.  (101  la.  514;  70  N.  W.  761) 98 

Levine  v.  Lancashire  Ins.  Co.  (Minn.),  (26  Ins.  L.  J.  36) 107,  121,  128 

Levy  v.  Brooklyn  Ins.  Co.  (25  Wend.  687;  2  Ben.  93)  60 

Levy  v.  Scottish  U.  &  N.  Ins.  Co.  (W.  Va.  S.  C.  A.),  (52  S.  E.  449)...  104 

Lewis  et  al.  v.  Springfield  F.  &  M.  Co.  (76  Mass.  159)  80 

Liebenstein  v.  Baltic  F.  Ins.  Co.  (45  111.  301,  305;  5  Ben.  115) 173,  189 

Linde  v.  Republic  F.  Ins.  Co.  (50  N.  Y.  Super.  362)  107 

Lion  F.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Star  (Tex.  S.  C.),  (18  Ins.  L.  J.  873)  60 

Little  v.  Phoenix  Ins.  Co.  (123  Mass.  380)  59 

L.  &  L.  &  G.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Agricultural  S.  &  L.  Co.  (33  Can.  S.  C.  94) ...  182 

L.  &  L.  &  G.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Delta  etc.  (Tex.),  (121  S.  W.  599).. 140,  143,  153 

L.  &  L.  &  G.  Co.  v.  Hall  (1  Kan.  App.  18;  41  Pac.  65)  93 

L.  &  L.  &  G.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Kearney  et  al.  (U.  S.  C.  C.  A.  8th  Dist.)  (94 

Fed.  314)  225 

L.  L.  &  G.  Ins.  Co.  v.  McNeill  (U.  S.),  (89  Fed.  131)  171 

L.  &  L.  &  G.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Tillis  (110  Ala.  20;  17  S.  672)  89 

L.  &  L.  &  G.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Van.  Os.  (63  Miss.  431)  164 

Loeb  v.  American  Central  Ins.  Co.  (99  Mo.  50;  21  Ins.  L.  J.  889) 38 

London  &  L.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Crunk  (91  Tenn.  376;  23  S.  W.  140)  14 

London  &  Lane.  F.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Fischer  (U.  S.),  (92  Fed.  500) 166 

London  &  Lancashire  F.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Storrs  (U.  S.  C.  C.  A.  8th  Dist.), 

(25  Ins.  L.  J.  283)  96 

Lowell  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Safeguard  F.  Ins.  Co.  (88  N.  Y.  591)  138 

Lumbermen's  Ins.  Co.  v.  Bell  (111.),  (45  N.  E.  130)  47,  53 

McAllaster  v.  Niagara  F.  Ins.  Co.  (156  N.  Y.  80;  28  Ins.  L.  J.  769).. 66.  102 
McCready  et  al.  v.  Hartford  F.  Ins.  Co.  (N.  Y.  App.  Div.),  (70  N.  Y. 

Supp.  778;  30  Ins.  L.  J.  668)  68 

McCullough  v.  Ins.  Co.  (113  Mo.  606;  21  S.  W.  207)  117,  118,  124 

McCullough  v.  Phoenix  Ins.  Co.  (Mo.  S.  C.),  (21  Ins.  L.  J.  781;  113 

Mo.  606;  21  S.  W.  207)  113,  119,  127 

McDermott  v.  Lycoming  F.  Ins.  Co.  (N.  Y.),  (12  J.  and  S.  221)  44 

McDowell  v.  Aetna  Ins.  Co.  et  al.  (Mass.),  (164  Mass.  444;  41  N.  E. 

665;  25  Ins.  L.  J.  156)  101,  131 

McFarland  v.  Kittanning  Ins.  Co.  (Pa.),  (21  Ins.  L.  J.  555)  129 

McFarland  v.  Peabody  Ins.  Co.  (6  W.  Va.  425)  168 

McFarland  v.  Peabody  Ins.  Co.  et  al.  (6  W.  Va.  425,  437;  5  Ben.  490).  187 

McGlathery  v.  Western  Assur.  Co.  (115  Ala.  213;  22  S.  104)  88 

McGraw  v.  Home  Ins.  Co.  (Kan.  S.  C.),  (28  Ins.  Dig.  18;  144  Pac.  821)  17 

McMillan  v.  Ins.  Co.  of  N.  A.  (58  S.  E.  1020;  78  S.  C.  433) 89 

McNally  v.  Phoenix  Ins.  Co.  (137  N.  Y.  389;  [S.  C.]  50  St.  680;  [S.  C.] 

42    St.    21)     37,  51 


TABLE  OF  CASES.  275 

McNamara  v.  Dakota  F.  &  M.  Ins.  Co.  (S.  D.),  (47  N.  W.  288)  174 

McNees  v.  Southern  Ins.  Co.  (69  Mo.  App.  232)  97 

McNutt  v.  Va.  F.  &  M.  Ins.  Co 225 

MacFarland  v.  St.  Paul  F.  &  M.  Ins.  Co.  (Minn.  S.  C.),  (21  Ins.  L. 

J.  879)  83 

Mack  v.  Ins.  Co 34 

Mack  v.  Lancaster  Ins.  Co.  (U.  S.  C.  C.),  (19  Ins.  L.  J.  68)  25 

Maclinger  v.  Mechanics  F.  Ins.  Co.  (2  Hall  490)  176 

Maisel  v.  Fire  Assn.  (N.  Y.),  (69  N.  Y.  Supp.  181)  177 

Malin  v.  Mercantile  T.  M.  Ins.  Co.  (105  Mo.  App.  625)  20 

Manchester  F.  Assur.  Co.  v.  Feibelman  (Ala.),  (23  S..  759) 167 

Manchester  F.  Assur.  Co.  v.  Simmons  (12  Tex.  C.  A.  607;  35  S.  W.  722)  93 

Mannasson  v.  Ins.  Co.  (29  Mich.  316;  3  Ins.  L,.  J.  668)  62 

Mfrs.  and  Builders  F.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Mullen  (Neb.),  (67  N.  W.  445) 121 

Marchesseau  v.  Merchants  Ins.  Co.  (2  Ben.  166)  60 

Marchessen  v.  Merchants  Ins.  Co.  (1  Rob.  [La.]  438;  2  Ben.  46,  166)...  25 

Maril  v.  Conn.  F.  Ins.  Co.  (Ga.),  (23  S.  E.  463)  163 

Marion  v.  Great  Rep.  Ins.  Co.  (35  Mo.  148)  59 

Marsh  v.  New  Hampshire  F.  Ins.  Co.  (49  Atl.  88)  175 

Marsh  Oil  Co.  v.  Aetna  Ins.  Co.  (79  Mo.  App.  21)  176 

Marshall  et  al.  v.  Amer.  Guar.  F.  &  M.  I.  Co.  (30  Mo.  App.  18) 67 

Maryland  F.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Whiteford  (31  Md.  219;  5  Ben.  240)  187 

Mascot  v.  Granite  State  F.  Ins.  Co.  (Vt.)t  (35  Atl.  75)  164 

Mason  v.  Franklin  F.  Ins.  Co.  (12  Gill  &  J.  [Md.]  468;  2  Ben.  214) 184 

Mason  v.  Hartford  F.  Ins.  Co.  (29  Up.  Can.  Q.  B.  585;  5  Ben.  294)..  164,  187 

Matthews  v.  Amer.  Central  Ins.  Co.  (154  N.  Y.  458)  37 

Mawhinney  v.  Southern  Ins.  Co.  (Gal.),  (32  Pac.  945;  22  Ins.  L. 

J.  596) 167 

Mecca  Ins.  Co.  v.  First  State  Bank  (Tex.),  (135  S.  W.  1083) 181 

Mechanics  Ins.  Co.  v.  Hodge  (111.  S.  C.),  (26  Ins.  L.  J.  406;  37  N. 

E.  51)  102 

Mechanics  Ins.  Co.  v.  Hoover  (182  Fed.  590;  aff'g  173  Fed.  888) 30 

Medina  v.  Builders  Ins.  Co.  (120  Mass.  225)  169 

Meigs  v.  Ins.  Co.  (205  Pa.  378)  141 

Meigs  v.  London  Assur.  Corp.  (126  Fed.  78,  781;  33  Ins.  L.  J.  251; 

32  Ins.  L.  J.  251)  139,  143 

Merchants  Ins.  Co.  v.  Stephens  (Ky.  C.  A.),  (59  S.  W.  511) 94 

Merchants  M.  Ins.  Co.  v.  LaCroix  (35  Tex.  249;  5  Ben.  455) 184 

Merrick  v.  Germania  Fire  Ins.  Co.  (54  Pa.  277)  27 

Meyer  v.  Amer.  Ins.  Co.  (4  N.  Y.  Supp.  617;  23  N.  Y.  Supp.  71; 

18  Ins.  L.  J.  156) 142,  151 

Meyerson  v.  Hartford  F.  Ins.  Co.  (39  N.  Y.  Supp.  329;  17  M,isc.  121)...  133 
Michel  v.  American  Cent.  Ins.  Co.  (N.  Y.),  (44  N.  Y.  Supp.  832;  17 

Hun.  87) 128,  168 

Michel,  Secy  of  State  v.  Southern  Ins.  Co.  (128  La.  562;  54  S.  1010; 

24  Am.  &  Eng.  Anno.  Gas.  305)  '. 137 

Michigan  Pipe  Co.  v.  Michigan  F.  &  M.  Ins.  Co.  (Mich.),  (52  N.  W. 

1070)  172 

Michey  v.  Burlington  Ins.  Co.  (35  la.  174,  5  Bennett  439;  2  Ins.  L. 

J.  15;  Ann.  14  Am.  R.  Ext.  Anno.  494  Notes)  13,  22 

Miller  v.  Hartford  F.  Ins.  Co.  (70  la.  704)  56 

Miller  v.  London  &  Lancashire  F.  Ins.  Co.  (41  111.  App.  395)  82 

Milwaukee  Mechanics  Ins.  Co.  v.  Russell  (O.  S.  C.),  (62  N.  E.  338; 

31  Ins.  L.  J.  360)  67 

Milwaukee  Mechs.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Stewart  (Ind.),  (42  N.  E.  290;  13  Ind. 

App.  640)  f 98,  132 

Milwaukee  Mechs.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Winfleld  (Kan.  C.  A.),  (51  Pac.  567)  ...  57 
Minneapolis  Threshing  Machine  Co.  v.  Darnall  (S.  D.),  (83  N.  W. 

266)  178 

Mispelhorn  v.  Ins.  Co.  (53  Md.  473)  56 

Mitchell  v.  Potomic  Ins.  Co.  (U.  S.  S.  C.)  (31  Ins.  L.  J.  570)  82 

Mitchell  v.  St.  Paul  German  F.  Ins.  Co.  (Mich.  S.  C.),  (52  N.  W. 

1017;  21  Ins.  L.  J.  1003)  25 

Model  D.  G.  Co.  v.  N.  B.  &  M.  Ins.  Co.  (79  Mo.  App.  550)  69,  90 

Monteleone  v.  Royal  Ins.  Co.  of  Liverpool  and  London  (La.),  (47  La. 

Ann.  1563;  18  So.  472;  24  Ins.  L.  J.  531)  10,  68 

Montgomery  v.  Amer.  Cent.  Ins.  Co.  (108  Wis.  146;  84  N.  W.  175;  30 

Ins.  L.  J.  122)  104 

Moore  v.  Ins.  Co.  (28  Grat.  508) 60 

Moore  v.  Perpetual  Ins.  Co.  (16  Mo.  98)  184 

Moore  v.  Protection  Ins.  Co.  (29  Me.  97;  2  Bennett  758)  60 


276  HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 

Morley  v.   L.    &   L.    &   G.    Ins.    Co.    (Mich.),    (48    N.  W.    502;   20   Ins.    L. 

J.  677) 68,  100 

Morrell  v.  Irving  Ins.  Co.  (33  N.  Y.  429)  65 

Morris  v.  Ger.-Amer.  Ins.  Co.  (Ky.),  (14  Ky.  L.  R.  859)  134 

Morse  v.  Buffalo  F.  &  M.  Co.  (30  Wis.  534;  5  Ben.  424)  187 

Mortimer  v.  N.  Y.  Fire  Ins.  Co.  (2  U.  S.  Law  Mag.  452)  44 

Mosness  v.  Ger.-Amer.  Ins.  Co.  (Minn.),  (21  Ins.  L.  J.  915)  98,  120 

Mosness  v.  German  Ins.  Co.  (50  Minn.  341;  21  Ins.  L.  J.  915;  52 

N.  W.  932)  98,  106 

Moyer  v.  Sun  Ins.  Office  (176  Pa.  579;  35  All.  221)  93 

Mullen  v.  Ins.  Co.  (58  Vt.  113)  61 

Mumford  v.  Hallett  (1  Johns  433)  32 

Murphy  v.  N.  Y.  Bowery  Ins.  Co.  (62  Mo.  App.  495)  182 

Murphy  v.  North  B.  &  M.  Ins.  Co.  (61  Mo.  App.  323;  70  Mo.  App.  98) 

55,  97,  130 

Mutual  F.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Alvord  (23  Ins.  L.  J.  801;  61  Fed.  752;  21  U.  S. 

App.  228)  93,  96 

Nally  v.  Home  Ins.  Co.  (250  Mo.  452;  157  S.  W.  769)  187 

Narinsky  v.  Fidelity  Surety  Co.  (92  N.  Y.  Supp.  771)  56 

National  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  O'Brien  et  al.  (Ark.),  (87  S.  W.  129) 115 

National  Masonic  A.  Assn.  v.  Burr  (Neb.),  (62  N.  W.  466;  24  Ins. 

L.  J.  423)  110 

National  Wall  Paper  Co.  v.  Associated  Mfrs.  Mut.  F.  Ins.  Co.  (175 

N.  Y.  226)  44,  179 

Nave  v.  Home  Mut.  Ins.  Co.  (37  Mo.  431)  80 

Nease  v.  Aetna  Ins.  Co.  (W.  Va.  C.  A.),  (9  S.  E.  233) 47 

Needy  v.  German-Amer.  Ins.  Co.  (Pa.  S.  C.),  (47  Atl.  739)  99 

Nelson  v.  Continental  Ins.  Co.  (182  Fed.  783)  33 

Nelson  et  al.  v.  Traders'  Ins.  Co.  (N.  Y.  C.  A.),  (34  Ins.  L.  J.  933)...  79 

Nerger  v.  Equitable  F.  Assn.  (20  S.  D.  419;  35  Ins.  L.  J.  556) 98 

New  Jersey  Rubber  Co.  v.  Commercial  U.  Assur.  Co.  (N.  J.),  (46  Atl. 

777)  165 

Newmark  v.  L.  &  L.  &  G.  Ins.  Co.  (30  Mo.  160;  1  Phillips  Sec.  624 

p.  1107;  3  Penn.  471;  13  111.  676;  1  Story  157)  75,  76 

New  Orleans  R.  E.  M.  Co.  v.  Teutonia  Ins.  Co.  (La.  54  S.  466)  18 

Newton  et  al.  v.  DeForest  Mut.  Fire  Ins.  Co.  (Wia  S.  C.),  (104  N. 

W.  107)  63 

Newton  et  al.  v.  Theresa  Village  Mut.  Fire  Ins.  Co.  (104  N.  W.  107)  ...  63 

Newton  et  al.  v.  Waterloo  Mut.  F.  Ins.  Co.  (104  N.  W.  107)  63 

New  York  &  Boston  Dispatch  Express  Co.  v.  Traders  Ins.  Co.  (132 

Mass.  377;  Ann.  42  Am.  R.  Ext.  Anno.  440,  Notes)  7 

N.  Y.  Cent.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Natl.  Protective  Ins.  Co.  (20  Barb.  468)  37 

N.  Y.  F.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Delaven  (N.  Y.),  (8  Paige  419) 65 

N.  Y.  Mut.  S.  &  L.  Co.  v.  Manchester  F.  Ins.  Co.,'  (N.  Y.),  (87  N.  Y. 

Supp,  1075)  121 

Niagara  v.  Heenan  (111.),  (54  N.  E.  1052)  175 

Niagara  F.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Bishop  (111.),  (154  111.  9;  39  N.  E.  1102;  45 

Am.  St.  105;  25  Ins.  L.  J.  24;  49  111.  App.  388) 113,  114,  118,  127 

Niagara  F.  Ins.  v.  Heenan  (81  111.  App.  678) 143 

Niagara  F.  Ins.  Co.  v.  DeGroff  (12  Mich.  124)  164,  189 

Niagara  F.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Heflin  (Ky.  C.  A.)  (51  Atl.  345;  30  Ins.  L. 

J.  326)  25 

Niblo  v.  North  Amer.  F.  Co.  (1  Sandf.  551)  32 

Nichols  et  al.  v.  Sun  Mut.  F.  Ins.  Co.  (Mass.  S.  C.),  (14  S.  W.  263; 

23  Ins.  L.  J.  633)  80 

Nickerson  v.  Nickerson,et  al.  (Me.  S.  J.  C.),  (12  Atl.  880)  46 

Nolan  v.  Ocean  Ace.  &  G.  Corp.  (23  Can.  L.  T.  187)  98 

Noonan  v.  Hartford  F.  Ins.  Co.  (21  Mo.  81)  49 

Norman  v.  Missouri  T.  M.  Co.  (74  Mo.  App.  456)  181 

Norris  v.  Equitable  F.  Assn.  (S.  C.  S.  D.),  (102  N.  W.  306)  98 

Norris  v.  Farmers'  Mut.  F.  Ins.  Co.  (65  Mo.  App.  632) 176,  181 

North  B.  &  M.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Moffat  (Eng.),  (L.  R.  7;  Com.  P.  25;  5 

Ben.  381) 185 

North  B.  &  M.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Robinett  (Va.),  (72  S.  E.  668)  98,  133 

Northern  Assur.  Co.  v.  Samuels  (Tex.  C.  C.  A.),  (38  S.  W.  239)  101 

Northern  Pac.  Exp.  Co.  v.  Traders  Ins.  Co.  (111.),  (55  N.  E.  702) 170 

North  German  Ins.  Co.  v.  Morton  (108  Tenn.  384;  68  S.  W.  816;  31 

Ins.  L.  J.  580)  131 

North  German  Ins.  Co.  v.  Morton-Scott-Robertson  Co.  (108  Tenn.  384; 

67  S.  W.  816;  31  Ins.  L.  J.  580)  72,  104 

N.  W.  Mut.  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Germania  F.  Ins.  Co.  (40  Wis.  446) 163 

N.  W.  Mut.  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Ins.  Cos.  (88  N.  W.  265,  272)  164 


TABLE  OF  CASES.  277 

Northwestern  M.   L.   Ins.   Co.  v.   Rochester  Ger.   Ins.   Co.    (88  Minn.    48; 

88  N.  W.  272)  33 

Norwayze  v.  Thuringia  Ins.  Co.  (111.  S.  C.),  (33  Ins.  L.  J.  83) 83 

Novak  v.  Rochester  German  Ins.  Co.  (111.  App.),  (40  Nat.  Corp.  698)...  98 

Obersteller  v.  Com'l  Assur.  Co.  (Cal.  S.  C.),  (22  Ins.  L.  J.  392)  60 

O'Brien  v.  Commercial  F.  Ins.  Co.  (63  N.  Y.  108)  55 

O'Brien  v.  Ohio  Ins.  Co.  (52  Mich.  131)  54 

O'Brien  v.  Phoenix  Ins.  Co.  (76  N.  Y.  459)  37,  38 

O'Connor  v>_  Queen  Ins.  Co.  (140  Wis.  388;  122  N.  W.  1038;  Ann.  25 

L.  R.  A.  [N.  S.]  501;  17  Am.  &  Eng.  Anno.  Gas.  1118) 14 

Ogden  v.  East  River  Ins.  Co.  (50  N.  Y.  388;  5  Ben.  439;  2  Ins.  L. 

J.  134)  •  .142,  143 

Ohage  v.  Union  Ins.  Co.  (Minn.  S.  C.),  (85  N.  W.  212)  94 

Ohio  Farmers'  Ins.  Co.  v.  Titus  (92  N.  E.  82)  93 

O'Keefe  v.  Liverpool  L,.,  L.  &  G.  Ins.  Co.  (140  Mo.  558;  41  S.  W.  922; 

26  Ins.  L.  J.  888)  9,  68 

Okla.  F.  Ins.  Co.  v.  McKey  (Tex.),  (152  S.  W.  440)  183 

Oppenheim  v.  Firman's  Fund  Ins.  Co.  (Minn.),  (138  N.  W.  777)  179 

Orient  Ins.  Co.  v.  Harmon  (Tex.  C.  C.  A.),  (117  S.  W.  192)  108 

Orient  Ins.  Co.  v.  Parlin  (38  S.  W.  60)  182 

O'Rourk  v.  German  Ins.  Co.  (Minn.),  (1091  N.  W.  401;  99  Minn.  293; 

104  N.  W.  900)  118 

Oshkosh  Match  Co.  v.  Manchester  Assur.  Co.  (92  Wis.  510)  41 

Ostrich,  v.  German-Amer.  Ins.  Co.  (65  C.  C.  A.  251;  131  Fed.  13;  33 

Ins.  L.  J.  925)  77 

Overby  v.  Thrasher  (47  Ga.  10)  120 

Pacific  Ins.  Co.  v.  Louisville  Lead  &  Color  Co.  (Ky.),  (87  S.  W.  1115).,  167 
Page  v.  Sun  Ins.  Office  (U.  S.  C.  A.  8th  Dist.),  (20  C.  C.  A.  397;  25 

Ins.  L.  J.  865;  36  U.  S.  App.  672;  74  Fed.  203)  140,  153 

Palatine  Ins.  Co.  v.  Morton  (106  Tenn.  558;  61  S.  W.  787;  30  Ins. 

L.  J.  481)  71,  98,  111 

Palatine  Ins.  Co.  v.  Morton-Scott-Robertson  Co.  (Tenn.),  (61  S.  W. 

787;  106  Tenn.  558)  99,119 

Palatine  Ins.  Co.  v.  Nunn  (99  Miss.  493;  55  So.  44;  40  Ins.  L.  J. 

1447)  11,  18 

Paltrovitch  v.  Phoenix  Ins.  Co.  (143  N.  Y.  73;  S.  C.  60  St.  462;  aff'g. 

S.  C.  68  Hun.  304)  37,  47,  50 

Paris  v.  Hamburg-Bremen  F.  Ins.  Co.  (204  Mass.  90;  90  N.  E.  420) 

94,  98,  129 

Parrish  v.  Virginia  F.  &  M.  Ins.  Co.  (20  Ins.  L.  J.  95)  33 

Parker  et  al.  v.  Amazon  Ins.  Co.  (Wis.  S.  C.),  (3  Ins.  L.  J.  567) 59 

Parks  v.  General  Interest  Assur.  Co.  (5  Pick  34;  1  Ben.  184)  184 

Parks  et  al.  v.  Hartford  F.  Ins.  Co.  (Mo.),  (12  S.  W.  1058)  165 

Parks  v.  Ins.  Co.  (100  Mo.  373)  137 

Patrons  Mut.  Aid  Soc.  v.  Hall  (Ind.),  (49  N.  E.  279)  178 

Peabody  v.  L.  &  L.  &  G.  Ins.  Co.  (171  Mass.  114;  50  N.  E.  526) 150 

Peabody  v.  Saterlee  (166  N.  Y.  174  [S.  C.]  36  App.  Div.  426;  30  Ins. 

L.  J.  885) 45,  46 

Pearlstine  v.  Westchester  F.  Ins.  Co.  (S.  C.  S.  C.),  (Ins.  L.  J.  39)  ...49,  53 

Peet  v.  Dakota  F.  &  M.  Ins.  Co.  (Dak.  S.  C.),  (20  Ins.  L.  J.  253) 47 

Pelzer  Mfg".  Co.  v.  St.  Paul  F.  &  M.  Ins.  Co.  et  al.  (U.  S.),  (19  Ins. 

L.  J.  372)  172 

Penn.  etc.  v.  Philadelphia,  etc.  (201  Pa.  St.  497;  51  Atl.  351)  12,  68 

Penn.  F.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Carnahan  (19  O.  C.  C.  97,  114;  10  O.  C.  D.  186, 

225)  112 

Penn.  F.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Drackett  et  al.  (O.  S.  C.),  (57  N.  E.  962)  94 

Penn.  F.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Drapper  (65  S.  923)  87,  89 

Penn.  Plate  Glass  Co.  v.  Spring  Garden  Ins.  Co.  (Pa.),  (28  Ins.  L.  J. 

223;  189  Pa.  255;  42  Atl.  138)  103,  131 

Penn.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Kerr  (62  Pa.  353)  19 

Peoria  F.  &  M.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Wilson  (5  Minn.  3;  4  Ben.  497)  144 

Peoria  F.  &  M.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Wilson  5  Minn.  3;  4  Ben.  497)  144 

Peoria  M.  &  F.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Lewis  (18  111.  553)  174 

Peoples'  F.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Pulver  (Clement's  Dig.  15  [Rule  5];  127  111.  246; 

20  N.  E.  18)  42,  47 

Perry  v.  Greenwich  Ins.  Co.  (N.  C.),  (49  S.  E.  889)  126 

Perry  v.  Mechanics  M.  Ins.  Co.  (11  Fed.  485)  20 

Pettit  et  al.  v.  State  Ins.!  Co.  (Minn.),  (19  Ins.  L.  J.  138;  43  N.  W. 

378) 178 


278  HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 

Phenix  Ins.   Co.   v.  Angel   et  al.    (Ky.),    (38   S.   W.    1067)    .,                             .  225 

Phenix   Ins.   Co.   v.   Belt  Ry.   Co.    (82   111.   App.   265)     171 

Phenix   Ins.   Co.   et  al.  v.   Carnahan    (63   O.   258;    58   N.  E.   805)  98 

Phenix  et  al  v.  Carnahan  et  al.    (O.)(    (58  N.  E.   805) 98 

Phenix  Ins.   Co.   v.   Martin    (Miss.),    (16   S.   417;    24   Ins.   L    J    319)  174 

Phenix  v.    Stocks   et  al.    (111.   S.   C.),    (36   N.  E.    408)    101 

Phillips  v.  Home  Ins.  Co.    (112  N.  Y.   Supp.   769)    32 

Phillips  v.  Protection  Ins.  Co.    (14  Mo.  220)    

Phoenix  Ins.  Co.  v.  Summerfleld  (Miss.  S.  C.),   (22  Ins.  L.  J.  746)    .....  59 

Phoenix  Ins.  Co.  et  al.  v.  Carnahan   (63  O.  258;   58  N.  E.   805)    112 

Phoenix  Assur.  Co.  v.  Stenson  (Tex.  C.  C.A.),   (78  S.  W.  866)   69 

Phoenix  F.  Assur.  Co.  v.  Murray  (U.  S.  C.  C.  A.),   (187  Fed.  809)    93 

Phoenix  Ins.  Co.  v.  Carnahan    (O.),    (58  N.   E.   805)    100,   112 

Phoenix  Ins.  Co.  v.  Center   (Tex.  C  .C.  A.),    (31   S.  W.   446)    57 

Phoenix  Ins.    Co.   v.   Dorsey    (Miss.),    (58   S.    778)    180 

Phoenix  Ins.   Co.   v.   Dunn    (Tex.),    (41   S.   W.    109)    167 

Phoenix  Ins.  Co.  v.  Favorite   (49  111.  259)    173 

Phoenix  Ins.  Co.  v.  Fleenor   (104  Ark  119;   148  S.  W.   650)    179 

Phoenix  Ins.    Co.    v.    Fleming   et  al.    (Ark.),    (27    Ins.    L,.    J.    584;    44    S. 

W.     464)     164 

Phoenix  Ins.  Co.  v.  Greer  (Ark.   S.  C.),    (25  Ins.   L.  J.   311)    82 

Phoenix  Ins.  Co.  v.  Moore    (Tex.),    (46   S.   W.    1131) Ill 

Phoenix  Ins.  Co.   v.   Lamar    (106   Ind.    513)    137 

Phoenix  Ins.  Co.  v.   Romeis   (O.),    (15  C.  C.   697)    106 

Phoenix   Ins.    Co.   v.    Stewart    (53   111.    App.    273) 177 

Pindar  v.  Continental  Ins.  Co.  tt  al.   (47  N.  Y.  114;   5  Ben.  185) 187 

Pinkham  v.   Morang  &  Monmouth  M.   F.   Ins.   Co.    (40   Me.   587;    4   Ben. 

43) 185 

Pioneer   &c.    v.    Phoenix   Assur.    Co.    (106   N.    C.    28;    10    S.    E.    1057;    19 

Ins.    L.    J.    408)    97 

Pittman  v.   Harris   (Tex.),    (59   S.   W.   1121)    166 

Pittsburgh   Storage  Co.  v.   Scottish  U.   &  N.   Ins.   Co.    (Pa.),    (32  Atl.   58)  172 
Platt  v.    Aetna   Ins.    Co.    (153    111.    133;    40    111.    App.    191;    24    Ins.    L.    J. 

132;    38    N.    E.    580)     67,   102 

Planters  &   Merchants  Ins.    Co.   v.    Thurston    (Ala.),    (9    S.    268;    20   Ins. 

I*    J.    746)     168 

Plinsky  v.    Germania  F.    Ins.   Co.    (32   Fed.    47)    20,   163 

Porter  v.   Traders'   Ins.   Co.    (164   N.  Y.   504)    55 

Post  Printing   &  Pub.   Co.   v.   Ins.   Co.   of  N.   A.    (Pa.   S.    C.),    (42   Atl. 

192)      25,      27 

Powers  v.   Imperial  Ins.   Co.    (48  Minn.   380;    51  N.  W.   123;   13  A.,  Eng. 

E.    L.    362,    365;    19    Cyc.    880)     44,  119 

Prader  v.   Natl.    Masonic  A.    Assn.    (la.),    (63   N.    W.    601)     110 

Pretzf elder    v.    Merchants   Ins.    Co.    (116    N.    C.    491;    21    S.    E.    302;    28 

Ins.    L.    J.   169) 127 

Produce  Refrigerator   Co.    v.    Norwich   Union   F.    Ins.    Soc.    (Minn.),    (97 

N.     W.     875)      114 

Prov.-Wash.    Ins.    Co.    v.    Board    of   Education    (W.    Va.),     (30    Ins.    L. 

J.     577)     121 

Prov.-Wash.    Ins.    Co.    v.    Wolf    (Ins.    A.    C.),    (72    N.    E.    606;    80    N.   E. 

27;    168   Ind.    690)     100,  124 

Prussian   Natl.    Ins.    Co.  v.   Lawrence    (U.   S.   C.   C.   4th   Cir.),    (221.  Fed. 

931)      105 

Purves  v.   Germania  Ins.   Co.    (La.),    (10   S.   495;    21   Ins.   L.   J.   306)    ....  168 

Queen  v.   Jefferson  Ice  Co.    (64   Tex.    578;    (15   Ins.   L.  J.    109)    94,  145 

Queen  v.   McCoin    (Ky.    C.   A.),    (49   S.   W.   800;    12   Deitch   67)    25 

Queen  Ins.  Co.  v.  Leslie   (O.  S.  C.),    (24  N.  E.  1072;  19  Ins.  L.  J.  673).  93,  94 

Queen   Ins.    Co.   v.   Vines    (174   Ala.    570;    57   S.    444)    89 

Queen  Ins.  Co.   v.   Young   (86   Ala.    424;    5   S.   102,   116)    129,  132 

Quinlan  v.   Providence- Washington  Ins.   Co.    (N.   Y.),    (39    St.    820;   aff'd. 

133   N.    Y.    356)     37 

Quinn  v.   Fire  Assn.    (180   Mass.    560;    62   N.   E.    980)    144 

Rafel  v.  Nashville  M.  &  F.  Ins.  Co.   (7  La.  Ann.  244;  3  Ben.  336)...  169,  186 

Ralli    v.    Troop    (157    U.    S.    386) 21 

Randall  v.   Phoenix  Ins.   Co.    (10  Mont.    362;   25   Pac.   960;   20  Ins.   L.   J. 

613)     93,  127 

Rau  v.   Westchester  F.   Ins.   Co.    (N.   Y.),    (36  N.   Y.  App.    516;   28  L.  J. 

183)     163 

Raulet  v.  Northwestern  N.  Ins.  Co.   (157  Gal.  213;  107  Pac.  292) 179 

JRead  v.   Ins.   Co.    (103   la.    314) 113,  124 

Reavis  v.  Farmers  M.  F.  Ins.  Co.    (78  Mo.  App.   14) 176 

Redner  v.   N.   Y.   Fire   Ins.    Co.    (92  Minn.    306;    99    N.   W.    886;    33    Ins. 

L.    J.    780)     106 


TABLE  OF  CASES.  279 

Reed  v.  Firemen's  Ins.  Co.  (81  N.  J.  L.  523;  80  All.  462) 183 

Reed  v.  Ins.  Co.  (76  N.  J.  L.  11 ;  69  Atl.  724) 182 

Regnier  v.  Ins.  Co.  (12  La.  336 ;  1  Ben.  670) 61 

Reilly  v.  Ins.  Co.  (43  Wis.  456) 67 

Reliance  Lumber  Co.  v.  Brown  (Ind.),  (30  N.  E.  625) 137 

Remington  Pepper  Co.  v.  London  Assur.  Corp.  (N.  Y.),  (12  App.  Div. 

218;  43  N.  Y.  Supp.  431) 10,  115 

Renshaw  v.  Mo.  State  Mut.  F.  &  M.  Ins.  Co.  (103  Mo.  595;  20  Ins. 

Ins.  L.  J.  385)  82 

Reynolds  et  al.  v.  Iowa  &  Neb.  Ins.  Co.  et  al.  (la.),  (46  N.  W.  659) 178 

Richards  v.  Washington  Ins.  Co.  (60  Mich.  420) 165 

Rickerson  v.  Hartford  F.  Ins.  Co.  (149  N.  Y.  307) 174 

Riddell  v.  Rochester  German  Ins.  Co.  (R.  I.),  (89  Atl.  833) 123 

Robert  v.  Sun  M.  Ins.  Co.  (Tex.  C.  C.  A.),  (35  S.  W.  955) 89 

Roberta  v.  Firemen's  Ins.  Co.  et  al.  (Pa.),  (30  Atl.  450) 172 

Roby  v.  Ins.  Co.  (120  N.  Y.  510) 85,  86 

Rochester  German  Ins.  Co.  v.  Peaslee-Gaulbert  Co.  (Ky.),  (87  S.  W. 

1115)  167 

Rogers  V.  Commercial  U.  A.  Co.  (15  Can.  L.  T.  228) 109,  127 

Rosen  v.  German  Alliance  Ins.  Co.  (Me.),  (76  Atl.  688) 85. 

Rosenwald  v.  Phoenix  Ins.  Co.  (50  Hun.  172;  19  St.  732;  3  N.  Y. 

Supp.  215)  Ill 

Ross  v.  Phoenix  Ins.  Co.  (Kan.),  (114  Pa.  1054)  ..  t 132: 

Rovlnsky  v.  Northern  Assur.  Co.  and  another  (S.  J.  C.,  Me.),  (34  Ins. 

L.  J.  800)  61 

Royal  Ins.  Co.  et  al.  v.  Parlin  &  Orendorff  Co.  (12  Tex.  C.  A.  572; 

34  S.    W.    401,    3,    4) 132 

Royal  Ins.  Co.  v.  Ries  (80  Ohio  272;  88  N.  E.  638)    109 

Royal  Ins.  Co.  v.  Roedel   (78  Pa.  19;  4  Ins.  L.  J.  840) 143 

Royal  Ins.   Co.  v.   Schwing   (Ky.   C.   A.),    (18   Ins.  L.   J.    451) 80 

Rudd   v.   Amer.   G.    F.   M.   F.    Ins.   Co.    (120    Mo.    App.    1;    96    S.   W.    237; 

35  Ins.    L.    J.    948)     85,      89' 

Russell  v.   German  F.   Ins.  Co.    (100   Minn.   528;    111   N.   W.   400) 9' 

Rutter  v.  Hanover  F.  Ins.   Co.    (138  Ala.   202;    35   S.   33) 110,   111,   112 

Ryan  v.  N.  Y.  C.  R.  Co.    (35  N.  Y.   210) 19,     20 

St.   John  v.  Mut.  M.   &  F.   Ins.   Co.    (11  N.  Y.   516) 81 

St.   Landry  Wholesale  Mercantile  Co.,   Ltd.   v.   New  Hampshire  F.   Ins. 

Co.  (113  La.  1053;  38  S.  87) 225. 

St.  Louis  Ins.  Co.  v.  Kyle  (11  Mo.  278) 38 

St.  Paul  F.  &  M.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Johnson  (111.  S.  C.),  (6  Ins.  L.  J.  434)....  65 
St.  Paul  F.  &  M.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Kirkpatrick  (Tenn.),  (164  S.  W.  1186) 

124,  127,  132 

Sachs  v.  L.  &  L.  &  G.  Ins.  Co.  (113  Ky.  88;  67  S.  W.  23)  144 

Samuels  v.  Continental  Ins.  Co.  (2  Pa.  397) 21 

Sandberg  v.  St.  Paul  &  S.  R.  R.  Co.  (80  Minn.  442;  83  N.  W.  411)..  ..  IT 
Sanford,  v.  Mechanics  Mut.  F.  Ins.  Co.  (Mass.),  (12  Gush.  541;  3  Ben. 

619)  186 

Schier  v.  Norwich  Ins.  Co.  (93  Mass.  336) 81 

Schmaelze  v.  Lon.  &  Lane.  F.  Ins.  Co.  (75  Conn.  397;  53  Atl.  853; 

33  Ins.  L.  J.  632)  140 

Schmitt  v.  Boston  Ins.  Co.  (81  N.  Y.  Supp.  767) 121 

Schmitt  Bros.  v.  Boston  Ins.  Co.  (N.  Y.),  (81  N.  Y.  Supp.  767) 121 

Schoenick- v.  American  Ins.  Co.  (Minn.),  (124  N.  W.  5) 106,  109,  133 

Schrepfer  v.  Rochford  Ins.  Co.  (77  Minn.  291;  79  N.  W.  1005) 94,  103: 

Schulter  v.  Merchants  Mut.  Ins.  Co.  (62  Mo.  236) 59- 

Scottish  U.  &  N.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Clancy  (Tex.  S.  C.),  (8  S.  W.  630) 98 

Scottish  U.  &  N.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Field  (18  Col.  App.  68;  70  Pac.  149) 134 

Scottish  U.  &  M.  Ins.  Co.  (Ga.),  (68  S.  E.  1097) 85 

Scottish  Union  Ins.  Co.  V.  Keene  (85  Md.  263;  37  Atl.  33;  26  Ins. 

L.  J.  963)  32,  54 

Scottish  U.  &  N.  Co.  v.  Moore  (Okla.)  (43  Pac.  12) 140,  143,  144,  153 

Scripture  v.  Lowell  Ins.  Co.  (64  Mass.  356) 82 

Seavy  v.  Central  Mut.  F.  Ins.  Co.  (Ill  Mass.  540;  3  Ins.  L.  J.  576)..  177 

Security  Ins.  Co.  v.  Farrell  (111.),  (2  Ins.  L.  J.  302) 26 

Security  Ins.  Co.  v.  Laird  (Ala.),  (62  So.  182) 85 

Security  Ins.  Co.  v.  Mette  (27  111.  App.  324) 85 

Seibel  v.  Ina  Co.  (Pa.),  (29  Ins.  L.  J.  838) ". 56 

Seibert  v.  Germania  Ins.  Co.  et  al.  (la.),  (35  Ins.  L.  J.  384) 121 

Sergeant  v.  L.  &  L.  &  G.  Ins.  Co.  (155  N.  Y.  349) 37 

Sexton  v.  Montgomery  Co.  Mut.  Ins.  Co.  (9  Barb.  191) 46 

Seyks  v.  Millers  Natl.  Ins.  Co.  (Wis.).  (41  N.  W.  443) 93 

Sharp  v.  Niagara  F.  Ins.  Co.  (147  S.  W.  154;  164  Mo.  App.  475)..  127,  182 
Shawmut  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Peoples  Ins.  Co.  (78  Mass.  535) 44. 


280  HALL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 

Shawnee  F.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Pontfleld  (110  Md.  356;  72  Atl.  835) 127 

Shawnee  F.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Thompson  (30  Okla.  466;  119  Pac.  985) 181 

Sherlock  v.  German-Amer.  Ins.  Co.  (N.  Y.),  (47  N.  Y.  Supp.  315) 168 

Sherman  v.  Madison  M.  Ins.  Co.  (39  Wis.  104;  5  Ins.  L<  J.  285) 149 

Shook  v.  Retail  Hdw.  M.  F.  Ins.  Co.  (Mo.  App.),  (134  S.  W.  589) 99 

Silver  v.  Western  Assur.  Co.  (N.  Y.),  (58  N.  E.  284) 104 

Sims  v.  State  Ins.  Co.  (4  Am.  311) 47,  53 

Sims  v.  Union  Assur.  Soc.  (Ga.),  (129  Fed.  804) 46,  47 

Singleton  v.  Phoenix  Ins.  Co.  (132  N.  Y.  298;  30  N.  E.  839) 7 

Sklencher  v.  Fire  Assn.  (N.  J.  S.  C.),  (60  Atl.  232) 76 

Sleeper  v.  Ins.  Co.  (56  N.  H.  401) 60 

Slinkard  v.  Manchester  F.  Assur.  Co.  (Gal.),  (55  Pac.  417) 167 

Slocum  v.  Saratoga  &  W.  F.  Ins.  Co.  (134  N.  Y.  Supp.  78) 179 

Smith,  County  Treas.  v.  German  Ins.  Co.  (Mich.),  (25  Ins.  L.  J.  192; 

65  N.  W.  236)  164 

Smith  v.  British  Am.  Assur.  Co.  (110  Ky.  56;  60  S.  W.  841) 130 

Smith  v.  Carmack  et  al.  (Tenn.),  (64  S.  W.  372) 171 

Smith  v.  Haverhill  Ins.  Co.  (83  Mass.  297)  39,  44 

Smith  v.  Herd  et  al.  (Kan.),  (30  Ins.  L.  J.  393) 129 

Smith  v.  Home  Ins.  Co.  (N.  Y.  S.  C.),  (47  Hun.  30) 51 

Smith  v.  Phoenix  Ins.  Co.  (Mo.  App.),  (168  S.  W.  831) 179 

Smith  v.  Union  Ins.  Co.  (25  R.  I.  260 ,  55  Atl.  718) 182 

Solomon  v.  Continetal  Ins.  Co.  (160  N.  Y.  959) 37 

Southern  Cold  Storage  W.  Ho.  v.  Dechman  (Tex.),  (73  S.  W.  545)....  173 
South  of  v.  Amer.  Cent.  Ins.  Co.  (34  R.  I.  324;  83  Atl.  441;  12  Am.  & 

Eng.  Ency.  L.  442 ;  3  Cyc.  374)  122 

Southstaffordshire  Tramways  Co.,  Ltd.  v.  Sickness  &  Acct.  Assn.,  Ltd. 

(Eng.),  (Q.  B.  D.  402)  165 

Spratley  v.  Hartford  F.  Ins.  Co.  (1  Di.  C.  C.  392) 176 

Sperry  v.  Ins.  Co.  of  N.  A.  (U.  S.),  (14  Ins.  L.  J.  141;  22  Fed.  516) 163 

Springfield  F.  &  M.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Crozier  (Ky.),  (12  Ky.  L.  J.  143) 166 

Springfield  F.  &  M.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Homewood  (Annotated) 113 

Springfield  F.  &  M.  Co.  v.  Payne  (Kan.  S.  C.),  (26  Ins.  L.  J.  46;  46 

Pac.  315 ;  57  Kan.  291) 106 

Spring  Garden  Ins.  Co.  v.  Brown  (Tex.),  (143  S.  W.  292) 180 

Standard  Sew.  Mch.\  Co.  v.  Royal  Ins.  Co.  (Pa.  S.  C.),  (201  Pa  645; 

51  Atl.  345;  15  Deitch  29)  25,  29,  31,  32 

Stanley  v.  Royal  Exch.  Assur.  Co.  (Kan.),  (145  Pac.  563) 134 

State  Ins.  Co.,  v.  Mackens  (38  N.  J.  L.  564) 56 

Steinbach  v.  Ins.  Co.  (U.  S.),  (13  Wallace  183;  5  Ben.  394)  189 

Steele  v.  Franklin  F.  Ins.  Co.  (17  Pa.  St.  290;  3  Ben.  278) 186 

Steinfeld  v.  Park  Ins.  Co.  (N.  Y.),  (50  Hun.  262;  [S.  C.]  19  St.  333;  2 

N.  Y.  Supp.  766)  60 

Stemmer  v.  Scottish  U.  &  N.  Ins.  Co.  (33  Ore.  65;  58  Pac.  498;  27 

Ins.  L.  J.  972,  973;  53  Pac.  498) 107,  115,  122,  126,  167 

Stenzel  v.  Pennsylvania  F.  Ins.  Co.  et  al.  (La.  S.  C.),  (35  S.  W.  271). 26,  34 

Stephens  v.  Union  Assur.  Soc.  (Utah  S.  C.),  (50  Pac.  626) 56 

Stevens  v.  Norwich  U.  Ins.  Soc.  (120  Mo.  App.  88;  96  S.  W.  684) 93 

Stickney  v.  Niagara  F,  M.  Ins.  Co.  (23  Up.  Can.  C.  P.  372;  5  Ben. 

503)  188 

Stockton  Comb.  Harvester  &  Agricultural  Works  v.  Glens  Falls  Ins. 

Co.  (Cal.  S.  C.),  (33  Pac.  663;  53  Pac.  565) 104 

Stout  v.  Phoenix  Assur.  Co.  (96  N.  J.  Eq.  566;  56  Atl.  691)....  106  110  112 

Strohn  v.  Hartford  F.  Ins.  Co.  (3  Ins.  L.  J.  283) 173 

Strome  v.  London  Assur.  Corp.  (N.  Y.),  (47  N.  Y.  Supp.  481;  162  N. 

Y.  627)  121 

Sullivan  v.  Germania  F.  Ins.  Co.  (39  Mo.  App.  106) 50 

Summerfield  v.  N.  B.  &  M.  Ins.  Co.  (62  Fed.  249,  (Va.),  (24  Ins. 

L.  J.  442)  93,  100 

Summers  v.  Western  Home  Ins.  Co.  (45  Mo.  App.  46) 85 

Sunderlin  v.  Aetna  Ins.  Co.  (N.  Y.),  (18  Hun.  522) 138 

Sun  Fire  Office  v.  Ayers  (37  Neb.  184 ;  55  N.  W.  635) 33 

Sun  Ins.  Office  of  London,  Eng.  v.  Western  Woolen  Mill  Co.  (72  Kan. 

41;  82  Pac.  513)  8 

Sun  Mut.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Crist  (Ky.  C.  A.),  (39  S.  W.  837;  26  Ins.  L.  J. 

695) 98 

Swearinger  v.  Pacific  F.  Ins.  Co.  (66  Mo.  App.  90)  50,  69,  97 

Taber  v.  Continental  Ins.  Co.  (213  Mass.  487;  100  N.  E.  636) 139 

Tanneret  v.  Merchants'  Ins.  Co.  (34  La.  Ann.  249) 81 

Taylor  v.  Ins.  Co.  et  al.  (Minn.),  (48  N.  W.  772;  20  Ins.  L.  J.  562) 137 

Temple  v.  Niagara  Ins.  Co.  (Wis.  S.  C.),  (85  N.  W.  362) 67 

Texas  Moline  Plow  Co.  v.  Niagara  F.  Ins.  Co.  (Tex.  C.  C.  A.),  (87 


TABLE  OF  CASES.  281 

S.    W.    192)     26 

Thomas  v.  Burlington  Ins.  Co.   (47  Mo.  App.   169) 57 

Thomas  v.   Hartford  F.   Ins.   Co.    (Ky.),    (53   S.   W.   297) 163 

Thompson  v.  Montreal  Ins.  Co.    (6  Up.  Can.,  2  Q.  B.  319) 75 

Thornton  v.  Security  Ins.  Co.   (117  Fed.  773;  32  Ins.  L.  J.  557) 41,     77 

Tillou  v.  Kingston  M.  Ins.  Co.    (5  N.  Y.   405;   3  Ben.  238) 185 

Tilton  v.  Hamilton  F.  Ins.  Co.   (1  Bos.  367;  S.  C.  How.  Pr.  363) 76 

Titus  v.  Glens  Falls  Ins.   Co.   (81   N.   Y.   410) 55 

Tolliver  v.  Granite  State  F.  Ins.  Co.    (Ill  Me.  275;   89  Atl.  8) 180 

Torpedo  Top  Co.   v.  Royal  Ins.    Co.    (162   111.   App.    338;'  42  Natl.    C.    R. 

593)      93,  99 

Townsend  v.   Greenwich  Ins.   Co.    (83   N.  Y.   Supp.   909) 107 

Townsend  v.  Merchants  Ins.   Co.    (N.   Y.),    (4  J.   &  S.   172;    45  How.   Pr. 

501)      60 

Traders   Ins.   Co.   v.    Dobbins    (Tenn.),    (86    S.   W.    383)... 82,  164 

Trans-Atlantic  F.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Bamberger  (Ky.  C.  A.),   (18  Ins.  L.  J.  625)  80 

Trans- Atlantic  F.   Ins.  Co.  v.  Dorsey   (56  Md.   70;   12  Ins.  L.  J.   437) 82 

Trask  v.  Ins.  Co.   (5  Casey  198)    37 

Trull  v.   Roxbury  Mut.  Ins.  Co.   (Mass.  S.  C.),    (3  Ben.   15) 66 

Trustees  Amherst  College  v.  Ritch    (151  N.  Y.   282) 37 

Trustees   First   Unitarian   Church    v.    Western   Assur.    Co.    (2    Up.    Can. 

2   B.    175;   5   Ben.    94)    150 

Tucker  v.  Colonial  F.   Ins.   Co.    (W.  Va.   S.  C.),    (34   Ins.   L.  J.    969) 55 

Tubb  v.   L.   &  L.  &   G.   Ins.   Co.    (Ala.),    (17   S.   615) 164 

Turley  v.  North  Amer.  F.  Ins.  Co.    (N.  Y.   S.  C.),    (25  Wend.   374) 49 

Tyblewski  v.   Svea  F.  &  L.  Ins.  Co.    (220  111.   436;    35  Ins.   L.  J.   616;   77 

N.    E.    196)     107 

Uhrig  v.  Ins.   Co.    (101  N.  Y.   362;   4  N.  E.   745) 113,   116,   118,  124 

Unrig  v.   Williamsburgh   City  F.    Ins.    Co.    (101   N.    Y.    362;    31   Hun.    98; 

4    N.    E.    745) 120,  127 

Underwood  v.   Farmers  Joint  Stock  Ins.  Co.    (57  N.  Y.   500) 44 

Unger  v.   People's  F.   Ins.   Co.    (N.   Y.),    (4   Daly  96) 59 

Union  Ins.  Co.  v.  Barwick  (Neb.  S.  C.),   (6  Finch  Dig.   57) 47 

Union  Inst.    Co.   v.    Phoenix  Ins.    Co.    (196   Mass.    230;    81    N.    E.-  994;    14 

L.  R.  A.   459)    135,   182,  183 

United,  &c..  Ins.  Co.  v.  Foote   (22  O.  340;  2  Ins.  L.  J.  190) 82 

U.  S.  Cooperage  Co.  v.  Fireman's  Fund  Ins.   Co.    (Mo.  App.),    (174  S.  W. 

193)      145 

Vangindertallen  v.  Phoenix  Ins.  Co.  (82  Wis.  112;  51  N.  W.  1122)) 93 

Veney  v.   Reginald,   Eng.    (Q.   B.,  Pt.   2,   177;   1   Ins.  Dig.   33) 97 

Vera  v.  Mercantile  F.  &  M.  Ins.  Co.    (216  Mass.  154;  103  N.  E.  292) 180 

Vera  et  al.  v.  Merchants  F.  &  M.   Co.   et  al.   (103  N.   E.   292;   216  Mass. 

154)      101 

Vernon  Ins.   Co.   v.  Maitlen    (158   Ins.    393;    62   N.   E.    755;    31  Ins.   L.    J. 

672)     114,  128 

Vorse  v.  Jersey  Plate  Glass  Co.   (119  La.   556 ;  93  N.  W.   569) 82 

Waddle  v.  Commonwealth  Ins.  Co.   (170  S.  W.  682;  184  Mo.  App.  571)..  181 

Wainer  v.   Milford  Mut.  F.  Ins.  Co.   (Mass.  S.  J.  C.),   (23  N.  E.   887) 101 

Walker  v.  German  Ins.  Co.    (Kan.),    (22  Ins.   L.  J.   750) 100,  129 

Walker  v.   Phoenix  Ins.   Co.    (62   Mo.  App.   209) 20,    49,    50,  59 

Waring  et  al.  v.  Indemnity  F.  &  M.  Ins.  Co.    (N.  Y.),    (1  Ins.  L.  J.  672)  172 

Washington  F.   Ins.  Co.  v.  Cobb    (Tex.),    (163   S.   W.    608) 180 

Washington  F.  &  M.  Ins.  Co.  et  al.  v.  Kelly   (32  Md.   421;   5  Ben.  303).  187 

Washington  M.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Heckenath   (N.  Y.),    (Leg.   &  Ins.   357) 38 

Watchorn  v.  Langford    (Eng.)    (3  Campbell  422;  1  Ben.   91) 169,  184 

Waters  v.  Assur.  Co.    (85  Engr.  C.  L.  879) 178 

Way  v.  Abington  M.  F.  Ins.  Co.    (166  Mass.   67;   43  N.  E.   1032) 22 

Webb  v.  Protection  and  Aetna  Ins.  Co.    (14  Mo.   3) 76 

Webb  v.   R.,   W.   O.  W.   R.   R.   Co.    (49  N.   Y.   420) 19 

Weidert  v.  Ins.  Co.    (Ore.),    (19  Ins.  L.  J.   740) 86 

Weissmann  v.  Firemen's  Ins.  Co.   (208  Mass.  577,  95  N.  E.  411) 94,  98 

Wellcome  v.  Peoples  Ins.  Co.    (68  Mass.   480) 44 

Welles  v.    Boston  Ins.    Co.    (6  Pick.    182) 169 

Wells  v.   Boston  Ins.   Co.    (6   Pick.    [23   Mass.]    182) 20 

West    v.    British    Amer   Assur.    Co.    (U.    S.    C.    A.,    Dist.    Col.),    (25    Ins. 

L.   J.   689)    61 

West  Branch  Lumberman's  Exch.  v.  Amer.  Ins.  Co.   (183  Pa.   St.  136;   27 

Ins.  L.  J.   305;   38  Atl.   1081) 169 

Westchester  v.  North   B.   &  M.   Ins.  C.    (160  Cal.   1;   116   Pac.   63) 99 

Westenhaven  et  al.   v.   Ger.-Amer.   Ins.   Co.    (la.),    (30  Ins.   L.   J.    314)..  128 
Westenhaver   v.    Ger.-Amer.    Ins.    Co.     (113    la.    726;    84    N.    W.    717;    30 


282  HAUL  ON  INSURANCE  ADJUSTMENTS. 

Ins.  L.  J.  314) 98,  129 

Western  Assur.  Co.  v.  Decker  (98  Fed.  381;  39  C.  C.  A.  383,  389).. 95,  127 
Western  Assur.  Co.  v.  Hall  (Ala.),  (143  Ala.  168;  32  S.  853;  25  Ins. 

L.  J.  874;  20  S.  447) 96,  97,  116 

Western  Assur.  Co.  v.  McGlathery  (Ala.),  (115  Ala.  213;  22  S.  104 

57,  88,  89 

Western  Assur.  Co.  v,  Mohlman  (U.  S.  C.  C.  A.,  2nd  Dist.),  (27  Ins. 

L.  J.  392)  80 

Western  Assur.  Co.  v.  Rector  (9  Ky.  L.  3) 164 

Western  Assur  Co.  v.  Studebaker  (124  Ind.  176;  20  Ins.  L.  J.  64) 25,  34 

Western,  etc.  v.  Traders  Ins.  Co.  (122  111.  App.  138) 180 

West.  Undw.  Assn.  v.  Hankins  (111.),  (35  Ins.  L.  J.  378) 121 

Western  Woolen  Mills  Co.  v.  Northern  Assur.  Co.  (139  Fed.  637;  Ann. 

72  C.  C.  A.  1) 17 

Wex  v.  Boatmen's  F.  Ins.  Co.  (N.  Y.),  (11  St.  Rep.  713) 8 

Whalen  v.  Goldman  (115  N.  Y.  Supp.  1006) 120 

Wheeler  v.  Phoenix  Ins.  Co.  (53  Mo.  App.  446) 181 

White  v.  Royal  Ins.  Co.  (149  N.  Y.  485;  affg.  S.  C.  Misc.  613) 45 

White  v.  Western  Assur.  (Minn.),  (54  N.  W.  195;  22  Ins.  L.  J.  305) 166 

Whitemarsh  v.  Conway  F.  Ins.  Co.  (Mass.),  (16  Gray  35;  4  Ben.  485)..  189 
Wholley  v.  Western  Assur.  Co.  (174  Mass.  263;  54  N.  E.  548;  28  Ins.  L. 

J.  1029)  9& 

Wicking  v.  Citizens'  F.  Ins.  Co.  (118  Mich.  640;  77  N.  W.  275) 119 

Wicking  et  al.  v.  Citizens'  Mut.  F.  Ins.  Co.  (Mich.  S.  C.),  (77  N.  W. 

275;  28  Ins.  L.  J.  230)  102,  129 

Wilcox  v.  Hill  (44  Mass.  66)  35 

Williams  v.  Fireman's  Fund  Ins.  Co.  (54  N.  Y.  569;  5  Ben.  537) 186 

Williams  v.  Roger  Williams  Ins.  Co.  (107  Mass.  377;  5  Ben.  373) 188 

Williamson  v.  L.  &  L.  &  G.  Ins.  Co.  (122  Fed.  69;  58  C.  C.  A.  241) 110 

Wilson  Drug  Co.  v.  Phoenix  Assur.  Co.  (N.  C.),  (14  S.  E.  790) 175 

Winn  v.  Ins.  Co.  (27  Neb.  649) 59 

Wolff  v.  L.  &  L.  &  G.  Ins.  Co.  (50  N.  J.  453;  14  Atl.  561;  17  Ins.  L. 

J.  714)  97,  98 

Wolverine  Lumber  Co.  v.  Palatine  Ins.  Co.  (Mich.),  (102  N.  W.  991)..  177 
Woods  v.  Ins.  Co.  State  of  Pa.  (87  Wash.  563;  82  Wash.  563;  144  Pac. 

650)  183 

Wright  v.  Hartford  Fire  Ins.  Co.  (36  Wis.  522) 43 

Wright  v.  Susquehana  M.  F.  Co.  (110  Pa.  29;  20  Atl.  716) 93 

Wynkoop  v.  Niagara  F.  Ins.  Co.  (N.  Y.),  (12  Ins.  L.  J.  253) 66,  102 

Yoch  v.  Home  Mut.  Ins.  Co.  (Cal.),  (44  Pac.  189) 164 

Yonkers  and  N.  Y.  F.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Hoffman  F.  Ins.  Co.  (N.  Y.),  (6  Rob. 

316)  46 

Yost  v.  McKee  et  al.  (Pa.  S.  C.),  (36  Atl.  317) 99 

Young  v.  Aetna  Ins.  Co.  et  al.  (Me.),  (64  Atl.  584) 118 

Zalesky  v.  Home  Ins.  Co.  (108  la.  341;  70  N.  W.  69) 104 

Zalesky  v.  Ins.  Co.  (102  la.  613 ;  71  N.  W.  566) 100 

Zimeriski  v.  Ohio  Farmers  Ins.  Co.  (91  Mich.  600;  21  Ins.  L.  J.  818; 

52    N.    W.    55) 93 


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